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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a study of US-Syrian relations, and the legacy of mistrust between the two 
states.  While there has been a recent growth in the study of Syria’s domestic and regional 
politics, its foreign policy in a global systemic context remains understudied within 
mainstream International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and even Middle 
Eastern studies, despite Syria’s geo-political centrality in the region.  The primary purpose 
of the thesis is to analyse and understand the driving factors in US-Syrian relations, both the 
continuities – distinctive in the context of the region’s dynamic political landscape – and the 
rarer instances of discontinuity.  By analysing the causes and constituents of US-Syrian 
relations, the thesis will also challenge a purely realist and power-political explanation that 
has dominated the discourse on Middle Eastern foreign policy; without discarding the value 
of alternative conceptual explanations, the thesis will argue that Syria’s position towards the 
US has been significantly (though not exclusively) influenced by a politically embedded set 
of ideas and principles that have evolved from an anti-colonial Arab nationalist ideology.   
 
Though recent constructivist debates have (rightly) brought the role of identity and social 
structure back to the fore, ideological or value-laden motives are still at times treated 
dismissively as an instrument of power politics (particularly in relation to Middle Eastern 
regimes) or, conversely, as a sign of regime irrationality.  The apparent methodological 
impasse in credibly connecting ideational motives with foreign policy implementation and 
the perceived incompatibility between ideas and pragmatic decision-making have prevented 
a deeper and more sophisticated exploration of ideological influences within IR.   
 
Thus the second aim of the thesis is to redress this imbalance by introducing a 
methodological framework of analysis for studying ideology in foreign policy-making; this 
will be operationalised by historically charting the development and influence of ideas on 
Syria’s position towards the US, drawing upon original archival material that has hitherto 
not been utilised in existing literature on this subject.  I argue that in Syria’s case state 
interests and security concerns are not dichotomous to ideational values; rather the two are 
coterminous goals in Syrian foreign policy.  In doing so the thesis employs historical 
analysis and FPA methods to assess the significance of the following factors in influencing 
Syria’s ideology, and thereby its relations with the US: Syria’s colonised past and 
contemporary US interventionism in the region; the policies and ideology of Israel; and 
finally the structure of the Syrian regime, and its connection to public opinion. 
 4 
Contents 
 
List of Acronyms.....................................................................................................................6 
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................7 
1.  Introduction........................................................................................................................9 
 
2.  Operationalising Ideology and Defining Syrian Arab Nationalism............................43 
2.1  The ‘Problem' of Ideology...................................................................................45 
2.2  Core and Peripheral Principles............................................................................61 
2.3  Affiliated Ideologies: Arab nationalism and Socialism.......................................73 
2.4  Rival Ideologies: Arab Nationalism and Islamism..............................................81 
2.5  Conclusion...........................................................................................................88 
 
3.  The Emergence of US-Syrian Relations: From Truman to Kennedy.........................90 
3.1  The early Syrian State and US Isolationism........................................................92 
3.2  The Rising US Role and Arab Disappointment...................................................97 
3.3  Truman’s Policies and Syrian Scepticism.........................................................106 
3.4  US-Syrian Relations under Eisenhower............................................................119 
3.5  Syria and the US after the UAR: from ally to enemy........................................125 
3.6  Conclusion.........................................................................................................131 
 
4.  Syria’s Isolation and the Birth of the US-Israeli Special Relationship.....................134 
4.1  Hafez Asad’s Ascendancy in the Ba’th party....................................................136 
4.2  The 1967 Arab-Israeli War................................................................................141 
4.3  Aftermath of the War.........................................................................................147 
4.4  Syria’s Marginalisation and the Advent of a New Regime...............................161  
4.5  Asad’s Pragmatism and the Impact on US-Syrian Relations............................167 
4.6 Conclusion..........................................................................................................176 
 
5.  US-Syrian Engagement: Disengagement Talks 1973 – 75..........................................178 
5.1  The US and Syria: Perceptions, Goals and Strategies.......................................180 
5.2  Terms of Syrian-Israeli Disengagement and US-Syrian Rapprochement.........190 
5.3  Egypt ‘Defects’..................................................................................................200 
5.4  Conclusion.........................................................................................................214 
 
 5 
6.  US-Syrian Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era.....................................................218 
6.1  Syria’s Participation in the Gulf War and Implications for Ideology................219 
6.2  The Launch of the Madrid Talks – Breakthrough in the Middle East...............228 
6.3  Transition from Bush to Clinton........................................................................234 
6.4  Implications for US-Syrian relations.................................................................241 
6.5  Explaining the Failure of the Madrid Process...................................................246 
6.6  Conclusion.........................................................................................................265 
 
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................268 
Bibliography........................................................................................................................285 
 6 
List of Acronyms 
 
AIPAC   American Israeli Public Affairs Committee 
ARAMCO   Arabian American Oil Company 
CENTO  Central Treaty Organisation 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
COS    Chief of Staff 
DMZ    Demilitarised Zone 
ERP   European Reconstruction Programme 
FO   Foreign Office (British Government) 
FPA    Foreign Policy Analysis 
FRUS    Foreign Relations of the United States 
GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council 
ICRC    International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDF   Israeli Defence Force 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IR    International Relations 
MEC   Middle East Command 
NA    National Archives 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NIE   National Intelligence Estimate 
NSC   National Security Council 
OPEC   Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PLO    Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
POW    Prisoner of War 
SD   State Department (United States Government) 
TAPLINE   Trans Arabian Pipeline Company 
TWA   Transworld Airlines (American) 
UAR   United Arab Republic 
UN    United Nations 
UNDOF   United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
US    United States of America 
USINT  United States Intelligence 
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 7 
Acknowledgments 
 
The PhD has been a long road; but I have met and been accompanied by many people along 
the way who have helped and supported me, and contributed to the thesis in some form.  It is 
a pleasure to acknowledge and thank them here. 
 
I would like to express my profound gratitude and appreciation for the invaluable support 
and guidance of my supervisors, Professor Fred Halliday and Professor Fawaz Gerges.  Fred 
Halliday provided me with the encouragement, guidance and freedom to develop my vision 
and arguments for the project.  His support and advice, particularly during challenging 
junctures in the research, was a great source of help and motivation.  He sadly died during 
the course of the PhD, and I can only hope that he would have been pleased with the final 
result.  Fawaz Gerges took over as my supervisor at a crucial stage of the thesis, and was 
instrumental in the smooth continuation of the project.  His positive encouragement, 
expertise on the subject and critical feedback enabled me to strengthen the thesis and see it 
through to completion. Both supervisors have had an important impact on the thesis and on 
my approach to scholarship, and it has been an honour to work with them. 
 
Other Faculty members have kindly read through chapters at various stages of the research, 
and offered valuable insights and suggestions which helped me to develop and refine my 
arguments.  Thanks to my advisor Federica Bicchi for her comments and for her kind 
support; and thanks also to Chris Alden, Roy Allison and Katerina Dalacoura who all gave 
very helpful suggestions.  I am particularly grateful to Michael Cox and Margot Light for 
their roles in convening the memorable, immensely helpful and always lively IR509 PhD 
workshops.  I learnt a great deal working with Barry Buzan on his undergraduate course, 
which increased my understanding and appreciation for theory; my thanks to him, and the 
students of 'International Security' and 'International Society', who made teaching so 
enjoyable.  Kim Hutchings has been a very supportive Head of Department; and Zeynep 
Kaya and Candice Moore have been a constant source of strength and friendship during the 
thesis; I am sincerely grateful for all their support. 
 
I received funding at various stages from the LSE; the International Relations department 
kindly awarded me with the Goodwin scholarship and funding for fieldwork.  I am grateful 
for their help which enabled me to dedicate myself to the research.  I would not have got 
very far with my fieldwork if it had not been for the wonderful help of Asiya Mohamed, I 
appreciate all her efforts. I am thankful too for the hospitality of friends in Washington DC: 
Minha Husaini; Anne, Will and Christine Elliot; Marinetta Cannito; Kathy and Charles 
Aquilina; Sarah Hassaine and Yasmin Shafiq – and of course my friends in Syria, who 
sacrificed their time to aid my research and who helped me get the most out of my visits. I 
am grateful to all those who gave up their time to be interviewed, and especially Martha 
Kessler who was an invaluable source of help and encouragement in the early stages of my 
fieldwork in the States. 
 
So many of my ideas and understanding of the discipline were shaped while being among 
the lively and supportive PhD community.  My thanks to all the following for their 
camaraderie and intellectual dynamism: the fellow researchers on the Middle East; 
colleagues of the research study rooms; my co-editors at the journal Millennium Marta 
Iñiguez de Heredia and Paul Kirby; my colleagues at LSE100; and all those who were in the 
same PhD intake as me.  A special mention to the following for their company, knowledge, 
discussions, humour and friendship over these years: Lisa Aronsson, Amélie Barras, Cristina 
Barrios, Claire Beaugrand, Alexis Crow, Klaus Dalgaard, Kathrin Dombrowski, Carmen 
 8 
Gayoso, Zeynep Kaya, Maiko Kuroki, Jorge Lasmar, Francesca Lessa, Candice Moore, 
Corinna Mullin, Kevork Oskanian, Vassilios Paipais, Marco Pinfari, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, 
Chris Phillips, Henry Radice, Meera Sabaratnam, Serena Sharma, and Ee Loong Toh. 
 
My deep gratitude, not to mention admiration, goes out to all the students, past and present, 
of Lincoln Chambers B.04.  Their spirit, energy, warmth, and optimism would never fail to 
cheer me up.  They provided encouragement and welcome distractions during those long 
days of solitary writing in the library, and generally made my experience at LSE a 
memorable and happy one.  
 
My old companions from King’s and South London, and my teacher Zeinab Moustafa, have 
been there for me throughout this and so many other journeys.  They have been ready to 
listen, and to offer their good advice, empathy and motivation at every turn.  Crucially they 
have always been there to remind me of the real world outside of the PhD, and of the things 
that matter most in life. 
 
More than anyone else, those who have given me the most and also have had to put up with 
me the most during the course of this thesis have been my family.  Their love, unfailing 
support, patience, faith, generosity, and jokes have kept me going even in the most difficult 
times. My heartfelt thanks to Aisha, Hannah, Hasan, Najmun, Maha, Mahbub, Mostafiz, 
Suhaib: I know, like me, they cannot wait to say goodbye to the thesis.  No words can do 
justice to the debt of gratitude that I owe my parents, Noor Saleha and Hafiz Mohammed 
Abdul Gani; I can never repay them for all they have done for me.  They are, quite simply, 
my heroes.  It was my father's passion for history, current affairs and deep interest in the 
Middle East that I inherited, and it was with him that I enjoyed sharing it the most.  My 
father passed away during the middle of the PhD; but although he is not here to see its 
completion, the thesis is bound up with fond memories of him – his and my mother's love, 
wisdom and inspirational examples have stayed with me throughout this process and will 
continue to do so afterwards. It is to them and my family that I dedicate the thesis. 
 
Finally, as ever, alhamdulillah, wa al-shukrulillah. 
 9 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Bashar Asad and George W. Bush began their presidencies only six months apart in July 
2000 and January 2001 respectively.  In the time President Bush was in office the relations 
between the two states deteriorated, seemingly beyond repair, with recriminations and 
accusations from both sides. Both held that the other party was chiefly responsible for the 
souring of relations.  Relations between the two states in this period were variously 
described as ‘estranged’, ‘hostile’, ‘tense’, ‘dire’, ‘very strained’, and characterised by 
‘outright mutual hostility’ and ‘mistrust’.1   
 
The poor relations did not start then however and answers to how and why the relationship 
has been so cold cannot be traced back solely to the presidencies of George W. Bush and 
Bashar Asad.  An analysis of the history of US-Syrian relations is necessary to provide 
context to recent tensions, which shows that while the US and Syria were not always in 
opposition to each other, the antipathy between the two states goes back a long way – at the 
best of times their relations were difficult and cautious, at worst they were openly hostile.   
 
To begin with, no significant historical ties existed between the US and Syria prior to the 
Cold War.2   After the First World War and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire the British 
and the French were the dominant external powers in the region.  Under French colonial 
rule, Syrian anger and suspicion towards European, and more generally any form of western 
intervention, was channelled into a mass movement for independence and Arab unity.3  
During this period, the US remained aloof from the region and the colonial exploits of the 
British and the French.  They generally supported Arab autonomy – indeed they applauded 
                                               
1
 See: United States Congressional Report 2008; “U.S.-Syria: Who’s converting whom?”, Middle East 
Strategy at Harvard, 25 April  
2008:http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/04/us_syria_whos_converting_whom/; “Iraq a catalyst for 
US-Syria rapprochement?” Hurriyet Daily News, 4 April 2010: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=iraq-a-catalyst-for-us-syria-rapprochement-2010-04-04; 
“Inside Story”, Al-Jazeera English, 22 February 2009: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2009/02/200922214452166695.html;  “US-Syria 
Relations Still Mired in Mistrust”, BBC News, 18 March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7949480.stm; 
“Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities”, International Crisis Group Report on US-Syrian 
Relations, February 2009: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-
lebanon/syria/083-engaging-syria-us-constraints-and-opportunities.aspx; Council on Foreign Relations, 
report 18 February 2005: http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/middle-east-us-syrian-relations/p7852 .  
2
 Indeed since its formation, the US had very limited involvement in the Middle East as a whole.  It was 
however brought abruptly out of its isolation from the region after the First World War, when it was 
required to participate in the post-war reconfiguration of the Middle East.  A fuller historical account is 
provided in Chapter Three.  
3
 Derek Hopwood, Syria 1945-1986 : Politics and Society (Unwin Hyman, 1988)., 23-25; Patrick Seale, 
The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (OUP 1965).  
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Syria’s independence from the French in 1946 – and as a result, they were viewed in a more 
positive light by many Arabs.   
 
However, this changed after the onset of the Cold War, when the US took on a far greater 
political interest in the region, largely framing its Middle East policies around its own 
strategic and economic interests and interpreting the region’s politics through the lens of its 
own ideological battle with the USSR.4  With increased instances of US intervention (the 
1951 Middle East Command; the attempted coup against Iran’s Mosadeq in 1953; initial 
support for British presence in the Suez Canal and the ‘Omega’ policy to discredit Nasser), 
much of the earlier goodwill that the Syrians may have felt towards the US was eroded.  The 
Syrian-American crisis in 1957, in which the US planned (but failed) to organise a coup 
against the weak and pro-Soviet Syrian government, established Syria’s lasting perceptions 
of the US as ‘second-generation imperialists’. 
 
The Arab-Israeli War in 1967 marked a turning-point in Syria’s regional role and importance 
to the US.  Having lost the Golan Heights to Israel, the Syrians became firmly entrenched 
within the Arab-Israeli conflict and would have a crucial role to play in the region, with the 
choice of either facilitating or ‘obstructing’ US mediation and intervention in the conflict.  In 
the 1973 war against Israel, Egypt and Syria hoped to retrieve their respective territories and 
increase their bargaining powers in negotiations.  After separate negotiations with Israel, and 
with US help, Egypt succeeded in its aim; Syria, in contrast, did not.  Egypt’s ‘defection’ 
and the US’ open acceptance of Israel’s post-1967 war borders shifted Syria’s position 
towards the US from one of cautious opposition to open provocation and hostility.   
 
Thus Syria went on to be the first state to openly support and sponsor radical guerrilla 
factions in Lebanon (even before the formation of Hizbullah); it was the first state to 
acknowledge the new Islamist regime in Tehran in 1979, and was the only Arab state to 
openly support the militants in the Iranian hostage crisis.  In turn, the US placed Syria on its 
list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ in 1979 and terminated financial aid and trading with 
Syria. 
 
                                               
4
 See Fawaz Gerges, The superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-
1967 (Westview Press, 1994); David Lesch, The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and 
Political Reassessment (Westview Press, 2003); Alan Taylor, The superpowers and the Middle East 
(Syracuse University Press, 1991).   
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From this, Syria was able to forge a new role for itself in the region, as an opponent of US 
policies and obstructing Israeli interests where possible without risking its own survival.  
Syria’s support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980-88 (in which the US was 
supporting and arming Iraq), Syria’s funding and supplying of arms to Hizbullah and Hamas 
against Israel, its disillusionment with the Madrid peace talks by 1996, and finally its 
opposition to the US ‘War on Terror’ and invasion of Iraq in 2003, are key examples of 
Syria’s consistent opposition towards the US for more than forty years.  Under the Bush 
administration, the US reciprocated Syria’s policy by insisting on its exclusion from regional 
diplomacy, renewing the sanctions it had already placed on Syria, bracketing it among other 
‘rogue states’, regularly accusing the Syrians of sponsoring terrorism, and singling out the 
regime for censure in its drive for democratisation in the Middle East. 
 
Key Questions, Hypothesis and Contribution 
Thus from this brief historical outline it is clear that the US and Syria have had a long 
history of mutual hostility.5  From this foundation we can set up the key problématique 
which forms the crux of this thesis.  This can be further divided into primary research 
questions, which frame the overall objective and direction of the thesis, and secondary 
questions, which will help to substantiate the core arguments.   
 
Firstly, despite the volatility and changing political landscape of the Middle East region, 
Syria stands out as one of the states with a relatively consistent foreign policy agenda, 
particularly in terms of its opposition towards American policy in the region.  It predates 
Iranian enmity towards the US by several decades, and has outlived the previously 
antagonistic positions of Egypt, Libya and Iraq.  While events and catalysts of dramatic 
change in the region routinely attract scholarly attention, the importance of continuities in 
patterns of relations should not be overlooked.  Thus the key question to ask is: why has 
Syria regularly opposed the US?  A comprehensive investigation of this question forms the 
                                               
5
 When using the term hostility here, it is not to be understood as armed conflict – in part the possibility of 
regular military warfare is negated by the asymmetries of military power between the two states. However, 
both Syria and the US can be described as having been engaged in an enduring conflict of interests, 
policies, tactics, goals and ideas.  I argue that their diplomatic and political clashes, frequently exacerbated 
by the withdrawal of ambassadorial representation on both sides, can be categorised as a form of hostility 
when one understands that peace, or peaceful relations, denotes more than just the absence of inter-state 
military combat.  The latter is an archetypal realist conceptualisation of peace that places analytical 
emphasis on military engagement.  However, a broader and more complex understanding of both conflict 
and peace facilitates a reading of US-Syrian relations as hostile, antagonistic and certainly not peaceful.  
See Johan Galtung’s seminal work ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 6.3, (1969) which argues that structural violence can still prevail even in the absence of war; and 
Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs ‘Beyond the absence of war: the diversity of peace in 
post-settlement societies’, Review of International Studies, 36, pp. 367-390 (2010).  The literature relates to 
internal state politics, but the concept can be extended to the nature of inter-state relations. 
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primary goal of this thesis.  A series of connected, secondary, questions follow on from this 
problématique:   
 
1. To what extent is Syria, as argued by the US, an obstructionist force in the region – a 
‘spoiler’ in any Middle East peace process and barrier to improved Arab-Israeli 
relations?  And what does Syria gain from such a policy, particularly if - as is often 
posited by academics - conciliation and cooperation remains the likeliest route 
towards the recovery of its territory from Israel?6  
 
2. Secondly, and crucially, why has Syria not (yet) followed the peaceful route taken by 
Egypt, its more powerful, fellow Arab state, with whom Syria supposedly shares 
greater ties in identity and history than it does with Iran?  Certainly, there are striking 
similarities between Hafez Asad’s Ba’thist Syria and Nasserite Egypt, and their 
respective relations with the US, which warrants such a query.  Both shared similar 
ideological and political positions vis-à-vis the US, and both were compelled to 
engage more closely with the US after losing territory to Israel in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War.  Yet by 1979, their paths dramatically diverged: whereas Egypt was able 
to forge a long-term alliance with the US after signing a peace treaty with Israel, 
Syria’s relations with the US continued to deteriorate.  Why Syria’s relationship with 
the US has followed such a different trajectory from that of Egypt remains a question 
that has been answered only superficially within the existing literature.   
 
3. Thirdly, to what extent is Syria’s opposition to the US framed by its alliance with 
Iran? A question that is regularly posed in policy circles is: what can be done, or 
what would it take, to coax Syria away from Iran’s perceived sphere of influence?  
Indeed is it even accurate to view Syria’s relations with Iran in this paternalistic 
light? 
 
4. Finally, for all the above questions, just how important is Syria to the stability of the 
region?  Is Syria effectively a bystander in the region’s affairs in relation to the 
aforementioned powers Egypt and Iran, both of whom have hegemonic claims to the 
region?  Given Syria’s deficit in power – politically, economically, even in terms of 
                                               
6
 Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiraven Ehteshami, Syria and Iran : Middle Powers in a Penetrated 
Regional System (Routledge, 1997)., 23. 
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the size of its population – does continued US-Syrian antipathy even matter or have 
any significant implications for the politics of the region? 
 
These are all important points of enquiry, which this study will seek to address.  But the 
framing of a question often depends on which side one stands and the assumptions one 
chooses to accept as the premise of those questions.  In the literature, when seeking to 
understand the mutual hostility, the burden of scrutiny has tended to fall upon Syria rather 
than the US; this is in itself indicative of the prevailing assumptions about the two states.  
From the above angle of questioning, Syria is cross-examined from an external perspective, 
while the US carries the mantle of neutrality merely responding to Syria’s self-constructed 
opposition.  However, it is possible, and indeed important, to also pose the questions from 
the opposite angle and flip the scrutiny onto the US and its policies, analysing how it has 
shaped and affected Syria’s position. 
 
Thus the key lines of enquiry from this alternative perspective are the following: the primary 
question to start with regarding the US’ role in its relations with Syria is to ask how the 
Americans have contributed to on-going hostility between the two states. Beyond this core 
question, four secondary questions can be extracted:  
 
1. Firstly, the US for its part has had a consistently unsympathetic view of Syria and its 
role in the region, stemming from a deep suspicion of its ideological roots, and 
particularly its alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 60s.  To what extent 
did the US allow its global concerns and its rivalry with the Soviet Union to 
disproportionately colour its view of Syria?  Indeed, has the US held fixed 
perceptions about Syria without sufficient intelligence, and is it possible that it has, 
on key occasions, presupposed Syrian intransigence and hostility despite Syrian 
efforts to the contrary?   
 
2. Secondly, what have been American expectations and demands of the Arab parties in 
the various regional peace processes, and what were the strategic judgments and 
interests behind them?  Following on from this question it is important to ask how 
realistic or reasonable those demands have been in light of Arab interests and 
aspirations.   
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3. Thirdly, and crucially, how far has the US’ close relationship with Israel hindered its 
role as a peace-broker in the region, and to what extent has that defined Syria’s 
perceptions of and attitude towards the US?   
 
4. And finally, the US championed Egypt during the Sadat and Mubarak regimes as a 
model for other states in the region to follow, and afforded it a great deal of power as 
a representative of the region and chief mediator between Israelis and Arabs.  But in 
focusing so narrowly on the Egyptian government, has the US excluded voices of 
opposition such as the Syrians', and thereby undermining the comprehensiveness of 
any potential peace plan that would have to include such dissenters?  Indeed, to what 
extent have US moves to isolate Syria from the regional and international system set 
the mould for Syrian obstructionism in the Middle East, perpetuating US-Syrian 
antipathy?   
 
Returning, then, to the two primary questions of the thesis – why has Syria so regularly 
opposed the US, and in what ways has the US contributed to the on-going hostility between 
the two states? – this thesis will make the case that Syria’s long-term opposition to the US, 
its foreign policies and presence in the region, is significantly influenced by ideological 
principles and not purely based on territorial or regime interests.  In that sense this thesis 
highlights the importance of ideational factors in foreign policy. It will demonstrate how 
these values are structured, informed and sustained by historical experience, society, and an 
(adaptable) ideological vision that takes from, and feeds into, the beliefs and strategic 
options of both regime and society.  Moreover, the thesis will argue that the US has played a 
major role in fostering the hostility with Syria through a policy of marginalisation and a 
pursuit of its own strategic interests above the issues concerning the region.  
(Mis)perceptions on both sides about each other have fuelled the antagonism and 
consolidated long-standing beliefs, which in turn sustain ideological positions held by both 
the Syrians and the Americans.  While the thesis focuses mainly on the role of Syrian 
ideology and how it relates to the US, American ideology undoubtedly plays a role as well 
here. 
 
In addressing the above questions and arguments, how does this thesis contribute to the 
current scholarship on Syrian and American foreign policy?  Firstly it should be noted that 
the continuity in mutual hostility has not gone unnoticed in the existing literature – this part 
of the argument is therefore not a new claim.  Scholars of Syria in particular have 
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highlighted its consistent foreign policy as one of the notable characteristics of the modern 
regime, particularly when compared to the fluctuating policies of its neighbours and the 
dynamism of the region in general.7  However, much of the scholarship on Syria focuses on 
regime structure and domestic politics to explain this phenomenon, without placing it within 
sufficient global and regional contextualisation.  Moreover, while there is plenty of literature 
that looks separately at US and Syrian foreign policies in the region respectively, there are 
relatively very few that examine in depth the bilateral relations between the two states.  Only 
two studies have been carried out on this subject to date: David Lesch’s Syria and the United 
States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East, (1992), an in-depth account of US-Syrian 
relations in the 1950s; and Robert Rabil’s Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in 
the Middle East, (2006), bringing the story up to more recent times.  The first is an excellent 
historical account drawing upon key primary documents, but it takes us no further than 1957 
when US-Syrian relations were just beginning to take shape.  The second is an informative 
but ultimately less rigorous analysis relying on secondary sources, and too bound up in 
regional dynamics to adequately distinguish between regional issues and US-Syrian bilateral 
relations – a difficult task, but one which this study seeks to accomplish.8   
 
The relative dearth of literature on US-Syrian relations, when compared to US-Egyptian, -
Iranian or -Saudi relations, reflects the US’ own position towards Syria over recent years 
which has typically been ambivalent and fairly dismissive – prevailing views in the policy 
world regarding what issues are of high and low salience, tend to infiltrate and be reflected 
in academic output as well.  Thus this study hopes to fill this gap in the literature on US-
Syrian relations, but also to contribute to wider debates on Middle East politics and US 
policy in the region.  Moreover, in analysing the importance of ideational factors in US-
Syrian relations this thesis also seeks to challenge the dominant narrative on the subject 
(which will be elucidated in more depth shortly), as well as reflect both the American and 
Syrian sides of the debate (as opposed to a US-centric account).  It aims to challenge the 
current discourse on US foreign policy towards Syria and the accepted notions of Syrian 
accountability for hostile relations, and in doing so the thesis also aims to offer a fresh 
conceptual framework for studying the subject.  Through this project I hope to situate the 
role and function of ideas more clearly and accurately within the study of Middle East 
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politics in particular, and foreign policy analysis more generally; the following sections will 
discuss the way this will be done in more detail. 
 
Theory: Realism and the Middle East 
In seeking to answer the key questions outlined and to substantiate the arguments posed 
above, there are two obvious and distinct methodological options.  The first is to adopt a 
straightforward historical approach.  The second approach is a predominantly theoretical 
one, in which claims by various paradigms about the nature of a system, state, society or 
individuals are employed to identify correlating patterns in the empirical case being studied.  
In this way, general rules are used to explain the particular, and often secondary (rather than 
primary) historical material tends to be deployed to affirm the validity and explanatory 
capacity of those theories.  A third option is to combine the two approaches, more of which 
will be said later on.  But first, we will look at some of the important theoretical approaches 
that have been used to explain events, policies and patterns of relations in the Middle East as 
a whole. 
 
There have been a few key developments over the past fifty years when it comes to offering 
explanations for the region’s politics.  Previously dominating the field was the culturally 
deterministic route, stemming from orientalist and anthropological perspectives and 
generating an exceptionalist view of the region.9  These studies focused on culture, religion, 
ideologies, emotion and the ‘Arab mindset’ as the drivers behind Middle Eastern foreign 
policy and social trends.    These causal factors are often bracketed as signs of so-called 
irrationality.  They tied in with cultural and racial (even racist) stereo-types of the region, 
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positing its leaders and social movements as irrational, unpredictable and even dangerous 
actors in contrast to the rationality and dispassionate behaviour of other, particularly 
western, international actors.  As a result, the region was widely perceived as resistant and 
unsuited to the application of generic theories of IR. 
 
While this approach still holds among some, regional scholars increasingly challenged this 
exceptionalisation of the Middle East, and argued that the theories and patterns of IR were 
universal and could be applied anywhere, including the Middle East.10  In the process of 
demystifying the Middle East and opening it up to the same modes of social and political 
enquiry that were applied elsewhere, a flurry of research began to emerge to draw parallels 
between the Middle East and its global counterparts; of those theories being applied to the 
Middle East, the realist paradigm has been the most dominant.   
 
Indeed, on the face of it, the insecurity and volatility of the region appear to justify realist 
interpretations of foreign policies in the Middle East; the dominance of the state and lack of 
institutional cohesion also lend to this view.  The rise of International Relations as an 
academic discipline after the First World War took its cue from contemporary events: the 
break-up of empires, national self-determination, and institution-building on the basis of 
nation-states, all encouraged the use of the ‘state’ as the homogenous unit of analysis in IR;11 
therefore the relatively recent imposition of a westphalian state system on the region has 
meant it has often been viewed and portrayed, unwittingly or justifiably, as a modern Middle 
Eastern version of Europe’s pre-war ‘balance of power’ system. In this context, in a move 
away from irrational stereotypes, ideational factors such as ideology and specifically Arab 
nationalism have taken a back-seat and are viewed in a purely instrumentalist light.  
Widespread instances of Arab collaboration with the US and the west, against the interests 
of fellow Arab states and regional solidarity, are presented as the clearest indications that 
pragmatism and competing national interests supersede what is deemed to be a weak and 
shallow ideological vision.   
 
It is true that more recently scholars have moved beyond this limited scope to look at non-
state relations and the interaction between ‘peoples and societies’.12  Fawcett argues, for 
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example, that the two factors crucial to the understanding of the region and transcending the 
concept of the state have been pan-Arabism and Islam.  And yet, despite this apparent 
movement away from basic notions of state-hood, territory and inter-state conflict, a cursory 
analysis of the region still appears to confirm material competition, a real scarcity of 
security, and an anarchical system in which there is no (effective) regional leadership or 
institutional representation at the global level13 – little wonder, then, that this has led to 
conclusions of an ‘unfinished’ state-system that could be best explained through political 
realism.   
 
In such circumstances, as posed by realists, the individual state relies on self-help and 
pursues material and strategic motives that are conducive to its national interests, be that 
mere survival and defence, or wealth and hegemony.14  The drive is presented as an entirely 
rational one - attached to the overriding pursuit for stability, order, maximisation of potential 
- and measurable through positivist methods.  Competition for resources, regular territorial 
and border conflicts (the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria-Turkey, Iraq-Iran, Iraq-Kuwait) and the 
perceived instrumentalisation, indeed abandonment, of ideology for the sake of pragmatic 
state interests (Egypt-Israeli truce, Syrian-Iranian alliance, Syrian-Iraqi inter-Ba’thist rivalry) 
all appear to validate the realist argument.  This seemed particularly true after the perceived 
failure of the pan-Arab ‘project’ in various regional conflicts, notably in 1967, and the 
subsequent decline of Arab nationalism in the Middle East.15 
 
Although ideational accounts of foreign policy did begin to emerge at the height of Arab 
nationalism in the late 1950s and early 60s, Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work in 1979 on neo-
realism prompted a strong revival of power-politics and material interests within the study of 
IR in general, this time shifting the emphasis away from individual agency towards a 
structural, systemic view.16  With the publication coinciding with major ruptures and 
changes in Middle East politics that appeared to endorse the structuralist argument,17 and 
                                               
13
 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argue that anarchy is reflective of a realist international system, whereas 
regional institutions and cooperation reflect a shift to international society and the decline of realism.  See 
Regions and Powers, (CUP, 2003), 53. 
14
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations:  the Struggle for Power and Peace (5th edition, Knopf, 
1978); for the application of the theory to a case study see Graham Allison, Essence of decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown, 1971). 
15
 Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan Arabism," Foreign Affairs 57(1978/9).; Jubin Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: 
Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (Tauris, 2006), 12 
16
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
17
 Namely: Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the Egyptian-Israeli truce; Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan; and the Iranian Revolution.  For the significance of these events in shaping the modern 
Middle East, from a neo-realist angle, see David Lesch, 1979: The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle 
East (Westview Press, 2001). 
 19 
thanks to its non-exceptionalist appeal,18 neo-realism has for many years been seen as the 
most suitable interpretive framework for the region, by both mainstream IR and Middle East 
scholars.19  
 
Following from this, the role of external powers and their capacity to influence the politics 
of the region is a theme that fits well within a neo-realist interpretation of the Middle East, 
since it places regional power and influence in the hands of homogenised state-actors with 
the greatest military capabilities.  Societal factors (i.e. identity), and domestic politics within 
the Middle East states themselves play a peripheral role (if any) within this analytic 
perspective.  Traditional Cold War historiography vis-à-vis the Middle East places 
explanatory emphasis on external agency, positing US involvement in the region in the 
context of the Soviet threat and vice versa.  According to this view, Middle East states had 
little stake in US policy-making towards the region, neither diplomatically, nor by shaping 
events on the ground; as a result, the US’ relations with individual states in the Middle East, 
the variance between those relations and the micro-level factors that led to conflict or 
alignment, are largely overlooked, or more commonly over-generalised in order to cover the 
region as a homogenous whole.  It is true that US relations with Iran have had more attention 
than most other states due to the added dimension of ‘political Islam’ and the utility of Iran 
as a thematic case-study within that domain.  But this specific attention has been extended 
only sporadically to other bilateral relations with the US.   
 
Even those aiming to avoid this paradigm inadvertently reinforce it: Peter Sluglett in his 
analysis of superpower intervention states that prominent Middle East leaders – Nasser, 
Hafez Asad, Saddam Hussein – were adept at playing the superpowers off each other during 
the Cold War, and presents a classic case of “the tail wagging the dog”; but ultimately in his 
analysis those individuals fade into the background and seem to merely play the role of 
agitators in the far greater, global conflict between the US and the USSR. 20   This 
demonstrates the resilience of the neo-realist view that foreign policy, wars and truces are 
dictated by the need for a balance of power; that the US and the USSR were the major 
players in the system, while the smaller states either aligned or remained neutral in the 
interests of maintaining the balance of power.  Syria, to take one example, is widely 
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perceived to have swung between ‘non-aligned’ status and a ‘satellite’ of the USSR; as such 
it demonstrated little independent agency, being dependent on and swayed by its more 
powerful Soviet ally, or by the constraints of the system itself and the necessity of military 
equilibrium. 
 
Realism and Syria 
If we are to assess the relevance of the realist theoretical approach to the focus of the thesis 
then, certainly, one of the most dominant interpretations in the literature of Syria’s policy 
towards the US, and vice versa, is the realist one.  Just as in the policy realm, academic 
discourse often posits Syria as a follower of Egypt’s example.  Under Nasser, Egypt had 
been seen as the leader of the pan-Arab movement; but with its shift to the pro-western camp 
and the subsequent political and economic gains that it made, scholars predicted similar 
repercussions for the entire region.21  Syria as a fellow ‘revisionist’ state was expected to be 
the most severely affected; its disillusionment with Egypt and the pan-Arab movement was 
translated as a dilution of its own ideological drive.   
 
Goodarzi, among others, positions Hafez Asad alongside Egypt’s Anwar Sadat: both 
political pragmatists who helped to usher in a new phase of realpolitik at the expense of 
ideology.22  In turn, Syria’s foreign policies, specifically those towards the US, have been 
interpreted as straight-forward geo-political pursuits,23 matching the US’ interest-driven 
policy towards the region as a whole.  Thus defensive, territorial concerns for Syria 
(retrieving the Golan Heights from Israel and preventing hostile encirclement by its 
neighbours) and hegemonic, security interests for the US (counter-balancing Soviet 
influence during the Cold War, safeguarding access to oil, and eliminating terrorist threats 
post-Cold War), are deemed to constitute their respective bilateral priorities in both 
diplomatic and confrontational settings.24   
 
Alongside defensive-realist explanations, there are also numerous arguments based on the 
need to protect regime security at home.  Thus if Syrian political rhetoric appears to display 
an intense ideological motivation behind its policies, it is to be remembered that it is just 
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that: rhetoric.  According to Owen, Syria has at times used extreme ideological language, not 
even for the purpose of regional legitimisation, but in fact to make it too dangerous for any 
other state to feasibly unite with its policy – in this way, he argues, Syria is assured that it 
never needs to follow through its empty threats and belligerent rhetoric.25  Others argue, on 
the basis of Syria’s strict domestic authoritarianism, that the regime is merely motivated by 
the need to maintain its own security, and wealth.26  Fred Lawson argues that the desire to 
protect the regime at home leads to the exploitation of events abroad to create a perpetual 
state of emergency and to smother potential dissent.27    
 
Hinnebusch and Ehteshami’s analysis of Syrian foreign policy is more nuanced, certainly 
not so starkly realist.28  The intense hostility between the US and Syria is acknowledged, and 
Syria is indeed described as one of the few remaining revisionist powers in the world, 
alongside the theocratic revisionists in Iran, which at first seems to imply an acceptance of 
ideology as an important influence on Syrian foreign policy.  However, they stipulate that 
this revisionism is not an ideological one, but one that is based on systemic factors and the 
need to balance power in the region.  Bureaucratic politics, exemplified by tensions between 
economic pragmatists and less-progressive ideologues, are portrayed as the main driving 
force behind outward revisionism, rather than an inherent ideological bent.  They point to the 
ascendancy of the pragmatists such as Hafez Asad, to demonstrate the strategic emphasis of 
Syrian foreign policy over the past forty years.  The authors associate this pragmatism with a 
dilution of ideology, certainly the revolutionary ideology which characterised the unstable 
Syrian regime before Asad’s seizure of power in 1970.  They argue that the shift from a 
weak, fragmented, ideologically driven state, to a strong centralised actor, is in great part 
attributable to the authoritarianism and realism of Hafez Asad.   
 
Overall, Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, having debated the possibilities, present Syrian foreign 
policy (which interestingly they not only associate, but also equate with Iranian foreign 
policy) as a rational one, reacting to the penetration of external global hegemons and inter-
state regional war, one that co-opts a degree of domestic-external “omni-balancing” to allow 
for bureaucratic politics, the need for public legitimacy and, above all, the retention of 
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relative autonomy for the leadership.29  In many respects this analysis of Syrian foreign 
policy does challenge the realist account (it certainly opens up the proverbial ‘black box’ to 
look at internal politics); but in terms of motives, it is still very much tied to the realist 
preoccupation with material interests.   
 
To sum up, in a realist assessment of US-Syrian relations ideology can act as a 
supplementary force and is used as a vehicle for legitimacy and mobilisation; however, it is 
not to be seen as genuinely-held values but as a “disguise” of the leader’s true power-
political motives;30 if a credible assessment of foreign policy is to be made then ideology 
should take a back seat to what are perceived as more substantial and urgent material 
interests.  From the literature we can extract four key realist assumptions that have 
dominated any analysis of Syria, and by extension US-Syrian hostility.  These assumptions 
undermine the role of ideology in Syria’s policy towards the US:  
 
i. There has been a decline in Syrian Arab nationalism following Egypt’s truce with 
the west; 
ii. Syria’s grievances with the US, and Israel, would dissipate should Syria’s own 
territorial dispute with Israel be resolved;  
iii. Syria’s authoritarianism means all power and decision-making resides with the 
President – its foreign policy reflects his personal motives and he is equitable to 
Syria;  
iv. reflecting the pragmatism of a regime merely interested in its own survival, Syria 
bandwagons or balances against external and regional hegemons and is swayed by 
fluctuations in the international system.   
 
In support of these assumptions, periods of temporary reconciliation between the two states 
– demonstrated during the 1990-91 Gulf War when Syria aligned with the US against a 
fellow Arab nation, and post-September 11 when the US sought and received Syrian aid in 
intelligence for the ‘War on Terror’ – are explained through the realist paradigm of self-help 
and disregard for normative and ideational constraints.  From a purely realist perspective, 
these instances of cooperation need not be viewed in a paradoxical light, as inconsistency 
and flexibility are the defining characteristics of pragmatist regimes.   
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Reassessing the realist interpretation 
The strength and utility of a realist perspective for the analysis of the Middle East cannot and 
should not be dismissed outright.  However, this should not prevent it from being critiqued 
in the face of historical inaccuracies and failures to present societal complexities.  The 
arguments and assumptions outlined in the previous section can be challenged on a number 
of fronts; there are, at best, missing components to a purely realist explanation of the US-
Syrian case.  I will briefly highlight these in relation to the four realist arguments put 
forward above. 
 
i. The decline of Egyptian pan-Arabism and the ‘domino effect’ on Syria 
 
Let us begin with the notion that Syrian Arab nationalism has been in decline since Egypt 
‘defected’ to the west.31  Hinnebusch states that the insecurity arising from the 1967 defeat 
led states to resort to realist self-help, ‘specifically, Egypt’s pursuit of a separate peace with 
Israel upset the Arab-Israeli power balance, heightening the insecurity of other Arab states, 
notably Syria, and encouraging them to similarly look to self-help through militarisation and 
separate diplomacy.’32 
 
But significantly, the above argument does not take into account the fact that Syria was 
vehemently opposed to the process of ‘separate diplomacy’, and consistently argued for a 
comprehensive approach that brought Egyptians, Syrians and Palestinians together to the 
negotiating table.  The separate peace approach was chosen by the US and foisted on the 
Syrians against their choice.33  Had Syria followed Egypt’s example of signing a truce with 
Israel, especially given that Egypt was arguably a regional hegemon at the time, this would 
have been the clearest indicator that realist motives were now coming to the fore, especially 
since the need to be on a war-footing was just as detrimental for Syria’s economic interests 
as it was for Egypt.34  But instead, by 1979 Syria shunned diplomacy and took a very 
different direction sponsoring and supporting opponents of the US and Israel with even 
greater zeal than before.  Given Syria’s precarious position, both regionally and against the 
                                               
31
 Ajami, "The End of Pan Arabism."; Humphreys, Stephen, Between Memory and Desire, 580   
32
 Raymond Hinnesbusch, The Politics of Identity in Middle East International Relations, in Fawcett, 
International Relations of the Middle East, 165 
33
 Hafez Asad denounced Sadat’s peace with Israel as a ‘breach of Arab solidarity’, arguing that the 
conflict with Israel was not just an Egyptian issue, but was an all-Arab one – refer to Asad’s interviews 
with Damascus Radio, 8 September 1975, Newsweek 22 September 1975, cited in Moshe Ma’oz, Asad The 
Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), 103-104.  For further 
elaboration on this divide see Chapter 5. 
34
 Hopwood, Syria, 104-5; Leverett, Trial by Fire, 33-35 
 24 
US, and with Soviet material support proving to be increasingly unreliable, this was a highly 
risky strategy to adopt in terms of Syria’s military and economic security (indeed it resulted 
in the US imposing a series of sanctions on Syria).  The fact that Syria was prepared to 
shoulder the risks of sanctions and isolation demonstrates that a purely realist explanation of 
Syrian policy is insufficient.  Thus contrary to the predictions, Syria’s recent behaviour does 
not indicate that it is about to imitate Egypt’s example. 
 
Such expectations do not take into consideration the different historical experiences of both 
Syria and Egypt that contributed in different ways to their collective identities.  Whereas 
Egypt’s territorial homogeneity was intact after the First World War and had remained the 
same for centuries, the break-up of Bilad ash-Sham into Syria, Palestine, Jordan and 
Lebanon meant that a wider Arab identity formed a constitutive part of Syria’s identity from 
the moment its colonial boundaries were imposed.35  Thus for Egypt, its about-turn in 1979 – 
seismic a shift though it was – constituted no more than a change in foreign policy; for Syria, 
this would have meant (and would mean) an overhaul of its identity, one that has directed its 
foreign policy since it acquired state-hood, and an acceptance of externally imposed borders.   
 
This is not to suggest that Syria’s pan-Arab identity is a ‘primordial’ nationalism, but rather 
that it has become socially and politically entrenched over time, and has influenced its 
politics and ideology.  It is thus much more problematic, therefore, for Syria to discard Arab 
nationalism from its foreign policy than it was for Egypt.   
 
Thus, Syria’s adherence to Arab nationalism was in fact strengthened and augmented by the 
turning-points mentioned above.  Goodarzi describes the 1970s as a decade of “disarray” and 
total confusion, following the failures of 1967, limited achievements of 1973, Egyptian 
‘defection’ after the Camp David Accords in March 1979, and lack of resolution on the 
Arab-Israeli front.  This may be an accurate assertion, and yet this does not, and did not, 
necessarily determine a decline in ideological zeal.  On the contrary, it is just as likely to 
have enhanced it, particularly as Syria was fully aware that it was unlikely to fulfil its 
territorial and strategic goals through its own military capabilities (which were insufficient) 
or its own negotiating powers (which were still weak and lacking necessary leverage) – in 
such a scenario, ideology supported the strategic need for sustained resistance to external 
powers.  As Patrick Seale argues, Egypt’s 'long retreat' from the pan-Arab project, beginning 
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as early as 1961 with the failure of the UAR with Syria, followed by the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war and the death of Nasser in 1970, did not dampen Syria’s Arab nationalist ambitions.36  
In the eyes of the Syrians, Egyptian Arab nationalism was exposed as opportunistic and 
motivated by statist goals (it is worth remembering that Syrian Arab nationalism, both 
institutional and at a popular level, pre-dated that of Egypt’s); thus Egypt’s demise provided 
the Syrians with the opportunity to supplant them as the ‘true defenders’ of the Arab cause.  
 
ii. Territory or Ideology? 
 
Chapter two elaborates on a core argument of the thesis: that Syria’s Arab nationalist 
ideology is primarily of a defensive-political, rather than a cultural, nature.  Indeed, Syria’s 
interpretation of Arab nationalism is argued by some to represent simply another 
manifestation of anti-imperialism.  Realists might argue that, in fact, this viewpoint 
reinforces their argument.  To some extent, anti-imperialism can be viewed as a product and 
manifestation of realist politics.  It is concerned with material issues, and in particular, seeks 
to re-establish and protect state sovereignty – state boundaries, autonomy and national 
defence are at stake here, all traditionally realist issues.  The fact that Syria’s opposition 
towards the US has endured for so long is, according to the realist camp, simply due to 
Israel’s continued occupation of the Golan Heights and the US’s uncompromising support 
for Israel.  If this territorial dispute were to cease, Syrian antipathy towards the US might not 
entirely disappear, but would significantly diminish.  If the territorial situation improved, 
Syria would avoid overt opposition for fear of retaliation and a return to the status quo, as 
exemplified in Egypt’s policies after the return of the Sinai.  Traditional realists, such as 
Morgenthau, even argue that anti-imperialism is the ultimate disguise of imperialist 
revisionism,37 which simply uses ideology and morality as a justification and cover for basic 
power-politics, and in Syria’s case, ambitions for regional domination. 
 
This realist view of anti-imperialism however is not sufficient, particularly in the Syrian 
case.  Though it is often dismissed as rhetoric, the Syrian leadership and its political elite 
have been consistent in maintaining that even if the Golan Heights were retrieved, there 
could be no peace without the resolution of the Palestinian problem, while neutral and non-
Syrian analysts have similarly argued that a resolution purely based on territorial issues is 
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unlikely.38  A deeper understanding of Syria’s territorial and political history, and an 
acknowledgement of the high level of politicisation and mobilisation of Syria’s population 
against colonialism since the end of the First World War,39 demonstrates that its anti-
imperialist ideology preceded and goes beyond its current territorial dispute with Israel, and 
will have contributed to the long-term development of Syrian identity.  Moreover, 
imperialism itself constitutes an ideology, with a set of values and perceptions held 
alongside its territorial ambitions; in this case, anti-imperialism, in opposing an ideology, is 
ideological in of itself.   
 
This argument is particularly pertinent when considering Syria’s view of Zionism as an 
imperialist ideology, which it believes needs to be contested and fought with its own 
ideology.40 The presence of ideology is further demonstrated by Syria’s opposition to 
America’s various regional policies (beyond just its support for Israel) on the grounds of 
perceived US neo-imperialism and unjustified intervention in other countries’ affairs.41  
Thus to reduce Syria’s policies to merely territorial ambitions is too simplistic. 
 
iii. Domestic politics: a ‘non-issue’ for Syrian foreign policy?  
 
We now turn our attention to domestic influences on Syrian foreign policy towards the US, 
challenging the realist assumption that the regime’s all-encompassing authoritarianism 
precludes any interaction between the executive and society.  It is easy to dismiss the role of 
society in affecting foreign policy when power is so centralised with one person, as it has 
been in Syria.  No doubt, the President has a direct bearing and influence on the continued 
relevance of Syrian ideology in both society and foreign policy, especially when his tenure 
has been a particularly long one, as was that of Hafez Asad.  As a result, many analysts 
identified Syrian foreign policy under Asad senior as a straightforward reflection of his 
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personal decision-making.42  Certainly, prior to Hafez Asad’s seizure of power in the 1970 
coup, Syria had been prone to factional in-fighting, political incoherence and instability, 
which in turn had made Syria vulnerable to outside intervention, not just from enemies, but 
allies as well (seen in the failed UAR union with Egypt and increased involvement from the 
Soviet Union).  Hourani states that with the arrival of Asad, the Syrian regime was 
transformed into a strong regime, “able to impose itself on the country and put an end, at 
least for a while, to the internal conflicts”.43  This analysis draws very much upon the 
notions put forward by the ‘cult of personality’ thesis, and places great responsibility and 
credit for Syria’s transition from weak state to regional power, on the personality and 
leadership of the President.  There are two main implications of this reliance on the ‘cult of 
personality’ thesis: (i) it marginalises the role of public opinion; (ii) it downplays the 
salience of ideology. 
 
(i) Given Syria’s authoritarianism, it is unsurprising that the role of society and public 
opinion as the source of a state’s ideational drive is an area of foreign policy analysis that 
has been seldom addressed in relation to Syria.  The centralisation of power by the 
leadership – singularly dominant and authoritarian by even Middle Eastern standards – and 
the deliberate ambiguity surrounding its domestic politics and civil society, has made the 
realist approach not only the most obvious, but also the easiest one to adopt vis-à-vis Syrian 
foreign policy.  The prevailing view with regards to Syrian domestic opinion is that, due to 
the authoritarian nature of the regime, it has “never been taken into account” and is a “non-
issue” in Syrian politics.44   
 
And yet despite the repression, civil society, opposition movements and independent public 
opinion do exist in Syria, and must be seen as important considerations for the leadership 
when conducting foreign policy.  The Asads, elder and younger, have been acutely aware of 
the need to be in line with mass opinion, and especially military opinion, in certain key 
issues.  For the leadership, the risk always remained that the tension already created by the 
oppressive surveillance culture and stringent controls in public and intellectual life, may be 
raised to unsustainable and potentially violent levels, if an unpopular and unrepresentative 
foreign policy is added to the list of the many domestic grievances.  Civil society has indeed 
been stifled in Syria and there is very little opportunity for the public to clamour for or 
initiate political change (the lessons from the bloody repression of the Ikhwani uprising in 
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Hama in 1982 are still fresh and it remains a taboo subject, while the Damascus Spring of 
2003 soon faded away; meanwhile the future of the 2011 uprisings remain uncertain, 
although the regime has once again adopted brutal tactics to repress them); but public 
opinion nevertheless plays on the consciousness of the president.45   
 
In a state where there are such high levels of political curtailment, stifling of opposition and 
control of public, political, educational and even non-political religious affairs, the only 
legitimate and feasible outlet for public expression and fervour is in the realm of foreign 
affairs.  Moreover, it is a realm where the views and wishes of society coincide with both the 
stance of the leadership, and the security interests of the state.  To be sure, hostility towards 
the US is disseminated top-down through the state-run media, but anger and suspicion 
towards the global hegemon is also a genuine feature of grass-roots public opinion and it is 
tapped into by the state.  This identity is perpetuated and regenerated through collective 
processes, not just at the societal level, but between the regime and the populace.   
 
Certainly, Syria's identity, its sense of moral (if not political) leadership and responsibility in 
the region, feeds off the constancy of external great power intervention in both domestic and 
regional politics.46  The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided the Syrian 
leadership with the perfect deterrence for internal disorder and revolt at a time when 
agitations for liberalisation were growing at home.  But it is to be remembered that in Syria’s 
history, there have been numerous dictatorships - Hafez Asad’s was not the first.   And under 
those dictatorships in which the ruler did not adhere to and uphold those deeply embedded 
principles held by the Syrian people – such as protecting Arab independence, resisting 
external interference and opposing Israel – Syria was at its weakest and most unstable, both 
at home and abroad.47  
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(ii) The downplaying of societal input is connected to the second viewpoint that the cult of 
personality usually means a sacrifice of ideology.  For just as that argument posits the leader 
as pursuing self-interests against the will of the people, it also suggests that ideology is either 
compromised or exploited only in order to maximise the leader’s personal gains – be that the 
promotion of family interests or the purging of any challenge to the premier’s power.48  
Particularly if the case can be made that a particular ideology permeates society through 
historical experience and consciousness (as this thesis does), the leader’s dismissal of public 
opinion is seen to also implicate a dismissal of ideology, and vice versa.  What such an 
analysis fails to consider is the leadership’s own relationship with the ideology in question, 
which need not always be a phoney one.  Unlike the numerous military dictators of the 
1940s and 50s, Hafez Asad’s political and even security outlook developed within a 
fervently ideological context.49  In his important work on Syrian domestic politics, 
Revolution from Above, Hinnebusch states: 
 
As the president became the main source of initiative in the regime, his [Asad’s] 
personality, values, strengths and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and 
stability.  Arguably Asad’s leadership gave the regime an enhanced combination of 
consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked.  The consistency of his policy was 
rooted in his political socialisation into an authentically Ba’thist world view, for his 
origins and career faithfully reflected on a personal level the saga of the Ba’th...’50 
 
Hinnebusch’s depiction of Asad’s rule does not contradict the view that the cult of 
leadership was and is prevalent in Syria; yet it also does not support the view that this 
necessarily means a discarding of ideology – on the contrary, given Asad’s adherence to 
Ba’thism, his authoritarianism simply led Syria further down the same path.  Further on, 
Hinnebusch goes on to state: 
 
Determined, intelligent and dedicated to his mission, Asad proved extremely stubborn in 
pursuit of nationalist principle in the conflict with Israel.  A tough Machiavellian, he 
seemed to use any means in the regional power struggle to defend his regime.  Yet, as a 
pragmatic realist he was also prepared to subordinate ideology to the realities of power, 
hence to moderate Ba’thism to accommodate the interests of the Bourgeoisie at home 
and Arab donors abroad. 
 
This passage appears to detract somewhat from the earlier statement on Asad’s dedication to 
Ba’thism.  The confusion over where Asad’s policies are to be situated – either in pragmatic 
realism or in principles and ideology – appears to lie in the fact that when dealing with 
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domestic issues, regime security, and intra-regional relations with fellow Arabs, Asad 
deployed pragmatism and power-political behaviour, while on the issue of Israel and with 
external players such as the US, Asad was uncompromising in pursuing Arab nationalist 
goals.  This does not in fact amount to the contradiction it appears to be, but rather reflects 
an assessment of different priorities on the domestic and international stage.  The defining 
principles of Arab nationalism, reflecting as it does a regional identity, chiefly relate to 
wider regional and international issues.51  It is when such issues are at play that ideology 
similarly comes into motion.   
 
However, this is not to suggest a strict internal/external binary, for as Fred Lawson argues, 
the two are strongly connected in Syria’s case; but whereas Lawson makes the case that 
external disputes are cynically fuelled at times of domestic unease, I argue that this is too 
restrictive an explanation.  Taking one’s country to the brink of war purely to quell unrest at 
home is too high a risk to take, and which in the post-9/11 era can pose just as great a threat 
to internal stability (note the unsettling results of sabre-rattling from Saddam Hussein or 
Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad).  Thus to adopt and broaden these inside-outside 
connections, I concur that Syria’s foreign policy is significantly guided by domestic factors, 
but delineate these as being a) the ideology of the regime; b) the ideology’s reflection of 
principles held by society; and therefore c) Syrian society itself.  As for Syria’s domestic 
policy, this is not the focus of this study; therefore the impact of the cult of personality, 
authoritarianism, sectarianism and the need for regime security, on Syrian society and 
political dissent, have only tangential implications for the argument of the thesis. 
 
iv. Autonomy, Agency and Ideology 
 
This brings us to the systemic accounts of US-Syrian relations based on neo-realist theory: 
what of the view that Syrian foreign policy, as with all the Middle East states, has been, or is 
dependent on external hegemons?  To what extent can we apply the ‘balance of power’ 
theory here?  Theoretically, strong states are identified as the instigators of an alliance-
building process, principally out of self-interest in order to maximise security and power 
base, while states lacking security and power on the international stage are generally 
expected to construct alliances with stronger states – in other words to ‘band-wagon’ in 
order to help their construction and maintenance, or to bolster their power within their own 
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sphere of influence.52  This theory is used to explain every major regional alignment, from 
the Cold War, to the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the Gulf War coalition in 1991.  So of course, 
this should be doubly true of alignment shifts, as states break obsolete alliances and form 
new ones depending on convenience and material benefits, regardless of ideology or 
historical precedents.   
 
Syria could technically be defined as a relatively small state, or at least in terms of its 
material capacity.  And yet, apart from Syria’s temporary (and important) alignment with the 
US during the Gulf War in 1991, the above bandwagoning trends have not been borne out.  
We might have expected Syria, according to such assumptions, to have struck more 
conciliatory relations with the US by now, particularly after the demise of its Cold War ally 
the Soviet Union, or to have followed in the footsteps of its larger and more powerful 
neighbour, Egypt.  Either such moves would almost certainly have generated economic and 
political advantages for the current regime, and may have offered a more pragmatic, albeit 
compromised, realisation of its territorial and strategic goals.  The examples of Egypt, 
Jordan and Libya (in the final years under Gaddhafi), all gaining financially through 
reconciliation, reinforce the strong likelihood of such an outcome; yet Syria has not gone 
down this path, despite the predictions of both academics and policy-makers.53 
 
Clearly, then, Syria possesses a high degree of autonomy from its regional neighbours and 
particularly from external hegemons – where does this independence stem from?  Syria 
possesses very little offensive capability on a regional, let alone international level.  
Nevertheless, it has shown over the years that it is a force to be reckoned with.54  One key 
difference between Syria and some of the other important players in the Middle East is that it 
possesses very little by way of natural resources – in particular, it does not possess oil, 
unlike Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran or Libya.  Thus a major focal point of other regional states’ 
relations with external forces is removed from the equation.  This forces us to assess Syria’s 
importance and utility for the US on entirely different grounds, and already steers us away 
from the narrow focus on strategic or imperialist national interest, which are traditionally 
(and aptly) offered as explanations for US intervention or interest in other oil-rich states.   
 
                                               
52
 Fawcett, International Relations, 174; Walt, Origins of Alliances. 
53
 Ajami, "The End of Pan Arabism."; Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: the Middle East 
in a Troubled Age (University of California Press, 1999); Hinnebusch in Fawcett, International Relations 
of the Middle East, 165. 
54
 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran,10 
 32 
And indeed a historical overview of US-Syrian relations and the impact on the peace process 
demonstrates that Syria is an important member of the region, with the political capability of 
affecting US interests and ambitions in the Middle East.  This, of course, confers a degree of 
power and repute on the Syrian state, which in turn enhances its standing in relation to its 
neighbours.  What, then, gives Syria the political leverage it has enjoyed in the region, when 
it has neither bandwagoned with the most powerful players in the region nor possesses much 
by way of natural resources?  What factors have, over time, converted Syria from being an 
economically, militarily and structurally weak state, to a regional middle power55 with a 
strong stake in any project for peace and stabilisation? And what actions and policies on 
Syria’s part have forced recognition and consideration from both American and Soviet 
superpowers in the past? 
 
For Hourani, this power status derives from the regime’s ability to repress potentially 
destabilising internal opposition and conflicts, while Seale sees this influence as stemming 
from Syria’s geographical and strategic centrality in the region, lying “at the heart of the 
Arab Asian power system where, for good or ill, it affects every political relationship in the 
region”.56  He also argues, however, that in the Arab world an alliance with Syria gives a 
state “nationalist legitimacy” – thus Syria’s ideological status is clearly an important factor 
in Syria’s regional political leverage.  Thus despite the material disadvantages, Syria is, or at 
least attempts to be, an independent agent in the regional and global arena, demonstrating 
that systemic factors cannot be seen as the sole influence on US-Syrian dynamics.   
 
Bringing back ideas 
While I have outlined the insufficiency of a purely realist understanding of US-Syrian 
relations, I am not attempting to provide a theoretical critique of the realist paradigm itself – 
this has been done thoroughly and expertly by others; indeed the realist-materialist debates 
retain such vigour precisely because they are regularly challenged.  Instead, this thesis seeks 
to positively highlight the salience of, and potential in, incorporating an ideational 
perspective in analysing US-Syrian relations, without necessarily excluding materialist 
arguments. 
 
The first place one might look in order to bring in an ideational component is Identity 
studies.  This ties in well with a constructivist analysis, which challenges many of the 
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assumptions of realism.  Identity certainly forms a key part of the ideational argument I am 
putting forward, but it does not constitute the full picture.  Part of the continued problem in 
bringing identity into foreign policy analysis is that it appears to detract from the agency of 
decision-making and places the emphasis on social structures and embedded norms – their 
precise influence on policy cannot be tracked easily.  This ambiguity, or epistemological 
‘problem’, can hinder the credibility of the ideational framework.  Moreover, it means 
analysts may find themselves falling back into ‘irrational’ explanations for foreign policies 
in the Middle East, and an unwelcome return to the early stereo-types of the ‘Arab mindset’. 
 
In order to understand the agency and intentionality behind the policies of an actor, and from 
an ideational angle, Ideology – in the broadest sense of the term – needs to be brought back 
into the debate.  When it comes to understanding the ideas that influence Syrian policy 
towards the US, identity alone does not produce and direct action.  It is, however, a vital 
component within an adaptable Arab nationalist ideology in Syria, and which has both 
captured and shaped the experiences, political aspirations and outlook of a society.  Arab 
nationalism’s initial emergence as a socio-political movement amongst both elites and the 
rank and file in Syria, means it has been a part of Syrian history and thus supplies Syria’s 
pan-Arab identity.  Thus instead of separating identity from ideology, it can be argued that in 
this case, to adhere to ideological values is an affirmation of identity and vice versa. 
 
While the discipline has accepted Identity into the fold, it maintains an uneasy relationship 
with ideology.  IR scholars face the following dilemma if they wish to employ ideology as 
part of any foreign policy analysis, particularly in relation to the Middle East:  That is, on the 
one hand, ideologies are considered as an intransigent, doctrinaire and dogmatic force in 
politics, thereby incapacitating actors when there is a need to compromise, even when the 
state’s security and national interests are at stake.  To pursue ideological goals at all costs is 
therefore branded as radical, illogical – once again, irrational.  On the other hand, if the actor 
is deemed to be acting rationally, then ideologies are seen as instrumental tools used to mask 
the reality of self-interest and personal gain.  In other words, to be rational and genuinely 
influenced by ideology is seen as an incompatible position. 
 
The first view takes us back to essentialist espousals found in orientalist literature, with 
connotations that his/her emotiveness prevents an actor from making the ‘right’ choices, 
reached through a scientific process.  The second option falls back on realist, and also 
Marxist, outlooks that only power-politics matter, while ideas are merely used to sell 
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policies to society.  As further evidence of the difficulty IR has had with the concept, and the 
confusion over it, we find that both these alternative viewpoints have been applied to the 
Syrian case.  The neo-Ba’thist regime that came to power in the revolution of 1966 and took 
the country to the unsuccessful war of 1967 is widely held to characterise the first position; 
in contrast, the post-Asad era is cited as an example of the latter view.   
 
Indeed Hafez Asad is attributed with being calculated and pragmatic, in many respects 
because of a perceived willingness to sacrifice ideology for the sake of political and strategic 
objectives; given that Asad’s rule brought stability to a previously weak and unstable 
country, this pragmatism earned him, and Syria, grudging respect from his international 
counterparts and even enemies.  The tactics he employed in negotiations and ability to 
balance a number of precarious situations at home were deemed as anything but a show of 
irrationality.  Moreover, the ruthlessness with which he dispatched domestic foes gave Asad 
a reputation as a Machiavellian, rather than an idealist holding on to any ‘altruistic’ Arab 
nationalist doctrine.  As seen from the views of policy-makers and academics alike, Asad’s 
pragmatism meant Syria acquired a new reputation for caution and strategic prowess, and 
could not as easily be dismissed on the grounds of radicalism and irrationality, labels which 
had in the past undermined the stature and credibility of Syria as an international actor.   
 
Thus it transpires that for Syrians too – in politics or academia57 – to be labelled as 
ideological has pejorative connotations and something that representatives of the regime are 
keen to disassociate themselves and Syria from.  Moreover, to be seen as an ideological 
actor too often provided opponents with a reason to avoid engagement with Syria, a trend 
that was detrimental to Syria’s goals and interests.  Pragmatism, then, has become the 
byword for competent and mature government.   
 
However, regardless of the image various parties want to construct for Syria, public 
disassociation from ideology – be that Arab nationalism, pan Arabism, Ba’thism or any 
other ism used to describe it –belies the ideational component in Syria’s foreign policy and 
relations with the US.  Having said this, it is true to say that the way in which ideology 
influences policy is far more nuanced than is often portrayed.  Moreover, what the ideology 
actually entails and the contexts in which it is deemed relevant also needs to be studied and 
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clarified, especially as simplistic generalisations have contributed to some of the problems 
with studying ideology outlined above.  Indeed part of the reason why there is a reluctance 
to turn to ideology as an explanatory factor is that it is almost always portrayed as something 
dogmatic, inconducive to adaptation and unable to respond to changes in the international 
system.  This would be particularly relevant in the Middle East context which has seen 
regime changes and shifts in patterns of alliance and enmity.   
 
However, as I argue in this thesis, what is required is a reassessment of the nature of 
ideologies, how they are integrated with other goals and motives, and how they influence 
any decision-making process.  As set out in greater detail in the next chapter, this thesis 
posits that ideologies should be viewed as an evolutionary and flexible set of political 
principles and values that inform and guide, rather than fix, foreign policy.  Moreover, I 
argue that ideologies do not necessarily contradict state interests and can in fact support a 
state’s interests in terms of security, political kudos and identity.  In this sense, pragmatism, 
as in Syria’s case, need not be viewed as something that is dichotomous to its ideological 
principles.    
 
Methods and Approaches 
To explore the themes and address the key questions outlined so far, the thesis adopts four 
approaches, which include analytical frameworks and general methodologies.  These are: 
historical analysis and historical sociology; foreign policy analysis; constructivism; and 
securitisation theory. 
 
The most important approach in this thesis is historical analysis.  Firstly it is important to 
chart a historical narrative of US-Syrian relations over a long period, relying predominantly 
on primary documentation, particularly given the lack of scholarly literature on this specific 
case.  Hobden states that, ‘all social interactions are affected by what has gone before, and in 
the understanding of the present the past cannot be escaped’.58  Thus such historical studies 
are necessary for a deeper understanding of a region that is regularly debated and analysed 
from only a contemporary angle.   
 
Secondly, a lack of historical analysis – particularly with a case-study that has long-term 
roots – risks supporting, albeit unwittingly, a political position which legitimates the 
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contemporary status quo, simply because it happens to be the status quo; to take the present 
as the starting point of analysis serves to overlook and downplay the contested nature of 
particular historical events and developments.  Viewing those changes as though they have 
become embedded norms - part of the established political landscape that actors need to 
work within – without applying historical scrutiny, is a normative position in of itself.  For 
example, to analyse US-Syrian relations during the years of the Bush administration alone 
would be to work on the basis that US sanctions on Syria, Syrian support for Hamas and 
Hizbullah, and Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights are structural features of the Middle 
East.  When things are adopted as structural norms, the capacity and potential for change are 
not given due acknowledgement.  Thus through historical analysis, this thesis aims to avoid 
this pitfall.   
 
Thirdly, the archival work carried out for this project facilitates discourse analysis to 
separate genuine motives and policies of the Syrian leadership from public rhetoric.  This 
will help to debunk the claims of instrumentalisation of ideology when Syria is employing a 
consistent ideological policy even in private.  In turn, this can then be compared with the 
private statements of Syria’s regional counterparts, to demonstrate the difference in 
approaches when ideology is discarded from a state’s policy considerations. 
 
There are of course other historical studies written in a similar vein on the subject of Syrian 
and American policy in the region – as already mentioned, Lesch’s work based on archival 
material on the Syrian-American crisis in 1957 is a good example of this; another is Helen 
Cobban’s work on negotiations in the 1990s, which relies on interviews and official 
statements at the time.  Arguably two of the most important contributions to the 
historiography of Syrian politics are Patrick Seale’s ‘The Struggle for Syria’ and his 
biography ‘Asad of Syria’.  Both works contain a high level of rich historical detail, situate 
the Syrian case-study within regional and global contexts, and provide astute and consistent 
analysis.  Of course, such works are utilised to inform the thesis; however, due to the depth 
of such studies, they mostly focus on a limited period of time, and therefore miss out on the 
long-term patterns in US-Syrian relations.  The aim of this thesis is to employ the same level 
of rigorous historical research, but covering a longer time frame in order to produce a 
comprehensive overview and evaluation of US-Syrian bilateral relations up until the end of 
Hafez Asad’s rule.   
 
 37 
However, despite the advantages to a historical study, there are potential limitations.  
Focusing too narrowly on the narrative of a particular state, society or event can culminate in 
a distorted view of their ‘uniqueness’ and limit the study’s wider contribution.  In order to 
make sense of the history, it needs to be contextualised within a broader framework and 
compared – be that with other events or states at the same time, or indeed across different 
chronological periods.  This approach – that is historical sociology - reflects a combination 
of history (a search for the particular) with theory (a search for what is general).  Historical 
sociology is a method to understand developments not at a given, static time in history, but 
over a length of time.59  Thus it helps to make sense of incremental changes (for example in 
US-Syrian relations) and how certain events, policies, and individuals have contributed to an 
ever-evolving bilateral relationship.  Furthermore, International historical sociology looks at 
the formation of the state – its constituents, both external and internal – and how that affects 
the international relations of the region and the state itself.60  This is particularly relevant in 
Syria’s case, as shall be explored in greater detail in chapter three.   
 
This approach ties in well with an overarching constructivist approach in that it recognises 
that different levels of relations (state-society, and state-state) are constituted by each other; 
a constructivist and historical sociologist approach also addresses the formation and shaping 
of ideas – identities, ideology and perceptions –  as historical processes, which holds off 
simplistic, essentialist explanations. 
 
Securitisation theory from the Copenhagen School is used in the thesis not so much as a 
method of study, but rather as a medium through which the convergence of material (so-
called realist) factors and ideational factors can be better understood.  According to a 
securitisation framework, the importance of ideas as a unit of analysis, and a catalyst in 
patterns of both amity and enmity, is fully recognised as a key component in issues of 
security.61  This is relevant for this thesis given that US-Syrian relations are so bound up in 
the concerns and discourse of international and regional security.  Traditionally, security has 
always been seen as the domain of realists and military-strategic studies; thus, given that 
Syria’s regional situation and relations with the US are inseparable from questions pertaining 
to the region’s security (for example: territorial/ border conflicts, nuclear proliferation, 
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terrorism, military intervention), it is unsurprising that Syria’s foreign policy goals and 
security interests tend to be seen through a conventional realist lens.   
 
However, securitisation theory posits a number of arguments that challenge a narrow, purely 
militaristic view of security: firstly, it is not just material factors (such as the state or 
territory) that get ‘securitised’, i.e. come under the protection of the state.  It can also be non-
material factors such as identity, even ideology.  Securitisation theorists argue that anything 
can come under the realm of security, depending on the values and perceptions held by the 
actors.62  This allows us to understand how ideational values and principles held by the 
Syrian state can become militarised and converted into security issues, without necessarily 
being a reflection of realist motives.  Particularly as in Syria’s case, and indeed that of the 
US and Israel, values, perceptions and identity are tied to material factors (such as land, and 
access to the region’s natural resources); ideational factors then become inseparable from 
security issues and geo-politics.   
 
Securitisation theory also acknowledges the role of societies, and the need for state leaders 
to successfully articulate what they deem to be security concerns to their people in order to 
deal with the threats that are faced.  And finally securitisation theory also seeks to widen the 
focus vertically beyond the unit of the state, once again supporting the notion that the 
security and concerns of the state do not exist independently of a) its society, and b) its 
regional and global relations.  It posits that these different levels – the state, regional and 
global - are interdependent and mutually constitutive (contrary to a purely realist 
framework).  This has particular salience for the Middle East region, highlighting why 
Syria’s Arab nationalist ideology still remains pertinent given this regional setting.  
 
Finally, and tying in with the approaches outlined above, the thesis integrates foreign policy 
analysis (FPA) throughout.  FPA provides the analytical tools with which to study the 
significance of different factors that come into play in a state’s foreign policy.  Whether this 
is the leadership and individual psychology, perceptions, public opinion, or the bureaucratic 
dynamics of the US State Department or the Syrian military, FPA will facilitate a 
comprehensive analysis of the relevant components in both US and Syrian foreign policies 
towards each other.  Identifying the sources and drivers of ideational factors within their 
foreign policies will also be aided by this approach. 
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Chapter structure 
The various approaches outlined above will be employed to different degrees in the five core 
chapters of the thesis.  The chapter structure reflects the combined theoretical and historical 
approach adopted in this thesis, allowing us to identify distinct patterns in US-Syrian 
relations across time.   
 
Chapter two is a theoretical and methodological chapter, following on from the theoretical 
discussion provided in this introduction, but will demonstrate in greater detail how an 
analysis of ideology can be effectively operationalised in this study.  It draws upon the 
theoretical work of Michael Freeden, as well as other studies of ideology to discuss the 
difficulties in incorporating ideology in an empirical study, and reassesses the nature of 
ideologies in general to resolve much of the confusion and inaccuracies surrounding the 
subject.  The chapter aims to define Syrian ‘Arab nationalism’ more accurately, and based 
on how it is interpreted and expressed in Syrian politics and society. The chapter untangles 
the various meanings that Arab nationalism has come to represent, distinguishing between 
Syrian and other interpretations of Arab nationalism, as well as clarifying the relationship, 
differences and connections between a ‘Syrian’ Arab nationalism and other competing 
ideologies (such as Socialism and Islamism).  The chapter provides an operational 
framework that facilitates the analysis of ideology in US-Syrian relations in the rest of the 
thesis. 
 
The following chapters incorporate historical narrative with integrated theoretical analysis.  
The chapters here have been split into the pre-1967 era, the inter-war years between 1967 
and 1973, the post-1973 years of Disengagement, and the post-Gulf War period of the 
1990s.  I have chosen this framework to reflect the major historical junctures from the Syrian 
perspective, rather than the more well-known and utilised Cold War framework which 
reflects the historical junctures from an American and western perspective.  Without doubt, 
the Cold War and its end had major consequences for global politics and economics, ranging 
from the global financial system, to nuclear armament to the impact of US unipolarity; 
furthermore, the Cold War, and the changes that it brought about in US foreign policy, have 
had a very important influence on US-Syrian relations, and for some Middle East states have 
shaped their entire foreign policy; however, this thesis aims to highlight the alternative 
world-views and national priorities that existed alongside the dominant agendas of the 
superpowers.  Some events in history – such as the establishment of Israel in 1948 (roughly 
coinciding with the start of the Cold War), the Arab defeats of 1967 and Egypt’s truce with 
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Israel - sent far greater shock-waves through the Middle East than obvious Cold War 
watersheds, and are viewed there as turning points independent of the Cold War.  And while 
those events became embroiled with the Cold War at the time, their implications have 
outlived US-Soviet rivalry and do not neatly conform to global historical turning-points.   
 
Thus pre-Cold War, it is true that the US was viewed in a more benevolent light by the 
Syrians, especially when compared to the European powers; but this trend also continued 
shortly after the start of the Cold War when the US opposed Britain and France during the 
Suez Crisis.  Syrian mistrust of the west and the US in particular certainly became 
exacerbated Mid-Cold War, but this did not come to an end with the demise of the USSR 
and end of the Cold War – ultimately their brief cooperation during the Gulf War in 1990 
was a false dawn.  Similarly, the post-9/11 era did little to shake the intractability of the 
Israel-Palestinian crisis; indeed it is worth remembering that the failure of the 
Shephardstown talks, the second Intifada and the ascendancy of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon a year earlier, already set in motion the downward trend in US-Syrian relations.  
Clearly then, America and Syria do not share the same historical narratives or reference 
points, which has to some extent contributed to their poor relations and understanding – in 
this way, an alternative historical framework will help to highlight the divergence between 
Syrian and American foreign policy priorities.  
 
In this vein, Chapter three provides a historical narrative of modern US-Syrian relations after 
Syrian independence and prior to the 1967 War, identifying: the historical roots of 
ambivalence between the two states; the origins of US involvement in the region; and the 
rise of the Ba’th in Syria.  It follows the change in the American position from being a 
champion of Arab rights to the foremost supporter of Israel.  It assesses the impact of the 
Cold War and the US’ growing strategic interest in the Middle East on its relations and 
image among Arab states.  It also takes a close look at Syria’s domestic politics and the 
lasting legacy of the relationship between ideology and society.  The chapter demonstrates 
the long-term causation and evolvement of policies and stances elucidated in the latter 
chapters, as well as providing a regional and post-colonial context to the later developments. 
 
Chapter four takes up the historical narrative just before the outbreak of the 1967 War, and 
relies on archival analysis and FPA to analyse the centrality that the Arab-Israeli dispute 
plays in antagonising relations between Syria and the US. The chapter looks at the rise of 
Hafez Asad in the Ba’th party and the evolution of the party, from its intellectual roots to its 
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domination by the military, and how that affected its involvement in the 1967 War; it also 
identifies the war as the first case of direct and public US support for Israel against Syria 
under Lyndon Johnson, as well as the first time the US and Syria were forced to engage 
directly with one another in the aftermath of the war.  In this sense, 1967 marks a crucial 
watershed in US-Syrian relations.  The chapter closely assesses the diplomatic impact of the 
1967 War and how it shaped future policies of both Syrian and American governments – 
indeed I argue that modern US-Syrian relations can in large part (but not entirely) be traced 
back to this seminal period.  Finally, the chapter analyses the shift in Syria’s approach once 
Asad comes to power in 1970, from a radical and overtly ideological position to Asad’s 
‘pragmatic’ turn, arguing that this was not a dilution of ideological principles but a change in 
strategy – one that was not sufficiently capitalised on by the US.   
 
The chapter draws heavily on primary sources from the US National Archives, Washington 
D.C and presidential libraries, plus relevant interviews.  These two early historical chapters 
constitute crucial foundations to any assessment of US-Syrian relations, for they reflect the 
long-standing nature of the grievances on both (but particularly the Syrian) sides, and 
highlight the great need to understand and address the legacy of a) colonialism and b) the 
establishment of Israel in the Middle East in general. 
 
Chapter five is a critical chapter in which Syria and the US finally engage with each other in 
direct talks after the 1973 war.  It focuses on the Disengagement talks, aimed at seeking a 
resolution between Israel and the Arab parties, and draws an important comparison between 
Egypt and Syria who had very differing outcomes from the US-mediated talks – this is used 
to empirically highlight the impact of ideological considerations, when they are taken into 
account and when they are discarded.  It serves to illustrate in detail why Syria did not 
pursue the same course as Egypt, and the lack of impartiality in US mediation tactics. 
 
Finally Chapter six will focus on the theme of engagement and analyses a period of direct 
communication between Syria, Israel and the US during the Madrid process from 1991-96.  
The chapter examines whether the instances of cooperation do in fact demonstrate 
contradictions in Syria’s ‘ideological’ position, or whether they are consistent with Syria’s 
Arab nationalist principles and strategic calculations for the region.  It is an important 
chapter that brings home the nuances of the overall argument of the thesis, and serves to 
demonstrate that a) the operationalisation of ideology in foreign policy need not be 
dogmatic, nor as straightforward as might be presumed on the surface, and b) the important 
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role of pragmatism even within an ‘ideological’ foreign policy, making it clear that ideology 
alone cannot be taken to explain every facet of state behaviour.  The chapter also assesses 
the strategies of negotiation, the separate motives and perceptions, as well as the pressures – 
both internal and external – faced by both the US and Syria in these times. 
 
Both chapters five and six seek to question the basic assumption that Syria has essentially 
played the role of a ‘spoiler’ and that its actions have primarily instigated poor relations with 
the US.  The focus on different chronological periods is important to provide a 
comprehensive overview of US-Syrian relations across time, and to demonstrate why their 
disputes have not been resolved despite global and regional changes, and the changing 
contexts in which their interaction takes place.  The analysis ends with the last days of Hafez 
Asad’s presidency, a natural juncture in Syria’s ideological policy.  That is not to say that 
ideology ceased to play a role under the successor regime – the next phase in the history of 
US-Syrian relations is suitable ground for a future analysis on the prevailing hostility 
between the two states under the governments of George W. Bush and Bashar Asad, and the 
enduring role of ideology in their foreign policies. 
 
The conclusion brings together the analyses of each of the chapters to produce an overall 
evaluation of US-Syrian relations.  It brings the historical and theoretical analyses back to 
the central argument underpinning the chapters, to form a comprehensive explanation for 
consistent US-Syrian hostility and to reintroduce the importance of ideational factors in their 
respective foreign policies.  
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Chapter 2 
Operationalising Ideology and Defining Syrian Arab Nationalism 
 
Underpinning the direction of this study is the argument that ideology has made a significant 
contribution to Syria’s foreign-policy decision-making, and in turn has affected its relations 
with the US.  The introductory chapter problematised the case of US-Syrian relations, and 
outlined the insufficiencies of the existing literature.  One of the key problems was the 
dismissal of ideology as an explanatory factor on account of apparent contradictions between 
Arab nationalism and the 'realities' of Syrian foreign policy; in turn, I highlighted the 
inconsistencies in the realist argument and suggested a (nuanced) ideational explanation.  
But before this can be demonstrated via the empirical chapters that will follow, more 
epistemological challenges to this hypothesis remain and need to be addressed: how can an 
ideational framework be operationalised? How can this argument be empirically 
demonstrated? How can the pitfall of reductionism be avoided? What are the nuances to this 
argument?  The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions.  It aims to establish the 
theoretical coherence of the ideational argument, and to demonstrate how an ideational 
framework can be operationalised in the context of this thesis.  Additionally, one of the main 
reasons why Arab nationalism is dismissed so easily as a significant factor in Syrian foreign 
policy is because of a misinterpretation of what the ideology represents, and a failure to 
distinguish between its core goals which are ‘non-negotiable’, and peripheral interests which 
are flexible and contingent.  Therefore this chapter also aims to define the principles that 
constitute Syrian ideology, against which Syria’s foreign policy can be more accurately 
measured.   
 
The first section of the chapter addresses the epistemological questions concerning the 
operationalisation of ideology, and aims to do the following: 
 
1. To identify and address the key problems realism and political theory have with 
ideology in general. 
2. To propose an understanding and definition of ideology that will be applied 
throughout the thesis.  This definition will contest the simplified reading of 
ideology often found in both theoretical and foreign policy literature. 
3. To introduce a framework for analysing ideology. 
4. To outline a method for applying this framework and measuring the role of 
ideology in foreign policy. 
 44 
In the second section of the chapter, I demonstrate how the framework is to be applied to the 
specific case of Syrian ideology.  This section does the following: 
 
1. Applies the core-periphery framework to the intellectual and practical 
manifestations of Arab nationalism.  What is its historical context? And what are 
the consistent core principles?  To answer these queries I detach Arab 
nationalism from generalisations and assumptions, and place it under closer 
scrutiny to understand it more deeply. 
2. In order to do this Syrian Arab nationalism is first situated in, and compared 
against, broader nationalist ideology; secondly its connections with socialism 
(often included as a tenet of Arab nationalism) are explored.  Thirdly its relations 
with Islamism is addressed to juxtapose Arab nationalism with a rival ideology. 
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2.1 The ‘Problem’ of Ideology 
 
To argue for the continued salience of ideology in contemporary IR is no easy task.  The role 
of ideology in decision-making, norms and ‘international systems’, receives scant attention 
in theoretical and methodological debates, and is largely left to historians and regionalists.  
This can be explained by three developments in the discipline: firstly, with the end of the 
Cold War and Fukayama’s declaration of ‘the end of history’, the study of ideologies in 
general appears to have less currency than it once had; secondly, beyond the debate between 
modernism and primordialism, Nationalism – one of the most common representations of 
ideology in IR - appears to have run out of steam in its capacity to throw up theoretical 
puzzles; and thirdly, those alternative approaches - such as constructivism, and particularly 
critical theory - where one might look to find challenges to the materialist paradigms in IR, 
have done little to dispute the marginalisation of ideology as an explanation for foreign 
policy.  One might add world events as a fourth factor in addition to these disciplinary trends 
– for example, discussing nationalism in relation to the Middle East might appear to be 
particularly irrelevant given the widely held view that, with the accommodation of Israel, 
neglect of the Palestinians, and persistent inter-Arab rivalry, pan-Arabism is now ‘dead’.63   
 
To compound the estrangement, those works that do focus on the impact of ideologies 
routinely fail to address the concerns and justifications given for the discipline’s 
disengagement from the topic, often presenting ideologically-driven actions and agendas as 
accepted fact, a ‘given’ that does not need problematising – much empirical and foreign 
policy analyses fall into this category, and it is in part due to this trend that greater bridges 
between structural theory, critical theory and the realm of FPA have not been made.64 On the 
other hand, some of these works will go the other way, paying too much deference to 
materialist frameworks and opting to present ideology as a purely instrumentalist vehicle.   
 
I argue that these potential weaknesses in any ideological analysis need to be rectified via a 
three-pronged approach: one confronting methodological issues; the second providing a 
                                               
63See Ajami, ‘"Stress in the Arab Triangle." Foreign Policy 29 (1978), an argument subsequently reiterated in 
numerous works, for example: Tibi (1997); Humphreys (1999); Goodarzi (2006); Ayoob (2007). 
64
 For a collaborative effort to bridge the divides between theory and FPA see Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield 
and Tim Dunne: Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, OUP (December 2007).  The aims and content of the 
publication were discussed at the 49th International Studies Association Convention 2008, during which the 
editors and contributors highlighted what they identified as the mutual marginalisation by both fields (theory 
and FPA) within IR.  While clearly making a laudable attempt to reconcile the old explanatory dichotomies 
between agency and structure, or between materialism and the ideational, ideology was cursorily addressed as a 
component of strategic interests and within the case-study on US neo-conservatism, which took the usual 
empirical turn common in straightforward historical FPA.  Its theoretical breakdown was once again side-lined. 
 46 
detailed analysis of the ideology in question, rather than relying on generalised assumptions; 
and the third being a historical analysis to scrutinise the role of ideology in the given case 
study (in this case US-Syrian policy) over time.  Hence, before reappraising the definition of 
Arab nationalism, and since indeed, ‘the concept of ideology and ideological thinking is a 
slippery one’,65 this section will proceed to provide a definition of ideology and a framework 
for its application. 
 
2.1.1 Defining Ideology 
Any analysis of ideology depends on whose definition one adopts. For neo-realists at least, 
ideology is not a factor deemed influential in the international system and therefore remains 
largely undefined.  Liberalism is itself an ideology, but conversely it also does not engage in 
much debate on ideology, partly because to acknowledge it would increase scrutiny on its 
values and practices as one set of choices amongst many others, thereby detracting from its 
universalist claims.  We can, however, gauge a definition of ideology from critical theory, 
which (generally) defines it in a pejorative sense: unlike realism, critical theory has produced 
some of the most influential commentary and a vast amount of literature on this subject.  The 
roots of critical theory can be found in Marxism66, which posits that ideologies are a tool of 
the elites to imbue the masses with false-consciousness, in order to make them easier to 
manipulate and control.67  To assert, therefore, that policies can be based on ideologies is to 
be duped by the rhetoric of the leaders, who only use them to pacify their domestic 
populaces.  The motivation for this is control – both economic and political.  What we see, 
then, is a convergence between the realists and critical theorists in viewing the default goal 
in international relations as being materialistic, with the difference being that the former is 
merely analytical in its approach while the latter is normative and prescribes emancipation 
from this status quo.  Ideology, therefore, is at the heart of the debate in critical theory, but in 
a way that discredits any function it might have other than to deceive – this, perhaps 
inadvertently, serves to support the realist starting-point. 
 
However, I aim to steer the discussion in this thesis away from a normative and prescriptive 
debate about ideologies per se, to an analytical one.  Raymond Geuss acknowledges that 
ideology can be understood in three different ways: the first is to view ideology in a purely 
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pejorative sense; the second is to view ideology in a positive sense; and the third is to 
recognise its descriptive value.  This chapter (and thesis) will largely adopt the latter 
position, recognising that ideologies are prevalent in international relations regardless of the 
purpose they serve, and for that alone they are worth studying.68 By descriptive value, it is 
meant that ideologies reflect the way a society and its political system operates, and enables 
both analysis and comparison by categorising systems and values.  On ‘descriptive’ 
ideology, Geuss states: 
 
...typically it will include such things as the beliefs the members of the group hold, 
the concepts they use, the attitudes and psychological dispositions they exhibit, their 
motives, desires, values, predilections, works of art, religious rituals, gestures, etc.69 
 
According to this approach, to argue something is ideological is not pejorative, rather it is 
deemed important for its explanatory use.  To a lesser certain extent, as will be clear from 
the definition offered below, the thesis also accepts elements of the positive view of 
ideology -  that ideologies are often constructed to enable a group ‘to satisfy their wants and 
needs and further their interests’.70  Thus ideologies are utilised by states, organisations and 
societies to identify a consistent set of beliefs about the world they live in, which then helps 
to guide, as well as prevent contradictory, decisions.  Notably in foreign policy literature, the 
prevalence of ideologies within western democratic governments is hardly disputed and 
accepted as a normal part of politics without assuming that they are only used to deceive, a 
characterisation that is mostly applied to non-western governments.71 
 
The debates on ideology within critical theory warrant far greater discussion than can be 
provided here.  Moreover, there are varying and at times contesting views among scholars as 
to the definition of ideology, but the preliminary aspects of the debate sketched out above 
are sufficient for this research. For the purpose of this thesis, and drawing upon some of the 
categories outlined by Geuss, I delineate a typology of seven core defining features which I 
argue all ideologies are predicated on, and which are applied to the Syrian case in this thesis.  
I identify them as the following: 
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(i) Firstly, an ideology is a set of both explanatory and normative beliefs pertaining to 
society and politics.  Thus they ‘purport to explain why the world is as it is, how it came to 
be so, and what the goals of political action should be’.72  The explanatory rubric of 
ideologies demonstrates the close connection between ideology and history – constructed 
history, certainly, but such histories are not merely created and used to justify ideological 
agendas post-conception, but already exist in prior form as experience, collective memory 
and actual events and changes, which constitute ideologies and appear to embed them in 
social and political reality; history, therefore, confers on ideologies both the claim to truth, 
and with that, the right to prescribe based on ‘lessons of the past’ and the wisdom of 
experience.   
 
(ii) Following on from this first feature, ideology is also an expression of human agency and 
intent. Those who adopt ideological beliefs do so with deliberate purpose to cultivate a 
particular course in the political and social spheres, or at least consent to the activism of 
others on their behalf and cooperate with the ideological programme.  This agency may be 
channelled into maintaining the status-quo, as is the case with conservatism, but this still 
involves decisive choices over which norms to pursue.  Often, however, ideology acts, and is 
propagated, as a vehicle for change, reflected by the fact that ‘ideology’ as a term was first 
coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in revolutionary France, a period representing 
turbulence and the ushering in of a new socio-political order.  Thus ideologies are utopian,73 
but are also manifested as active social and political movements that promote idealism as a 
realisable objective.   
 
In connection to this utopian turn, ideologies usually purport to offer a morally correct set of 
values, such as justice through equal distribution of wealth, freedom through self-
determination, civilising through imperialism, or human rights through democratisation; thus 
altruism is often a core justification for ideologies.  However, given that it is an articulation 
of intentionality, an interesting dilemma emerges over the moral or egotistical nature of 
ideological thinking.  Thus on the one hand, the agency that is inherent to the concept of 
ideology appears to fix it to rational-choice theory and individualism in IR, which has 
developed quite firmly into a materialist school of thought and as an extension of classical 
realism.  The forging of this connection can be traced to thinkers Hobbes, Locke and 
Voltaire, among others, who argued that human desires, in fact, stimulated and were the 
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driving force behind reason, without which it would be stinted.  Rational decision-making, 
therefore, no longer refers only to the presence of reasoning, but has come to be synonymous 
with pragmatism for the sake of material gain and survival.74   
 
On the other hand, within the philosophical strain of political theory, such rationalism has 
been argued to be a process of morality.  Kant distinguished between the ‘political’ (that is, 
action and intentions reacting to instinct and human needs/desire for power) and the ‘moral’, 
this representing an action and intention made after a reflection of what is right.75  It is not 
necessarily the outcome, therefore, that determines whether an action is moral or power-
political, but the internal process that produced the action – crudely put, acting on reason, as 
opposed to instinct and necessity, is a crucial facet of moral action.  This would appear to 
validate the potential for ideologists, and by extension ideological states, to seek to act as 
moral agents in the international sphere.  
 
(iii) Ideologies tend to be promoted as universal messages – for example, through the 
perspective of the English School, ideologies might be interpreted as favouring a solidarist 
system (either internationally or domestically depending on the ideological goals and 
interests of the state) rather than a pluralist one, at least in relation to alternative ideologies 
and political structures.76  Ideologies have even morphed into systemic orders so that a 
differing narrative is interpreted not merely as a challenge to the ideology, but as a threat to 
regional or global stability in addition to its values – liberal democracy and nationalism are 
two such ideologies that have been entrenched within international political and economic 
structures, to the extent that nationalism, for example, is increasingly included among the 
primary institutions of international society in English School debates.77  This demonstrates 
that ideologies begin as universal messages, and if successfully universalised, can appear to 
assume an ontological character. 
 
(iv) Despite the universalising nature of ideologies, there are always competing and varying 
narratives within them, creating an internal pluralism in which ideas both oppose and 
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overlap, giving a greater complexity to the broader concept upon which they are based. This 
means there can be different interpretations of, and within, the same ideology, which can 
focus on different issues at different times.  There may be core and peripheral concepts, that 
can in turn create an overlap with competing or neighbouring ideologies, but they all still 
constitute the ideology as a whole.78   
 
(v) Connected to this last feature, ideologies are not timeless, essential concepts, but are 
constituted by their broader social contexts.79  Thus the principles and goals that shape them 
cannot be abstracted from the spatial, temporal and socio-political contingencies that are 
always reconfiguring ideologies.  Consequently, ideologies can undergo adaptation and 
transition and will shift over time.  This does not negate the role of ideologies, or necessarily 
reflect a crude manipulation on the part of ideologists to suit and pursue their own interests.  
Rather it demonstrates that ideologies need not be rendered obsolete by socio-political 
change or pragmatic realities, nor indeed are these concepts mutually exclusive.   
 
Furthermore, it highlights the notion, as indicated above and as argued by Michael Freeden, 
that ideologies can have a positive function in organising and mapping the beliefs and 
experiences of society, creating priorities out of a tangle of interests and issues that then 
facilitates political decision-making.80  The shifting of core ideological concepts to the 
periphery, and vice versa, reflects the changes in the concerns and priorities of its adherents; 
the very fluidity of ideologies does not necessarily confirm an internal weakness in their 
original policies, but according to Freeden reflects the continued dependence by society and 
decision-makers on an ideological framework to interpret and make sense of social changes 
and patterns81 - this is an important factor, more of which will be discussed shortly. 
 
(vi) As far as it is possible to make a clear demarcation between politics, society, culture, 
and economics, ideologies are not confined to the realm of politics.  However, although 
ideologies consider a range of factors, they are still ultimately concerned with the way in 
which their principles can affect all such areas.  In that sense, ideologies do politicise all the 
above spheres and thus it is argued here that, ultimately, ideology is a political phenomenon.  
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(vii) Finally, ideologies are dependent on societal co-option; in other words they are, or at 
least their proponents seek to transform them, into popular movements.  Analyses of 
ideological influences often become hoisted on the role of the leadership without giving due 
consideration to the connection between the regime and the populace in conducting 
ideologically oriented policies.  The justification and continued relevance of any ideological 
agenda rests on the transmission of ideological values from top to bottom for the sake of 
legitimacy, but this also works the other way around through a bottom-up process: the 
executive is reassured and encouraged in its ideological zeal by popular mandate, even in 
authoritarian systems.  Indeed, an ideological policy can only be sustained in such security-
driven environments through this societal connection.  Given that foreign policy is often a 
political and ideological expression of the state on the international stage, and given that the 
state’s infrastructure and being is contested and consolidated within its urban centres, the 
source of ideological propagation and legitimisation must be looked for within those 
arenas.82   
 
In turn, it becomes clear that the search for the roots of ideological consistency and 
adherence by the regime lies not only with the executive itself but also with the level of 
societal following.  Furthermore, revisionist ideologies originate in the quest for an upheaval 
of the prevailing social and political systems in the desire for change – specifically a change 
that is adopted by many and, theoretically, benefits the majority.  As discussed above, 
ideologies are essentially idealistic in their goals, driven by claims to morality.83  Thus in 
such a context, regardless of how removed an ideology may be from this overriding 
principle in praxis, it must retain the collective element in order to even exist – indeed the 
success of any ideology is determined by ‘the degree to which they [articulate] with social 
movements’.84   
 
Moreover, it is in many circumstances meaningless to separate ideological motives held by 
the regime from its search for popular legitimacy, as if the latter necessarily negates the 
former.  A regime driven by ideology is not devoid of pragmatic considerations as a result 
(why must it be?), for real ideologues will seek to propagate their vision to greater numbers 
as a means to its eventual realisation.  With that propagation can come a real adherence to 
those beliefs and norms; it is questionable whether any group or individual, whether a social 
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movement, government or a leader, would be able to sustain such a high level of cognitive 
dissonance (as this would entail) between internal power-political motives and a false 
external moral outlook.  Indeed, without the electoral checks and balances of a democratic 
system, authoritarian regimes in particular rely on ideology as a connecting force between 
regime and populace – from an entirely functional point of view such connections are 
indispensable to the management of any system.  In short, ideologies are, by nature of their 
goals, methods and justification, social movements that are political.   
 
The use of this typology enables us to identify the difference between ideology and identity, 
or ideology and mere interests.  Moreover it also allows us to dismiss some of the 
misnomers which are at times used to negate the presence of ideologies in a given situation.  
If we apply the typology to Syrian Arab nationalism we can ascertain how it reflects the 
above ideological tenets: 
 
(i) Arab nationalism is rooted in the historical experience of external interference in the 
region, particularly after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  It offers its own explanations 
on why the Middle East went through so much turmoil in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and why the region continues to experience seemingly intractable problems (namely 
colonialism and exploitation of its resources and strategic assets).  This external interference 
was seen to be continued by Israel after the Europeans had departed.  The ideology also 
serves a normative function in prescribing the antidote to this problem: opposition to all 
external interference and imperialist ideologies, in all its guises. 
 
(ii)  Syria’s Arab nationalism is also more than just a reflection of identity.  Identity is seen 
as something that is acquired without choice, whereas adherence to Arab nationalist 
ideology is a conscious choice.  Arab identity is a key component of Arab nationalism, but 
not all Arabs will necessarily be Arab nationalist.  Moreover Arab nationalism was 
conceived as a reflection of moral agency and a just movement against forces of oppression 
– but mostly external forces. 
 
(iii)  Arab nationalism is not universal in the sense that it is concerned with a particular 
geographical region.  But Arab nationalists have tended to view the region’s politics in a 
Manichean light, in which alternative ideological perspectives are mistrusted.  American 
liberal-democracy and Zionism thus provide the perfect counter ideologies on which Arab 
nationalism can thrive.  And hence Arab nationalists, at the grass roots level or at the state 
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level, have often found themselves in conflict with fellow Arabs of opposing ideologies (be 
they conservative regimes or Islamists at home). 
 
(iv)  The internal pluralism within ideologies in general is also manifested in Arab 
nationalism.  Thus we can see differences among the intellectuals in the movement, the 
general public and the militaries that adopt Arab nationalism.  There were different strategies 
between the revolutionary and more ‘radical’ Arab nationalists of the 1966 Ba’thist 
government, who believed in an offensive approach to achieve its goals, and the ‘pragmatist’ 
Arab nationalists after Hafez Asad took power who adopted a more defensive approach.  
Some strands of Arab nationalism prioritise Arab unity, some associate closely with 
socialism, whereas others will prioritise protection of Arab independence. 
 
(v)  Arab nationalism, like any other ideology, neither emerged nor exists within a vacuum.  
Particularly in Syria’s case, Arab nationalism was strongly shaped and guided by the 
political and social context at the time. Mistrust of external forces thus continues to be a 
defining feature of the ideology.  Arab unity, on the other hand, has been harder to adhere to, 
in part because other Arab states have shown little interest in this principle.  Another 
example of the ideology’s flexibility is the treatment of Turkey – initially mistrusted as the 
former imperial power, it was embraced by Arab nationalists when it demonstrated that it 
now shared some of their ideological goals.   
 
(vi)  Arab nationalism is a political phenomenon in that it views culture, the economy and 
religion through an ideological and political light.  Culture, including Arabism, is co-opted 
for the political struggle; economic matters have similarly been subject to political agendas – 
thus during the 1960s, a socialist economy was seen as a way of advancing the political 
goals of the ideology.  Religion is not dismissed entirely as is the case in Communism – it is 
seen as a part of Arab identity, but is not to override the key principles of Arab nationalism. 
 
(vii)  And finally, Arab nationalism gained momentum as a popular political movement in 
response to the turmoil after World War I.  The pervasive impact of French colonialism in 
Syria and the accessibility of Arab nationalism’s anti-imperialist message gave it greater 
traction among a wide audience.  The leaders have been a product of the societal adherance 
to ideology.  That connection was far stronger before the institutionalisation of ideology 
under the Ba’th, but public opinion remains a significant justification for the continued 
pursuit of Arab nationalist goals in Syrian foreign policy.   
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2.1.2 Constructing a Framework for Analysis 
The above section provided a typology on the nature of ideologies, enabling us to identify an 
ideology when it is in motion within a foreign policy.  This typology was then compared 
with and applied to Syria’s Arab nationalism to emphasise the fact that we are indeed 
discussing ideology here and not merely identity or interests.  However, one feature of the 
typology requires further explanation, this being point five regarding the adaptable and 
contingent nature of ideologies.  Without deeper explanation, this could be misunderstood to 
imply that ideologies are ever-shifting, thus rendering the study of any ideology and its 
impact on foreign policy over a long time period as problematic. However, since ideologies 
are conceptualised and promulgated as a clear set of principles, any adaptation is likely to 
occur in a more structured way.    
 
To aid this explanation, I build on the work of Freeden to argue that ideologies are 
comprised of core principles and peripheral principles. The core principles are the raison 
d’être of the ideology, and are less likely to change or shift in importance.  They are still 
grounded in historical context, and their relevance is still dependent on particular political or 
social circumstances; but both context and circumstance are deeply embedded, structurally, 
empirically and as an inter-subjective social consciousness – such sedimentation of an idea 
is hard to alter.  These core principles are the most important standard against which an 
actor’s adherence to an ideology should be measured.  Moreover, in order to identify what 
those core principles are, one needs to return to the historical-sociological roots of the 
ideology – the purpose for which it was conceptualised and formed.   
 
Beyond these core principles, there are also peripheral principles in the ideology.  These are 
unlikely to have constituted the original purpose of the ideology.  They are also more 
contextually restricted – temporally, geographically or within a particular socio-political 
setting.  Often peripheral principles are adjoined to the ideology because they support and 
strengthen the core principles and goals.  In a scenario in which pursuit of a peripheral 
principle might threaten or contradict a core principle, then it would be compromised if 
needed; and if it is deemed no longer useful to the core goals of the ideology, it may be 
discarded altogether.  The boundaries between the core and peripheral principles are not 
fixed and unchangeable.  Peripheral principles can increase in their ideological value and can 
shift into becoming a core principle.  This can also occur vice-versa, with a core principle 
becoming relegated to a peripheral principle; but due to the embedded nature of an original 
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core principle, this is far less likely.  This framework for understanding the relationship 
between core and peripheral principles in an ideology is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1:  The Core and Peripheral Principles in an Ideology 
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Furthermore, the principles of a given ideology are not exclusive to that ideology.  They will 
not be shared entirely by another ideology; otherwise the distinction between the two would 
be rendered obsolete.  However, there can be overlap between some principles, be they core 
or peripheral.  As a result, ideologies can sometimes be confused with similar or overlapping 
ideologies, and they can be interpreted as being the same or as always being connected.  This 
is not necessarily the case, and overlapping ideologies can remain estranged regardless of the 
connections.  In fact these can often become competing or rival ideologies.  As they might 
share principles that appeal to the same social constituency and claim to have similar (if not 
identical) goals, the competition for legitimacy and support can be fierce (for example 
between Arab nationalism and Communism, or Islamism).  Where there is regular overlap 
however, ideologies might avert conflict and instead become affiliated; and if the affiliation 
is long-standing the coalition of ideologies can come to be identified as a broad ideology in 
of itself (such as Arab nationalism with Socialism in the 1960s).  Once again, however, 
whether ideologies are affiliated or cease to be so depends on the historical context and a 
number of contingent factors (which will be highlighted later).  Figure 2 below illustrates the 
relationship between different ideologies. 
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Fig. 2:  The Relationship between Ideologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the above argues that ideas can evolve and move within an ideology, it does not 
explain in what circumstances this might occur, nor does it tell us much about the ideology’s 
relationship with politics and society externally.  For the process of ideological construction 
and implementation is not purely endogenous – external factors play an important role in 
shaping an ideology’s goals and principles, and in producing a relevant context in which it 
can operate.  This link is illustrated in the models below.  By geographical context, it is 
meant that some ideologies have macro-level concerns, for example they might have been 
formed to address regional or international issues and as a result they are not always relevant 
in a domestic setting.  This can be true the other way round, where a domestically-concerned 
ideology is not applicable in an international setting (although this is less likely as local 
ideologies will often influence an actor’s foreign policy agenda significantly).   
 
External actors can also affect the implementation and salience of ideology – if an actor’s 
allies are using rhetoric or pursuing policies that are ideological, there will be an added 
commitment for the actor to support them (for example the policies of Hamas or Iran will 
have an impact on Syria’s ideology).  Similarly, if an enemy is overtly ideological in its 
motives and policies (such as Israel), this will supply greater provocation for an ideological 
response.  It is also possible, indeed very likely, that the implementation of ideological 
policies will feed back into the external factors to make them more ideologically charged.  
This would then perpetuate the salience of ideology in a given situation. 
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Fig. 3: The Contingency of Ideological Formation and Initial Implementation 
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Fig. 4: The Contingency of Ideological Salience over time 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on this framework, if we know what are: the core principles; the peripheral principles; 
what are its competing or affiliated ideologies; and what are its opposing ideologies; then we 
would have a clearer idea of what the ideology is, and importantly what it is not.  If we also 
take into account the factors that influence ideological implementation, then we also have a 
clearer idea of: when ideology is being implemented because of the contextual relevance; 
when it is not implemented because there is a lack of contextual relevance; and finally when 
it appears to have been discarded despite it potentially being relevant in the context.   
 
If the above factors are applied, it would have a significant impact on the reading of 
ideology in the Syrian context – its meaning, its manifestation and implementation in 
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domestic or foreign policy would be understood as a more contingent phenomenon.  If 
functioning ideologies are read as being inherently contingent, we would then need to 
reassess the charges of hypocrisy often levelled at ideological actors.  That is not to say 
those charges are refuted altogether – depending on the actor and the context, those charges 
may well be accurate.  But there should be a more robust criterion for measuring whether, or 
the extent to which, an ideology has been discarded or compromised. 
 
One final caveat remains with regards to operationalising an ideological framework.  Using 
the above models, we can identify: what is an ideology; what are the core ideas and 
principles of that ideology; the contexts in which the ideology is likely to be more salient 
within a state’s foreign policy.  But how do we even trace ideological motives within a 
state’s foreign policy?  The question of ‘measurement’ and ascertaining causation remains a 
key problem with any ideational explanations.  Without a sound method for quantifying the 
presence of ideological motives within foreign policy, the deeper understanding of 
ideologies provided by the above frameworks becomes detached from the concrete policies 
of states and the empirical sources used in this study.  Moreover, without such a method it 
would not be possible to falsify an ideological explanation – the inability to falsify an 
explanation which is presented as an all-encompassing formula, in fact undermines its 
credibility.  Thus to avoid this pitfall, I propose the following methodology to connect the 
above theoretical frameworks to the empirical and historical investigations of the thesis. 
 
How we measure the importance of any factor and its role in causation is a concern for the 
social sciences in general, which often cannot rely on the quantitative and ‘objective’ 
methods of the natural sciences.  John Stewart Mill sought to confront this problem with a 
research method in which the use of questions can be used to deduce which factors are more 
significant and which are less significant in a social or political phenomenon.85  As with all 
such methods, it cannot be used to categorically determine a particular causal explanation, 
but I will use it to highlight the significance of ideology, rather than claiming to prove that it 
is the sole causal factor behind US-Syrian policy-making.   
 
According to this method, if a variable (in this case, ideological motives) was not 
particularly significant, it would capitulate when placed under pressure.  Thus we would 
need to analyse whether ideology is a continuous variable even under situations of pressure.  
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In Syria’s case, the resilience of ideology in its foreign policy, even when the conditions 
would suggest a discarding of ideology would better serve its self-interests, would act as a 
strong indicator that ideological factors are at play.  Thus the following questions should be 
posed of Syrian foreign policy: 
 
1. At times when the Syrian regime was under pressure from the US to comply (under 
sanctions and the threat of force), how did it react? 
2. When Syria lost the support of its allies because it still held to ideological principles, 
while they did not, how did it react? 
3. When Syria was offered significant concessions to discard its ideological position, 
particularly through material and financial incentives, how did it react? 
4. When Syria faced a possible failure of its goals, what impact did this have on its 
ideological policies? 
 
This set of questions is by no means exhaustive; moreover it would only provide a 
comprehensive and reliable picture of Syria’s foreign policy, and its connections with 
ideology, when used to analyse Syria’s policies over a long period of time.  However, it does 
provide us with an effective way of measuring the extent to which ideology is a factor in 
Syria’s policies towards the US; from there we can seek to understand why ideology might 
still be a factor, using the core-periphery and contingency models outlined above.  
Comparison will be used to bolster this method in two different ways: firstly, a comparison 
between Syria’s reactions and the reactions of neighbouring states who had discarded 
ideological factors; secondly, a comparison of Syria’s reactions in different historical 
periods, in order to understand the circumstances that produce continuities or indeed 
discontinuities in Syria’s foreign policy and the salience of ideology. 
 
Mill’s methods allows us to recognise the nuances and complexity of causal analyses.  Even 
if the above measurement enabled us to ascertain the importance of ideological factors in 
Syrian policies towards the US, it cannot and should not be used to rule out other factors.  
This method recognises the possibility of multiple causes – thus to use this approach is not to 
claim ideology is the sole factor behind a particular policy.  Other causes could include: self-
interest; regime stability; public opinion; personal views of the leaders; external factors 
forced on the decision-makers.  However, what this method helps to demonstrate is that the 
variable under scrutiny is a necessary component for a particular outcome.  In this case, it 
would enable us to demonstrate that ideology is an ‘insufficient but non-redundant’ factor in 
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the history of US-Syrian relations.  The thesis will seek to demonstrate that among the set of 
conditions needed to have produced such a degree of mistrust between Syria and the US 
over the decades, ideology has been one of them.  To further strengthen the argument, I will 
draw together the analyses from the historical chapters in the conclusion and compare them 
with counterfactuals and factors that can be used to falsify the argument. 
 
The next section of this chapter will apply the core-periphery distinction (shown in figures 1 
and 2) to the various ideas associated with Syrian Arab nationalism to filter out the 
principles that most accurately define Syrian ideology.  This will enable us to identify the 
core values of Syrian Arab nationalism86, its affiliated ideologies, competing ideologies and 
indeed those ideologies and principles that have erroneously been associated with it within 
the literature.  First I will analyse Arab nationalism as a whole, and examine a) how it fits 
into nationalism, and b) how it relates to the principles within nationalism, namely the roles 
of culture and liberalism.  It will be argued that it shares nationalism’s drive for 
independence and autonomy, but that it is far closer to anti-colonialism in its goals.  Second 
I will assess Syrian Arab nationalism and its connections with an affiliated ideology – that of 
Socialism.  This analysis is then extended to Arab nationalism’s relationship with the rival 
challenge of Islamism, a key competitor in the Middle East region. 
 
The last parts of this methodology (the contingency models in figures 3 and 4, and Mills’ 
methods) will be applied in the conclusion, using the findings from the historical-empirical 
chapters of the thesis. 
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2.2 Core and Peripheral Principles: 
Situating Arab Nationalism within Nationalist Ideology 
 
The first task here is to identify the core principles of Syrian Arab nationalism.  While the 
Ba’th party in Syria, which founded itself on Arab nationalist ideology, distilled its core 
principles as: ‘freedom from occupation, Independence and Arab Unity’, much of the 
literature simplifies Syria’s Arab nationalism as simply another brand of nationalism.  This 
implies that we could, therefore, simply look to the core goals of nationalism to understand 
Syrian ideology.  However, to rely on a theoretical dogma alone is not enough as this needs 
to be measured against internal evolutions in the ideology, and crucially, how it has come to 
be understood in practice.  Thus even though the term nationalism has been attached to it, to 
what extent does Syria’s ideology constitute a form of nationalism at all?  In order to answer 
this query, the core principles of Nationalism itself need to be understood and defined 
accurately.   
 
2.2.1 Defining Nationalism 
Nationalism, as Hutchinson and Smith put it, ‘is one of the most powerful forces in the 
modern world’87: it had a major influence on the American and French Revolutions of the 
18th Century, both key turning-points in western political and social history; in promulgating 
ideals of citizenship and equality on the basis of national identity, it helped to politicise 
civilians within those states; and in the long-term, as it emerged as the dominant ideology in 
Europe through state-based industrialisation and revolution during the 19th Century, it served 
to entrench the westphalian system as the modern order, giving it a moral legitimacy and an 
ideological, as opposed to just a utilitarian, character.  The following provides a basic outline 
of nationalist principles in the European intellectual tradition.   
 
For Rousseau, nationalism was an expression of loyalty to the political institutions and laws 
holding a community together; thus national symbols, history and culture are useful insofar 
as they prevent absorption of the nation’s identity into another and foster loyalty to the 
aforementioned institutions.88  Herder, however, argued that common political identity rests 
not on polity but shared culture, especially language, for political institutions are created and 
external to innate human nature, whereas unity through common language reflects one’s 
natural state.  Given this emphasis on a ‘natural’, cultural cohesion, Herder criticised the use 
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of political force and centralised bureaucracy to bind communities together.  He underplayed 
the propensity for rivalry and conflict by arguing that there can be many nations of equal 
value, existing through peaceful coexistence.   
 
In summary, both Rousseau and Herder (despite differing over the weight given to culture or 
politics), along with other ‘founders’ such as Fichte and Mazzini, saw the cultural and 
political coming together - the latter chiefly being reflected in their calls for autonomy, self-
government and popular freedom: for communities to live together, there needed to be order 
and obedience to laws, while that could only be achieved through a sense of belonging 
arising from egalitarianism.89   
 
John Stuart Mill’s later work followed on from this, bringing nationalist and liberal ideals 
together in that he argued any shared sentiment can engender nationalism, regardless of 
religion, race or culture; in line with the principle that individuals have the right to associate 
with whom they choose, he also made the case for shared and representative government.90  
The German historian Heinrich Von Treitschke offered an alternative view to the liberal-
nationalist concept that a sense of belonging must include freedom of association, arguing 
instead for the primacy of territory in defining one’s nationality, and that fulfilling the 
territorial promise of a nation was an ‘historical task’.91  Among the early European 
exponents of nationalism, Mazzini is the one notable intellectual to promote insurrection and 
armed struggle as a means to a more just, egalitarian, nationalist end.   
 
Reflecting the variation in the above definitions, two alternative interpretations can be 
identified within the broader discourse on nationalism.  Gershoni and Jankowski delineate an 
‘idealist’ and cultural perspective on the one hand, and a political approach on the other.92  
The first, promulgated by Ernest Renan (1882), Arnold Toynbee (1915), Hans Kohn (1944), 
Karl Deutsch (1953) and Benedict Anderson (1983) among others, treats nationalism as an 
organic product of, and force for, social cohesion through modes of communication, 
language, shared geography, history and religion.  The second perspective – held by the likes 
of Elie Kedourie, Gellner and John Breuilly (1993) – while not discounting culture once 
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nationalist movements are in motion, essentially sees nationalism as ‘an ideological style of 
politics’,93 which proposes that ‘the political and national unit should be congruent’.94    
 
As with all such ideologies, nationalism is not static; it is prone to fluctuations, alterations 
and evolution, being contingent on varying socio-political circumstances – thus the division 
between what constitutes ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ nationalism can often be blurred.  
Certainly political forms of nationalism will adopt familiar historical and cultural symbols to 
legitimise and substantiate projects that are, after all, nominally based on notions of popular 
representation and empowerment.  Ultimately though, we can identify the core principles of 
nationalism from this discussion as being: common political identity, founded upon and 
driven by a common culture (language and ethnicity) – the desire to bring the two elements 
together generates the principles of autonomous government, achieved via either cessation 
from other political unions, or unification of smaller entities.  Thus if culture and political 
autonomy are the core principles of nationalism, liberalism (popular representation, 
individual rights, religious pluralism based on secularism) has emerged as a very strong 
affiliated ideology.  In some manifestations of nationalism, the coalition has been so strong 
that they form a unified ideology, for example in the US.  Although nationalism is found in 
all parts of the world, including authoritarian regimes, the libertarian associations with 
nationalism even in varied contexts still remain in theory. 
 
Where then does Arab nationalism sit within an ideological framework that largely emerged 
out of Europe? And what are the areas of overlap and variation?  I will address the three 
principles of nationalism in turn: culture, liberal values and political autonomy. 
 
2.2.2 Arab Nationalism: A Cultural or Liberal Project? 
It is true that both the cultural and liberal project can be strongly traced in the intellectual 
history of Arab nationalism, where a deliberate, secular and cultural project akin to (and 
indeed borrowed from) Eurocentric nationalist accounts is outlined. Sati al-Husri was a key 
figure in the development of Arab nationalism as a cultural phenomenon, as a set of ideas 
that referred not just to the political context of colonialism, but also to (it was hoped) a more 
enduring, positive conceptualisation of Arab consciousness and identity.  His works leaned 
heavily on the form of nationalism espoused by the likes of Herder, Fichte and Arndt, 
focusing especially on the commonality of language as the cohesive element in an Arab 
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cultural community that would in turn develop into a united political community.95  As C. 
Ernest Dawn highlights, Arab nationalism has often been explained as a (mainly secular) 
Arab awakening instigated by increased contact with western science and secularism: 
Rifa’ah Rafi’ al-Tahtawi was one example of those Arab intellectuals who eulogised the 
west as an inspiration for Arab nationalism.96  On this basis, little distinction can be made 
between Arab nationalism and European nationalist models. Further supporting such a view, 
there is no escaping the origins of nationalism as an ideological reflection, legitimisation and 
promotion of the ‘nation-state’ – a product of the Europeanisation of world order through the 
westphalian state system, in which sovereignty, territory and autonomous temporal rule are 
paramount,97 as opposed to alternative political or religious concepts that have an accidental, 
secondary connection to territory.  As a result of the intellectual roots, scholars still defer to 
Arab nationalism’s apparent cultural roots when offering a definition.  Rashid Khalidi, to 
take one example, summarises Arab nationalism as: 
 
[T]he idea that the Arabs are a people linked by special bonds of language and 
history (and many would add, religion), and that their political organization should in 
some way reflect this reality.98 
 
However, all the above can only be argued in theory.  In practice, the intellectual movement 
within Arab nationalism has on the whole been unsuccessful in mobilising either popular 
opinion or regional foreign policies on the basis of culture; while aspects of liberalism, 
including civil rights and representative government, have also been completely sidelined in 
the internal politics of those states with claims to Arab nationalism.  In fact, these are the 
two areas where the practice of Arab nationalism has differed most from western models of 
nationalism.   
 
Addressing culture first, we can say that it is certainly important in that it provides a 
geographical boundary based on common language wherein Arab nationalism can operate.  
However, in terms of the intellectual cultural project outlined above, Arab nationalism has 
fared poorly in secularising traditional and even modern religious cultures.  It does have an 
appeal, but mainly for Arab elites, many of whom have been educated in the west or within 
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western institutions in the Middle East.99  Attempts to then translate common cultural 
identity into political projects have been largely fruitless: the collapse of the UAR between 
Syria and Egypt between 1958-61, and the ineffectual Arab League that still operates but 
barely registers on individual foreign policies and has little international leverage as a 
collective policy unit, are two examples of unfulfilled idealism based on a united cultural 
identity.  Here I should make a distinction between Arab nationalism and Arabism; whereas 
the former is an ideology, the latter is not, but rather it relates to the promotion of all the 
cultural facets shared and expressed within Arab identity without political aims.  Thus I am 
not suggesting that Arabism is not widespread– Arabic and Arab film, music and literature, 
for example, are all very popular and are shared across the region.  However, if they are then 
harnessed for a specific political agenda, it is more often than not because they connect to 
anti-colonial sentiments parallel to the political campaigns of the ideologists. 
 
Part of the difficulty for Arab nationalism in using existing culture for greater political goals, 
is that it encroaches on other loyalties that have ample cultural and political substance to 
foster socially cohesive identities at local levels.  Two such loyalties will be briefly 
highlighted here (although they could be broken down even further to include tribal, ethnic 
and sectarian loyalties): these being statist nationalism and Islam.   
 
The first concept, statist nationalism, has taken root as an inevitable by-product of practical 
realities.  As Humphreys states:  
 
[State] boundaries that were purely colonial fictions created out of thin air in 1920 by 
Britain and France for their own convenience – had become sacred and immutable in 
1950.100 
 
State patriotism, as an obstacle or challenger to Arab nationalism’s regionalism, has emerged 
in all of the Arab states, and most influentially in Egypt and Iraq.  Humphreys argues that an 
Egyptian, as opposed to Arab, nationalism was crystallised by British occupation in 1882, 
articulating a strong sense of historical and cultural identity that had long existed within its 
stable geo-political boundaries; thus, in this sense, Nasser’s Arab nationalism marked a 
temporary interlude before Egypt returned to statism under Sadat.  Donald Reid argues that 
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Pharaonic symbolism has provided Egyptians with a strong counter-nationalism,101 predating 
Arabism and connecting them to an overlapping African identity as well.   
 
Similarly in Iraq, while initially Arab nationalism was employed to foster greater cohesion 
among its ethnically diverse population, ideological sentiments were to a large degree 
subverted under Saddam Hussein’s rule – conversely so, given that it joined Syria in the 
ranks of Ba’thism in 1966 and that Hussein was most vocal in extolling pan-Arabism in his 
foreign policy.  As Wieland, Humphreys and Tripp argue, the regime’s self-interest and 
‘Stalinist’ repression, and the alienation of the Kurdish and Shi’a populations, prevented a 
greater level of ideologisation of Iraq’s security-driven priorities.102   
 
Moreover, Iraq frequently departed from an Arab nationalist agenda by hailing its separate 
Mesopotamian past.  Indeed, notwithstanding the personal, power-political rivalry between 
the leaders of Syria and Iraq, Syria’s perception of Iraq as corruptors of Ba’thist ideology 
contributed to their mutual antipathy.  Such counter-cultures were effectively channelled into 
political projects of state-building, which rivalled and hindered the intellectuals’ calls for 
political unity based on a broader Arab culture. 
 
The second challenge highlighted above, Islam, has provided important cultural symbols, 
historical narratives and idioms, which are often used by Arab nationalists to encourage the 
very sentiments that its own secular, cultural discourse fails to invoke.  Islam in some ways 
is the more problematic of the two competing loyalties highlighted here, at least 
conceptually: while Arab nationalism can at least purport to be a separate phenomenon from 
state nationalisms, which are at times denigrated as products of western colonialism, its 
cultural symbols often collide with similar unifying concepts in Islam – for example the 
Ummah, historical ‘heroes’ such as Salah al-Din Ayyubi, and even Arabic as a revered 
language (albeit for differing rationales).103  The Syrian regime, for example, regularly 
employs the above religious reference points among others to simultaneously serve its 
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ideological goals and tap into the population’s religious loyalties.  It should be noted here 
that Islam does not necessarily provide a uniform identity that automatically fills the 
‘cultural void’ of nationalism as promulgated in Islamist thought,104 indeed it accommodates 
localised cultural pluralism; nor is there such a high degree of religiosity in Arab society that 
only an Islamic culture appeals; but it is the case that the more generic cultural references 
that Arab nationalists would seek to draw upon tend to be framed in a religious context, 
thereby helping to raise their authenticity. 
 
Thus the cultural project of Arab nationalist ideology as articulated by its chief proponent 
Sati al-Husri has not succeeded because, on the one hand, state-based nationalism resists the 
homogenisation of interests, identities and collective action, while on the other hand its 
symbols and emotional appeal are often absorbed within Islam, reserving little for the banks 
of a secular transnational loyalty. 
 
Where, then, does this leave the liberal programme that became attached to many of the 
successful nationalist movements in Europe, and which was ideologically adopted by Arab 
nationalist doctrines.105  In practice the two ideologies have been very divergent on this 
front.  Most European nationalisms became attached to the concept of citizenship, and 
thereby a route to economic, political but also social transformation; it often represented the 
emerging middle class whose social upward mobility was previously prevented by the 
dominance of elites seeking to preserve their influence and stake within the state.106   
 
Popular franchise, human rights legislation, civil liberties, thus became the goals of liberal 
nationalist movements in Europe; although those movements had varying and in some cases 
very questionable success, these principles eventually became fixed on the states’ 
constitutional and political landscapes, not just theoretically but to a significant degree in 
practice as well.  To take Syria’s case however, the Ba’th party failed to bring about its 
original constitutional goals for domestic freedoms and representation.  Rather the 
democratic process has been thoroughly stifled and civilian freedoms have been sacrificed to 
safeguard the interests and authority of the minority regime.  Indeed it is Syria’s 
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authoritarianism and repression of dissent that is at the heart of a materialist, power-political 
diagnosis of Syrian foreign policy.107   
 
This divergence in the outcomes of the European and Arab nationalist movements can partly 
be understood by recognising that the context of repression and domination that the 
nationalist movements were challenging was different in Europe and the Middle East.  In 
Europe, the struggle for equality, representation and recognition of ‘the masses’ was 
contested mostly within states through civil wars and internal revolutions;108 in the Middle 
East, and indeed throughout the ‘Third World’, nationalist movements were essentially anti-
colonial with the struggle for equality and freedom transferred to an international level, 
contested between the local populations and their external colonisers.  This is not to say that 
conflicts did not exist internally within the old colonial states.  Certainly in Syria, as 
elsewhere, there was internal struggle for equality and resentment towards the dominance of 
ruling Syrian elites, many of whom were formed under colonial rule.  But as Halliday and 
Alavi argue: 
 
While the ideologies of power and opposition found in these societies are, in the first 
instance, concerned with internal, domestic, conflict, the issue of external relations 
and the role of external forces is always central and forms a vivid part of the world 
view that sustains such movements.109 
 
In recent history, those in power in Syria have been very successful in dealing with the 
opposition.  Certainly, domestic conflict is always of paramount concern; but the holders of 
power have so successfully crushed any organised form of dissent in the past as to make it 
an untenable and desperate business.  The uprisings in the spring of 2011 marked a dramatic 
change in the public’s willingness to challenge the leadership, but for many the brutal 
crackdown by the regime will have confirmed their existing fears.110   In such circumstances, 
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external relations and the role of foreign forces that was already central, gains a heightened 
importance among both the forces in power and those in opposition.  Thus in practice, Arab 
nationalism does not represent the liberal project, while those calling for domestic reforms 
recognise that Arab nationalist ideology is not intended to offer a solution to local 
grievances, and is chiefly relevant at a regional level. 
 
2.2.3 The Search for Political Autonomy: Roots in Anti-Colonialism 
This leaves us with the principle of political autonomy as the remaining connection between 
Arab nationalism and broader nationalist ideology.  With the cultural project lagging behind 
as a predominantly elitist agenda, and the liberalisation of domestic politics never having 
taken off, Arab nationalism (meaning the ideology, and not Arabist culture or identity) has 
emerged as an overwhelmingly political and anti-colonial movement, especially in terms of 
its popular appeal; its potency is based on anti-hegemonism and resistance to external 
intervention in line with other non-aligned movements during the Cold War.111  Indeed, the 
legitimacy and continued relevance of Arab nationalism among the masses is dependent on 
this principle, with which it can appeal to both secular and religious elements in the region.   
 
Thus while Bassam Tibi may describe Husri as ‘the spiritual father of Arab nationalism’, 
and while it may well have been the case that, in terms of its cultural and intellectual basis 
Arab nationalism was inherently an extension of European ideology, such characteristics 
were pushed into the background when it came to political mobilisation.  For all the 
romanticism and cultural references in Arab nationalist literature, the ideology’s potency, 
practical resonance and political realisation has been manifested since its emergence in the 
20th century as a struggle for political and economic autonomy from external great power 
domination, whether during the Arab Revolt in 1920, the Syrian uprising against the French 
in 1945, the 1956 Suez crisis or even during the failed wars of 1948 and 1967.   
 
Certainly, statist nationalism and decolonisation in the Middle East and the old Third World 
sat concomitantly on the political agenda of anti-imperialists – for the practical realities of 
the international system made integration and representation contingent on the nation-state.  
And for most Arab leaderships, the statist format became fixed and accepted as the new 
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status-quo.112  But despite this ‘westernisation’ of the regional order, and its willing co-
option by elites, a dissatisfied, foundationally revisionist ideological movement remained - 
and of all the Arab states, it had the most room to manoeuvre in the fragile and dysfunctional 
Syrian state.  As long as the hegemonic ideology, be that European colonialism or 
‘Wilsonian liberalism’, or Zionism, was and is seen to legitimise the existing order and the 
region’s structural inequalities, it remains in principle challenged by, Arab nationalism.   
 
Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism is not in this case an instrumental principle en route to 
Arab solidarity and eventual unification; in fact it has come to be the reverse, that Arab 
solidarity is sought in order to close the door on external meddlers, and is most prized at 
times of opposition against an external power such as the US.  It is not an exaggeration to 
state that the raison d’être of Arab nationalism, as it has developed and has been applied by 
its political exponents, is this opposition to external hegemony and interference.  Meanwhile, 
Arab unity (especially pan-Arabism) on the basis of shared culture has been pushed to the 
margins as a peripheral principle of Arab nationalism.  Even so, this is not so far from the 
intellectual origins of the Ba’th party, for whom nationalism symbolised first and foremost a 
struggle against colonisers, before embarking upon any cultural programme.  The Ba’th 
claimed to present a comprehensive political programme with its three fundamental 
principles being: ‘Freedom from occupation; Arab independence and unity; socialism at 
home’.113 Originally, as founders of the party Salah al-Din Bitar and Michel Aflaq 
explained: 
 
[W]e saw nationalism simply as a struggle between the nation and the colonizer...In 
the country those who helped the foreigner were called traitors and those who 
opposed them nationalists.114 
 
The founders later attached a cultural and intellectual ‘awakening’ to their doctrine, but it 
was nevertheless instrumental to the struggle for autonomy:  
 
To be effective, the struggle against the colonizer had to involve a change of mind 
and of thought, a deepening of national consciousness and of moral standards.115 
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It should be highlighted that the anti-imperialist concept is not, in this case, inter-changeable 
with simple anti-westernism.  The dispute is a political one, not based in culture or 
xenophobia, as reflected in the above passages; this is further demonstrated in the activation 
of Arab nationalism against both western and Arab forces alike.116   
 
The above places a high degree of emphasis on Arab nationalism as an anti-colonial 
struggle, and brief mention now needs to be given to those powers and ideologies against 
which it has been, and is currently, directed.  The clearest enemies of Arab nationalism in its 
early stages were the European colonisers of the Middle East, Britain and France.  The 
physical occupation in the early 20th century transformed an uncertain, intellectual concept 
into a social, ideological movement, and made it a necessity and an obligation for Arab 
politicians and the masses alike.  A proto-Arab nationalism had initially focused its efforts 
on the Ottoman Turks, but this soon fizzled out with the break-up of the empire and arrival 
of the Europeans.   
 
Zionism, and later Israel, joined the ranks of Arab nationalism’s ideological opponents (little 
distinction was made between Zionism’s fundamentalist and liberal strands117); as with the 
Europeans, there was no ambiguity over Israel’s role as colonisers of Jerusalem, reminiscent 
in the view of Arab nationalists of the Crusaders – regardless of religion or race (although 
both could always be exploited), this point was sufficient to foment an enduring hostility, 
demonstrated initially towards Israel’s very existence, later towards its policies and interests.   
 
The later and current opposition towards the US and its Middle East policies is a less 
straightforward Anti-colonial stance: the US had always castigated the European powers for 
their colonialism in the region, and until the 2003 Iraq war, the US had never directly 
occupied Arab land.  However, US support for Israel and persistent interference in Middle 
East politics have portrayed the US as ‘neo-colonialists’.118  The socialist principle within 
Ba’thism, in particular, provides it with yet a further rationale to oppose the US and its 
strategic-economic policies.  Thus for contemporary Arab nationalists in the region, 
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freedom, their core mantra, is not simply achieved through self-determination, but via the 
deeper notion of agency both in domestic and foreign affairs. 
 
Given this analysis, filtering out the main objectives of Arab nationalism in praxis, it is more 
logical to position it closer to other non-western post-colonial nationalist movements, 
articulated for example in the works of Marcus Garvey and Franz Fanon,119 which define 
anti-colonialism and revolution at the core of their ideology.  Tibi recognises the anti-
hegemonic character of Arab nationalism, but spends most of his work focusing on the 
intellectual writings of European nationalists and especially their Arab off-shoot, Sati al-
Husri; considering the heavy cultural emphasis of Husri, and the liberal associations of the 
European nationalists, it is no wonder that Tibi makes numerous claims pertaining to the 
‘death’ and obsolescence of Arab nationalism in the contemporary Middle East.  Similarly, 
Dawisha does not look to the potency of anti-colonialism in Arab nationalist ideology, 
focusing rather on its failure to deliver Arab unity.  Tibi, Dawisha and Ajami dismiss the 
role of Arab nationalism by judging it with criteria that have largely been peripheral to the 
Arab nationalist project for much of the last century, at least in practice.   
 
By paying greater attention to Arab nationalism’s core principle of anti-colonialism and 
freedom from the influence of external hegemonic forces, it is possible to argue that the 
ideology has a continued relevance and influence in the current regional context, albeit 
having to negotiate its primacy with Islamism as a fellow anti-imperialist movement on the 
one hand, and statist nationalism as a negating influence on the other. 
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2.3 Affiliated Ideologies: Arab nationalism and Socialism 
 
Although not central to all branches of Arab nationalism, the Ba’th party brought socialism 
into its doctrine as a domestic aim.  Socialism presents a particular case of internal variations 
of ideological interpretation, unsurprisingly given its intellectual development in both 
western and non-western regions, and in hegemonic and anti-colonial contexts.120  How then 
did the Ba’th party originally construe socialism within its own nationalist agenda?  How 
does Ba’thist anti-colonialism and socialism support each other, which is given primacy?  
Furthermore, one of the recurring questions to arise in relation to Syrian foreign policy, 
particularly during the Cold War, is the extent to which the regime was under the influence 
of the Soviet Union; and thus, how far was Syria’s Ba’thism, with both its principles of anti-
imperialism and domestic-socialism, merely an Arab extension and imitation of Soviet 
Communism?  If there was much borrowing in terms of ideology, and dependence in terms 
of strategy and policy, might Syria’s ostensibly ideological position against the US in fact 
represent a case of Third World bandwagoning with the Soviet Union, and what impact, 
then, did its collapse have on Syrian foreign policy?121 
 
2.3.1 Socialism at home and abroad 
Historically, there have been important links between Syria and the USSR highlighting the 
close relations between a relatively weak state and a superpower.  However, ideologically, 
Syrian socialism often, and deliberately, retained a clear distance from communism.  From 
early on, socialist ideologues and activists made in-roads into Syrian politics, playing a key 
role in opposing the Syrian elites and politicians who emerged under the French mandate.  
Heading the socialist movement since the 1930s and setting up the Arab Socialist Party in 
1945 was Akram Hawrani, an activist from Hama anxious to participate directly in political 
action;122 in his earlier years he had founded his own Youth Party in opposition to the 
dominant National Bloc in Syrian politics.  He was motivated by a clear domestic agenda 
against Syrian landowners and ‘feudalism’, and on several occasions was able to mobilise 
violent uprisings and mass demonstrations by the peasantry – an important factor in the 
politicisation of Syria’s rural communities and in encouraging a revolutionary style of 
politics among the grass-roots.123   
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Such campaigns were hardly any different from the principles of the Communists in Syria, 
but rather than bring the two groups closer together, they provoked opposition and rivalry 
from the marginalised Communists.   With Bitar and ‘Aflaq’s Ba’th party growing in 
popularity, and the gradual consolidation of their nationalist ideas into a more concrete 
ideology, their meeting and joining forces with Hawrani in December 1952 was a turning-
point for Ba’thism and Syrian politics in general.  With this newly forged ideological 
coalition between what Seale describes as, ‘perhaps the most astute and the most principled 
men in Syrian public life’124, the most active and scathing anti-hegemonist forces in Syria 
had come together.  The domestic grievances against inequality and corrupt ruling elites who 
had cooperated with the French, could easily be brought under the international context of 
resisting foreign domination.  Within the ideological development of the Ba’th, it became 
clear that fighting the ‘oppression’ and inequality at home was a means of resisting 
imperialists abroad.   
 
Secularism also appealed as a mutual feature between socialism and nationalism, albeit 
based on different rationales – according to the socialist perspective, religion alienates its 
adherents from themselves the more they give to God, in a similar fashion to capitalist 
extraction from the labourer, whereas for nationalism, religion is more a problem of 
misdirected loyalty that should be granted to the nation. 
 
In terms of foreign policy, Syria became one of the strongest Cold War allies of the Soviet 
Union in the Middle East, brought together by mutual strategic interests no doubt, but also 
united further by shared socialist ideals and suspicion towards the US and its European 
partners.  The USSR’s strategic interests were clearly served by the alliance – its long-term 
goal had been to control the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles in order to gain easy 
naval access to the regions beyond, plus to block European access through the Black Sea;125 
furthermore, the pro-western Baghdad Pact would bring NATO and the US’ influence to the 
Soviet Union’s front door.  Providing support to emerging ‘revolutionary’ states in the 
Middle East was a logical step towards rebuilding a buffer zone between the USSR and the 
western sphere of influence, while at the same time aiding its ideological project.  
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Syria, in turn, mainly depended on the Soviet Union for defensive reasons.  By 1955, Syria, 
already beset with internal political instability, was under increasing military threat from 
Israeli border raids, and pro-western encirclement by Iraq and Turkey.  Encouraged by 
Syria’s opposition to the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Union stepped in to offer ‘aid in any form 
whatsoever for the purpose of safeguarding Syria’s independence and sovereignty’.126  The 
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars when the Soviet Union directly supported the Syrian (and 
wider Arab) cause against Israel and the US, and in particular the high degree of arms 
supplies and military assistance, stand out as clear examples of strong Syrian-Soviet 
relations during the Cold War. 
 
However, despite this emphasis on their defensive-strategic relationship, it is important to 
note that Syrian dependence on the Soviet Union was also ideological.  Syria’s ideology had 
its own indigenous roots, and may have developed independent to the Soviet Union’s anti-
imperialist agenda, but during the Cold War, Syria’s alliance with the Soviet Union allowed 
it to broaden its ideological framework from anti-hegemonism in the Middle East, to 
viewing itself as being part of a global struggle.  There was not merely a bipolar 
international security structure in place during the Cold War, but importantly an 
international ideological structure; the Soviet Union led the faction that purported to stand 
against imperialism, the old Great powers and their colonial policies, and in that sense Syria 
willingly followed the Soviet model in strategic and diplomatic policies out of ideological 
commitment.  And yet despite the connections, socialism was not a core principle in Syrian 
Arab nationalism, but could be more accurately described as an affiliated ideology. 
 
2.3.2 Arab nationalist first, socialist second 
Given the above, the question remains – to what extent is socialism still an affiliated 
ideology, how strong is the coalition between Syrian Arab nationalism and socialism? While 
Ba’thist regimes embarked enthusiastically on socialist programmes after the revolution in 
1963, it has had a notably lacklustre uptake in public opinion compared to the other pillars in 
the Ba’th party slogan – Arab unity and freedom from occupation.  This can be attributed to 
two basic reasons.   
 
The first is because effective socialism at home was impractical from early on due to the 
lack of industrialisation and levels of development needed for such a system.  Although a 
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crude measure, a basic comparison between doctrine and implementation will serve to 
elucidate the inherent problems with Syria’s socialist project:  A feature of socialism, as 
articulated by Henri Saint-Simon, is that it is should be implemented with the emergence of 
new, socio-economic, industrialising systems, running with the tide of modernisation and 
historical progress,127 in which innovators and producers – scientists, engineers, artists, 
industrialists128 – take over the reins of society.  Famously for Marx and Engels, this new 
triumphant class was the proletariat, the one social class able to bring about emancipation 
from the injustice of a capitalist system.  While this was inevitable with historical 
development, they argued it still required agency and action on the part of the workers – in 
other words, forcing change through revolution in order to mirror the socio-economic 
transformations already taking place.129   
 
The attempts by the Ba’th party before and after they came to power, to industrialise the 
country and urbanise the population through a rapid and sudden process of change – 
accompanied by eager ideological rhetoric designed to mobilise greater following among the 
people – certainly reflected the revolutionary nature of socialist systemisation advocated by 
its intellectuals.  However, a socialist revolution required the prevalence and subsequent 
upheaval of a capitalist system, in which the proletariat represent the oppressed class 
struggling and overturning the ruling bourgeoisie – no doubt, social mobilisation depended 
on such emotive rhetoric and imagery.   
 
Syria’s predominantly agricultural economic system had not reached an industrial level 
conducive to such a revolution, thus promoting notions of a class struggle in order to drive a 
socialist agenda had little resonance with the Syrian masses; as the Soviet and Chinese 
models have demonstrated, structural economic changes can be forcibly implemented at 
great human cost, but despite possessing the necessary level of political centralisation Syria 
did not have the resources, stability or demographic capacity to complete such an overhaul.  
For sure, socialist policies certainly had an impact on notions such as equal access to 
services, education and welfare.  Such changes should not be underestimated.   
 
But overall, socialism at home, while not without some benefits, in reality translated into 
another function of state control.  In fact, rather than furthering the ideological cause among 
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the growing urban population, it is now often blamed for the country’s economic stagnation 
and has instead become a focus of criticism against the regime. Indeed the limited success 
and appeal of socialism in Syria is now coming to light with increased pressure for 
liberalisation of the economy and education, not from the usual quarters of opposition but 
from economists, entrepreneurs and academics. 
 
The second reason that socialism has not been popularised is that the domestic dynamics of a 
socialist ideological agenda have largely been overshadowed by its utility for Syria’s 
international relations, especially during the Cold War.  If, as was maintained by Syria’s 
ideologues, an important impact of a capitalist system was the creation of an international 
market, used as a means of spreading capitalist values and practices across borders to other 
societies, then socialism could be used as a means of resisting such economic encroachment.  
Thus the main appeal of socialism at home as viewed by the nationalist elements in the Ba’th 
party and as presented to public, was as an expression of autonomy from external powers.  
The co-option of socialism as an ideological principle was, and remains, a utilitarian move: 
domestic production, self-sufficiency, state control of public services and employment were 
deemed as efficient ways of holding back covert foreign influence through investment, aid 
and trade.  It also saved the Syrian state from the political binding and indebtedness to 
foreign (especially western) forces, which other Arab states had fallen prone to.   
 
It should be remembered that the socialist roots in Ba’thist ideology were introduced initially 
through a pragmatic and logical alliance between Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party and was 
never in of itself at the heart of the Arab nationalist agenda.  Whether adopted by the Ba’th, 
Nasser in Egypt, or other ‘revolutionary’ Arab states, socialism emerged as the natural ally 
indirectly through Arab neutralism in the Cold War.  For Syria, this stance was adopted by 
the regime in 1950-1 before it was picked up by Nasser, reflecting, as Seale argues, their 
bitter experiences under the French mandate, ‘resentment at the defeat in Palestine and the 
West’s part in the creation of Israel’,130 and not necessarily a pro-Soviet position at that 
point.   
 
Hawrani’s socialist party had expressed its goals in identical fashion to the nationalists, in 
1950 calling for a foreign policy ‘free from all foreign orientation or influence’,131 and had 
united with the Ba’th against the military dictator Shishakli in 1952 when reports emerged 
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that Syria was about to join the western Middle East Defence Pact; moreover, in addition to 
these connections, and as ‘Aflaq explained, the militarism of Hawrani’s party, and his 
connections in the army, were deemed necessary for the Ba’th’s step-up to ‘the period of 
party warfare’ that would be needed to precipitate revolution.132 
 
That the main appeal of socialism for the Ba’th was its inherent anti-hegemonism and not its 
Marxist overtones, was made all the clearer by the Ba’th’s rivalry with and hostility towards 
the Syrian Communist party and its more thorough, alternative socialist doctrine. ‘Aflaq 
explained that initially, on first encountering Communists during his earlier travels as a 
student in Europe, he admired them because they were persecuted by the authorities, but 
nevertheless was ‘suspicious of their dogmatic views’.133  But by 1936, ‘Aflaq and Bitar 
were completely disillusioned by the ideology when the Syrian Communists argued for a 
mere relaxation of the French mandate, but nevertheless agreed with its retention: 
 
The Syrian Communist Party became nothing more than an executive tool of its 
French parent party and the French Government in general...Indeed its very existence 
became dependent on France’s continued hold over Syria...it forgot its real enemies 
and concentrated instead on attacking Franco, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mussolini, and 
other enemies of France and Russia, while allying itself to political and social 
reaction at home.134 
 
Furthermore, the Ba’th recognised that the Soviet Union was pursuing its own interests in 
the Middle East, and that ‘the Arabs’ should not be ideologically attached to the Soviet 
Union (as Arab Communists were), but should similarly pursue their own independent 
policies.  In 1944, they published their manifesto, in which they highlighted the difference 
between ideological and political dependence and accepting strategic support and alliance 
from the USSR: 
 
We are not against the Soviet Union as a state...The Arabs see no necessity to oppose 
a great state like the Soviet Union which, from its inception, has shown sympathy for 
countries fighting for their independence.  Our aim is to establish friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union by means of official inter-governmental treaties and not 
through the medium of the local Communist Party....But the well-informed Arab 
cannot be Communist giving up Arabism.  The two are mutually exclusive.135 
 
It was a clear statement of independence, all the more significant given that it came at the 
same time that the Soviet Union was lending its first gesture of support to Syria over 
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Lebanon, a move that had strongly enthused other political parties in Syria, including the 
government, towards the superpower.  Thus in 1954, in Syria’s first open elections since 
independence, a wave of nationalist fervour brought a number of anti-western individuals to 
Parliament, including Khalid Baqdash, a Communist deputy.  However, even the US, 
inclined to view any such developments as evidence of Soviet infiltration recognised that it 
was: ‘more as an assertion of anti-Westernism with pro-Soviet overtones than as an 
expression of actual Communist sentiment.’136 
 
This distancing from its loyalties to socialism and the USSR, despite the latter’s power and 
influence, was at times demonstrated at the foreign policy level as well.  As the above 
demonstrates, the appeal of a close alliance with the Soviet Union was based on its overt 
anti-imperialism and opposition towards Israel and the US, as well as the revolutionary 
model that it had set.  A Syrian-Soviet alliance was entirely in keeping with Syria’s 
interpretation of Arab nationalism as an anti-colonial doctrine.  If at any point the USSR 
sought to encroach on Syrian independence and autonomous policy-making at the regional 
level, Syria notably distanced itself from the Soviets, especially under Hafez Asad’s 
presidency.137  He did not shirk from asserting Syrian independence when deemed 
necessary, most notably prior to the 1973 war with Israel.138 
 
When the USSR went into decline, Arab nationalism certainly took a corollary hit.  It aided 
Syrian disillusionment with the state of international affairs, particularly at a time when 
Syria was becoming increasingly isolated at both the regional and global level.  Mohammed 
Ayoob argues that the end of the Cold War in fact weakened socialist-oriented nationalisms 
in the ‘South’, whether Arab, African, Asian or Latin American.  The removal of the USSR 
as a counter-balance to western/northern intrusion ‘signalled a major triumph for economic 
liberalism that provided ideological justification for penetrating weak and vulnerable 
Southern economies and polities’, undermining the potency and value of both socialism and 
nationalism as forces of resistance and autonomy.139  Indeed, it does appear to have been the 
overall impact on post-colonial nationalisms on a global level; the collapse of the Soviet 
Union certainly generated a period of doubt and a security impulse among most Middle 
Eastern states to bandwagon with the US in its ‘unipolar moment’, and it did cause the 
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Syrian government to operate with greater caution within the international and regional 
setting.   
 
However, as outlined above, Syria had not been dependent on the USSR for its sense of 
moral purpose against the US and the west in general, even if it was heavily dependent in 
terms of methods and resources.  Its anti-hegemonic discourse and ideological rationale were 
not imports from the Cold War but were emergents of indigenous historical experiences, not 
just French occupation, but also regular interference and attempted control from its 
neighbours, and American intervention and support for Israel.  Secondly, as was evident 
after the Camp David Agreements in 1978 and the ensuing Israeli-Egyptian truce, Syria 
often demonstrated that it was able to refocus its sense of ideological purpose from the 
collapse of an alliance.  Without underestimating the disillusionment and set-back that the 
demise of the Soviet Union represented for the Syrians, it is possible to argue that it enabled 
Syria to forge a distinctly Arab nationalist role for itself in the region and vis-à-vis the US, 
while its demands and goals were no longer overshadowed by the politics of the Cold War.  
Syria was now able to take up the mantle as enemies of Israel and the US on its own 
ideological terms, bringing its own agenda to the fore.  In sum, this demonstrates the typical 
relationship between affiliated ideologies, as outlined at the start; and thus a dilution of a 
socialist agenda in Syria should not be read as a contradiction of its core ideological goal. 
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2.4 Rival Ideologies: Arab Nationalism and Islamism 
 
Having analysed the core and peripheral principles of Arab nationalism, and its affiliations 
with socialist ideology, we now finally look at its rival ideologies.  Arab nationalism may 
have effectively become an anti-imperialist movement, but it does not enjoy a monopoly of 
that role in the region and has always needed to prove its credibility ahead of competing 
narratives of anti-hegemonism.  In Syria, communism and socialism, as discussed in the 
previous section, challenged for the mantle particularly during the 1950s and 60s, while 
Islamism emerged as the main rival to Arab nationalism most notably during the 1970s and 
80s.   
 
2.4.1 Competing revisionists 
The intensity of the rivalry between Arab nationalists and Islamists can be explained by their 
fundamental disagreement over religion and secularism; but it can also be attributed to their 
similarities, in terms of their transnationalism, hostility towards Zionism, appropriation of 
the Palestinian cause, as well as usage of cultural symbols as highlighted earlier.  As Tibi, 
Itamar Rabinovich and Sylvia Haim note,140 the two ideologies even share some common 
intellectual roots, since Arab nationalism was not solely founded upon western nationalist or 
socialist discourse.   
 
Those roots can be traced to the religio-political movement that grew in the 19th Century, 
alternately labelled as Islamic modernism, Islamic revivalism or pan-Islamism, to give a few 
examples, and carried forward by the likes of Jamal al-Din ‘Al-Afghani’, Muhammad 
Abduh (from Egypt) and Rashid Rida (born in Syria, educated in Egypt), these being some 
of the most prominent Islamists.  They were heavily critical of the Ottoman rulers for 
abusing the status and purpose of the Islamic Caliphate through corruption and repression.  
The Ottoman rulers’ divergence from traditional Islamic principles and their increased 
leaning towards the West, most notably after the Crimean War, were highlighted as the 
reasons for the Caliphate’s clear decline and vulnerability.   
 
Such views were not necessarily based on an aversion to modernity in of itself, indeed the 
corruption that was the focus of their criticism was also a major obstacle to economic and 
political progress; but rather their criticisms were directed at modernisation through 
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Westernisation reflected most overtly through the reforms of the ‘Tanzimat’ period.  It was 
not a structural ‘revolution’ that they were calling for –but rather for a spiritual reformation 
and the removal of western influence while the need to preserve the Caliphate itself was 
never in doubt.  Notably, apart from Rida, they did not argue for an ‘Arabisation’ of the 
Caliphate; while their attacks on the Ottomans were viewed by some as being open to 
nationalist interpretation, they did not offer, indeed they often refuted, the nationalist 
alternative.  They saw themselves as following a long tradition in Islamic history of 
revivalism (tajdid), treading the same path as classical Islamic scholars such as Ibn 
Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyam, whom they regularly referred to, in holding the leaders and 
societies to account.  They argued that progress and modernisation would be achieved by 
returning to authentic Islamic traditions, and not by discarding them as held by the 
secularists.   
 
In this sense, Islamism refuted the causal relationship between modernisation and 
secularisation that was crystallised in the west, and similarly articulated by Arabist 
intellectuals.  This claim to religious authenticity was an important component of early 
Islamist movements, and as is still the case, could be used to undermine other domestic 
political movements.  It is on this basis that they justify their political activism to their wider 
societies where there has historically been a resistance to the integration of politics and 
religion, and where traditionalists who argue against such politicisation as a corruption of, 
and distraction from, true religious ideals, tend to (initially) have a greater following.   
 
The next notable wave of Islamism came after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and the 
founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, which was soon exported to other 
parts of the Middle East.  The movement broadly took on many of the principles outlined 
above: the importance given to indigenous spiritual revival, the commitment to a resurgent 
Caliphate, the ‘comprehensiveness’ of religion – including its application to politics, and in 
particular, an even more vehement opposition towards the west and colonial imposition;141 
change was advocated through a combination of preaching, political activity, and later, 
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‘physical struggle’, given that the colonial powers themselves had a military presence in the 
region.142   
 
From this summary of Islamist thought and development, it is possible to delineate the areas 
in which Islamists and Arab nationalists clash, and where they compete and seek to outdo 
each other.  Firstly, they differ on issues of identity and primary loyalty, the former holding 
to religion and the latter to autonomy of the Arab nation; both adhere to notions of 
transnational solidarity, but once again, the theoretical boundaries of this broad community 
are premised on alternative concepts; while Arab nationalism does not negate the role of 
religion as a tradition, it advocates secularism both as a fundamental and instrumental 
principle for the sake of representation, contra to the Islamists.  They even differ on the 
crucial notion of anti-colonialism, in that the Arab nationalists oppose any external 
domination, while, in essence, the Islamists oppose domination from un-Islamic forces 
(although this does not rule out fellow Muslims).   
 
However, in the context of post-war colonisation by European powers, which both 
movements were born into and which absorbed their priorities, Islamists and Arab 
nationalists were unified in their objectives, methods, and rhetoric.  One might wonder why 
there was not a stronger alliance between the two, akin to that of the Arab nationalists and 
socialists; but a fear from both sides that the other would become a stronger force, and a 
perception among the Islamists that they had lost a great deal more since the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire than the nationalists – thus feeding a view that the nationalists were 
colluders – prevented any effective coalition and ensured that the rivalry persisted. 
 
2.4.2 Arab nationalists and Islamists, at home and abroad 
As intimated at the start, ideologies take on different levels of salience in different contexts - 
this is particularly the case with Arab nationalism, it being concerned with wider regional 
issues and not just the domestic situation.  In extension to this, it is not just the relevance of 
the ideology itself that might alter between the international and domestic setting, but also its 
relationships with other ideologies; this can be seen with Arab nationalism’s links with 
Islamism. 
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Clifford Geertz argues that ideologies are born in the throes of change, providing people 
with a means to reorient themselves to the social world in a period of disruption, and when 
the previous established order cannot be relied upon.  Geertz attributes the social dissonance, 
within society and between it and the elites, to secularisation rather than to class conflict, 
and argues that ideology can be used to manage these problems.143  Given that Ba’thism in 
Syria has led to the secularisation of politics, and partially of society, to what extent has it 
been able to manage the ‘social dissonance’ and the predictable alienation of the 
predominantly Sunni population from the minority Alawite regime? 
 
On the domestic front, Islamism and Ba’thist Arab nationalism have not coexisted well 
together; by and large the Syrian regime has been successful in eliminating the Islamist 
challenge within the state, certainly it has been far more successful than some of its 
neighbours. A number of reasons, apart from sheer ruthlessness on the part of the regime’s 
security apparatus, can be identified.   Keddie highlights the role of rapid economic 
development and oil income in augmenting the influence of Islamist movements within most 
nationalist states.  Thus extensive urbanisation exacerbates the visible differential treatment 
between the poor and wealthy in the cities, while profits from oil help to speed up the 
process of urbanisation, and with it ‘income gaps, corruption, and visible wealth for the 
few’.   
 
Such circumstances, accompanied by widespread popular discontent, make the political 
environment ripe for the rise of Islamism as a supposedly more equitable and frugal 
alternative to the status-quo.    Moreover, Keddie argues, such governments are more likely 
to have experienced a heavy western impact and level of control, adding to their 
unpopularity; Iran, Egypt and Tunisia are cited as typical examples of this in the past.144  But 
in Syria, economic development and urbanisation have been slower than in other states in 
the region (especially since Syria was already behind in this respect); thus the suppression of 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s uprising in Hama in 1982 was successful not only due to the 
disproportionate military force that was unleashed on the small provincial city, but also due 
to the relative ease with which the activists could be isolated and contained within one part 
of the country.  Keddie agrees that Syria does not fit the ‘socio-economic profile of a state 
that encourages the growth of Islamism’.145  Moreover, unlike the examples given above, 
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Syria has held fast to its revisionist stance and maintains its criticism of, and distance from, 
the western powers.  Both factors have helped to dissipate Islamist fervour in Syria. 
 
However, with the relentless pursuit of socialist reforms since the ascendancy of the Ba’th in 
1963, the process of urbanisation, while still not as extensive as in other parts of the Middle 
East, was still accelerated at a destabilising rate for the class and social structures in the 
existing urban centres; at least enough to stimulate increased opposition from Islamist 
activists and sympathisers, of which there were a growing number in the 60s and 70s.  
Islamism in Syria has largely been carried forward by the Muslim Brotherhood – set up in 
1935 in Aleppo (where the headquarters remained until 1944) they were an extension of the 
Egyptian movement but lacking in their political and military experience, popularity and 
distinctiveness from the wider nationalist movement.  In the 1950s, the Brotherhood in Syria 
put forward a concept of Islamic Socialism, to highlight the commonalities between the two 
on issues of equality, social welfare and combating poverty, briefly bringing them closer 
together with the Ba’th and Hawrani’s Socialist Party; however by 1961 the term 
‘Socialism’ was removed altogether from their rhetoric and replaced with a more overtly, 
albeit more general, programme that promoted similar objectives as before, but through the 
‘establishment of a virtuous polity which would carry out the rules and teachings of 
Islam’.146  While Batatu describes their central slogans as being ‘no more definite’, popular 
but lacking in practical utility and clarity, they nevertheless represented a religious-oriented 
challenge to the secularism of the communists, socialists and the rising Ba’thists.147 
 
Currently, the Brotherhood have no route to political power; yet an ‘Islamic’ public opinion 
continues to motivate the regime to safeguard its Arab nationalist credentials and restrain 
(although not necessarily abandon) cynical power-political campaigns in the region.  When 
the Syrian regime intervened against the Palestinians in Lebanon, pinning back the 
Palestinian forces in 1976 and allowing Maronite Phalanges to exploit the lack of resistance 
and destroy the Tal az-Za’tar camp, it was heavily opposed by the Islamists at home and 
alienated much of Syrian opinion.148  It was a loss of legitimacy acutely recognised by the 
regime, particularly as they witnessed the ensuing rise in domestic conflict between the 
Islamists and the Ba’thist regime in the 70s, coming to a head in the early 80s.   
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Thus the Islamists, both at home and abroad, while subdued in the context of internal 
structures of power, continue to play an important role in propping up and revitalising the 
ideological purpose of Arab nationalism.  Although Syrian control of Lebanese affairs has 
not ceased, the bloody intervention in Lebanon in 1976 was an anomaly that will not be 
repeated willingly.  The Muslim Brotherhood, extinguished as a serious political challenger 
through sheer military force in Hama in 1982, without achieving their goals of revolution or 
redistribution of Alawite minority power, nevertheless succeeded in creating a distance 
between the ruling elite and the majority Sunni population of the country.  True, not only did 
they fail to destabilise the regime, but in fact inadvertently strengthened Alawi unity within 
the army, and between the army and the leadership.  But the atmosphere of crisis and 
rebellion which the brotherhood’s campaign fostered was at the time critical and threatening 
for the regime.149  It is not one that Hafez Asad, nor his successor, wished in any 
circumstances to battle through again.  Doubts over legitimacy when a regime is so clearly 
unrepresentative and narrowly based in its tribal and religious appeal, is a persistent 
problem; hence even a latent, disarmed opposition needs attention, either via indirect 
accommodation or outright suppression.150  Given these domestic circumstances, it has 
become logical for the regime to disproportionately promote the anti-imperialist principle, 
already central to the Ba’thist ideology, to its population.   
 
If the domestic situation between the regime and its Islamist opponents appears to be a 
struggle for power more than anything else, their connections on the regional and 
international stage take on a greater ideological character.  While Syria may not have won 
many friends with its polarising rhetoric and what might be viewed by some of its Arab 
counter-parts as moral posturing,151 it certainly has ensured that ideology has remained on 
the Middle East’s agenda and that Arab nationalism continues to be an anti-hegemonic 
reference point.  Syria’s neighbours, particularly the secular states, cannot step too far wide 
of the ideological benchmark set by the Syrians for fear of alienating their domestic 
populations and regional partners.  Syria’s stance has also had a crucial impact on the 
fortunes of regional Islamists.  During the Cold War, Islamism was galvanised by the rivalry 
of secular nationalism; both pitted themselves against conservative regimes and the United 
States.152 Since then, other Arab nationalist regimes have fallen by the wayside – Egypt, 
South Yemen, Libya, Iraq and the Palestinian Fatah movement have all demonstrated the 
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fallibility of Arab nationalism.  Against this backdrop, Syria remains as the sole ‘vanguard’ 
of Arab nationalism, promulgating it as a political and social-value system, and resisting the 
US and Israel on that front.  In this sense, Syria continues to contain, challenge as well as 
spur on its Islamist competitors.     
 
Moreover, Syria’s ideological stance does not always put it on a collision course with 
Islamism; when Islamism is manifested as a regional resistance movement, defying Israel 
and the US in alignment with Syria’s own Arab nationalist agenda, it is in fact endorsed, co-
opted and actively supported by the Syrian regime.  The points of correlation that do not 
suffice at home (such as anti-hegemonism and a transnational regional loyalty) form a 
unified and representative front in the international context.  Hizbullah and Hamas in their 
conflict with Israel, and Iran in its long-term antagonism towards the US, correspond 
entirely with the political mandate of Ba’thist ideology.  Importantly, their activities are 
undertaken within the existing framework of the nation state, 153 and are not so revolutionary 
as to destabilise the entire structure of the Middle East region, inviting yet more external 
intervention under the pretext of democracy and freedom.  In turn, this has tempered the 
conflict between Ba’thists and Islamists to a certain degree on the domestic front, especially 
when foreign policy forms such a key component of Syria’s news agenda and political 
activity.  Once again, this apparent inconsistency or even contradiction in policy is given 
meaning and clarity when understood in the context of the flexibility and contingency of 
ideologies. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
To sum up the analysis of Syrian ideology, I have argued in this chapter that its practical 
manifestation, particularly in relation to the masses of Arab opinion, has been as an anti-
colonial, anti-hegemonic project juxtaposed against oppositional forces, be that colonial 
powers, Israel or the US.  I propose that, while Arab nationalism falls within a very basic 
rubric of nationalism, viewing it through a Eurocentric lens alongside other nationalist 
movements in Europe fails to take account of its particularities and differentiation in terms 
of its core and peripheral principles, its historical development and practical realisation.  
Those core principles are political autonomy from global hegemonic and external influence, 
and freedom from occupation or imperialism – be it military, economic, or political.   
 
Crucially, in the event that a non-Arab actor supports these core principles, Syria has been 
seen to willingly lend its support and forge a strong alliance; this has been the case with Iran 
and Turkey in the past.  And in the same way, if an Arab actor contravenes these principles, 
Syria has had no hesitation in opposing it.  As the ideology’s core goals are not based on 
culture, this need not be read as a contradiction of ideology.  Indeed Arab unity, especially 
internally within the region, has evolved into a peripheral principle, except where it is 
needed to support the core principles.  Socialism remains, but tentatively so, as an affiliated 
ideology – calls for greater economic liberalisation at home, an infitah, do not therefore 
amount to a usurpation of Syrian ideology.   
 
This chapter has set out a framework for analysing ideologies within a foreign policy setting; 
it is hoped that by clarifying the definition of both ideology and Syria’s Arab nationalism in 
this way, many of the questions about ideology and how it can be operationalised in this 
study will be answered.  In particular, given that many of the realist assumptions about 
Syrian foreign policy rest on the view that Syria has frequently reneged on its ideological 
principles for the sake of power-political interests, this chapter is important in reasserting 
what those ideological principles are in the first place.  This endeavour will have 
implications for the prevailing views on Syrian foreign policy, since an awareness of its 
ideological priorities and its practical goals reduces to some extent the level of apparent 
contradictions in its international relations. 
 
Without doubt, there remain significant pitfalls with an ideational approach: firstly, if 
ideology is treated as a seemingly consolidated concept, albeit with historically embedded 
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socio-political roots, there is always the risk of reification and determinism;154 secondly, by 
highlighting the strength of ideational motives and by framing the thesis as a 
counterargument to prevailing power-political explanations, the same criticisms of mono-
causality and absolutism levelled at realist interpretations might be similarly applied to an 
‘ideological’ argument; and thirdly, in order to even study ideas, it is necessary to apply 
fairly generic analyses to diverse movements, which are not monolithic blocs but are 
represented by a variety of groups adhering to different aspirations and methodologies – 
such internal variations can be subtle or at times starkly contrasting.  There is always a risk 
that these nuances and variations are lost for the purpose of analysis.   
 
But at the same time, as Halliday and Alavi note, ‘[i]deologies are not infinitely flexible’,155 
and will retain core reference points that allow some degree of (cautious) generalisation.  It 
is possible to avoid the above methodological traps through a consciousness that they are 
ever present, and through a recognition of: a) the differences between the core (more 
important) and peripheral (less important) principles in an ideology, which in turn indicate 
when a state is likely to be intransigent or flexible in adhering to ideology; b) the ever 
contingent nature of the implementation and salience of ideologies, dependent on different 
contexts, and c) the need to ground any conclusions about the role of ideology in a state’s 
foreign policy within a thorough empirical analysis.  This last approach will be adopted 
throughout the ensuing chapters, enabling us to explore: how Syrian ideology was 
formulated and came to be implemented in the first place; the extent to which ideology 
continued to be relevant or not in later policies; the times when the ideology was adapted; 
and finally the times when it may have been discarded versus the times when it was strongly 
adhered to in US-Syrian relations. 
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Chapter 3 
The Emergence of US-Syrian Relations: From Truman to Kennedy 
 
This chapter analyses the long-term causes and evolution of policies and stances elucidated 
in the latter chapters, and aims to provide a regional and post-colonial context to the thesis.  
It analyses policies and events, but also deliberately explores the perceptions and outlooks of 
the two sides.  US-Syrian antipathy did not emerge from a negative reaction to a single 
policy – their positions were moulded in the first place by perceptions and evaluations that 
had developed over time, and incrementally from a series of encounters and activities from 
both sides in the region.  The contribution of this chapter to the thesis overall is not merely 
to provide background context, but also to demonstrate the longevity of US-Syrian mistrust 
and to argue the point that latter US-Syrian relations cannot be understood without reference 
to the region’s history in the twentieth century.   
 
The following questions have guided the research and analysis for this chapter:  What were 
the determinants of Syria’s early foreign policy, and what were its aims?  Similarly, what 
was the US’ strategy in the Middle East, and what were its aims?  What foreign policy did it 
adopt in relation to Syria in particular?  Firstly, the chapter also seeks to analyse how their 
respective aims affected their policies towards each other, and through that to account for the 
emerging ambivalence and mistrust between Syria and the US; in answer to this question, 
the chapter explores the historical factors that heightened the possibility of mutual hostility, 
as well as the immediate policies and actions that confirmed it.   
 
Possible avenues for conciliation are also addressed, as well as the reasons they ultimately 
failed.  Secondly, the chapter seeks to highlight the distinctive aspects of US’ policy towards 
Syria in comparison to other states in the region, and to provide an overview of the 
development and change in US-Syrian relations over this period; hence it follows US-Syrian 
relations through the inter-war period, and then through the Truman, Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations.  And finally the chapter will investigate the nascent roots of 
ideology in Syrian foreign policy during its immediate post-colonial history. 
 
Two potential problems with writing this chapter should be highlighted here.  Firstly, since 
Syria’s affairs were so closely bound to regional politics in this period, it is often difficult to 
address Syria separately.  Indeed doing so would result in a loss of context and explanation 
for both Syrian and American motives and policies towards each other: both viewed the 
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region as a connected whole – Syria from the perspective of Arab nationalism and the US 
from the perspective of a global Cold War.  Neither shared former colonial links, nor did 
economic resources act as a uniting factor; without direct bilateral relations to draw upon, 
particularly early on, a comprehensive approach to Arab opinion that incorporates the Syrian 
perspective has at times been necessary for the earlier period.  I have, where possible, 
distilled Syria’s position from the wider picture; at other times, Syria’s specific standpoint is 
already clear from the documents. 
 
Secondly, the chapter (as with the latter chapters) often relies on US (and in some case 
British) sources to extract Syrian opinion and perceptions; this is due to the lack of Syrian 
historical documentation, often because they were not recorded or have not survived, while 
those that have are generally not open to the public.  Nevertheless, there is extensive 
documentation of direct Syrian communication, its policies, opinions and domestic situation, 
and transcripts of conversations recorded by US ambassadors and intelligence agencies. 
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3.1 The Early Syrian State and US Isolationism 
 
This section will briefly analyse how the European mandates after the First World War laid 
the foundations for Syrian politics in the inter-war period, thereby producing a legacy of 
priorities, fears and aspirations that were built on by later political actors.  The section will 
also assess the US’ contribution to the process (often neglected because it appears to have 
been so limited), so as to provide a holistic account of US foreign policy towards Syria and 
the region by the end of the chapter.   
 
At the end of the First World War, in line with the general principle of self-determination, 
President Woodrow Wilson indicated that the US was sympathetic towards Arab aspirations, 
stating as the twelfth of his ‘Fourteen Points’ that,  
 
‘The other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an 
undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development’.156   
 
However, while this apparently demonstrated strong American support for Arab sovereignty, 
the US made no attempt to thwart the major powers’ quest for control over the Middle East; 
rather the mandate system enshrined in the US-inspired Covenant of the League of Nations 
acted as a green light.  The US held a typically isolationist stance towards the Middle East 
and saw European control over the region to be in the best interests of all parties involved 
(for the time being).   
 
US isolationism was temporarily postponed in May 1919 when it sent two prominent 
businessmen, Henry King and Charles Crane, on a fact-finding mission to Syria (then 
including Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon) and Iraq.  By sending an academic and a 
businessman, not politicians, to carry out a report with no binding effect, the US was 
signalling its continued political indifference to the region so as to allay European fears and 
Arab expectations, without appearing wholly detached from world affairs.  Ultimately, their 
report, outlining a unified Arab state and independence as the overwhelming wish of the 
people, was virtually ignored and made no contribution to British and French plans for the 
region; it was subsequently determined that ‘Syria should go to France and Mesopotamia to 
Great Britain’.   
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Though the US distanced itself from such projects, it was not vociferous in its objections to 
the French mandate over Syria in a meeting of the Council of Four just a few days before all 
mandates were authorised and fixed, despite the fact that of all the great powers France was 
the most unwelcome as resented by the Arabs.157  Furthermore, King and Crane had 
concluded in their report that the Syrian mandate would go to France, ‘frankly based, not on 
the primary desires of the people, but on the international need of preserving friendly 
relations between France and Great Britain.’158   
 
Besides the ultimately ineffective King-Crane initiative, US interest in the Middle East 
during the inter-war period did not extend further than commercial investment in the 
region’s relatively untapped oil assets.159  The Syrians, in turn, had little interest in the 
activities of the US.  Syria had three major concerns in this time: maintaining continued 
resistance to the Great Powers in the Middle East; opposing the growing Zionist movement, 
particularly since the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and increased Jewish immigration into 
Palestine; and to resolve the internal factional strife that allowed the French to exploit their 
differences.  In response to these concerns Arab nationalist sentiment reached even greater 
levels during the 1930s, exacerbated by the Palestinian uprising in 1936 and the enactment 
of yet more treaties to prolong informal mandates in the Arab states.160  In Syria, this unrest 
was manifested at a more popular level and is well-documented in other works.161 
 
This popular movement was given political impetus with the Arab League Pact, formally 
signed by Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and Saudi Arabia on 22 March 
1945.  It prohibited any resort to force among member states, provided for the consultation 
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and mutual assistance in the event of aggression against a member state, set up a Council 
and a Secretary General with headquarters in Cairo, and provided for cooperation between 
member states in other non-political fields.  However, such was the lack of US political 
involvement in the region at the time that, in the words of the US Director of Office of the 
Near East, ‘relations with the Arabs remained in general unaffected by these 
developments’.162  Only when pressed for a view on Arab unity by the Saudis, the US stated:  
 
The policy of the United States Government toward the Near Eastern nations has not 
formally been stated, but its general attitude is well known.  This Government 
desires to see the independent countries of the Near East retain their freedom and 
strengthen their economic and social condition, and fully sympathises with the 
aspirations of other Near Eastern countries for complete liberty...163  
 
Outwardly, then, the US adopted an early policy of sympathy and support for Arab unity, 
independence and greater prominence in world affairs. 
 
In accordance with the policy outlined above, the US recognised Syria’s struggle for 
independence against the French and that it would need financial assistance to overcome 
disorder and French obstructionism as the Syrians came closer to their goal.  Anticipating 
conflict, Syria appealed to the US to provide policing equipment and training to enable them 
to maintain internal order.  The US ministers based in the Middle East with their knowledge 
of the situation were keen to meet such requests.  Thus, in early August 1945, Merriam, head 
of the US Near East Department, proposed ‘in the interest of peace and security’ the 
allocation of up to $100,000,000 a year for several years, administered jointly by the State, 
War and Navy Departments, until the region became politically and strategically stabilised164 
– the plan, however, was rejected by Secretary of State George Marshall as unfeasible.165   
 
Unable to provide the Arab states with the necessary financial backing for long-term 
stabilisation, a frustrated Merriam acknowledged that, ‘our policies in these situations are 
not worth the paper they are written on because we have not prompt and effective means of 
carrying them out’.  The notion of empty promises and lack of real help when needed was to 
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be a recurring theme in nationalist rhetoric against the US in later years, ironically based on 
the same assessment Merriam had made of his own government. 
 
Since the US could not or were not willing to provide any concrete support via finances or 
military help, it was left to the British to intervene with its forces when clashes between the 
Syrians and the French reached serious levels and threatened to destabilise neighbouring 
states.  Nevertheless, the records show significant US concern over France’s inflammatory 
policy, prompting strong condemnation and unequivocal instructions to the French that they 
should evacuate Syria without conditions.166  Through these collective efforts, the UN in 
April 1946 finally terminated the French mandate, demanded their immediate withdrawal 
and declared Syria an independent state.  Shukri Al-Quwatli, the head of the Syrian National 
Party, and the incumbent president under the French mandate since 1943, stayed on in the 
role as Syria entered independence.  Thus it is fair to say that ultimately, the US played a 
late, but important, role in aiding Syrian independence; indeed, it is arguable that this 
constitutes the single most significant act of US assistance towards the Syrians throughout 
their modern relations. 
 
Notwithstanding this positive intervention for Syrian independence, it should be noted that 
ending Europe’s monopoly over the Middle East’s resources was a key motive in the US 
policy to support Arab independence.  US interests remained focused on the region’s 
economic potential, despite the major political developments taking place in this period.  
Hence, even during the high-point of nationalist unrest during the Second World War, US 
correspondence and documentation on regional affairs were dominated by discussions over 
access to Saudi and Iraqi petroleum.167 
 
Thus the US’ major interaction with the Syrians in this formative era was to support their 
independence and to engage in active diplomacy to oust the French.  It represented a positive 
beginning from which Syria and the US, on the face of it, had the opportunity to form more 
substantive and durable bilateral relations.  However, it is also clear that US policy in the 
Middle East was focused on forging relations with oil-rich and economically strategic 
countries; the US largely remained passive to the region’s major political developments, not 
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yet perceiving the implications they would have for the US’ own global and ideological 
strategy after the Second World War.  This demonstrates how crucial the next period would 
be in moulding the direction of future US-Arab relations.   
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3.2 The Rising US Role and Arab Disappointment 
 
This section highlights the growing involvement of the US in the region following the 
Second World War and Syrian independence.  It looks at the nascent Middle East strategy 
adopted by the US, and how it was viewed in the eyes of Arab states.  It analyses why 
despite offering a fresh alternative to the imperial policies of the major powers, Arab and 
Syrian politicians maintained an ambivalent stance towards the new superpower.  This 
section provides a more general and foundational view of the underlying conflict between 
Arab and American approaches to the region’s issues – a more specific and focused analysis 
of American and Syrian interaction will follow later. 
 
As the physical presence and political influence of the European colonial powers began to 
recede in the Middle East, the role and participation of the US in the region as a western, yet 
historically neutral, force became more significant and came under greater scrutiny.  The 
significance of its role lay in its coinciding rise as a superpower, and through that its 
increased potential to act as a fair arbiter in the region’s affairs, with the political leverage 
and military might needed to defend state sovereignty and individual rights.  At first, there 
had been ample hope among Syria’s Arab nationalist movements based on the US’ minimal 
and relatively unsullied record of involvement in the region, as well as its public 
chastisement of European colonialism as an obstacle to democracy and freedom.168  The 
Atlantic Charter, extolling the need for democracy and independence in all parts of the 
world, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1941, had 
given further cause for optimism in the Arab World.169 
 
Those with political aims and interests observed and judged the US on its policies and 
reactions to regional issues, hoping to see a departure from the old Anglo-French approach, 
rather than shunning them through a simple anti-western prejudice.170  In a conference 
between US Ministers to the Middle East and Harry Truman shortly after he became 
President in 1945 after the death of Roosevelt, the US Minister to Syria and Lebanon George 
Wadsworth conveyed the situation in the Arab world and its importance to the US.  He 
warned that the US needed to form a positive post-war policy prioritising Arab 
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independence and unity as a primary objective, and not to view the region in a merely 
instrumentalist light.  He argued:  
 
[I]t seems vital to recognize that the whole Arab world is in ferment, that its peoples 
are on the threshold of a new renaissance, that each one of them wants forthrightly to 
run its own show, as the countries of the Western Hemisphere run theirs, without 
imperialistic interference, be it British or French, in their internal affairs.  They say: 
“You have your Pan-American Union; we want our Arab Unity.  Relations between 
your countries are based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality; that is 
the principle upon which we wish to base our relations with each other and with all 
other nations.  We need foreign skills and capital and technical experts but not 
foreign dictation.  We want treaties of friendship with all countries, treaties of 
alliance and special privilege with none.  In our dealings with foreign governments 
and interests, we want to be free to apply freely the principle of equality of 
opportunity and the open door”....the United States can play a leading role.  Our 
moral leadership is recognized today.  The governments to which we are accredited 
want most of all to know whether we are going to implement that leadership, 
whether we are going to follow through after our great victory or leave the field, as 
we did at the end of the war, to others.171 
 
His summary of Arab sentiment towards the US, based on his knowledge of the Arab 
nationalist movement in Syria, demonstrates how critical this immediate post-war period 
was for the future trajectory of East-West relations.  Wadsworth predicted that if the US 
failed to give this support, the Arab states would turn to the Soviet Union and would ‘be lost 
to our civilization’.  And even so, he specifically pointed out that there did not need to be 
conflict with the Soviet Union in the region as their policies had thus far merely paralleled 
that of the US in acknowledging the independence of Arab states.  Due to their existing close 
relations, the future alignment of Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the US was less in doubt than 
that of the Syrians, who had already begun to develop ties with the Soviet Union since their 
prompt recognition of Syrian independence.  However, despite such fears, Syria’s President 
Quwatli made clear in these initial stages that Syria, having no other formal relations with 
any other country since independence, wished to have its closest ties with the US, to sign its 
first treaty with the US and to use it as a model for such relations with other states.172  With 
this positive approach and willingness to cooperate, and with sound intelligence readily 
offered by US legations on the ground, why then did relations between Syria and the US 
take such a negative turn? 
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In basic terms, one might simply point to actual US policies that turned Arab nationalist 
regimes such as Syria against them.  However, most of these policies only became apparent 
during the mid-1950s when Britain’s prolonged withdrawal from the Middle East was 
emphatically confirmed, and the US felt it both had a freer hand in the region, and needed to 
play a greater role to prevent Soviet encroachment.173  By that period, doubt and suspicion of 
US interest in the region was already shifting to outright rejection, at both the executive and 
popular level.  Thus in fact this suspicion had been accumulating from a much earlier stage.  
Before analysing the active policies adopted by the US towards Syria, we need to consider 
American strategy towards the Middle East as a whole, and how this was received and 
interpreted by the regional actors.  Having had the opportunity to observe US motivations 
and approach to the region, four areas of dissatisfaction began to emerge among the Arabs. 
 
i. The Cold War comes first: US instrumentalisation of the Middle East 
 
Firstly, while the US sought to portray itself as a bastion of freedom and self-determination, 
as it had previously done after the First World War, many nationalists, both politicians and 
activists alike, began to see a different picture in which the Americans were certainly 
different, but not necessarily better, than their predecessors.174  The French and the British 
had sought direct control over the region, but not only for access to resources – a sense of 
historical ownership and an attempt to hold onto their fading imperial identities also played a 
part, particularly with regards to the French in Syria, which had little to offer by way of 
resources; the Arabs, in turn, were able to position themselves in direct opposition to them, 
fighting against the absorption or annexation to another nation’s empire and identity, and 
against accountability to outsiders.  Thus it was a clear zero-sum conflict, fought over 
territory and resources, but rooted in issues of ideology and identity.  That control of the 
Middle East was the central issue was in no doubt – the French and the British had multiple 
concerns in different parts of the world, but the nature of empire meant that those 
commitments were pursued with both the local and global contexts in mind; thus their 
colonies were conscious of their direct interest and involvement, albeit of a negative form. 
                                               
173
 Cases such as the Syrian-American crisis (elaborated further on), but also the US dispute with Iranian Prime 
Minster Mosadeq in 1953, early support for British presence in the Suez Canal zone, initiation of the Omega 
Policy to undermine Nasser, and pushing Jordan away from Pan-Arabism and the UAR in 1958: all put the US 
in a negative light and erased much of the good will that Arab states previously had towards them. 
174
 Hoskins, the Acting Regional Planning Adviser Near East Office, stated to Byroade Asst Secretary of State 
for the Near East, ‘It is hard for many Americans, unless they have recently visited certain parts of this area, to 
realize how general and how deep-seated is the distrust and in some cases hatred for the British and the French 
because of their past or present colonial policies and activities...the US is increasingly being put in the same 
imperialist category’: Memo, 7/4/1952, FRUS, 9:204 
 100 
 
The new situation was subtly different.  While Roosevelt had claimed to be morally 
committed to the rights and independence of all states and regions for the sake of 
democracy, the arrival of Truman’s administration saw the US move away from the rhetoric 
of idealism, announcing a more confrontational foreign policy via the Truman Doctrine.  It 
specifically focused on its rivalry with the USSR as its main concern.  Unsurprisingly in this 
context, the US did not see Syria in bilateral terms but as a factor within its wider global 
strategy.  It was no longer the case that there were a multitude of disparate issues, which all 
had to be resolved individually by the colonial power involved.  Now, an issue, a conflict, or 
a country, was only significant in that it had strategic implications for a single, all-
encompassing priority, that being the emerging bipolar Cold War.   
 
The Middle East – and especially Syria, with little historical connections with the US or 
Britain, and lacking in oil – was to witness this hierarchy of concerns first-hand; this 
generated the first aspect of Arab disappointment.175  The US calculated that a stable and 
continuous energy supply would be central in reconstructing Europe and Japan in any 
power-struggle with the Soviet Union, and that control over those supplies would be a 
crucial battle-ground – it was this that prompted the US to take a far greater political interest 
in the region.176  If we look forward to almost a decade after Syrian independence and the 
creation of Israel, US Secretary of State John Dulles acknowledged the difference in 
priorities between the Arabs and the Americans, stating that the Arabs are ‘more fearful of 
Zionism than of Communism, and they fear lest the United States become the backer of 
expansionist Zionism’; moreover, their differences with Britain, France and Israel meant the 
Arabs paid ‘little heed to the menace of Soviet Communism’.177  This analysis, however, 
was to come later: under Truman, US policy towards the Middle East was dominated by its 
preoccupation with the Soviet Union and little else.    
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ii. Different rules for different regions 
 
The second issue of contention was the US’ disparate treatment of its western allies and so-
called Middle Eastern allies.  According to the National Security Council (NSC) paper 129/1 
titled ‘US objectives and policies with respect to the Arab state and Israel’, the US’ goals 
were, 1) to reduce the instability threatening the West’s interests; 2) to counter and diminish 
Soviet influence (and in turn to increase the West’s influence); 3) to maintain accessibility of 
resources (chiefly oil) for the US and its allies in order to strengthen the ‘free world’; 4) to 
help these countries resist Soviet ‘aggression’; and 5) to strengthen the notion of sovereignty 
in the Middle East.178  It is clear from this where US priorities lay.   
 
The US perceived the above aims would be achieved through a minimum objective of 
stability (and later on, through the maximum objective of Arab-Israeli peace).179  With the 
latter seeming such a distant prospect in the post-war period, and even more so after 1948, 
the only viable option apparently left for the US was the basic retention of stability.  As in 
the traditional interpretation of the international system, stability for the US meant retaining 
the status-quo, and hence blocking the progress of ‘leftist’ movements that opposed the west 
and acted as channels for Soviet influence.   
 
While it could be argued that the US adopted the same approach to all the regions it was 
involved with, including Europe, it should be noted that the Middle East states were not 
beneficiaries of the US’ altruistic ideological agenda in the same way that Europe was.180  
Not any state’s sovereignty was necessarily worth protecting, nor were the Middle East’s 
resources to be safeguarded for its own uses, rather the US’ concerns for democracy were 
reserved chiefly for its allies outside of the Middle East that were deemed to be ideologically 
sound.  By comparison, Europe did not have the same material value (by way of resources) 
as the Middle East; that the US was so keen to prevent Soviet-Communist encroachment in 
the region testifies to the strength of America’s ideological commitment to its allies in the 
west.  In contrast, the Middle East was valuable for its strategic and material value, with 
little potential (in the view of the US) for ideological cooption.181   What happened there 
domestically was of little concern to the US, except when it was feared that a state’s internal 
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politics was providing a gateway for Soviet penetration, and thereby enemy access to vital 
strategic resources.   
 
The question that Middle Eastern states were asking was: what would they be gaining by 
cooperating with the US?  For critical observers in the region, those seeking a change from 
the mandatory status quo, there was something fundamentally contradictory about America’s 
Middle East policy.  Certainly, it was strongly ideological; but surely, notions of the ‘free 
world’ referred not just to freedom at the inter-state level, but also domestically, to those 
individual liberties that constituted so-called democracies.  And yet, as it appeared to actors 
in the Middle East – politicians, social movements, the public – this element was so crudely 
dispensed with in the US’ approach to the region that it seemed an ideological ally in this 
part of the world was one that merely facilitated US intervention on American terms.  There 
were US individuals who privately held the view that some form of an Arab union was 
unrealistic anyway, and was not likely to materialise in their lifetime182 – in short, it was not 
a project worth pursuing.   
 
With such a dim view of Arab aspirations, it is not surprising that the US did not exert more 
effort in sustaining a unified political regeneration of the region.  Nor is it surprising, given 
the above, that it was difficult for the US to co-opt Middle Eastern states to its own liberal-
democratic programme.  Ultimately having failed to make a lasting impression in this way, 
the US resorted to a limited, short-term approach in which it offered material incentives to 
remove obstacles to western policies and interests in the region.  Thus any relationships 
between the US and the Arab states were strategic and relatively superficial in that if 
economic assistance was terminated there would have been little remaining connection 
between them. 
 
iii. Conflicting ideologies 
 
What impact did offering rewards alone have on state behaviour?  If there was no inherent 
reason to align with the US except for material gain, and less immediately to avoid conflict 
with a superpower, and when such aid and pecuniary incentives dried up, so too did the 
channels of cooperation.  This, in fact, raised the potential for instability in the regional 
system, and ironically it also locked the US into participation in an effort to control this 
outcome.   
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The historical adoption of alternative ideological agendas by Middle Eastern states were 
attempts, however unsuccessful, to counter the instability generated (albeit not solely) by the 
above situation, in order to foster some regional cohesion based on ideas and beliefs rather 
than on inconsistent and transitory advantages such as external grants.  With nationalist-
inclined regimes making such an assessment, two directly opposing programmes for stability 
in the region were produced: neutralist (or what the US saw as ‘leftist’) movements seeking 
internal agency; and the west, seeking to harness the region for the global struggle against 
Communism.  Thus the third area of contention between the US and the regional 
(nationalist) actors was that the US not only had diverging priorities from them in relation to 
the Middle East, but also had different interpretations and solutions for the prevailing 
instability characterising the region.  It was all the more galling for Arab nationalists that the 
US had previously voiced their support and enthusiasm for greater Arab unity and 
independence,183 whereas now American leaders were singling it out as a threat. 
 
There were, of course, actual policies that reflected US instrumentalisation of the region and 
American support for Israel (more of which below), which did precipitate clear, outward 
opposition and which will be analysed in the following sections.  But it is inaccurate to 
define Middle Eastern opposition in this period as an instantaneous backlash to the US’ 
growing support for Israel, or purely resistance to any form of interference in the region, as it 
can often appear when existing literature focuses on a particular event, rather than relations 
over time184; moreover, this accumulative opposition resulted from an holistic evaluation of 
US goals, interests and approach to the Middle East, such as that outlined above, and an 
assessment of the repercussions of US intervention.  To view Arab opposition in just a 
reactionary light attaches suggestions of irrationality and emotiveness to the governments 
and the societies in the region in a way that belies the more considered and conscious 
positions of the Arab states in this period. 
 
iv. US support for Israel 
The above policies of the US which clashed with the Arabs’ interests and aspirations were 
all rooted in America’s security interests and ideological battle with the USSR.  However, 
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there was one other key area of contention between the US and the Arabs, which was not a 
part of the Cold War framework at this early stage.  This was the US policy of supporting 
the establishment of an Israeli state.  Wilson’s principles of national self-determination and 
giving importance to popular will, and the Atlantic Charter that followed, gave the Arabs 
cause for optimism that the new hegemon would help them to achieve their aspirations 
which had been blocked for so many years by the European powers.  The early American 
condemnation of imperialism and the European mandates had resonated deeply with the 
Arabs – they thus expected the US would similarly support their view that the Balfour 
declaration, and its promise to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine, was an extension of 
European colonialism and secret diplomacy, and therefore neither legitimate nor justified.   
 
They were of course proved wrong – for not only did the US endorse Britain’s agreement 
with the World Zionist Organisation, but it went further than Britain in support of a newly 
created state, and the unlimited immigration of Jewish people into Palestine.  Under the 
mandate, Britain had attempted to manage a worsening situation between Palestinians and 
Jewish immigrants by limiting the number of immigrants to 30,000; moreover they wanted 
to avoid the displacement of the Palestinian population because of the problems it was likely 
to cause in the other mandated regions under British control.  In contrast, the practicalities 
and consequences of Jewish immigration on the existing communities in Palestine did not 
come into American consideration.  On 1 February 1944, the US Congress and Senate 
passed a joint motion stating: 
 
The doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into the country, and there 
shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately 
reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth.185 
 
This, then, was not a new policy to emerge after the onset of the Cold War, but had been 
gaining momentum over the inter-war period.  Thus in the same period when he was 
championing Arab rights in the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt was passionately advocating the 
need for a Jewish state in the region.  This was in part attributable to his own Jewish 
ancestry, and a personal emotional affinity that he felt with the Jews.  But he was not alone 
among America’s political elite.  Many of them felt deep sympathy for the plight of the Jews 
since the holocaust and sought to make amends on behalf of the west.  Moreover domestic 
political consideration were at play even in the early years of America’s engagement with 
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the Middle East, and a large Jewish-American community and public opinion in favour of an 
Israeli state meant Arab aspirations on this issue were sidelined.  While the Arab-American 
differences outlined above emerged with the start of the Cold War, the source of this friction 
was external to, and preceded, the Cold War.   
 
However, with Israel’s unilateral declaration of statehood in 1947, followed by UN 
ratification and the formal separation of Palestine in 1948, America’s pro-Israel policy 
became more public in the Middle East.  It coincided with the announcement of the Truman 
doctrine – both of these aspects of American policy in the region were seen to undermine 
America’s previous policies opposing external intervention and colonialism, and exacerbated 
Arab grievances and mistrust against the US. 
 
In summary of this section, Syria’s political actors made the following evaluations early on: 
1) the core foreign policy goals of the US with respect to the Middle East were different 
from those pursued by its regional actors: for the regional actors, ridding their countries of 
external domination (including Israel) and independence were paramount, for the US this 
aspect was only instrumental to their economic interests and the blocking of Soviet 
encroachment; 2) the US sought to protect the region’s resources in order to supply and 
strengthen western democratic governments against Communism and authoritarianism, and 
yet their ensuing intervention in the Middle East (including Syria) often helped to install or 
uphold non-democratic regimes against the ‘popular’ will; 3) for the US, the post-war status 
quo without Soviet encroachment represented stability, whereas for the regional actors the 
mandate system seemed merely to have been replaced by the establishment of Israel and 
indirect Western control – thus the status-quo still had to be challenged; 4) the US supported 
the establishment and security of Israel: whereas the US had disapproved of the perpetuation 
of the mandate system in the Middle East, this latest example of colonisation as the Arabs 
saw it, the ‘Nakbah’, had US endorsement.  
 106 
3.3 Truman’s Policies and Syrian Scepticism 
 
A number of US projects and initiatives that were formulated to achieve the NSC aims 
outlined earlier, which reflected the three areas of friction and nonalignment analysed above, 
can be identified in the post-independence period as having provoked dissatisfaction and 
early tensions between the US and Syria, these being: suspected US support of a dictatorial 
coup, the Point IV Programme, the US’ preferential treatment towards Israel, and the Middle 
East Command (MEC).   
 
i. Sponsoring regime change 
 
Having previously shown little interest in Syria, it being of less economic value than its 
neighbours, the US became aware of the Soviet Union paying it more attention.  In 1949, the 
US made its first intervention in Syria’s fractious political scene to help General Husni al-
Za’im overthrow the Al-Quwatli regime on 30 March.  The US acknowledged that he was a 
‘Banana Republic dictator type’,186 but despite this contradiction of outward US rhetoric for 
the pursuit of democracy, what mattered here was that the new dictator was recognised as 
someone who would work with the west and help them implement schemes for peace with 
Israel.  Moreover, it was hoped he might bring stability to Syrian factionalism (even if that 
meant through repression) and that in turn he would be able to reduce Soviet influence in the 
country.  And indeed, Za’im delivered to a large extent on these expectations: he signed an 
armistice with Israel and facilitated western economic interests by approving concessions for 
TAPLINE, which transported ARAMCO oil from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean.  He 
improved relations with Turkey, a NATO member and a vital ally of the US in the strategic 
interface between east and west, at a time when Turkey was experiencing a widening rift 
with its Middle Eastern neighbours.  He unilaterally steered Syria away from a pan-Arab 
agenda towards western preferences, imprisoning Ba’thists and stating: 
 
The Syrian Republic wants neither Greater Syria nor Fertile Crescent.  We will pit 
our forces against these two projects of foreign inspiration...we have assurances that 
Great Britain is for the status quo and that France and the United States would never 
accept a change in the situation.187   
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Finally he demonstrated himself as a useful ally in the Cold War by clamping down on 
Communist factions in Syria and showing willingness to accept US military assistance in a 
clear signal that Syria was ready to throw its lot in with the US.  Unfortunately for the US, 
Za’im was overthrown within four and a half months; thus Truman’s short-term link with 
Syria, hinging as it was on one individual, evaporated before it had really begun.  The US’ 
historical tendency to operate through individuals in the Middle East in exclusion of other 
parties was a key reason why it was unable to build a stable bilateral relationship with Syria 
throughout the post-independence period, being so closely associated with the discredited 
regime after a change in government.   
 
ii. Point IV assistance 
 
Two military coups followed Za’im’s assassination: Sami al-Hinnawi lasted only a short 
period before General Adib ash-Shishakli ousted him in a coup in late 1949.  The US 
attempted to start afresh with the Shishakli regime, once again using the tool of material 
incentives to bring it in line with western strategy and interests in the region.  The Truman 
administration had introduced the ‘Point IV Programme’ as a way of propping up 
economically developed countries with financial and military assistance to prevent them 
from succumbing to Soviet influence; the logic here was not dissimilar to that of the 
Marshall Plan and the subsequent European Reconstruction Programme introduced two 
years earlier.  The ERP was gradually beginning to bear fruit in Europe, not least in fostering 
a far greater level of not just economic but also political cooperation between old allies and 
former enemies alike; it seemed reasonable to the US that such a programme might have 
provided a significant route towards stability in the Middle East, as well as engender a 
deeper loyalty to the US.  Certainly it reflected a long-term commitment on the part of the 
US, as opposed to ad-hoc and transitory handouts given to temporary dictators.   
 
The programme of assistance was offered to the Syrian regime, but after ongoing 
negotiations, and stalling on the part of the Syrians, the opportunity for cooperation on this 
front was eventually rejected.  Indeed, as the US often reflected afterwards, Syria was 
ultimately the only Arab state to ‘flatly refuse’ US assistance through Point IV, and further 
economic aid offered for construction and development.188 
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Why then, was the programme scuppered before it could make any meaningful progress?   
Firstly, it is highly questionable whether the Americans’ analogy between the ERP and a 
potential Middle East economic programme was an accurate one.189  Shishakli refused 
assistance on the basis that it appeared to merely aid planning rather than actual 
implementation of reconstruction projects.   
 
Secondly, the lack of trust on the Syrian side was too great.  This mistrust was built on the 
recent history of US involvement in Syria’s coups, but particularly connected to US 
sympathy for Israel.  The Syrians had the following ongoing grievances with regards to 
Israel, which they believed the US had done nothing to rectify or was directly responsible 
for: 1) Israel’s refusal to comply with recent UN resolutions;190 2) the Palestinian refugee 
crisis, lack of any UN action on the issue, and continued US pressure on Arab states to settle 
refugees without any plans for repatriation;191 3) the US and UN’s failure to push back 
Israel’s borders;192 4) the disregard of Arab demands for the internationalisation of 
Jerusalem;193 5) no action over the continued incursions by the Israelis over the Israeli-
Syrian border;194 6) US endorsement of continued Jewish immigration into Israel;195 and 7) 
the fact that the Germans had been instructed to pay reparations to Israel for Jewish losses in 
the War, while nearly one million displaced Palestinians would not receive reparations from 
Israel.196 
 
Despite a military dictatorship being in place, this did not mean that Syrian politics and 
society had been stabilised and that the incumbent regime was free from the threat of public 
or factional revolutions – the fear of public opinion, political threats and Shishakli’s personal 
opposition towards Israel,197 obstructed the development of any positive and substantial 
relations between Syria and the US.  At a time when US hegemony was in no doubt, and 
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Syrian domestic politics was still fragile, sacrificing greater security through US backing 
was highly significant and indicative of Syria’s anti-imperialist priorities. 
 
iii. The Middle East Command 
 
If the Point IV Programme made little progress, the Middle East Command (MEC) was 
doomed to fail from the start.  It was proposed by the US as a way of prizing Egypt away 
from British control and to allow the strategic routes of the Suez Canal to be utilised for the 
Western economy on an equal basis.  The US sought to replace the existing (and 
constraining) Anglo-Egyptian Treaties, and presented the MEC favourably to the Arabs as a 
way of ending old colonial ties, whereas privately it had little to do with promoting Arab 
independence.  The MEC would have a British Supreme Commander, links to NATO and 
staff from the US, France, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.  The 
MEC headquarters was to be based in Egypt, and in the event of war, Egypt was required to 
guarantee the MEC access to all facilities.   
 
Ultimately the proposal was counter-productive, prompting the Egyptians to both abrogate 
the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and to reject the MEC in October 1951.198  Syria, although 
not specifically solicited to join the MEC, supported and encouraged Egyptian opposition on 
the basis that the Head of the MEC was to be of a non-Arab nationality, that western troops 
based on Arab soil during peace-time was too reminiscent of imperialism, and lastly it 
seemed the MEC was being forced on the region.199  The greatest impact of the MEC on US-
Syrian relations was to aggravate Syrian public opinion against the west and make it even 
more difficult for any Syrian leader to cooperate with the US, as will be analysed in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
What Syria had needed after independence was sustained financial help with development 
and reconstruction, support for its goal of carving out an independent niche for itself in 
regional politics, and chiefly it sought arms for security.  The US certainly encouraged the 
Syrians to apply for assistance through global financial institutions, but these all took the 
form of loans or the reimbursement of cash rather than the provision of funds and equipment 
up front; moreover, any direct US aid tended to be offered on the condition of progress in the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict, whether agreeing peace with Israel or the resettlement of Palestinian 
refugees in Syria.  Thus in Syria’s view, US aid was too complicated a pursuit;200 in the 
place of the anticipated help they perceived a single-minded, anti-Communist agenda, 
disconcertingly detached from the priorities and interests of the Arabs.  Meanwhile the US 
contradicted its formally-held position of support towards Arab unity, perceiving it as an 
extension of Communism and Soviet influence.   
 
To exacerbate matters, it showed no signs of pressurising Israel to compromise on any Arab 
demands.  US policies and attitudes combined reflected, in the eyes of the Syrians, a 
complete misreading of the region’s politics and a failure to appreciate the scars of its very 
recent history.  It not only made the Syrians less willing to cooperate, it instilled in them a 
mistrust of what further problems and loss of independence such cooperation could lead to in 
the future.  With only minimal and unsubstantial interaction, the Truman administration had 
shifted the Syrian position from one of candidness and optimism towards the US, to one of 
aloofness and suspicion. 
 
3.3.1 Domestic politics and the role of popular movements 1946 – 1954 
The previous sections looked at Syria’s interaction with the US at the leadership level.  Prior 
to independence, the presence of the French prevented any meaningful Syrian leadership in 
foreign affairs, while post-independence, the fledgling state was dominated by a series of 
coups and counter-coups, bringing in highly autocratic military leaders.  Thus in terms of the 
actual decision-making, it has been appropriate to focus on the elite level.  However, the 
development of politics on the ground among competing popular movements needs to be 
explored in more detail, particularly since they began to have an increasing influence on top-
level decision-making.  Thus, before addressing US-Syrian relations during the Eisenhower 
administration, this section will look at the radicalisation of popular politics against both 
Israel and the US during the transitional period under Truman and the early years of his 
successor, and how that spread in a bottom-up process.  It will also highlight the increasing 
connections between Syria and the Soviet Union resulting from the strong ideological 
trajectory of Syrian domestic politics.   
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i. The impact of Syria’s state-formation 
 
There are a number of distinct trends in Syria’s state formation that need to be highlighted 
by way of explanation.  Firstly, the Middle East state system was a new formation beset by 
internal strife and colonial intervention, preventing an immense structural change from 
having any chance of becoming a settled and functioning characteristic of the region.  By the 
Second World War, the Arab states were still fighting to attain a status nominally granted to 
them at the end of the First World War.  By the time Syria had gained independence in 1946 
the momentum for positive transition and political change had been lost, and much of the 
existing style of factionalism and entanglement of foreign affairs in domestic politics, had 
become entrenched in the political structure.  This was more evident in Syria than in Egypt, 
for example, where the state’s new boundaries had created a greater upheaval in identity and 
political administration.   
 
It was in this context in the search for security that foreign support was constantly sought by 
disputing factions to shore up their own power; the interference of outside forces in Syrian 
affairs, whether they were French, British, Iraqi, Jordanian, or Egyptian, meant that Syria 
could not challenge them alone with their limited resources and military, and needed the 
added threat of a more powerful state to have any credibility.201  Foreign involvement in 
Syrian affairs also meant that Arab nationalist ideology that drew its relevance from the 
interference of external forces could remain paramount not just for foreign policy but also 
for the state’s domestic politics. 
 
Another important issue that needs to be acknowledged with regards to Syria’s domestic 
politics, which in turn affected its standing on the international stage and subsequent 
bilateral relations with external powers, was the lack of ownership of foreign affairs (which 
up until independence remained in the hands of the French).  There was, therefore, a lack of 
Syrian representation in discussions between the west and the Middle East, particularly at 
times of crisis.  The US was able to strike up a significant level of diplomatic rapport with 
both Egypt and Iraq, even though both were also inclined towards a pan-Arab agenda in the 
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post-war period; this was something it failed to achieve with Syria.202  It is possible to strike 
a connection here between the more revolutionary, ‘radical’ direction of the Syrian 
nationalist movement (compared to the tempered nationalism found elsewhere) and its lack 
of voice or representation at a higher and more consequential level of politics, where the 
opportunity (or necessity) for dialogue and pragmatic considerations can often dilute an 
unwavering ideological stance that is more easily maintained in an isolated, domestic 
context.   
 
Another factor playing into this was, of course, the nature of the mandatory division between 
Britain and France; clearly those countries historically attached to Britain also inherited 
more substantial attention and contact with the US as a result of the close Anglo-American 
relationship.  The old French mandates, however, were disadvantaged by overbearing French 
control,203 as well as poorer links between France and the US: consequently, Syria had much 
less representation on the international stage, at ambassadorial level and at the UN, than its 
neighbours.  This contributed to the US’ perceptions that Syria had less influence on 
collective Arab politics than its better established and politically cohesive peers. 
 
ii. Public opinion 
 
Both the entanglement of foreign and domestic issues, and the alienation of ideological 
parties from the domestic and international setting, combined to form a particularly ‘radical’, 
revolutionary brand of domestic politics in Syria.  The wider the gap felt between the masses 
and the political elite, be they foreign occupiers, wealthy notables or military autocrats, the 
more likely the masses were to create an alternative political platform that was more 
inclusive, more idealistic and certainly more critical towards their regime and external 
powers.  Thus, while this chapter focuses on the decisions and diplomacy of the elite, their 
stand-points - particularly moments of intransigence and opposition - cannot be understood 
without recognising the popular pressure influencing their policies.  US correspondence with 
other regimes in the region demonstrate the extent to which public animosity towards Israel 
and the west played a greater role in Syrian decision-making than in other states; US legates 
in Syria, their British or French counterparts and the Syrian officials themselves, regularly 
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alluded to this constraint in any dealings with the west, manifested in Syria’s unique lack of 
cooperation or participation in a number of US-led defence or economic programmes. 
 
This public influence was demonstrated when the US had relatively easy relations with the 
Syrian officials in power in the late 1940s,204 and had not yet been directly exposed to the 
level of anti-western, and more recently, specific anti-American, public sentiment.  Initially, 
in the autumn of 1950, the unsettled nature of the Syrian state was seen by the US to present 
a good opportunity to turn away from ‘reactionary regimes’ such as Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, by creating economic links with the Syrians to increase US leverage in the region 
and promote reform.205  With their greater experience of the region, the British advised 
caution in such a plan, arguing that ‘the intense nationalistic and anti-imperialist sentiment in 
Syria could constitute a barrier’.206  This was echoed by Ma’ruf Al-Dawalibi the Syrian 
Minister of National Economy, when he expressed to James Keeley, the US Minister in 
Syria: 
 
Syrian public opinion hold US partly responsible for plight [of] refugees and believes 
that if true to its oft-expressed ideals, US should take lead in enforcing UN decisions, 
particularly, as Arab states were stopped by US-UN action in defending inalienable 
rights of Palestine Arabs.  As long as Arab refugees are denied these rights...Syrian 
opinion will remain exacerbated and any Syrian statesman who seeks cooperation with 
US in political or economic sphere will be plagued by criticism and opposition because 
of US connection with Palestine tragedy.207   
 
And indeed when Keeley spoke to Syrian journalists and the press, he found that while they 
were not averse to closer economic connections between Syria and the US, there remained a 
‘deep-seated chagrin’ at the US’ previous support of Israel to the disadvantage of the Arabs, 
while the fear of further Israeli aggression made ‘almost everyone suspicious of our 
professed good intentions’.208  Moreover, earlier in the year, Mustafa Siba’i of the Islamic 
Socialist Front,209 ‘an authentic mouthpiece of the Syrian masses’ according to Seale, and 
highlighted by the US as an important anti-western group, declared: 
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We are resolved to turn towards the eastern camp if the Democracies do not give us 
justice...To those that say the eastern camp is our enemy we would answer: when has 
the western camp been our friend?...we will bind ourselves to Russia were she the 
very devil.210 
 
The Syrians’ view that the US did not fully appreciate their grievances would have been 
further exacerbated if American views on Syria’s concerns over Palestine were known – for 
there was a perception, held even by those in the Near East Office that Syria had no business 
in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and should prioritise their own economic 
matters.211   
 
On top of these obstacles, the US was well aware that Syria had not only stalled over Point 
IV assistance, but chose not to request aid through the US Export-Import Bank or loans from 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as all of its neighbours 
had done.212  It was stated: 
 
Of all the Arab states, Syria...is the most wholeheartedly devoted to a neutralist 
policy with strong anti-Western overtones...The Syrians unlike any other Arabs feel 
themselves free of need to look to the West for any kind of support or help (they are 
economically self-sufficient).213 
 
This tendency of the Syrians to seek economic independence and self-sufficiency was 
unnerving for the US: it prevented the US from gaining political leverage in the short-term, 
and in the long-term contributed to the view that the Syrians were singularly difficult to 
cooperate with.214 
 
Nevertheless, the US proceeded to tour the Arab states in an attempt to co-opt support from 
the emerging neutralist regimes.  George McGhee, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, who had initially touted the project and took part 
in the tour, was at last able to witness this public opposition during his visit to Syria.  It was 
by this stage being expressed vocally and regularly against the major powers, Israel, and 
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increasingly the US, on the streets of Damascus and in the press.215  Before the official visit, 
a coalition of opposition groups made up of the Ba’th, the Arab Socialist Party and the 
Islamic Socialist Front declared their policy of strict neutrality towards both the US and the 
Soviet Union; students petitioned and rallied against the British and American arrivals; and 
workers sent letters of protest to western ministers in Syria.216  The Ba’th, emerging as a 
strong and popular nationalist force by this stage,217 followed up with a manifesto in January 
1951, stating: 
 
The Arab nation fighting to free itself from Anglo-French-American 
imperialism...warns the Arab League against making any gesture of adhesion to one 
or other of the two blocs; it holds to a genuine neutralism which will prevent 
Western imperialism making the Fatherland a strategic base and exploiting its oil 
resources for military ends...218 
 
During and after the representatives’ trip in February and March, there were attempted 
bombings at the British consulate in Aleppo and at the US Minister’s residence in 
Damascus.219  However, such public protests did not deter the west from pursuing their 
Middle East Defence strategy, although they felt vindicated in their choice to leave Syria out 
of their plans for the MEC.  Alongside their leaders’ opposition to the proposals, the Syrian 
public marched in their thousands after Friday prayers to protest against the US and the 
British, and to pledge their support for the Egyptians in the face of ‘imperialist plots’.220   
 
Meanwhile, political groups used allegations of supporting the west to bring down their 
rivals and cause significant political changes at home – the following were all deposed 
consecutively for cooperating with west: the conservative Quwatli in 1946, the dictators 
Za’im and Hinnawi in 1949, and two successive Prime Ministers serving under General 
Shishakli – Nazim Al-Qudsi and Hasan al Hakim221 - for not rejecting and condemning the 
MEC in public in 1951.  Thus it was not just the case that domestic politics influenced 
foreign policy, but foreign affairs similarly had a major impact on domestic issues.   
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This became more evident when General Shishakli was overthrown in 1954; the free 
elections that followed demonstrated the extent to which anti-western, ideological parties 
had worked underground to strengthen their support base and become consolidated, political 
organisations.  They now came to the fore, with the Syrian public voting overwhelmingly in 
favour of neutralist parties and independents.  The Ba’th had made the greatest progress 
among the parties – having secured only one seat in the Syrian Chamber in the 1949 
elections, they now emerged as the second largest party close behind the conservative 
People’s Party, whose numbers had halved since the last election.  Some of the notable 
individuals to be elected were Salah al-Din Bitar, co-founder of the Ba’th; Ma’ruf al-
Dawalibi, a conservative in the People’s Party but also leading member of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood; Khalid al-‘Azm, a strong proponent of neutralism and standing as an 
independent; and Khalid Baqdash, leader of the Communist Party.  The results did not so 
much reflect the rise of the left in Syria, but a popular response to perceived US pressure on 
the Syrian government.222  This important distinction was often overlooked in the west; thus 
the day after the elections on 25 October, the Cairo daily Al-Ahram announced ‘Syria rejects 
all pacts with the West’, whereas the American press reported the elections as a victory for 
Communism in the Arab world.223 
 
iii. Syrian-Soviet relations 
 
Nevertheless, while the Syrians were not about to adopt the Soviet Union’s ideology, they 
did welcome relations with a superpower that at least recognised Arab priorities in the 
region, and at best shared their goals of combating pro-Israeli, western interference.   
 
There are three key factors to highlight with respect to the Syrian-Soviet connection: first, 
there was a convergence in regional goals between the Soviet Union and Syria, as both 
sought to remove western control.  While the Soviet Union had been one of the foremost 
supporters of the establishment of Israel, it had gradually begun to backtrack from this 
position by the early 1950s, seeing the strong pro-western course that Israel had adopted.  
After the fall of Hasan Al-Hakim’s Government in October 1951, the new Prime Minister 
Ma’ruf Al-Dawalibi – anti-western and anti-Hashemite – learned from his predecessors’ 
downfall and advocated a firmer neutralist stance.  He was one of the first in the Arab world 
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to call for a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and the purchase of arms from the 
east instead of the west;224 in response, the American press labelled him as ‘the most 
outspoken anti-American Arab leader’.225  
 
Secondly, it is important to note that the USSR and Syria were not in complete alignment to 
the extent that Syria was a Soviet satellite in the region; indeed, there were significant 
disagreements between the two.  It was a negative ideological alliance in that their 
opposition towards the US and the west, and not a self-standing unity, defined their 
alignment;226 this subtlety was often lost on the Americans, who regularly conflated 
nationalism with Communism. 
 
Thirdly, increased Soviet-Syrian ties served to perpetuate the existing suspicion and coldness 
between the US and Syria – for the Americans, this gave further currency to their formative 
view that the Syrians were an unruly and intransigent, obstructionist force in the region, one 
whose opinions were unreliable and need not be taken into strong consideration; whereas for 
the Syrians, American reactions to their links with the USSR confirmed their impression of 
the US as a self-interested party in the region bent on monopolising all power and 
allegiances for itself.  The instability of Syrian domestic politics in this time had greatly 
contributed to its marginalisation in US considerations for the region, viewed as incapable of 
dictating its own affairs.  While to a certain extent this had been the case, in large part due to 
French occupation, the internal developments and subsequent radicalisation of Syrian Arab 
nationalism had in fact a major influence on regional politics and provided continued 
impetus to anti-westernism in the region.  As Seale argues, ‘to have an Arab policy at that 
time was to have a policy regarding Syria’.227   
 
The US did not fully appreciate this, while it is arguable that the Soviet Union did; thus 
instead of recognising that Soviet strategic calculations were crucially at play here, 
efficiently taking advantage of Syria’s regional concerns, the US viewed the Syrians as 
being wilfully inclined towards Communism.  The US did not compete with the Soviet 
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Union for Syria’s alliance, as it did over Israel and Egypt; and by the time the Americans 
recognised Syria’s importance and sought to challenge Soviet influence, it was too late.  
 
From this account of radicalisation and popularisation of ideological politics and foreign 
policy in Syria, it is possible to understand the context of US policies towards Syria and the 
region under President Eisenhower.  The next section looks at the Baghdad Pact, the Suez 
Crisis, and the Syrian-American crisis of 1957, which served to bring US-Syrian relations to 
a new nadir. 
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3.4. US-Syrian Relations under Eisenhower 
 
Despite the above developments in Syria’s internal politics and affiliation with the Soviet 
Union, there was renewed optimism in both Syria and the Arab world immediately after 
Eisenhower came to power in January 1953;228  It was generally considered that both the 
President and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought to operate foreign policy in 
the Middle East on a more ‘even-handed basis between Israel and the Arabs’.229  
 
However, despite the fact that Arab opinion towards the US was at such a critical juncture, 
and given the rising tension between the US and the Soviet Union, there remained as before 
a ‘hierarchy of threats’ for the Eisenhower administration, with Communism at the top, 
followed by the threat of anti-western nationalism, and finally imperialism and 
colonialism.230 Thus, in spite of Eisenhower’s more comprehensive appreciation for the 
importance of the Middle East compared to Truman, Syrian disappointments were not about 
to be rectified now.  Moreover, for all the rhetoric that the US sympathised with Arab 
nationalist aspirations, the US’ key alliances being forged in the region were with those 
conservative, ‘reactionary’ regimes such as Saudi Arabia, for whom Arab nationalism 
represented a threat both to their self-interests as dynastic rulers and their religious 
opposition towards Communist influence in the region.231   
 
The strategic importance of the region has already been outlined; but in the above context, 
and after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Korean War and the fall of Chiang 
Kai-Shek in China, the Middle East had become indispensable for the US.  By the 1950s, the 
potential of this importance was fully realised not just for the US but for the entire western 
economy, upon which western Europe based its post-war reconstruction.  British 
Government figures for early 1956 showed that Europe imported roughly 93 million tons of 
crude oil, 90 per cent of which came from the Middle East; demand for crude oil products 
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had increased by 17.4 per cent in just two years between 1954 and 1956.232  The favoured 
means of protecting such economic interests was by providing military assistance to allies in 
the region – this doubled up as straight-forward defence against any potential Soviet military 
threat from the East, but also as a political gesture that these countries were indebted to the 
US and under their influence.233   
 
3.4.1 The Baghdad Pact and the Suez crisis 
Thus in this context, and despite the evident opposition to such projects, the prospect of a 
pro-western regional defence plan resurfaced again in 1953 – no longer as the MEC, but via 
the Baghdad Pact (later renamed as CENTO), drawing help from South Asia and Turkey 
(the so-called ‘Northern Tier’) to protect the Middle East, for British and American interests.  
The US was well aware that such a pact might provoke greater anti-westernism, but it took a 
calculated gamble in promoting it, arguing that if it did not, it would make little positive 
difference to the relations between the US and neutralist states.234  Following the revolution 
in Egypt, its nationalist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, rejected the Baghdad Pact, creating 
unprecedented tensions between the Egyptians and the British.  Eventually, in 1956, Britain 
provoked matters by refusing to fund the building of the Aswan Dam, to which Nasser 
responded by blocking British access to the Suez Canal, a cornerstone of British Middle 
Eastern strategy.  The ensuing Suez Crisis involving Britain, France, Israel, Egypt, Syria and 
the two superpowers, had a marked impact for Arab-west relations. 
 
Syria’s role in all this was significant: Seale argues that Syria had effectively held the 
‘casting vote’ among the Arab states on the future of the Pact.  February 1955 saw the 
demise of the conservatives in the Syrian Chamber due to their equivocation on the issue, 
and the forming of a new and more emphatically anti-western government235 - once it had 
expressed its opposition to the Baghdad Pact, other states followed suit, reassuring Egypt 
that it would not be isolated in its stand-off against the British.236  Moreover, the Syrians 
continued to support the Egyptians against the west by sending their own troops into the 
conflict of 1956.   
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The crisis also confirmed the growing convergence of Soviet and Syrian Arab nationalist 
interests in the region.  Thus the Soviet Union entered the fray in the last few months of the 
crisis, declaring they would send troops in if the British and French did not withdraw.  It was 
most probably an empty threat and did little to sway the conflict, but it certainly raised 
Soviet currency with the nationalists.  Furthermore, after years of rejected requests for arms 
from the US, the Syrians now had a willing supplier in the Soviet Union, receiving £100 
million worth of arms from the Soviet Union between 1954 and 1957.237  Nasser’s 
successful resistance against the west persuaded the Soviet Union of the advantages in 
providing the Arabs with the proper means to continue such resistance in the future, 
especially with the US keenly pursuing defence pacts with these same states.  Hence the 
lines of Cold War alliances were drawn up in the Middle East, and the fearful prognostics of 
Communist take-overs appeared, in the eyes of the US, dangerously imminent in Syria.238 
 
3.4.2 The Syrian-American crisis 
It was in this regional context of western set-backs, emboldened Arab nationalism and 
Soviet intervention, that the Syrian-American crisis developed in 1957.  Syria’s Ba’thist-
Communist coalition during the Suez Crisis was interpreted by the US as a Communist 
domination of Syrian politics.239  The US was further alarmed at the speed with which the 
Russians had been able to secure a Syrian alliance, and the damage it was capable of 
inflicting on western interests in the region.  It was no longer viable to take a passive 
approach to the internal affairs of Arab states: while in the past the US had clandestinely 
supported individuals who were already in search for power, the US would now be willing to 
actively instigate domestic and regional resistance for the overthrow of a ‘dangerous’ 
regime.  There had already been an aborted attempt to overthrow the Syrian government in 
the run-up to Suez, masterminded by Britain and Iraq;240 the US had been privy to those 
plans but did not actively participate – they now sought to carry out the task more 
efficiently, using their newly-established dominance of the region.   
 
Fearing imminent Soviet intervention in the region, the new US strategy was publicly 
declared with the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957.  In it, Eisenhower demanded 
alignment against ‘the East’, not just the Soviet Union but its Arab allies as well; he 
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stipulated that the US would strengthen the internal security of any state threatened by 
‘International Communism’ and would provide military assistance against Communist 
aggression.  The doctrine imposed a bipolar context onto local conflicts, recasting them as 
extensions of the Cold War.   
 
Using the doctrine as a mandate to intervene, James Richards, the new Special Assistant for 
Middle East Affairs, and then Loy Henderson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, toured the 
region in March and August 1957 respectively to enlist support from regional states, and in 
turn to isolate Syria from its neighbours.241  Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq 
were all consulted by the US and gave their endorsement to the Eisenhower Doctrine; 
Neither US representative visited or made any contact with Syria throughout the ensuing 
crisis. 
 
Given the growing isolation it was finding itself in, the increased frequency of Israeli attacks 
on the border,242 and given the progress of Soviet-Syrian relations in the previous two years, 
it was not surprising that at this time, Syria’s Defence Minister Khalid al-‘Azm travelled to 
the Soviet Union to sign a technical and economic agreement with the Soviet Union.  
However, this was viewed by the US as the sign that Syria had become a Soviet satellite.  
Within a week, on the 12th August, the Syrians announced the discovery of a US plot to 
overthrow the regime.  There appeared to be ample evidence that the US had been behind 
the plot, enlisting the help of former dictator Shishakli and attempting to recruit a number of 
Syrian officers to the plan.  In response, and in a show of defiance, the Syrian government 
expelled three US diplomats – Robert Malloy, Howard Stone and Francis Jetton – and 
purged a number of Syrian officers; this, in turn, was reciprocated by the US with the 
expulsion of the Syrian Ambassador, Farid Zayn-al Din, and his staff from Washington.   
 
The crisis did not dissipate with the above dismissals.  Syria, seeking to close ranks after the 
scare, replaced its former Chief of Staff with the Soviet sympathiser ‘Afif al-Bizri.  For the 
US, this change signalled the inevitable Communist take-over that they had feared.243  It sent 
arms to those of its allies neighbouring Syria, while Henderson briefed Turkish, Iraqi and 
Jordanian leaders on a plan of action.  He urged them to ensure that any armed action 
undertaken should be defensible at the UN, and is reported to have stated that: ‘[Any] action 
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must be one hundred per cent successful when you decide on it.  It is our belief that if there 
is to be action it must be efficient.’244  The US had traditionally relied on Turkey to put 
pressure on Damascus; they now instructed it to send its troops to the Turkish-Syrian border.  
The Soviet Union responded by sending two warships to Syria’s aid. 
 
However, Turkey was not able to muster enough regional support for its actions, given its 
close association with the west and unhealed rifts with its Arab neighbours since the break-
up of the Ottoman Empire.  Other conservative Arab states were becoming increasingly 
uncomfortable with US belligerence, and were facing mounting domestic criticism at a time 
of renewed nationalism.  Thus Saudi Arabia intervened at this crucial stage, mediating 
between the Americans and Arab states to moderate their positions towards Syria. 
 
Due to the strength of nationalist fervour coming off the back of the Suez Crisis key Arab 
states eventually refused to act against the Syrians,245 and the US project failed.  
Nevertheless, the incident had a significant and long-term impact on US-Syrian relations.  It 
marked the beginning of a profound hostility towards the US and feeling of ‘imperialist 
victimisation’ on Syria’s part.246  Years of suspicion and anti-westernism were confirmed 
and justified by the crisis; having previously marginalised Syria in regional affairs, the one 
time the US had recognised Syria’s importance had led to a violation of its sovereignty.  
That the Syrians had initially held a degree of optimism for prospects under the Eisenhower 
administration made the Syrians all the more mistrustful of future American governments. 
 
For the US, the fear of Soviet penetration had led them to instigate direct regime change, 
regardless of how counter-productive it might prove in the end.  It demonstrated a 
reactionary approach, and a disregard for Syria’s strategic value except in relation to the 
Cold War.  This limited analysis of Syria’s importance was demonstrated by the US’ 
satisfaction at the eventual outcome of the crisis, which ironically saw Nasser taking over 
from Saudi Arabia as mediator, thereby drawing Syria away from the USSR and inclining it 
closer towards Egyptian pan-Arabism.247  In the US’ view, the fact that Syria was now far 
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more hostile towards them, severely hindering future relations, was an unfortunate, but not a 
calamitous (and certainly not the worst) turn of events.  Once again, the US demonstrated its 
willingness to sponsor a military coup in order to replace an anti-western government in the 
Middle East.  Furthermore, despite acquiring a far greater knowledge of the region and 
ability to assess the situation accurately, the Eisenhower administration had demonstrated 
the same propensity to translate all regional issues through a Cold War lens.  Syria, for its 
part, had demonstrated a high degree of autonomy in its actions vis-à-vis the US amidst 
widespread anti-westernism among the public. 
 
Western-sponsored regional intervention in its domestic politics had created turmoil and a 
break-down of Syria’s political cohesion.  Fearing further destabilisation in the aftermath of 
the Syrian-American crisis, Syria saw little other option than to enter into a union with Egypt 
in 1958, its stronger Arab nationalist ally.  Syria saw out the remainder of the Eisenhower 
administration and the arrival of President Kennedy as a bystander in the United Arab 
Republic (UAR).  It was to be a short-lived union, before Syria made its re-entry as an 
independent and key regional actor in the volatile decade to follow. 
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3.5 Syria and the US After the UAR: From Ally to Enemy 
 
Nasser might have demonstrated his independence from the west, but supporting him as 
leader of the Arab nationalist movement actually served American interests, as the US 
depended on him as a restraining force over the more ‘radicalised’ and unpredictable 
nationalists in Syria.  Despite initial reservations, the US viewed the UAR as a positive 
feature on the Middle East scene, not bringing stability through Arab unity, as Syria had 
hoped, but through the subservience of a radical force to one whose revisionism was limited 
and compatible with the status quo.  US dismay at the Syrian rebellion against the UAR in 
1961 reflected this position.248  The following highlights their negative assessment of the 
Syrians and how that played into their policy-making:   
 
It should be emphasized...that the Syrians have traditionally been [a] highly 
individualistic and undisciplined people and that Syrian political movements, no 
matter what the coloration or how well unified at the inception, have always 
degenerated into squabbling factions and rivalries...which the communists are better 
equipped to deal with than we are.249 
 
Hence the US viewed Syria as an inherently problematic and uncooperative feature on the 
Middle East scene – from such statements it is evident that a historical intransigence towards 
each other was becoming embedded on both the American and Syrian sides.   
 
3.5.1 A brief alliance 
The US initially feared that ‘an independent Syria’ would become even more hostile toward 
Israel, and thus at first concluded that Syria’s defection went against US interests.250  But 
based on reports that the rebels were, in fact, ‘fairly well-disposed toward the West’251, the 
US began to see the potential advantages of the break-up, and covertly encouraged the new 
Syrian regime to pursue a pro-western course.252  The new Syrian premier was Ma’mun 
Kuzbari, holding the positions of Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Foreign Minister, 
ruling by decree, and considered as someone capable of ‘changing his political orientation at 
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will’253 - but yet again, the implications for Syrian domestic politics and the potential 
fragility of the regime did not instil caution in American support.  Kuzbari kept the 
Communists in prison, was very much on the right of Syrian politics, and pledged closer 
political and economic relations with the US than Syria had ever permitted in the past.254  
His Ministers began immediately by requesting an aid agreement, which even took the US 
by surprise, acknowledging that ‘Syria never previously was willing to negotiate.’255  Thus, 
in order to help the regime to survive, the US agreed to provide political and economic 
support; they indicated that they would even consider supplying arms, something that they 
had never previously been willing to do.256  
 
In a private memo outlining US policy towards Syria, the US stated that despite the fact that 
prospects for political stability were poor, the US would continue to encourage the present 
regime and ‘discourage internal realignments detrimental to our interests’.  The US also 
wanted to prevent external actors from causing trouble for the ‘friendly’ Syrian regime, 
outlining that it would try to restrain Israel from provoking them.257 
 
Furthermore, the US decided: there should be greater cultural exchanges and visits between 
the countries; the US would engage Syria in the UN and with other Western and Latin 
American countries; it would also direct European countries to supply arms to Syria 
(believing that a benign source of arms would have a major role in maintaining stability in 
Syria).  The US also planned to provide training and technical assistance, financial loans 
from the Development Loan Fund, and to respond to Syrian requests for surplus foodstuffs 
(worth over $15 million under the PL480 Assistance Programme).258  The US pledged to 
promote US-Syrian trade, help build a free enterprise system, and to encourage the IMF and 
other countries to assist with up to $40 million worth of loans and the restoration of a free 
currency.259  Finally, the US guaranteed it would secure the private payment of outstanding 
and unpaid fees from TAPLINE to Syria in the region of $8 million.260 
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The first test for the US-Syrian alliance came in October 1961, when Israel planned to divert 
Jordanian waters to the Negev, and began planning for a nuclear energy programme.  The 
US did little to restrain Israelis based on their military superiority, which the US was 
confident would inhibit the Arabs from attacking.261  When the Syrians did express strong 
opposition to Israeli intentions, the US attributed it to ‘trouble-making’ from the Egyptians, 
rather than genuine disagreement with the Israelis, and urged the Syrians to keep to the 
existing armistice.262  Yet even this pro-Western Syrian government could not accept the 
US’ assessment of the issue, and lamented the US’ failure to recognise that ‘Syria and other 
Arabs are still at war with Israel’.263   
 
To further exacerbate tensions, and despite the official cease-fire, clashes between the 
Syrians and Israelis on the disputed territory of Lake Tiberias were occurring with increasing 
frequency in February and March of 1962.  Israel accused the Syrians of sparking the crisis 
by firing rifles at Israeli fisherman and Israeli police patrol, while the Israelis responded with 
raids over the border, targeting Syrian gun positions on 16-17 March.  While accepting that 
Israel had ‘applied force of much greater magnitude than that directed against Israel’, the US 
focused its efforts on restraining Syria.264   The Syrians, in protest against the US’ passivity, 
threatened to take the matter to the UN Security Council, seeking to induce the UN to 
compel Israel to comply with partition and refugee resolutions, or otherwise to face 
expulsion from the UN.265  The Syrians also demanded that the US Government take a 
public position against Israeli diversion of waters from Jordan, threatening in private the 
‘destruction [of the] US’ position in the Middle East, an advancement of Soviet causes 
therein, and risk of Arab-Israeli war.’266   
 
However, throughout this episode it is notable that, while of course the US still maintained 
its support for Israel, it was more willing to castigate the Israelis in public, not merely to 
prevent Syria from turning towards the Soviet Union, but out of a genuine belief that Israeli 
actions were inflammatory.  Hence, US responses deliberately emphasised condemnation of 
Israeli retaliations.267  
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Kuzbari’s regime did not last long, as was often the case with pro-Western regimes in Syria, 
and was overthrown within two years; what, therefore, is the significance of this short 
episode of Syrian history, so soon eclipsed by the Ba’thist Revolution, in understanding the 
history of US-Syrian relations?  There are a number of important conclusions that can be 
drawn from this case.   
 
First, the speed and assurance with which the US was willing to support the new regime, 
describing it as ‘the best and most pro-Western in a decade...[that] deserves our immediate 
support’268, reflects how simplistic US policy assessment towards Syria was in this period – 
even more so given all their previous misgivings about the volatility of Syrian politics, the 
fact that this was yet another military dictatorship, and despite all reports from the region 
advising that the regime was unlikely to survive for long.269  However, it does also reflect 
the continued fear with which the US contemplated a nationalist regime that might be 
opposed towards the US and favourable towards the Soviet Union. 
 
Secondly, it becomes increasingly evident from a reading of the documents that the US’ 
policy on Syria was unsophisticated (particularly compared to the calculated and nuanced 
approach adopted in its Egyptian and Saudi policies), lacked a coherent strategy, and was 
based on a muddled reading of Syria’s importance in the region.  Thus on one hand, Syria 
was significant enough to prompt a risky, and ultimately damaging, US-sponsored coup in 
1957; but on the other hand, there remained a lingering perception that investing support and 
aid in Syria would not produce much strategic head-way for the US in the region - as a US 
official put it, ‘from a strategic point of view, is it more important to cozy up to five-million 
volatile Syrians or to make our peace with the largest and most influential country of the 
Arab world?’270  In the US’ view, Syria was not a key bilateral counterpart in the region, 
with whom to negotiate and compromise – its unreliability so far had made that unnecessary; 
but it had the capacity to be either an instrument or a hindrance to US strategy, and when 
those occasions arose, the US reacted to exploit, thwart or redirect events. 
 
A third issue to highlight is the depth of Syrian-Israeli antipathy, as well as US support for 
Israel, which has always been a central and negative factor in US-Syrian relations; it would 
appear that even with the most cooperative of Syrian regimes, Israel remained an obstacle to 
closer US-Syrian relations – the only Syrian leader to adopt a positive policy towards Israel 
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had been Husni Za’im, who lasted less than five months in power.  Nevertheless, the US still 
urged greater restraint on Israel and was more willing to apportion equal blame on both 
Syria and Israel, when a friendly Syrian regime was in place.   
  
And a final analysis that can be made from this episode is to recognise that any regime to 
follow would be fully aware of the support – technical, financial and political –that the US 
had previously been providing to a pro-Western regime.  The immediate withdrawal of that 
assistance would fuel any existing opposition and resentment towards the US.  It would, of 
course, also justify and provide conclusive evidence for the new regime that the US was 
supporting its domestic enemies and was seeking to undermine its ideological goals.  It 
would be interpreted as a boycott - and if the new regime was already inclined towards a 
‘radical’, ideological agenda, this would be enough to push existing suspicion and caution 
towards open hostility.  That is, of course, precisely what happened when the Ba’th came to 
power. 
 
3.5.2 The Ba’thist revolution 
The Syrian Army, headed by a National Council of the Revolutionary Command, overthrew 
the Syrian Government and assumed power on 8 March 1963.  This new group appeared to 
have much wider support than those responsible for previous coups in the country, especially 
in terms of support from the military.271  The new regime was dominated by Ba’thists, while 
the numbers were completed by neutralists and military officials.  Key Ba’thist Salah al-Din 
Bitar became Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.  Describing him as a ‘moderate socialist 
and ardent pan-Arabist’, the US was at first hopeful that there could be positive relations.272  
US optimism was formed on the basis that the new regime declared itself as anti-
Communist; despite its recent experience with Syria, the US did not at this stage see Syria’s 
Ba’thist commitment to pan-Arabism as a threat.  Even recognition that it was anti-Zionist 
did not spark greater fears; indeed the US predicted Syria would now ‘seek friendly relations 
with the West on a basis of non-alignment’.273  The US misread the extent of Syrian 
opposition towards Israel, and that this was indeed the main driving-force of Ba’thist Arab 
nationalism and the cornerstone of its anti-westernism.274   
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However, as Syrian-Israeli tensions flared up again on 20 August 1963, once again on the 
Lake Tiberias border, the extent of Syrian opposition towards Zionism dawned on the US.  
Moreover, the caution exercised by the previous Syrian regime was cast aside – indeed, the 
new Ba’thist regime had not even sought recognition from, or relations with, the west, a 
clear and deliberate show of independence from western opinion.  In turn, and in contrast to 
its earlier policy, the US gave Israel its unreserved support, while categorically blaming 
Syria for starting the incident ‘as a means of uniting people behind them...since Israel is the 
one issue that forces all Arabs to unite’.275  The US encouraged the UN’s severe ‘censuring’ 
of Syria on the basis that Syria was at fault, the Israelis had been reprimanded the year 
before and ‘above all...to warn Syrians off before they become too rambunctious’.276  US 
reservations over the new Ba’thist regime were further raised when it became clear that other 
conservative regimes in the region appeared to view the Ba’thists and their brand of Arab 
nationalism as posing a greater danger than Nasser.277   
 
Thus a new level of suspicion and intransigence had developed on both the American and 
Syrian sides; this was to escalate throughout the next four years, culminating in the outbreak 
of the defining Arab-Israeli War in 1967.  This issue is dominated by both US and Syrian 
relations with Israel; therefore the run-up to and fall-out from that War will be discussed in 
the next chapter, which focuses on US-Syrian antipathy over Israel as a case-study.   
Moreover, the next phase marks significant changes in both Syrian and American politics, 
caused by the rise of Hafez Asad and the start of the US-Israeli ‘special relationship’ under 
Lyndon Johnson and Nixon. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified the roots and development of Syria’s historical opposition 
towards US policies and involvement in the Middle East, and in turn American 
marginalisation of Syria and denunciation of its domestic-regional politics.  Both those 
developments combined to produce a mutual hostility by the end of the period examined 
here, and contributed to the entrenchment of ideology as a necessary political framework 
through which Syria managed its foreign policy. 
 
To answer the underlying questions that this chapter began with, and to apply the framework 
outlined in the previous chapter,278 we can conclude that the determinants of Syria’s foreign 
policy in the post-colonial era were dominated by Syria’s mandatory history, which had had 
a significant impact on its lack of political stability, the entanglement of external issues with 
the domestic agenda, and its lack of representation in international diplomacy.  The French 
and British mandates in the Middle East, and the establishment of Israel, both perceived as 
European, imperialist projects, set the historical context in which Syria’s ideology was 
formed.  As a result, and given the salience of ideology for the regional situation, Syria’s 
foreign policy goals were imbued with an embattled Arab nationalist ideology to rid the 
country and the region of imperialism.  It was influenced to a large degree by popular 
opinion, alienated from and galvanised by unrepresentative and constantly changing 
governments.  In extension of these aims, Israel and any external power supporting Israel 
and colonial exploitation of the region were vehemently opposed.  Realisation that the US 
was preoccupied with its own global strategy against the Soviet Union and sought to 
instrumentalise the Middle East for its Cold War, rather than support its independence and 
political development, disappointed Syrian expectations. US support for Israel and their 
perceived dismissal of Arab demands, ‘imperialist’ economic and defence programmes 
through Point IV, the MEC and CENTO, and the encouragement and instigation of 
clandestine regime change in 1949 and 1957, all exacerbated earlier Syrian mistrust and 
resentment.  
 
The US, for its part, was prevented from striking closer relations with Syria early on due to 
overbearing French control over the country during the mandate, and its lack of internal 
political cohesion after independence.  Although the US placed little economic value on 
Syrian relations and did not see it as a priority, it had attempted to develop bilateral links 
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through economic assistance; but since the purpose of such aid was to encourage regional 
stability and Arab-Israeli peace, it could not come without any conditions.  Syria’s rejection 
of all forms of US aid and refusal to compromise on those conditions, contributed to 
American frustration and the view that the Syrians were singularly intransigent and 
inherently anti-western.  Syrian neutralism was conflated with Communism and Soviet 
‘satellisation’, prompting alarmist, reactionary policies that lacked long-term vision – 
ironically these pushed Syria closer towards its Soviet ally for arms and security.  What is 
particularly notable in this period is the US’ reluctance to engage in greater dialogue with 
the Syrians and its tendency to marginalise Syria in regional issues, viewing it as volatile and 
unreliable. 
 
Apart from brief interludes of cooperation, notably under Za’im and Kuzbari, this period of 
US-Syrian relations represents a worsening trajectory of opposition between the two states.  
Although the Syrians were cautiously optimistic at the start of America’s involvement in the 
Middle East, one might argue that they were bound to scrutinise all US policies in a critical 
light given their experience of colonialism, and were therefore predisposed to view the US’ 
role as negative and imperialist.  Moreover, it is true that Syria, as with the other Arab states, 
frustrated the US with its parochialism and apparent aversion to understanding the Middle 
East’s position in a global context.   
 
However, it could similarly be argued that Syria, as a weak state just emerging from foreign 
occupation and threatened by interference from its neighbours, was always unlikely to 
appreciate or prioritise the global implications of its domestic or regional politics.  From the 
Syrian perspective, if the US wished to come out of isolation from the Middle East, it had 
the responsibility (and capacity) as a global superpower to rectify the blunders of its 
predecessors in the region, to respect local aspirations, to approach the Arab-Israeli problem 
on an even-handed basis, and to familiarise itself with the deeper complexities and nuances 
of Arab domestic politics.   An oversight of these issues might have been justified against 
the dangers of the Cold War; but on the other hand, the US’ fear and anticipation of Soviet 
encroachment prompted it to engage in blatant alliance-building, which in fact provoked 
greater Soviet involvement than otherwise might have been the case. 
 
These conflicting arguments demonstrate the extent to which interpretations widely differed 
on both sides, creating a stalemate in US-Syrian relations; uniquely it was one that was 
predominantly based on disagreements over regional issues, rather than bilateral issues.  As 
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will be demonstrated through the following chapters, this was a trend that continued to be 
manifested in their future relations. 
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Chapter 4 
Syria’s Isolation and the Birth of the US-Israeli Special Relationship 
 
This chapter builds on the last historical chapter to outline the key short-term events and 
issues that influenced the US-Syrian relationship prior to and at the start of Hafez Asad’s 
presidency in 1970.  In particular, it brings into focus the centrality of Israel to the 
antagonistic development of US-Syrian relations.  In the short period between 1967 and 
1973, the regional security dynamics changed significantly – the internal balance of power 
had tipped heavily in Israel’s favour; external patterns of relationships had also altered so 
that the US’ support for Israel was consolidated into a long-term American strategic 
position, while Arab dependence on the Soviet Union had begun to wane.  The vulnerability 
that now hung over the Arab states pushed them into two opposing directions: one was to 
dilute their hostility towards Israel and thereby bring themselves closer to the US in the face 
of its growing military and economic superiority over the USSR; the other was to continue 
opposing Israeli occupation of Arab lands (even without Soviet support if necessary) and to 
engage the US in the region’s disputes in the hope that America would apply pressure on 
Israel to comply with some of their demands. 
 
Before going into the detail of this seminal period in the region’s history, I will first outline 
here some of the key arguments and theoretical underpinnings that will be drawn out through 
this chapter.   Firstly, I argue that this period has been crucial in shaping US-Syrian bilateral 
relations which continue to be constituted, in a constructivist sense, by their relations (or 
lack of) with Israel.  Whatever the fortunes of the US’ alliance with Israel, it will have an 
impact on its relations with Syria, and similarly, Syria’s dispute with Israel will have a 
significant impact on its relationship with the US.  This hypothesis has been borne out by 
other Arab states, whose relationships with Israel have largely determined their relations 
with the US, and vice versa.   
 
Secondly, this chapter demonstrates the complex nature of security in the region, in the way 
it and its threats are perceived and constructed.  Thus when security is discussed in relation 
to both Syria and Israel, what is traditionally taken to reflect a materialist concern needs to 
be widened to encompass and connect a range of issues, from military, to economic, to 
identity security.  In this respect, the Copenhagen school’s analysis of security is relevant.  It 
proposes that the meaning of security is different depending on whose security is at stake 
and what values the respective parties deem needing protection.  For Syria, the range of 
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security concerns in this period were not disparate ones that ought to be treated separately, 
but were all seemingly connected by one main threat, historically the colonial threat, and 
latterly Israel.   European colonial activity was fed by an imperialist ideology, while Israel’s 
territorial, political and cultural security was embodied in many ways in Zionist ideology – 
Arab nationalism thus emerged as a counter-ideology and acted as both an idea and a policy 
that combined a perceived need to protect not just Arab cultural, but also territorial and 
economic security.   
 
Thirdly, this chapter contests the view according to neorealist theory that power inequalities 
necessarily cause weaker states to bandwagon with more powerful states.  This chapter 
demonstrates that this is not always the case, as seen from the example of Syria.  Its policies 
in this period support the argument that the balance of power dynamics in a given region 
need to be viewed in a more nuanced way, and that weaker states can choose who they 
bandwagon with based on values and ideas, not just power and material gain - although this 
does place them under greater pressure from the hegemons. 
 
Finally, as a framework for analysis, this chapter will employ FPA.  The systemic context is 
taken into account by recognising the intervention of cold war politics and geopolitical 
factors.  But the chapter argues that ideas act as a valuable intervening variable, while the 
agents responsible for adopting and operationalising those ideas are also analysed.  Thus the 
psychology and biases of leaders, their coterie of policy-makers, lobby groups, the military 
and public opinion, are taken into account as important constituencies and influences on 
foreign policy in the US-Syrian context. 
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4.1 Hafez Asad’s Ascendancy in the Ba’th party 
 
As elucidated in the previous chapter, Israel had since its establishment been the main 
aggravating factor in Syria’s relations with the west, particularly the US.  It is impossible to 
over-state the role that Israel plays in any development of US-Syrian relations.  Syria’s 
popular and political adherence to an anti-imperialist agenda and Arab nationalist aspirations 
designated Israel as ‘the number one enemy’.279  It also strengthened Syria’s relations with 
fellow neutral Arab states and its sense of ideological importance, given that Zionism – 
branded as the latest face of imperialism – was now on its doorstep.280  Thus there emerged 
two elements to Syrian opposition towards the US: one, it was the dominant force of the 
west, and as such was already tainted by Syrian perceptions and experience of western 
imperialism; two, the ‘universal resentment against Israel’ within Syria produced a 
‘corollary resentment against [the] US as [the] power primarily responsible for Israel’s 
existence.’281   
 
The previous chapter already outlined the early development of Syrian mistrust as a result of 
US support for Israel during and after the Second World War.  Alongside the impact this had 
on foreign policy and public opinion in Syria, one must also take into consideration the 
impact these developments had on the perceptions of future president of Syria, Hafez Asad.  
Too much can be made of the psychology and personality of leaders, and how their life 
experiences supposedly mould their future decisions in government.  Such analyses can all 
too often take on a deterministic hue, sidelining pragmatic and contingent decision-making 
that is often rooted no deeper than in the contemporariness of leadership.  And yet one must 
also be cautious not to lean too far the other way, where earlier personal experience is 
completely dismissed.  The extent to which experience influences decisions is difficult to 
gauge categorically.  However, it is safe to assume that such experience contributes to an 
individual’s bank of contextual knowledge – after all, decisions and policies cannot be made 
within a vacuum of information, and even new information will be processed and made 
sense of through existing knowledge and perceptions.282  Given Hafez Asad’s thirty-year 
rule, his prominence in the Ba’th party from a young age, and the consistency of some of his 
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strategic decisions in the region, it is imperative to consider his earlier experiences as an 
influential factor on Syria’s future policies and the region’s politics. 
 
The seven years that Asad spent at the Latakia secondary school, where he completed his 
education in 1951 aged twenty, played a crucial part in forming his future outlook.  He said: 
‘My political life started then and has not been interrupted since’.283  Hailing from the 
‘Alawi mountains and confronted with the social inequalities of the town where he was 
schooled, Asad grew up with a strong class consciousness.  The fusion of social inequality 
and foreign occupation directed him towards the political ideologies holding sway at the 
time.  He joined the Ba’th at sixteen years of age.  With the last of the French soldiers 
leaving on 17 April 1946, Syria prepared itself for the development of a more sophisticated 
political system, while ideological parties began to put in place their domestic agendas.  For 
the Ba’th this meant mass recruitment and socialist reform.  Such efforts and anticipations 
for the future were suddenly interrupted on 29 November 1947, when the United Nations 
General Assembly passed a resolution to designate more than half of Palestine to the new 
state of Israel.  As Asad himself opined, from this moment ‘the contest with Zionism became 
the major theme’ of his life.284   
 
Asad’s political development mirrored the politicisation of Syria’s identity and its relations 
with its neighbours. Moreover, the continuation of Asad’s political fervour during his 
military career, which he embarked on because he could not afford medical training, point to 
why the army was to become ingrained in Syrian politics; for just as Asad carried politics 
into military life, he, and others like him, in turn carried the military with them as they 
entered into politics, helping to weave Arab nationalist ideology into the fabric of political 
life in Syria.   
 
Asad graduated as a pilot officer and was posted to the Syrian officer corps in the early 
1950s.  Since the 1949 military coup, it had become accepted that the army represented a 
key aspect of Syrian political life.  After the overthrow of Shishakli and Syria’s return to 
party-politics, Asad tried to recruit as many of his officer-colleagues to the Ba’th party.  
When at school, Asad’s main ideological battles had been against the landed class and the 
Muslim Brotherhood; but in the army he saw the fault-lines existing mainly between the 
Ba’th nationalists and Antun Sa’ada’s pan-Syrian nationalists.  The Syrian Social Nationalist 
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Party (SSNP as the party came to be known) was by now widely seen as being pro-western, 
anti-Communist and anti-Arab nationalist, whereas the Ba’th claimed to unite the Arabs and 
fend off western hegemony in the region.285  Following the Malki affair, in which a member 
of the SSNP was found guilty of assassinating a leading Ba’thist army colonel, the SSNP 
was purged once and for all, leaving the Ba’th as the dominant force in the military.  This 
contributed to Syria’s history of suspicion towards Syrian-centric nationalism and notions of 
greater Syria that put a Syrian national identity above a wider Arab identity.  This also had 
implications for Asad, as the advance of his own career coincided with the rise of his party 
within the army, and he was singled out for promotions and special training.   
 
Instead of heading to Britain for training, as had traditionally been the case, Asad and his 
colleagues were sent in 1955 to Nasser’s revolutionary Egypt – it was at this time that 
notions of a union between Egypt and Syria were already being floated by their respective 
policy-makers.  Egypt’s equipment was too poor for the training to continue, thus Asad and 
his colleagues were transferred eventually to Britain.  It was in this period of turmoil for 
Anglo-Egyptian relations that Asad was able to observe the nationalist and revolutionary 
fervour in Egypt and the high-handed attitude of the British Foreign Office towards the 
Middle East.   
 
Another early factor that was to have an impact on Syria’s later foreign policies was Asad’s 
suspicion of the Soviet Union.  Despite Syria’s leftist leanings, and the development of a 
political affinity with the Soviet Union over the years as a counter to the US, they were 
mistrusted for being an ‘atheist’ country, whose Marxist internationalism was a rival to Arab 
nationalism, and which had been amongst the first to acknowledge the state of Israel in 
1948.  Even though relations between the Soviet Union and Arabs had improved since the 
death of Stalin, Asad maintained this air of caution in his later dealings with the Soviet 
Union.  Nevertheless, the USSR’s antipathy towards the west made it an invaluable ally for 
the Syrian regime. 
 
Finally, before he made his ascent in the Ba’th Party through the Military, an influential 
episode in the development of Asad’s principles and perceptions was the failure of the 
United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt.  While it had initially been hailed by the 
Syrians as marking the revival of pan-Arab cooperation and strength, it ultimately turned out 
to be a sour experience of domination by the Egyptians who were on their own quest for 
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regional hegemony.  The founders of the Ba’th Party, Aflaq and Bitar, were deemed by 
many in the Ba’th, especially those in the Military who had lost out in rank and political 
involvement as a result of the Union, as having sacrificed the Party without considering the 
Syrian people.  This impacted Asad’s political views on what should be the correct aims of 
the Ba’th, and also on the ineffectiveness of having ‘theorists’ leading the party.  While they 
had articulated the ideological principles and goals of the party, they were not the best 
people to operationalise them. Moreover, their social standing, hailing from the middle class, 
meant they were perceived to be averse to the radical sentiment welling up below.  The 
Union had direct consequences for the Ba’th, for Nasser dissolved all political parties.  
Akram al-Hawrani, earlier cited as a key player in the fortunes of the Ba’th and Arab 
nationalism in Syria, gave up his ineffective position in the UAR government in disgust, and 
accused Nasser of wanting to accommodate Israel at the expense of the Palestinians.  
Hawrani rejected any pragmatic approach with the Israelis, seeing the conflict with Zionism 
as an existential one in which survival was at stake.   
 
Taking their cue from such developments, Asad and his co-conspirators in the army set 
about clandestine operations to bring down the Union.  After a well-planned coup, the UAR 
was dissolved on 28 September 1961.  Thus a new era in Ba’thist nationalism began, in 
which practical implementation of ideology, the primacy of the army and challenging 
‘imperialism’ and Zionism above all else were at the forefront of the party’s agenda, taking 
precedence over ‘Arab unity’ wherever it was deemed to be a hindrance.  This could be seen 
as the first clear example in which Ba’thist nationalism prioritised resistance of Israel over 
Arab unity, particularly if unity led to a compromise of the former.  This marked one of the 
key stages of evolution of the Ba’th party, but also in the interpretation and application of 
Arab nationalist ideology in Syria. 
 
The period between the coup and the eventual Ba’thist revolution in 23 February 1966 saw a 
series of counter-coups and struggles for power between Ba’thists, Nasserites and 
conservative forces.  The military continued to play an integral role in this time, entrenching 
itself further into the web of national politics.  Asad simultaneously made his rise up the 
ranks of both the military and the Ba’th.  The militarist Ba’thists concluded that to prevent 
the subjugation from external forces again, the military not only needed to be strong, but 
also sufficiently politicised in order to remain loyal to the ideological agenda of the Ba’th 
from within.  Given the social constituency of the rising military class and their favouring of 
action over ‘theorising’, the ‘neo-Ba’thist’ revolution of 1966, as it is often termed, saw a 
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more militarised and socialist government taking over.  The effective ruler was Salah Jadid, 
though he appointed Nur al-Din al-Atasi as Head of State, whose Sunni background would, 
he hoped, pacify those opposing his own leadership on the grounds that he was himself 
Alawi.  He appointed Hafez Asad in the position of Defence Minister.  A few months later, 
the abilities of the new Syrian government were put to the test as it confronted the prospect 
of a war against Israel.   
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4.2 The 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
 
In the early 60s, due to Soviet arms supplies, there were many in the US State Department 
who believed the UAR had been in a position of strength compared to Israel, claiming that 
their armoury and firepower ‘outclassed’ anything the Israelis had, which partly explains 
why the US so heavily supplied Israel with arms.286  But this notion was disputed by other 
authorities in the US state department, who argued Nasser’s stockpiling of weapons in the 
UAR were ‘useless’, and that Israeli arms accumulation for the sake of pacifying its 
domestic population, was not a worthwhile, nor an effective policy for peace in the region or 
Israel’s security.287   
 
In this period, the US was faced with the dilemma of maintaining equilibrium in the Middle 
East or tipping the balance of its fragile diplomacy further in favour of Israel.  A difference 
of opinion emerged between members of the State department and the President’s office 
over how best to manage America’s two strategies – that of garnering Arab support to fend 
off the USSR, and also protecting Israel.  The US was already planning to support Israel 
over its planned diversion of Jordanian waters to support its growing population, a hugely 
controversial move.  The State Department recognised that to grant Israel additional military 
aid at this time, as it was requesting, could unnecessarily antagonise Arab forces in the 
region, leading to a dangerous, possibly nuclear, arms race.   
 
Despite this, President Kennedy decided to significantly increase both economic and military 
aid to Israel so that during his term in office, aid to Israel totalled at $1bn since 1948, 
compared to the marginally higher amount of $1.7bn earmarked for all the Arab states put 
together288; when President Lyndon Johnson took over in late 1963, he took this a step 
further by supplying specifically offensive weapons to balance what he saw as ‘the 
disproportionate arms build up on the Arab side’.289  While much of the literature states that 
the US Government did not go so far as to approve Israel’s development of a nuclear 
deterrent, the declassification of South African government files from this period show that 
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Israel did eventually acquire the technology needed for this from the then Apartheid 
regime.290 
 
The border skirmishes (particularly surrounding Lake Tiberias) in the early part of the 
decade between Israelis and Syrians developed into direct and increasingly violent battles 
between both militaries.  Via so-called agricultural settlements, the Israelis had begun to 
occupy parts of the mutually accepted demilitarised zones (DMZ) which had been 
designated as neutral land since the 1948 war.  While Israel gained greater control over the 
water and economic resources in those areas, Asad as Defence Minister responded by 
shelling the Israeli settlements.   
 
Syria’s actions,  in addition to Palestinian guerrilla raids invited escalating Israeli 
‘retaliations’,291 which were (to Syria’s frustration) accepted as legitimate self defence and 
met with no action by the UN.  When Syria claimed that it could not control or stop the 
Palestinian guerrilla raids, the US in turn entered into the dispute with a warning that, 
similarly, it could not stop Israel if it chose to strike.292  Asad felt that he was in a dilemma: 
if he did nothing it would have meant surrender to Israeli encroachment in the DMZ; but 
large-scale retaliation would, he conceded, bring about the army’s defeat in the face of 
Israel’s military superiority.293   
 
Such increased militarisation of Syrian-Israeli enmity, over an initially low-key border 
dispute, contributed to the escalating tensions between Israel and all the Arab states, acting 
as the precursor to war in June 1967.  It does also demonstrate the limitation of superpower 
involvement in the conflict – while they potentially could have stopped the escalation, it was 
the regional actors who played the key roles in starting the war. This also raises question 
marks about the widely adopted interpretation that Syria were the main provocateurs – 
indeed from the account provided, both the longstanding dispute over the DMZs, 
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unchallenged Israeli settlers and Israeli retaliations, also contributed to rising tensions.  This 
highlights the historiographical difference that is at times lost in accounts of the 1967 war.294 
 
The ruling figures of the key states, their personal histories and political biases, had a 
significant bearing on the march to war.  For Egypt, Nasser was a victim of his past glories 
in Suez; his inability to challenge Israel over its actions in the region, and his perceived 
passivity over Palestine, led people – in Egypt and elsewhere – to question his assumed 
leadership of the Arab nationalist struggle.  In an attempt to repair this damage he veered 
further to the left, increasing links with the USSR and even the Viet Cong to engage in 
empty sabre-rattling– much to the anger of the US.   
 
In turn, the US leadership, having been willing to see him as someone worth negotiating 
with in the past, now saw Nasser’s moves as deliberate antagonism and were happy to see 
him disciplined and curtailed.  Lyndon Johnson was an even more pro-Israeli president than 
Kennedy had been before him295; thus Nasser’s actions and bellicose rhetoric (all for show 
and not with intent) further alienated Washington and meant that the US was less likely to 
restrain Israel in the event of war.   
 
Israel, for its part, was far more willing to escalate the level of confrontation than the Syrians 
or indeed any of the leaders anticipated.  Nasser’s provocation was not seen as threatening, 
but rather as an opportunity to be exploited.  The Prime Minister, Levy Eshkol, being far 
more cautious than his political peers and the Israeli public, came under pressure and finally 
stepped down on the eve of war, giving way to a war coalition including militarists Moshe 
Dayan, Shimon Peres, Yitzak Rabin and the even more right-wing Menachim Begin.  
Israel’s objectives were no longer merely to hold on to the DMZs, or to teach Syria a lesson; 
their target was now the defeat of Nasser and Egypt, seen as both the greater threat and the 
greatest prize since 1956.  Beyond this there were those who saw war as an opportunity to 
expand Israel’s borders permanently and redraw the map.296   
 
The scale of war hoped for by the Israelis was the complete reverse of the intentions and 
predictions of the Syrians who did not have the capability to engage in all-out warfare.  
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Their only way of responding to Israel’s encroachment into the DMZs had been to sponsor 
limited guerrilla raids - what Asad called a ‘people’s war’ -297  but they had not wanted an 
escalation beyond the Syrian-Israeli borders.  What they did not calculate was their inability 
to control the actions and motives of the Palestinian guerrilla movement, who saw the 
advantages of an all-out Arab-Israeli war for their own cause.   In the face of increased 
tensions between Syria and Israel, the under-fire Nasser felt compelled to demonstrate his 
pan-Arab credentials by signing a defence pact first with Syria and then Jordan, agreeing to 
come to their aid if they came under attack.  Though Nasser had no intention to fight a war 
with Israel and was unprepared in the event, this provided Israel with the opportunity to 
bring Egypt into the sphere of war and – given Israel’s military superiority, assured US 
backing and better preparation – to inflict a likely defeat on their old foe.   
 
Between November 1966 and April 1967, Israel launched an invasion into the West Bank of 
Jordan and escalated its air battles with Syria, forcing Egypt to respond by moving its troops 
onto the Sinai border with Israel.  What Egypt intended to be a deterrence to Israel and a 
launch for negotiations, provided Israel with the Casus Belli it was looking for to pursue a 
full-scale war against the Arab states (with tacit and full approval from President Johnson), 
in order to annex more territory and enhance its security position.298  In the week-long war 
the Arab states endured a crushing defeat.  Israel took the Egyptian Sinai, the Jordan West 
bank and the Syrian Golan Heights.  On 5 June, Syria lost its airforce, on the 10th the Golan 
was captured; on the same day, a ceasefire was announced, but despite this Israel went on to 
capture Quneitra, the main town of the Golan, as well as Mount Herman on 12 June – a 
strategic high-point on the Golan, which the Israelis set up as an electronic listening post and 
from where they could ‘monitor every movement in the Damascus plain’.299  Over the 
course of the war, six hundred Syrian soldiers were killed from continuous bombing and 
napalming; the town of Quneitra was utterly destroyed, becoming a symbol of Syria’s sense 
of injustice, while its inhabitants and those from surrounding areas were forced to flee, 
leaving some 120,000 displaced Syrians.300 
 
The significance of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war for the region as a whole, its causes and 
consequences, has been analysed in great depth elsewhere and need not be revisited in 
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further detail here.301  It is sufficient to emphasise that the outcome of the war was militarily 
and politically disastrous for the Arabs states and had a grave psychological impact: 
suddenly their Arab nationalist identity and its capacity to unite the Arabs was called into 
serious question. This was accompanied by the realisation that Israel, with its small 
population and all its vulnerabilities, had surpassed all the Arab states in its military power 
and tactical awareness.  The war was a pivotal event in consolidating Israel’s statehood and 
stake in the region, as well as an asymmetrical military and economic situation.  It also 
served to stamp US dominance in the region as the patron of the victors versus the USSR. 
 
However, beyond its general impact on Arab morale, the war had a particular, constitutive 
part to play in the future triangular political dynamics between the US, Syria and Israel.  The 
rest of the chapter will now focus on the impact of war on the development of US-Syrian 
relations.  Firstly at a domestic level, the failures of the Syrian army, the humiliating loss of 
the strategically vital Golan Heights, the destruction of the civilian town of Quneitra by the 
Israeli army after the official ceasefire, and the roles played by both external and regional 
actors, provoked in Damascus both introspection and a deeper mistrust of enemies and allies 
alike.  The strategic wisdom of Salah Jadid’s government’s militaristic approach, not just in 
the war, but prior to it, was now scrutinised more openly – militarism had become a part of 
the Ba’thist revolutionary ideology in the 1950s and 60s, but should it be adopted to the 
point of jeopardising Syrian and Arab interests?   
 
This was an observation not lost on Hafez Asad, who himself carried the guilt of overseeing 
the air-force and being connected with its failures.  Such a humiliating defeat could not be 
repeated, and change at the top of the regime – not just in personnel but also in strategy – 
was becoming viewed as a matter of urgency, setting in train intensified rivalry within the 
leadership and debate about the future of Syria’s political approach, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  Secondly, the war did not just generate introspection and have a 
negative effect on Syria’s morale; it also had a major influence on Asad’s personal, long-
term perceptions of the US as the bankroller of Israel, and the Soviet Union’s unreliability as 
a key ally.  Thus the need for a more strategically competent, less reactionary and perhaps 
more pragmatic government was simultaneously tied to deepening hostility and mistrust 
towards the US, not the opposite. 
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The sense of international law being violated with impunity – for example, Israel’s unilateral 
invasion of Arab territories, the sacking of Quneitra even after the declaration of a cease-fire, 
and the occupation of seized land through civilian settlements which permanently displaced 
Arab communities that had evacuated during the war – provoked Syrian anger and charges 
of double standards.  It also meant the ensuing American proposals for peace were treated 
with disdain by the Syrians, mirroring what they felt was Israeli disdain for UN laws 
safeguarding Arab security. 
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4.3 Aftermath of the War 
 
In the months following the outbreak of the 1967 War, the United Nations issued Security 
Council Resolution 242 on the 22 November.  The text of the resolution emphasised the 
‘inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war’ and the need to work for a ‘just and 
lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security’.  It stipulated that all states 
should act in accordance with article 2 of the UN Charter.  Crucially, it laid down two 
principles, with implications for both Israel and the Arab states.  The first of these was ‘the 
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflict’.  The second 
was: ‘The termination of all claims or states of belligerence and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every 
state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free 
from threats or acts of force.’  In addition to these principles, the resolution also affirmed: 
 
1) The guarantee of free navigation (for all states) through international waterways in 
the area 
2) A guarantee for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem 
3) A guarantee of territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in 
the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones 
 
Resolution 242 was supposed to set the basic goals and parameters of a possible peace 
settlement.  But efforts to move the parties concerned towards that settlement required more 
than the rhetoric of a UN resolution; for it carried no condemnation, apportioned no 
responsibility, nor conveyed a clear timeline or potential sanctions that might have induced 
greater urgency among the states involved.  Amidst a continuing war of attrition, the US 
attempted (and largely failed) to secure cease-fires through an initiative set up by Secretary 
of State William Rogers (known as the ‘Rogers Plan’), and sent Ambassador Jarring on a 
diplomatic mission to sell the prospect of peace negotiations to the Arab states.  For the 
Syrians, the resolution did not go far enough to force Israel’s withdrawal from Arab 
territories; furthermore it appeared to equate the urgency of Israeli withdrawal with a 
reciprocal diplomatic recognition of Israel on the part of Arab states – given that Syria at this 
stage contested not only Israel’s borders but what it saw as Israel’s illegitimate occupying 
status, it could not accept such a proposition.  In protest at the resolution’s perceived 
leniency towards Israel and disregard for the refugee problem which long pre-dated the 1967 
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war, as well as in protest at America’s contribution to Israel’s victory, Syria refused to 
accept resolution 242 or to receive Ambassador Jarring in the country. 
 
Beyond this, the US also enacted its own policies independent of the UN to address the 
volatility prevailing in the region in the aftermath of war.  It imposed a complete embargo on 
the sale of items that could be of military significance to the Arab states and Israel.  Despite 
their attempts and requests to restart trade, the embargo remained firmly in place towards 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and was enacted most consistently against the Syrians.  In contrast, 
the embargo was soon lifted for Israel. Officially, the US justified their contradictory actions 
by arguing they had ‘diplomatic relations’ with the Israelis, whereas they did not with the 
Arab states.302  The US further argued that since the Soviet Union did not exercise any 
restraint in its military sales to the area (i.e. to Arab states) it felt compelled to reassess its 
own policy.303  In this way, the policy was portrayed as an attempt to restore military parity 
in the region, even though US weapons were far superior to those of the Soviet Union.   
 
It was an argument ill-received by the Arabs; thus when, in 1968, the Americans agreed to 
the sale of 50 F-4 Phantom supersonic jet aircrafts to Israel worth a total value of $200m in 
order to boost Israel’s Defence, they was severely criticised by the Arab states, which was 
then manifested among the Arab public with street protests against the US and western 
personnel.304  The US also breached the embargo by supplying weapons to Jordan to prevent 
it from turning to the Soviet Union; this effectively polarised the region even more than 
before, between allies of the US and allies of the Soviet Union.   
 
It was during this period of existing tension that matters were made worse by Syria’s 
hijacking of a US plane.  One of the first jobs of the newly elected President, Robert Nixon – 
who replaced the Johnson administration in January 1969 - was to condemn the hijacking 
and order the extradition of the perpetrators.  Immediately then, prospects for US-Syrian 
rapprochement and thereby a smoother path towards peace negotiations appeared dim.   
 
While the issues of weapons sales and terrorism rumbled on, the potential peace settlement 
was still on the table but faced several problems.  Resolution 242 had in fact done no more 
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than symbolise the deadlock that now existed between the Arabs and Israel  - the Arabs 
interpreted it as demanding Israel’s complete withdrawal behind the 1967 borders prior to 
negotiation, whereas Israel saw it as a demand for the recognition of Israeli sovereignty and 
security before any return of land.305   
 
In the face of this deadlock the US became preoccupied with the Jordanian and Egyptian 
sides of the settlement, viewing Jordan as ‘the most ready’ to accept Israel as a neighbour, 
and Egypt as having ‘earned the right to make peace’ through its size and importance in the 
region.306  In contrast, the US stated its main reason for ‘ignoring Syria has been the Syrian 
government’s refusal to accept the principle of a peaceful settlement.’  The Syrians’ 
unwillingness to endorse UN resolution 242, to hand over militants, or to allow US 
Ambassador Jarring to enter the region, showed them to be ‘typically intransigent’ in 
America’s view, and justified their policy of non-engagement with Syria’s grievances.307  
The Syrians, for their part, felt non-cooperation was the only means by which they were able 
to voice their condemnation and anger at the occupation of Arab lands and the perceived 
waiving of Israeli culpability by the US.  
 
America’s silence over Syria’s situation (its loss of land, large numbers of military 
casualties, displacement of its people) further deepened the mistrust felt towards the US and 
aggravated its enmity towards Israel.  The US, however, remained confident about its policy, 
basing it on an assessment that at that moment there was ‘virtually no chance’308 of a Syrian-
Israeli settlement, at least not before Israel had settled with Jordan and Egypt.  Not only was 
it deemed logical, it also allowed the US the opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of 
cooperation versus the consequences of obstructionism, making an example of Syria and its 
non-compliance.   
 
Thus 1969 saw the emergence of the policy of ‘separate peace’, one which would have 
lasting consequences for Syria, its relations with the US and indeed for the wider region.  It 
is true that the Syrians had framed the logics of this plan by refusing to accept UN resolution 
242, unlike its Arab neighbours.  Their intention had been to pressurise its neighbours to 
follow suit and form a united Arab front, one that would be stronger against Israel and in 
negotiations with the US; moreover the refusal to accept 242 was designed to act as a 
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message of defiance and intolerance for the continued occupation of Arab land, 
contravening, as the Syrians saw it, international law.  However, the US determined that 
‘problematic’ Arab states should no longer be allowed to influence its own agenda for the 
region, and it was the US which wished for and instigated the policy of separate paths to 
peace – a policy which the Syrians were always to view as a deliberate move to irrevocably 
divide the Arabs and deny justice to both Syrians and Palestinians.309   
 
Nevertheless, despite leaving the Syrians out in the cold, the US outlined a potential 
incentivising plan in the event that Syria would eventually come round and accept the 
necessity of negotiating with Israel.  The preconditions for a Syrian-Israeli settlement310 
included the following: 
 
1. All parties would agree on a timetable for action 
2. The state of war and belligerency would be terminated and a formal state of peace 
established 
3. Parties would agree on a secure and recognised boundary between them 
4. Parties would work out an agreement on demilitarised zones 
5. Refugees from the 1948 war would be offered compensation or repatriation 
6. Syria and Israel would mutually agree to respect and acknowledge each other’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence 
7. The final accord  would be recorded and signed by parties and held by the UN 
 
In public, the Americans put the onus for further peace talks on the Syrians, with the 
implication being that they only had themselves to blame for the lack of progress on the 
Syrian-Israeli front.  But they also acknowledged that as long as Israel retained the right to 
annex the Golan Heights, there would always be seeds for ongoing conflict in the Middle 
East.311  Officially, Israel cited security reasons to justify annexation, so in response, the US 
sought a compromise by allowing Israel to retain a thin strip of territory along the crest 
overlooking the Jordan River (but not overlooking Lake Tiberias) thus assuring security for 
Israel’s Hula Valley.312  However, despite such overt attempts to reach a compromise, the 
US had privately conceded from an early stage of proceedings that: 
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The Israelis will not withdraw from [the] Golan Heights no matter what is decided 
by the great powers in this regard.  If worst comes to worst, the Israelis are prepared 
to confront even the United States should the United States attempt to force the 
Israelis to pull back.313 
 
Israel was keen to point out that the assurance of security was not enough, for their claim to 
the Golan Heights was not based merely on security but history and moral right.  Israeli 
diplomat Ben Aharon reiterated the non-negotiable conditions of Israel’s annexation by 
stating that the US must ‘realize the depth of feeling in Israel about [the] retention of the 
Golan Heights’.314  This forces a reassessment of the notion publicly promulgated by the US 
at the time, that Syria alone was the intransigent factor in any proposed peace settlement.  
Given its private statements to the US about its implacability on the issue, the notion that 
Israel was a passive actor merely waiting for the Arabs to accept universally accepted peace 
conditions is not viable with the documentary evidence.  Rather Israel’s predetermined and 
immovable position on what the outcome of any settlement should be (including permanent 
rights for Israel to annex the Golan Heights), significantly contributed to the existing 
stalemate between Syria and Israel.   
 
As will be outlined in greater detail, the reason why in contrast other Arab states, Egypt and 
Jordan, did not experience the same deadlock in their negotiations was because they 
accepted Israeli conditions, almost fully and with few demands of their own.  Noticeably in 
the State Department records, the Israelis were not questioned in their commitment to peace 
or asked to compromise as the Syrians were, not in private and never in public.  The purpose 
of negotiations on the Syrian-Israeli front, from the American standpoint, was mainly to 
persuade the Syrians to accept the Israeli position, rather than to produce movement and 
bargaining from both sides.  This argument is further supported by Kissinger’s shuttle 
diplomacy, analysed in the next chapter. 
 
4.3.1 Emergence of the American-Israeli ‘special relationship’ 
Based on the above analysis, one might ask the question: why did the US make such little 
attempt to move the Israelis from their own position of intransigence, while simultaneously 
berating the Syrians for theirs?  What bonds of loyalty or identity, what strategic or 
economic necessities, or what domestic political influences bound the US so closely to Israel 
and generated such a strong inclination to pursue Israeli interests on Israel’s behalf?  In the 
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previous chapter, it was outlined that the US pursued this policy under Roosevelt and 
Truman, to a lesser extent under Eisenhower, and with increased vigour under Kennedy.  
This trend was continued and raised to greater levels under President Lyndon Johnson and 
the partiality became particularly marked during the 1967 War.  When Nixon became 
President in 1969, he sought to temper the appearance of overt bias that Johnson had 
fostered315; but by that stage the US-Israeli ‘special relationship’ was already a fixture of US 
foreign policy.  It had evolved into something that went deeper than pure strategic interests 
and was a virtually unshakeable commitment.   
 
The 1967 war and the alarming rapidity with which the US and the Soviet Union were 
dragged into a regional conflict, creating the danger of a direct confrontation between the 
two superpowers, forced a reassessment of US strategy in the Middle East.  The US could 
not protect both Israeli interests while at the same time seeking to strengthen the Arabs so 
they could be used as a bulwark against Communism, if they were both likely to be in 
conflict with each other.  Moreover, Israel’s military victory and superiority in the 1967 War 
had put the US in a difficult position.  No longer was it possible to play to international 
sympathy and a (now outdated) moral justification by claiming to support the ‘underdog’ in 
the region, while claiming to equally defend both sides was also no longer viable.  While 
still in a dilemma over how it was to proceed in its engagement with the Middle East, the 
State Department produced a paper on ‘US policy in the Middle East’ drafted in the summer 
of 1968.  It eloquently illuminates the nature of America’s dilemma:  
 
‘...Israel cannot be described merely as a ‘disturbing factor’ in our relations with the 
Arab world – Israel and the nature of our relationship with it is a basic obstacle to 
our achieving better relations and exerting greater influence throughout the area.  In 
a sense we are caught within a dilemma.  On the one hand, we feel constrained to 
maintain a special association with Israel, while on the other, we seek to safeguard 
our interests in the Arab world which are being eroded because of our special 
relationship with Israel.  The weakness of our position...is that we are trying to 
achieve both objectives, although they are incompatible. 
 
It would be helpful if we were to recognize the difficulty in which we find ourselves 
and analyze the reasons for our special relationship with Israel and failure to achieve 
our goals in the area.  Then, and only then, could we begin to approach the area and 
its problems with a greater degree of realism. 
 
We have developed [a] special relationship with Israel for very valid reasons.  But 
they are reasons not germane to Middle Eastern dynamics.  They are associated, 
rather, with political factors at work elsewhere around the world, most particularly in 
the United States and in Western Europe.  We should also recognize that Israel itself 
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holds the key to none of our interests in the area: it is not an effective deterrent to the 
spread of Communism nor an effective instrument for strengthening western 
influence there; it controls no significant amount of petroleum; it is not a factor in 
communications or transit facilities; and, by itself, it cannot bring about peaceful 
conditions.  On the other hand, the Eastern Arab states do hold the key to our basic 
policy objectives, with the one exception of the one envisioning a peaceful resolution 
of area problems.  This last one is attainable only through Arab-Israel 
cooperation.’316 
 
The paper then outlined two alternative policy routes.  One was to ‘maintain a low level of 
involvement in the internal and regional politics of the Middle East’.  The authors of the 
paper deemed that taking on an even greater responsibility in the region would require the 
US to play a far more decisive role which would not be possible ‘without alienating one or 
the other of the contending parties, or both’.  However, it was also acknowledged that if the 
US chose to remain aloof from the hostile situation in the Middle East and did not weigh in 
heavily with the parties, ‘the Arab-Israel conflict will remain smouldering and will break out 
from time to time in open warfare’, while US Cold War interests would be continuously 
weakened.  Thus the second route, and the one which the policy paper recommended, 
required the US to make a serious commitment to one of two possible, and probably divisive, 
resolutions, these being: ‘a) an end to Arab irredentism or b) a decision on the part of the 
Israelis not to seek their destiny as a nation apart from the Arab community in which they 
are located’.  It was agreed that both options would generate resentment and opposition on 
either side of the conflict.  If the US was to pursue such a policy, then it would have to be 
prepared to abandon the appearance of trying to placate both the Arabs and the Israelis – 
though there were many that already felt the US handling of both sides was far from 
equitable.   
 
From the introspective tone of the paper, one might at first assume that the US was set to 
reassess its close relations with Israel and that, on the balance of US geo-political interests, 
the US would give its support to the Arab states.  However, to the contrary, US opted to give 
its unreserved support to Israel after this policy paper was issued – a policy which reflected 
the President’s office and the view of the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  From here-on 
in, the US saw Israel no longer as an isolated outpost of US interests in the region, but as a 
state that could also help the US fulfil its strategic goals in the region, an accolade that had 
traditionally been bestowed upon the Arabs.317  And thus rather than pursuing incompatible 
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goals, two key strategies were twinned, so that the US was now on course to focus its efforts 
on aiding the Israelis and further boosting their military capability and strength in the region.   
 
As intimated in the policy paper, the key reasons for US support for Israel had not 
historically been strategic or geopolitical.  Rather US-Israeli relations had been fostered 
because of personal ties between members of the US administration and Jewish identity, and 
an emotional connection felt towards Jews as a result of the Holocaust.  Moreover, there was 
a large Jewish community living in the US whose voice carried more weight than that of 
Arabs living in another continent.  When domestic politics became fraught, successive US 
administrations increasingly approached Middle Eastern affairs against the background of 
needing the support of the Israeli lobby.318  Short-term political pragmatism at home played 
as much a part in America’s decision to support Israel as the emotional ties of some US 
politicians. 
 
Nixon’s initial aim to establish a detente between all parties, was essentially discarded by 
this new policy – but it did reflect pragmatism to the extent that any type of peace – even an 
incomplete one, or an unjust one in the view of the Arabs – was deemed acceptable if it was 
in US interests.  As for the support of Israel, this was a policy that had already been in 
motion under Johnson and Kennedy before him, but after this internal debate it was now 
accompanied with a strategic rationale as well.   
 
4.3.2 The Syrian post-war position and policy towards the US 
The last section looked at America’s reaction to the outcome of the war and its increasing 
political inclination towards Israel; this section analyses the Syrian reaction to their defeat 
and to the US’ policy. 
 
Between 1967 and 1970, the Syrians saw no signs of progress for the recovery of the 
occupied Golan Heights, Palestinian territories or parity in the balance of power in the 
region.  As a result, the Syrians harboured a number of grievances against the US for (as 
they saw it) aiding Israel in an illegal occupation against Arab aspirations and interests. The 
first grievance was the basic factor of the US’ alliance with Israel.  The Arabs reacted to the 
negative outcome of the 1967 War by enacting a boycott against Israel, which was led by the 
                                               
318
 R. Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 121 
 155 
Syrians - labelled ignominiously by the US as ‘the most rabid of the Arab countries on this 
subject’.319    
 
The US noted from the Ba’th’s early foreign policy, it was not only the ‘most belligerent of 
all the Arab states toward Israel’, its preoccupation with Israel had ‘dominated Syria’s 
foreign policy’ and as a result, it tended to ‘shape its policy toward a given nation in terms of 
that nation’s policy toward Israel’.320  Even prior to the June 1967 War Syria had viewed 
anything American with ‘profound suspicion’.  As the US correctly asserted, the ‘basic issue 
is the Palestinian problem and the total identification, in Syrian eyes, of the United States 
with Israel.’321  After the war, Syria’s animosity and association of the US with Israel only 
increased.  The Syrian government severed relations with the United States with immediate 
effect, giving American official personnel only 48 hours to leave, whose lives according to 
US reports had been in grave danger while they remained in Syria.  Although other Arab 
states, such as Iraq, Algeria and Egypt, had also broken official relations with the US in 
protest after the war, they still maintained diplomatic links by retaining personnel in their 
respective Interest Sections in Washington.  Syria’s break, however, was ‘total’.  The 
furthest the Syrian government went was to assign a clerk to the Syrian interests section of 
the Pakistan Embassy in Washington DC, Syria’s protecting power in the US, while Italian 
officials had to represent the US in Damascus.   
 
Moreover, the US continuously came under severe attacks in the Syrian press and visas were 
refused to American tourists.  At this point, US-Syrian relations were at their lowest ebb.  
Things did not improve in 1968 when the US noted that ‘the prospects for resuming relations 
with Syria are even bleaker than those of Iraq’, with whom the US also had frosty relations 
since its own Ba’thist revolution.322  According to the State Department the US had, up until 
1972, very few direct contacts with Syrian officials from 1967 onwards.323  An internal 
report on foreign trade in the Middle East further elaborated on the extent of poor relations 
between the US and Syria: 
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To date, the Syrians have continued to be extremely hostile to the US and their 
public information media have castigated the US to a degree which even exceeds the 
hostile Peking propaganda.  Furthermore the Syrian Government has boycotted 
American goods and has favoured the goods of other countries.  The SARG has 
attempted to undermine the pro-Western governments in Jordan and Lebanon by 
means of sending fedayeen through Lebanese and Jordanian territory.  This has 
invited Israeli retaliation which has contributed to the internal instability of these 
countries.  Thus we do not want to do anything that would enhance the military 
capabilities of either the fedayeen or the Syrian Army.’324 
 
The Second main grievance, and apart from the US’ general support for Israel, was Syria’s 
frustration at the US-imposed embargo on the sale of weapons to the Arab states, as alluded 
to in the above statement.  They saw this as a deliberate attempt to prevent the Arabs from 
developing not just their militaries but also their general domestic security infrastructure; 
even the import of police radios was vetoed by the US.  Against this backdrop, the Syrians 
were especially vexed by the US’ continued supply of arms and fighter jets to Israel, while 
their own military stockpiles deteriorated.325  Indeed the US had become the major source of 
arms for Israel,326 which were used directly against Palestinian and Syrian fedayeen – 
deemed as terrorists by the US and Israel, and as an important part of a legitimate resistance 
by the Syrians. 
 
The third grievance, and most grating for the Syrians, was the US’ ambivalent stance 
towards Israel’s refusal to withdraw from Syrian land – for Syria, the most antagonistic of all 
Israel’s policies was that which it maintained towards the occupied territories.   The Israeli 
Ambassador to the US reflected his government’s viewpoint when he told the Americans 
with regards to building settlements on the Golan Heights, that he: 
 
saw no reason why Israel should not do what it wished to fulfil its responsibility for 
maintaining the territories under its control so long as Israel acted within the context 
of military occupation and abided by the Geneva Convention.327 
 
Thus it was apparent that the Israelis did not perceive any need or pressure to withdraw from 
the Golan Heights seized during the war, despite its illegality under international law.  
Furthermore, they made it clear they had no intent to do so in the future by continuing to 
build settlements.  In 1968 the Jewish Agency announced plans to settle a further 15,000 
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civilians on the Golan Heights.  Initially, the US did express disapproval, pointing out that 
the mentioned settlements, ‘would...be in violation of the Convention’, citing Article 49, 
paragraph 6 of the 1949 Geneva Convention pertaining to civilians, which stipulated: ‘The 
Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies’.328  The ICRC Commentary329 provided on the convention indicated 
that this clause was intended to prevent the colonisation of occupied territories in the 
aftermath of war.  As an official at the US State Department highlighted, the clause was 
inserted to prevent practices similar to those adopted by Nazi Germany during World War II 
when it had transferred portions of its own population to occupied territories for political and 
racial reasons; thus, he argued, Israel was ‘pursuing a policy with regard to settlements on 
the Golan Heights which is inconsistent with the intent of Article 49(6).’330  There ensued as 
a result of his comments some dispute within the State Department about the extent to which 
the Article in question prohibited any settlement on occupied areas; but there was no doubt 
that it clearly prohibited colonisation which, it was agreed, would occur if the number of 
settlers was substantial.  This debate and conclusion was not discussed a great deal in public, 
and it was clear no action would be taken over it. 
 
Thus there was an unusual situation in which the US itself clearly stated that continued 
Israeli occupation of Arab land and subsequent building of settlements was illegal under 
international law, but at the same time, it refused to put any pressure on Israel to withdraw 
following its strategic policy shift to defend Israel at the expense of the Arabs.  With the 
strategic policy change outlined earlier, all US efforts in the Middle East appear to have 
inclined towards strengthening Israel’s position as opposed to enabling the Arabs to realise 
their goals of recovering lost land and dealing with the repatriation of refugees.  Instead of 
demanding Israeli withdrawal from land occupied during the war, the US enabled this 
situation to be framed as the status quo.  This then put the onus on the Arab states to 
recognise and strike peace with Israel in return for land.  Prior to this, the return of lands 
seized in conflict was an unconditional stipulation under international law; as Henry 
Kissinger elucidated in his memoirs, it was the US who altered this international norm after 
making this significant policy change in favour of Israel.331   
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With Israel continuing to build settlements, and with the US effectively defending Israel’s 
actions, Syria now felt that it had both the moral and legal argument on its side.  Thus 
despite the US’ policy, the Syrians felt that under international law, it was within their rights 
to recover their lost lands without the conditions that Israel and the US had placed on them.  
This position is one that Syria continues to publicly and officially maintain. As a result, 
Syria also became over time, a champion of the UN as the legal framework within which to 
operate and pointed the blame at the US for operating outside of it.332  The legal route 
became a reflection of a moral argument for the Syrians, while international law was treated 
as an ally against the alliance of the US and Israel, seen by Syria as the real transgressors. 
 
As for the fourth major grievance, the Syrians saw the US as deliberately using post-war 
Arab disillusionment, and its own superpower influence, to sow disunity amongst the Arab 
states.  On one hand, the US observed that the war had united some Arab forces with the 
effect of ‘downplaying the conflict between nationalism and Islam’,333 but on the other hand 
it had also set some regimes apart from others, producing cleavages within the collective 
Arab policy that could then be exploited by the US and Israel to initiate peace among some 
of the Arab states, if not all.   
 
Jordan was marked as one of those countries.  So even though the war had focused Jordan’s 
attention towards the building of its military capabilities against Israel, the US also 
recognised this was a development that could be swung around; for unlike Syria, Jordan was 
not motivated by ideology, but regime security.  As the State Department observed, in 
contrast to Syria: 
 
King Husayn’s main preoccupation is the preservation of the monarchy for the 
Hashimite dynasty.  If he could do it by accepting Israel’s existence he probably 
would do so, but he is inhibited from doing so by the pressure of Palestinians in 
Jordan and his revolutionary Arab rivals.334   
 
Even if Jordan opposed Israel on an instrumental basis, for domestic factors and not out of 
any moral or ideological principle, this would have been sufficient for Syria’s political 
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cause.  However, any such expectations were dented as the US, recognising a weakness in 
the Arab front, put its efforts into swaying individual state policies. 
 
It was not the case that there were no efforts or wishes on either the American or Syrian side 
to improve relations.  Indeed, at one point, Egypt’s decision to raise US representation in 
Egypt to Ambassadorial rank did stimulate Syria to bridge the divide.  Moreover, the 
Americans still saw some benefits in maintaining modest relations with Syria – the 
‘maximum extent permitted by the Syrians’ -  which they hoped would include commercial 
and cultural activities at same level as other countries.  In view of both geo-political 
considerations and of its potential in economic and human resources, Syria was deemed by 
the US to be too important to ignore, much less ‘give up’, and through some degree of 
normalisation of relations in non-political fields, the US sought to have rights to transit oil 
through Syria and to fly its aircrafts over Syrian air space.  The Americans acknowledged 
that while they could not hope to change Syrian attitudes towards Israel, and thereby the US, 
they could help develop Syria into a ‘modern nation’, which would accrue subsidiary 
benefits for US economic and commercial interests in the region.335 
 
However, these intentions failed to materialise.  As the State Department correctly asserted, 
regardless of these non-political gestures, the ‘main impetus for improvement of relations 
with the United States is forward movement on a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict’.336  
The Syrians held deep mistrust and anger towards the US, and the latter failed to calculate 
that its economic and cultural activities would also be viewed in a suspicious light.  Thus 
Syria engaged in a number of acts to further widen the diplomatic gulf between the two 
states.  In 1969, two Israeli passengers were detained in Syria following the hijacking of a 
TWA airliner on 29 August 1969.  This became a matter of ‘very profound concern to the 
United States Government’.  The Syrian government had expressed it was willing to publicly 
reconsider releasing the two Israelis in exchange for two Syrian military pilots held by Israel 
since 1968 when their planes strayed over Israeli territory on a training mission and made an 
emergency landing on Israeli territory.  However the Israelis had publicly rejected any 
suggestion of such an exchange.337  In addition to this, the Syrians had detained several US 
citizens suspected of espionage for Israel.  As was accurately observed:  
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This, in fact, has been the general rule of our efforts to improve relations with Syria.  
Every time our contacts seem about to reach a conclusion, an incident has occurred 
between Syria and Israel, or on another front of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which sets 
us back to our original starting point.338   
 
Thus as outlined above, there were several reasons Syria was so opposed to US and did all it 
could to hinder US activities in Syria and in the region.  In summary, these reasons were: 
 
i. US support for Israel in the 1967 War 
ii. The continued US embargo on arms trade in the region, while it was lifted for Israel 
- indeed arms sales to Israel increased. 
iii. Nixon’s policy shift that favoured Israel’s stance in the conflict and reconfigured the 
return of occupied land as being conditional on peace (contra international law) 
iv. US failure to condemn continued Israeli settlements in occupied territories 
v. Perceived US exploitation of cleavages amidst the Arab ranks, demonstrated by 
American efforts to coax Jordan to sign a separate peace with Israel. 
vi. Suspected US espionage for Israel 
 
The Syrians sought to communicate these grievances to the Americans, and it only 
exacerbated the hostility when the US dismissed Syrian anger as ‘xenophobia’. 339  The 
notion that Syria’s grievances were a result of irrational hatred of the US, rather than 
American policies, served to undermine Syria’s political claims – this in turn enabled the US 
to sideline Syria, while Syrian opposition rather than being taken seriously was perceived as 
emotional and reactionary. 
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4.4 Syria’s Marginalisation and the Advent of a New Regime 
 
The above analyses the bilateral relationship between the Syrian and American governments, 
but it is also important to analyse simultaneous developments at the regional level to 
understand state behaviour and changes taking place at the bilateral level.  In Syria’s case 
this is particularly important; it is fair to say that more than most states, Syria’s policies at 
three different levels - international, regional and domestic – have been interrelated.340   
 
Thus if we are to analyse the relationship between the US and Syria at this time from the 
domestic angle, we may ask to what extent their policies were supported by and reflective of 
the national mood in their respective countries.  In the US, foreign policy, as in many 
democracies at this time, remained primarily a concern of the political elites and interested 
lobby groups, while the domestic agenda dominated popular political discourse.  In Syria, 
however, foreign policy was intertwined with domestic politics.  Given that it found itself on 
a constant war-footing at its borders against Israel, foreign policy was not only the preserve 
of the elites but was in the consciousness of many ordinary Syrians.  When gauging the 
success or validity of any foreign policy action, it should be measured against the goals and 
values of not only the government but also the society within which it operates, even in a 
closed authoritarian system.   
 
In Syria’s case, it was not only victory against an enemy such as Israel that mattered; the 
principle of ‘standing up’ to the Americans and showing solidarity with the Palestinians and 
fellow Arabs was not only valued but demanded, even in the absence of success.  This was 
alluded to regularly in the primary sources, highlighting that the Syrian public, more than in 
other Arab states, was cited as being hostile to the US and reflected their protests more 
vocally and openly.  The goals and values in such a foreign policy were not pursued only in 
the hope of attaining material and military advantage, but were formulated on the basis of 
fairly rudimentary principles that were captured within Arab nationalist ideology, but were 
not constrained to those who called themselves nationalists or Ba’thists.  The principles of 
anti-imperialism and opposing occupation were broad enough to attract the strong support of 
average members of the public, regardless of the political machinations of the party elite and 
controversies over domestic policies.   
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Thus while the government of Syria was at this time weak and unstable, facing both 
international and internal party pressures, it was supported by its people on its stance against 
Israel.  This is supported by the report at the time from Dr. Luigi Conte, the Italian officer in 
charge of American interests in Damascus, who claimed that the government enjoyed a great 
deal of popularity.  He suggested that Syria was the first Arab country to undergo a ‘real 
proletarian revolution’, and felt that the grass roots popularity and degree of control of the 
regime in Syria was perhaps underestimated. 341   
 
However, despite such support, by 1970 the Syrian government was facing growing 
opposition from various quarters.  Defeat against Israel had been a humiliating episode and 
increased criticism against the regime.  There were those in Syrian society who had 
significant reservations against the Ba’thist revolution to begin with, despite its popular 
stance towards Israel, among them the urban merchant class and Islamist groups, as 
highlighted in chapter 2.  Moreover, deep rifts also existed within the Ba’th party itself, 
which had not been resolved by the radicalist purges of 1966.  Some in the party dissenting 
against the Jadid regime found a rallying point in Salah Bitar, once a Ba’thist, now outside 
of the sphere of the regime.  Others such as Akram Hawrani and Amin al-Hafez were 
identified by the US as being distrustful of the US but also opposed to the current Syrian 
regime.  They were marked out as potential agitators, and in such an event, the US kept 
channels open in case they wanted to contact the US with a view to changing the Syrian 
regime.342   
 
The lack of experience and indeed incompetence among a number of those whom Jadid had 
put in key positions added to the weakness of government and its inability to face conflict 
with Israel: these included Yusuf Zu’ayyin as Prime Minister; Ibrahim Makkhus as Foreign 
Minister; Nur al-Din al-Atasi as head of State.  Sectarian divisions were also becoming more 
apparent under Jadid, with the Druze marginalised after a series of coup attempts, while 
Sunni elements in particular were outraged at an article published in the Ba’th’s military 
journal denouncing God and insulting religion on the eve of war.  It was Jadid who brought 
Asad in as the Defence Minister after the radical ‘neo-Ba’thist’ revolution in 1966, and Asad 
in turn played a key role in quelling a major rebellion against Jadid; but their alliance 
unravelled with defeat against Israel.  Jadid blamed defeat on the armed forces controlled by 
                                               
341
 Memo of conversation, 18/9/1968, folder 2, Entry A1 (5624) Lot#71D5, Record Group 59, Box 2,  
342
 Memo of conversation, Machlani to D. S. Mak (acting deputy chief of Mission), 27/3/1968, Folder 3 of 
4, Entry A1 (5624) Lot#71D5, Record Group 59, Box 2. 
 163 
Asad, while Asad and his supporters in the army accused the leadership of undermining the 
army (and thereby its effectiveness in battle) through its political purges.343 
 
These internal problems within the Syrian regime were further compounded by its growing 
isolation in the region.  While the military had supported the regime in its more active 
‘defiance’ of Israel, there was also an increasing realisation in some quarters that the Syrian 
leadership was pursuing a radical strategy that, rather than furthering the ideological cause, 
was proving to be reckless and threatening to its neighbours.  Syria could not afford to tread 
an isolationist path; the Ba’thist regime had staked its role and purpose on its regionalist 
credentials, and to persist with a radical agenda that appeared to advance little else except 
Soviet geopolitical interests, put Syria in a negative light and awkward contradictory 
position.   
 
Moreover, without sufficient military support from its Soviet allies or the capacity to back 
up threats, Syria’s belligerence was in fact exposing its vulnerability and alienating it from 
its neighbours who felt Syria’s posturing left them with less room to manoeuvre.  By March 
1968, plans were well underway to bring Israel and Jordan together in an agreement in 
which Israel would return some of the West Bank to Jordan and compensate for refugees, 
and Jordan would enter into economic cooperation with Israel – thus the US was set to 
increase economic aid to Jordan with the view of making it a ‘showcase country’.344  
America’s relations with the Saudis, Lebanese, and increasingly with Egypt, provided 
enough substance to continue with a settlement of the Middle East’s problems without Syria.  
By September 1968, the US State Department privately reported that ‘all the Arab leaders 
(with the exception of Syria) genuinely desired an end to the conflict with Israel’, although 
none of them could express this publicly given popular opposition to such a move.345   
 
By 1970, this trend became even more pronounced and problematic for the Syrians: the 
death of Nasser – increasingly mistrusted by the Syrians for his willingness to even 
contemplate a settlement with the US, but still tied to Arab nationalist goals nevertheless – 
hailed the arrival of Anwar Sadat, initially vocal about his opposition towards Israel and the 
US, but fast disassociating himself from a united front with the Syrians.  Given its isolation, 
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the fact that Syria was still entrenched in its hostility towards the US was something that the 
US was able to ignore without (it thought) much consequence.  The Jadid regime had 
portrayed its stance to be based on a fixed and Arab-centric ideology, rather than on 
common international principles, thus making it easy for the US and indeed Arab neighbours 
to dismiss Syria as an inflexible party in any peace plan and, therefore, one that was not 
worth negotiating with.346  Rather than retaining the purity of Arab nationalist goals, this 
lack of pragmatism was in fact strategically detrimental to the principles the Syrian regime 
sought to uphold.  Apart from this ideological debate, there were also straightforward power 
struggles at the heart of the Ba’thist regime.  Amidst this internal turbulence, yet another 
coup against the government ensued; having at one time quashed an earlier challenge to 
Jadid’s power, Hafez Asad was now the chief instigator.  With his links in the army and the 
power base he had slowly built up within the Party, Asad seized power in 1970, and was to 
hold onto power against the odds over the next thirty years.   
 
Asad’s leadership, notably different from the Jadid regime for its pragmatic approach, 
marked a turning point in the nature of the Syrian regime, its strategy in foreign policy, and 
the internal stabilisation of the state.  However, the notion that there was a change in the 
main substance of Syria’s foreign policy as a result of Asad’s pragmatism is contestable.  
Olson argues that he only appears to be more pragmatic (and by extension less ideologically 
motivated) when he is compared with the radicalism of the Jadid regime from 1966-70.347  
Olson contends that when compared with the Ba’thist and wider nationalist forces that 
preceded that regime, Asad was no more pragmatic than other Syrian leaders, while his 
policies seem consistent with his predecessors’ ideological commitment and strategies.348  
 
I agree with this view up to a point: it is the case that when cast alongside Jadid’s 
particularly radical and revolutionary regime, Asad’s approach tends to be interpreted as 
being less ideological when this is not necessarily so.  However, I contest Olson’s position 
that there is consistency between the leadership of Asad and pre-Jadid figures.  Asad's 
leadership was clearly set in different circumstances – regionally and domestically.  Syria 
found itself in a more hostile neighbourhood after the 1967 War, even more isolated than 
before by the growing influence of the US and military power of Israel, and the softening 
positions of fellow Arab states towards both.  As Israel had shown, its willingness and 
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capacity to retaliate to both military and political provocation was great and extremely costly 
for the Arabs. The external constraints on Syria’s revisionism were therefore far greater than 
they were previously, and willingness to engage in belligerent rhetoric with limited gain had 
to be checked - especially when the state of its military was continuing to deteriorate.   
 
Meanwhile, there was growing pressure on Syria’s leadership to stabilise the country’s 
economic situation, at a time when surrounding states were increasing in wealth and 
improving domestic infrastructure.   Jeopardising stability and development at home by 
inviting tighter sanctions and more military threats was a risk too lightly taken in the past, 
and which would have greater repercussions amidst the changing economic and political 
environment by 1970.  Finally, the Jadid regime had seen the growing alienation between the 
Ba’th Party, whose constituency was increasingly based among the rural and Alawi 
population, and the rest of the Sunni urban-based population.  The former tended to be more 
radical, the latter less so, and they were becoming alarmed at Syria’s regional isolation and 
the accusations that it harboured a sectarian regime.  When Asad took over, he immediately 
embarked on a project to drastically increase the Party membership, particularly in the urban 
areas, in order to raise the government’s legitimacy.349   
 
Thus as a result of these different circumstances that Asad found himself in, I take the 
position that he was indeed more pragmatic than his predecessors within the Ba’th Party, due 
to a host of domestic and external pressures and constraints.  Numerous events had shown 
that there was no such thing as glorious failure in the pursuit of ‘ideologically pure’ policies, 
adopted more for the sake of party endorsement and legitimacy than for the increasingly 
alienated Syrian population and principles of Arab nationalism; rather, the greatest threat to 
those principles were now seen to be Syria’s marginalisation and yet another external 
reconfiguration of the region in the absence of an Arab nationalist voice.   
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the most important aspect of the ideology, in practice and 
increasingly in principle, was its opposition to external interference and lack of regional 
autonomy.  A radical stance that a) purported to be holding true to a regionalist ideology, but 
which in fact led to marginalisation and irrelevance, and b) provoked war and in turn 
destabilised the country and the region, thereby inviting yet more external involvement, was 
seen as far more detrimental to the core ideological goals and security of the region than 
measured pragmatism.  The notion, however, that Asad was ready to sacrifice all his 
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political beliefs, especially given his personal experiences in his youth, does not give enough 
recognition to the power of ideas.  Understanding how Asad’s pragmatism was firmly 
situated in an ideological framework is an important nuance. 
 
 167 
4.5 Asad’s Pragmatism and the Impact on US-Syrian Relations 
 
Asad brought the pragmatic approach discussed above not just to the Syrian government’s 
policies at a domestic level, but importantly to foreign policy as well.  Having seen the 
failure of its policy of non-engagement, and the continued deference towards Israel by both 
the US and other Arab states, Asad sought to temper Syria’s hostility towards the Americans 
and thereby raise its input in regional affairs.  This was reflected on a number of levels.  For 
example, after the 1967 War, Syria refused to receive Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and 
Joe Sisco in Damascus, and designated its Deputy Foreign Minister, Zakaria Ismail, as the 
primary channel of communication – this had represented a fairly low level of diplomatic 
contact between the two states, and was a deliberate signal to the US that Syria did not seek 
closer relations.  On his arrival as President however, Asad changed this policy by accepting 
the need for direct communication. 
 
The olive branch was also extended in other areas such as trade. Thus Syria changed its 
policy of boycotting US goods, and began placing requests for sales of equipment that was 
of non-lethal military use – indeed the Syrians had sought to extend this trade to armaments 
in general, although this was not granted by the Americans.  It is plausible to see this as a 
strategic decision by Syria, to increase its influence with the US by becoming a key outlet of 
trade which the US would not want to lose due to political problems.   
 
This policy change can also be connected to the fact that the Syrians wanted to reduce their 
reliance on the USSR, and needed more modern western equipment, which their Israeli 
enemies had been able to take advantage of.  According to Ghaleb Kayali, an ex-member of 
the Syrian Foreign Office, the Syrian government – particularly the military wing – had 
become disenchanted with the Soviets.350  Furthermore, Asad personally, on becoming 
president, sought to make a cleaner break from the Jadid regime; having his own doubts 
about Soviet intentions and influence over Syria, he began to create a greater distance 
between Damascus and Moscow and the relationship was increasingly becoming an uneasy 
one.  Syria successfully resisted signing a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1972 
although both Egypt and Iraq had done so.  Of course ties were not severed – in particular 
the military links remained strong.  Even as late on as 1973, Syria received 3 times the 
number of Soviet fighter aircrafts in the first half of the year than it had received in 1972, 
while Syria had acquired $200m worth of Soviet arms, and there were 1400 Soviet advisors 
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in Syria by June 1973.351  Nevertheless, there continued to be strained relations because of 
the Soviet Union’s increasing attempts to influence Syria, while its military failed to react to 
aid the Syrians when 13 of their aircrafts were shot down in September 1973.  The shift in 
relations had a positive impact in Washington who observed that Syria was ‘disposed to 
expand and improve its relations with other countries and to rely less exclusively on the 
Soviets for outside support.’352   
 
In more substantial policy areas, Syria also demonstrated signs of accommodation and 
flexibility.  In 1971, the areas of disagreement were highlighted as being Syria’s rejection of 
the UN Security council resolution 242, as well as it consistent support for the admission of 
the People’s Republic of China to the UN and the expulsion of Nationalist China.353  But on 
8 March 1972, Hafez Asad finally accepted resolution 242, four and a half years after it had 
been passed.  On the occasion of that announcement, however, Asad was at pains to reiterate 
that the Arab people had two aims ‘from which they will not deviate or abandon: liberation 
of the occupied land and restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people.’354  Asad argued 
that any international effort by Arab republics should reflect these two aims.  While his 
change over 242 could be portrayed as an embarrassing climb down, this was not how Asad 
perceived it - rather he felt it was a way of making it difficult to ‘keep the Golan Heights out 
of the Jarring picture’.  Indeed Asad had understood that the reasons why there was less 
urgency on settling the Israel-Syrian front was partly because Syria had still not accepted 
242.   
 
At first the US showed signs of responding positively to Syria’s concessions.  It still 
maintained its policy of embargoing military shipments to countries that had broken 
diplomatic relations with it; but by 1972, the US did consider supplying weapons to the 
Syrians as an exception to its general policy, and taking into account that even an 
improvement of 50% of the Syrian military cargo vehicle fleet, though improving Syria’s 
military capability, would not significantly ‘change the basic quotient in the area’.355  The 
US considered increasing wider non-military trade with Syria and showed willingness to 
overlook arrears in Syria’s repayment of development loans.  Moreover, the US recognised 
increased Syrian interest in purchasing US military equipment instead of from the Soviet 
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Union as a positive move and a sign that the Syrian government sought to reduce the 
distance between Washington and Damascus.356  The US also recognised the potential that 
Syria’s growing petroleum industry presented to the US economy.     
 
Moreover, with regards to the peace process in the Middle East region, the US gained further 
confidence on the potential for building on US-Syrian relations from Syria’s firm stance 
against fedayeen activities on its own soil, despite Syria’s rhetorical support for the fedayeen 
elsewhere.  Crucially, the US perceived that the Syrians were ready to strike a political 
compromise with the Israelis, even if they continued to ‘talk tough’ in public and had 
initially rejected UN resolution 242.  And finally, what the US regarded as the ‘best 
indication of improved Syrian Government attitudes’, was Syria’s request for weekly visits 
to Damascus from the American consul in Lebanon – the US felt that this augured well for 
future diplomatic relations and positioning of US personnel in Syria which had hereto been 
prohibited.357  The following makes the State Department’s perspective clear: 
 
Syria remains a negative factor in Middle East peace-making efforts, but under the 
Asad regime, which came to power following failure of Syria’s attack on Jordan in 
late 1970, it is moving in the direction of greater pragmatism.358 
 
The new Syrian government was also described by the US ambassador to Syria as: 
 
More pragmatic, more responsible and less ideologically motivated than the previous 
Syrian regime.  While of course the regime’s policies leave something to be desired, 
this is a relative matter and our actions and reactions can be helpful in shaping the 
Syrian Government’s future policies.359 
 
While the following statement from the State Department provides another exposé on 
America’s perceptions and its policy intent towards Syria: 
 
...if we can re-establish an American presence in Damascus, despite Syrian and 
Ba’athi political sensitivity, there is a chance of starting a dialogue which could lead 
to creation of vested interests on both sides in reaching a settlement of our relatively 
minor bilateral financial problems.  I very much doubt we could offer the Syrians, as 
an opening gambit, enough economic aid to persuade them to let us in through the 
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political door; but through the economic route there is a chance of gradually 
rebuilding a position of some modest influence in Damascus.360   
 
There were of course on-going areas of disagreement.361  But overall, there were clear 
signals of cooperative intent and indeed major policy changes on the Syrian side (as seen 
with the acceptance of resolution 242), which were in turn picked up and understood by the 
Americans.  The US responded – to an extent – by approving the rather modest sale of 4,000 
trucks and 175 ambulances, an example of one of the few instances of US-Syrian trade, 
particularly in areas of defence.  However, despite such justifications provided by the State 
Department, President Nixon still refused to permit the sale of non-lethal military equipment 
to go ahead.   
 
What, then, can be gauged from these developments about US perceptions of Syria? What is 
clear from such statements above is the State Department held the view that a more 
pragmatic Syrian government – one that was demonstrating greater strategic awareness – 
would also be, to a certain extent, abandoning its ideological principles.  Moreover, the US 
intended that a greater level of communication and financial transactions should also 
persuade the future direction of Syria’s policies to a more US-friendly position.362  The US 
was further encouraged in this view by Syria’s renewed diplomatic ties with Jordan (which 
had been broken off since 1970) seeing that it could lead to a political realignment of the 
region – namely into one less hostile towards Israel.  Thus it was stated:  
 
By choosing to rejoin the Arab mainstream and associate with “moderate” states 
such as Egypt and Jordan, Syria may be tacitly opting for the benefits which might 
accrue from a negotiated settlement to the Middle East problem...there are also 
unsubstantiated reports that by being increasingly reasonable and repairing her 
relations with Jordan, Syria stands to gain increased financial support from Saudi 
Arabia.363   
 
Such actions, including increased clampdowns on the fedayeen movement were interpreted 
by the State Department as Syria’s growing willingness to put national interests first before 
the interests of its ideological allies, and by extension a greater willingness to reach a 
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settlement with its ideological foes.  It would seem that they anticipated that with a Syrian-
Israeli agreement, Syria would eventually follow a non-ideological path, just as they were to 
witness with Egypt after the 1973 war.  This in itself reflects a key motivation behind any 
political engagement by the Americans – any political compromises in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict were expected from the Syrian side, rather than the Israeli side.  Notably, no 
mention was made about the potential return of the Golan Heights as a result of Syria’s 
increased cooperation.   
 
There are three further questions that can be raised from here.  Firstly, how significant was 
the change in Syria’s policies since the arrival of Asad, and how great was the potential for 
greater cooperation at this stage? Secondly, was the State Department accurate in its view 
that the Syrian government was indeed becoming increasingly pragmatic and therefore less 
ideological and willing to thaw the ice in US-Syrian relations, which had especially 
developed since the 1967 War?  Thirdly, given the State Department was so keen to increase 
the level of US economic assistance to Syria, why did this ultimately stall on the American 
side?  
 
Firstly, the conciliatory overtures by Asad’s government were indeed highly significant in 
the context of Syria’s recent and indeed long-term history.  Given that there had been no 
formal diplomatic relations between Syria and the US under the Ba’thist regime prior to 
Asad’s presidency, and given the extent of Syria’s hostility towards the US and its 
opposition towards resolution 242 – albeit minimal in its eventual impact – the pragmatic 
shift under Asad marked a critical period for US-Syrian relations that contained the potential 
for substantial engagement and dialogue between the two states.  In the post-1967 political 
stalemate between Syria and the US, it was Syria that made the first move towards 
engagement with the Americans.  This move was made, it should be remembered, without 
Syria receiving any assurances about the return of the Golan Heights or indeed a resolution 
of any of the issues affecting the Arabs. 
 
Secondly, let us assess the State Department’s prognosis of the Syrian government and its 
suggested policies for greater economic collaboration.  Most of the literature looking at this 
period of US-Syrian relations follows the view of the State Department that Syria’s 
increased pragmatism under Asad would lead to a gradual abandonment of its ideological 
fervour and opposition to Israel.  However, I contend that: a) the State Department was over-
optimistic in its belief that through greater economic relations, the US could sway Syrian 
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policies in the political field; and b) its high level of expectation from the Syrians in fact 
jeopardised the prospects for dialogue.  The use of economic and financial assistance as both 
a political and ideological tool was a recurring aspect in US foreign policy.  However, what 
the US State Department arguably did not consider was the extent to which Syria also shared 
America’s appreciation for the value and power of economic aid.   
 
However peripheral a goal it sometimes became in its policies, Syria’s links with socialism, 
as well as its observance of the cosy relationship between some of its conservative oil-rich 
Arab neighbours and the west, meant that Syria remained wary about accepting widespread 
assistance beyond what it felt it urgently needed – especially assistance with political 
conditions attached.  Indeed the consistent element in Syrian policies was its caution in 
incurring any debts to other nations.  Hence the US even acknowledged that Syria had 
always faithfully paid off its debts to the US.364  Syria’s historical and ideological 
perspective held that to be indebted to other countries risked the loss of independence, and a 
long-term obligation to repay those debts not only financially, but also politically.  This was 
reflected by the Syrian governments during the 1940s and 50s even before the Ba’thist 
regime.365  Crucially, this caution over receiving economic aid did not mean Syria was not 
willing to enter into substantial trade, provided it would not be indebted to another state.  
Even after the US refused the sale of military equipment, and even when relations began to 
deteriorate again, Syria notably persisted in its requests to purchase weapons from the US.366  
For Syria, the wish to buy weapons from the US reflected a strategic need to restore military 
parity to the region, and to particularly rectify the military imbalance between Syria and 
Israel that was so obviously exposed during the 1967 War.  Hence requests for increased 
American trade from the Syrians can in fact be seen as a continued commitment to its 
ideological goals and opposition towards Israel.  In this sense, the State Department were too 
presumptuous about the implications of Asad’s increased pragmatism.   
 
Moreover, it can be argued that American expectations and demands for Syria on the back of 
this increased pragmatism were unrealistic, failing to take account of the entrenched nature 
of Syrian opposition towards Israeli policies, and as a result this acted as a disincentive for 
further cooperation on the Syrian side.  The State Department’s willingness to engage more 
with the Syrians was based on the belief and expectation that Syria should have to make the 
                                               
364
 Memo, Seelye to Joe Sisco, 1973, File 76D451, DEF-12-5, Lot #76D451, Record Group 59, Entry A1 
(5630) 
365
 See chapter 3 for more detail on this. 
366
 Memo of conversation, Khaddam and Kissinger, 26/2/1974,  Middle East trip follow-up, RG 59, 
Briefing Books 1958-1976, Lot#75D146, Middle East Trip Follow Up 5/1974, Box 205. 
 173 
whole shift towards the US and Israeli positions, without any reciprocal movement the other 
way.  On the face of it, the Americans claimed to recognise the need for ‘dialogue’ to stem 
the ‘Syrians’ ability to play a spoiling role’ in the region,367 but it would appear that their 
understanding of the purpose of dialogue was to convince and convert the Syrians to a pro-
western position.  Arguably in diplomatic terms, the point of dialogue is to be a two-way 
process of compromise and sacrifice.  The mismatch in their relative objectives for dialogue 
meant that conditions were ripe for increased frustration from both the Syrian and American 
sides and a growing perception that the other party was not genuinely interested in 
compromise. 
 
Finally, we come to the question of Nixon’s objection to the sale of military equipment to 
the Syrians, despite the initially positive views of the State Department on increased 
economic trade.  One possible argument is that Nixon recognised more accurately the long-
term motives of the Syrian regime and the unlikelihood that it would substantially alter its 
policy towards the US and Israel without major demands of its own that the US could not 
meet.  This argument, however, is unlikely.  The State Department had a greater awareness 
and grasp of Syria’s position than the President’s office, which was traditionally far more 
conscious of domestic factors.  The State Department did in fact express reservations about 
Asad’s ability to manoeuvre given a number of constraints at the domestic level – they 
argued that ‘Syria is experiencing a moment of frustration’ (as surmised by the Italian 
ambassador) because President Asad was: 
 
inclined toward moderation but there are various forces at work which could prevent 
Asad from cooperating in the peace effort; the Army, the radicals and others seem to 
be unhappy with the cease-fire and to favour more fighting.  Asad wants to do what 
Sadat did but is torn between various segments of Syrian society.368   
 
First of all, it cannot be ascertained from such a document that Asad really did want to 
imitate Sadat in striking a truce, eventually, with the Israelis and the US.  This notion is 
contradicted by the documents on US-Syrian discussions in the contentious year ahead, and 
it also demonstrates ignorance of Asad’s suspicions about Sadat and the direction he was 
taking at this stage.  But even so, in the unlikely scenario that he did seek to sign a truce with 
Israel, the documents once again suggest that the Syrian leadership had to consider the 
sentiments and political outlook of various sectors of Syrian society.  Indeed, US officials 
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seemed surprised to find ‘conservative, highly pro-western Syrian[s]’ in line with the general 
popular mood against Israel and the US’s ‘harsh’ attitude towards Syria.369  This supports 
the argument that collectively, Syria’s foreign policy at this time was shaped by ideological 
motives – whether these motives were held by the regime, or domestic constituents who 
influenced the regime. 
 
However, while these may have been the dilemmas faced on the Syrian side, they do not 
adequately explain the hesitation on the Americans’ part to engage more closely with Syria.  
To understand the President’s primary concerns we need to look to the internal politics in the 
US.  Throughout the deliberations of whether military sales should go ahead or not, the most 
important factor for Nixon, and acting as the major obstacle to agreeing such a deal, was the 
likely reaction not just of Israel but particularly the Israeli lobby in the US towards the 
sale.370  A change in policy had been proposed and constantly stalled since 1969 due to 
ongoing problems between Syria and Israel.  Back then, a TWA aircraft to Damascus was 
hijacked shortly before the recommendations were to be made by the State Department, 
while the Syrian government was judged to be ‘conducting itself in such an improper 
fashion’ by holding two Israelis, that the time was not yet right to press for a policy 
change.371   
 
However, since then, and even after Syria’s conciliatory gestures since Asad came to power, 
the matter continued to face obstacles due to the way American sale of items to Syria would 
appear to the Israelis.  Though Nixon was emotionally ambivalent about Israel, not carrying 
the same loyalty that his predecessors (or indeed his Secretary of State) felt, he was 
nevertheless beholden to the sentiments of the US Congress, which was still very much in 
favour of Israel.372  Thus the negative coverage that such a transaction - and indeed any 
example of greater US-Syrian cooperation - might have generated at home amongst the 
Israeli lobby groups and with Israel itself was a major contributing factor in America’s 
policy towards the Syrians. 
 
It was in this context of frustrated Syrian efforts to engage more closely with the US in the 
hope of progress in the peace settlement that Syria and Egypt embarked on the 1973 War 
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against Israel.  The main objectives behind this move were to regain land, rehabilitate their 
reputation and to restore greater parity to the heavily skewed balance of power in the region.  
Military action was deemed necessary by the Syrians and the Egyptians because the Arabs 
had so little to bargain with, while their military and strategic inferiority meant they had no 
way of forcing Israel to the negotiating table.  Some level of parity was needed before Israel 
could be made to see any need for a settlement, given that the post-1967 status-quo suited 
them very well; moreover through conflict, Syria and Egypt intended to show the US that 
they were serious players in any negotiation process and still retained political and military 
agency. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to highlight the significance of this historical period and its 
constitutive effect on US-Syrian relations thereafter.  It reflected the importance of both 
structural factors (regional insecurity, colonial legacy) and agency, chiefly Asad’s personal 
and historical ties to ideology, which formed his political principles and goals, but also the 
role of individuals in effecting policy in neighbouring Arab states, Israel and the US.  The 
chapter demonstrated how both structure and agency inform, but also are shaped, by ideas, 
which in turn become embedded and institutionalised within state policy and among public 
opinion.  This could be seen from both Syrian and American positions towards Israel and 
each other.   
 
At the start of the period under scrutiny here, the US heavily favoured Israel in military 
armaments before and during the 1967 war – this continued with a one-sided arms embargo 
against the Arab states that did not extend to Israel.  Through Syria’s subsequent reactions 
towards the US, and the crystallisation of US negative perceptions of Syrian obstructionism, 
it is possible to identify this as a period when US-Syrian hostility became especially 
pronounced and continued along this trajectory for decades to follow.  The failure of the US 
and indeed the international community (via the UN) to expel Israel from the occupied 
territories and apply any sanctions, enforced the notion of Israel’s impunity after breaching 
international law.  
 
Following the war, the US made a crucial policy change in which they no longer sought 
equilibrium between the Arabs and Israel, but instead decided to give their support to one 
side, creating a military disparity in the region and also placating domestic Israeli lobby 
groups.  By building up Israel’s military and strategic position, the US aimed to take war off 
the agenda despite fostering Arab resentment, as well as furthering US economic and 
strategic objectives against the USSR.  The US also diluted the UN’s stipulation for 
unconditional withdrawal of land occupied during war: by demanding safeguards for Israel’s 
security as a precondition before the return of Arab territories, the US was arguably 
legitimising Israeli occupation as a strategic option, despite the illegality of occupation via 
settlement under international law.  This altered Israel’s game plan, who recognised that the 
status-quo was now in its favour – thus obstruction and delays of any settlement suited its 
own interests and became a favoured tactic whenever negotiations threatened to extract 
Israeli concessions. 
 177 
 
The post-war situation also saw the US develop a second crucial and lasting policy, that of 
Separate Peace.  In favouring a piecemeal approach to the region’s problems, it directly 
contradicted Syria’s interests and ideological vision for a comprehensive peace settlement.  
This was facilitated in no small part by the Arab states themselves- the Jordanians’ lack of 
commitment to any ideological goals for example, as well as the transitional nature of the 
Egyptian regime.  Thus Syrian hostility towards both the US and Israel stood out amongst 
other Arab states.  Syria was the only state to reject UNSCR 242, on a point of principle.  
Syrians were also especially aggrieved by the unbalanced arms embargo which prevented 
Arabs from matching Israel’s military power.  And finally the fact that no movement was 
made by the US to address the occupation of the Golan Heights, while Egypt and Jordan 
both had more American attention and sympathy, further fuelled Syrian hostility towards the 
US for its perceived hypocrisy in the enforcement of international law. 
 
Asad came to power in a period of turmoil both within Syria and in the wider region.  Both 
via his style of leadership and clear changes in policy, Asad shifted Syria onto a more 
pragmatic course, but one which was not necessarily less ideological.  The main concessions 
Syria granted the US was the late acceptance of 242 and the request for increased Syrian-
American trade, especially in military equipment.  While the US State Department were 
certainly responsive, they were ultimately too optimistic about changing Syria’s position 
through economic aid and failed to successfully make the case to the President for an 
American rapprochement with Syria.  The President’s office, on the other hand, was to 
become greatly preoccupied by domestic issues such as the Watergate scandal.  Thus 
criticisms by the Israeli lobby at home carried even more weight and turned out to be rather 
influential in preventing the US from improving its ties with Syria. Thus by the end of this 
period, Syria’s conciliatory gestures remained unreciprocated by the US, who continued to 
impose isolation on the Syrians.  Being outsiders to the peace process engendered a deep 
sense of frustration and dissatisfaction with America’s role as mediators in the region; 
however, such sentiments merely worsened after Syria’s eventual inclusion into the process 
of negotiations, as will be explored in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 178 
Chapter 5 
US-Syrian Engagement: Disengagement Talks 1973 - 75 
 
The last two chapters focused on the emergence and entrenchment of US-Syrian hostility, 
and greater estrangement between the states.  In contrast these next two chapters will focus 
on the theme of engagement between Syria and the US.  The chapter assesses the strategies 
of negotiation, the separate motives and perceptions, as well as the pressures – both internal 
and external – faced by both America and Syria in these times; it also looks at why 
negotiations ultimately stalled and failed to produce better relations between the two states. 
The chapter focuses on the Disengagement negotiations from 1973-75, drawing upon 
primary sources from US archive and interviews.  This is an important and influential period 
for it set the tone not only for future negotiations between Syria and the US but also had a 
lasting impact on the Middle East landscape and set in train unlikely alliances and deep 
fissures between the states in the region.  A number of questions that were highlighted in the 
introduction of the thesis will be addressed in this section, these being: what were US 
demands of Syria in the negotiations, and how reasonable or realistic were they? Did the US 
have fixed perceptions of Syrian intransigence – and to what extent did this factor as well as 
America’s relationship with Israel hinder opportunities for peace?  Was Syria obstructing the 
peace process? And why has Syria not followed Egypt in signing a truce with Israel and 
forming a close alliance with the US?  
 
Before beginning this analysis it is important to highlight the prevailing discourse and 
historiography on the roles of both the US and Syria during this period.  An influential 
argument is that Syria played the role of a spoiler – unwilling due to its radical ideology to 
compromise with the US, unwilling to even acknowledge the existence of Israel, and instead 
intent on obstructing other states from making peace.373  According to this viewpoint, 
Syria’s goals were unrealistic and deliberately unattainable in order to scupper the chances 
for peace; its motives for perpetuating conflict have been attributed to the regime’s need to 
justify authoritarianism at home and an overbearing influence of the military, while some 
have argued that Syria was bowing to pressure from a belligerent public.374   
 
This view is particularly strengthened when juxtaposed by the (apparent) willingness, and 
indeed success, of Egypt, Jordan and Israel to negotiate and reach settlements.  By extension, 
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the US’ successful role in mediating lasting deals between those countries appears to 
demonstrate American neutrality and fairness.  Syria, therefore, bears the brunt of 
responsibility for the failure to retrieve its lost land, for continued conflict with Israel and as 
a result bad relations with the US.  The charge has often been, both within literature and also 
in policy circles, that Syria did not, and does not, do enough to secure peace – this marks a 
surprising degree of continuity in the views of Syria before and after Hafez Asad coming to 
power, the key difference being that ideology was replaced by self-interest and regime 
security as the prime motivation.375 
 
This assessment is contested by what might be termed as revisionist historical accounts.  
Patrick Seale’s biography of Asad provides an alternative analysis, in which he argues that 
the US had little intention of helping Syria to retrieve its land and sought to avoid a 
comprehensive peace settlement that would have safeguarded the rights of Palestinians.376  
This was not as a response to Syrian obstructionism, but rather it was a position determined 
long before negotiations began.  Seale argues that America’s, and particularly Henry 
Kissinger’s, primary goal was to support Israel’s interests, and by undermining the Arab 
nationalist movement to also kick out Soviet influence in the region.  Egypt, he argues, 
rather than acting as pragmatic peacemakers had in fact been too idealistic in its expectations 
of what the US could deliver.  According to this view, the Syrian-Israeli track failed because 
of a ‘duplicitous’ American strategy, Israeli intransigence and Egyptian weakness.377  Seale 
relies on interviews with key players in those negotiations, records of diplomatic cables and 
in particular Kissinger’s own memoirs.  This chapter will support this argument, using 
documentary evidence that had not yet been released when Seale wrote his account.  This 
supplementary primary material will further strengthen and develop the revisionist case.  In 
this analysis I will pay particular attention to the roles of four key actors in the eventual 
failure of a Syrian-Israeli settlement which has had lasting repercussions for US-Syrian 
relations: Syria, America, Israel and Egypt. 
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5.1 The US and Syria: Perceptions, Goals and Strategies 
 
The previous historical chapter took us to the eve of the 1973 war between Egypt, Syria and 
Israel.  The war was a result of the deadlock that followed the 1967 war.  It had been a 
devastating defeat for the Arabs: with Israel occupying and settling on captured Arab lands, 
and content with the status quo, the Arabs had little to no bargaining power in any peace 
process in order to retrieve their land and restore military and political balance in the region.  
With resolution 242 still not enacted by Israel, Syria and Egypt launched a military attack on 
Israel on 6 October 1973 to rebalance the disadvantage.  Despite gains at the start of the war, 
and though the war served to challenge the notion of Israel’s invincibility, the Arab armies 
were ultimately pushed back by Israel’s counter-offensive, having to relinquish the Sinai and 
Golan, and suffering many casualties.   
 
On 24 October 1973 Egypt agreed to a ceasefire without securing any Israeli commitments 
to withdrawal and without consulting with Asad, which forced Syria to follow suit since it 
could not have fought the war alone.378  This fragile ceasefire was to be followed up with a 
multilateral conference to be held in Geneva under UN auspices to enable talks among all 
parties and ratification of agreements.  While it had often been the case that Syria followed 
Egypt’s lead in foreign policy issues, on this occasion the ceasefire proved to be a highly 
controversial decision and was met with widespread opposition in Syria, particularly among 
the public and the military.379 Syrians felt that the Arabs had more to gain if the war was 
prolonged, which in turn would have vastly strengthened their hand not only in negotiations 
but in the region’s overall balance of power.  Moreover, Asad felt that the American-
contrived ceasefire was not merely a cessation of hostilities by all parties (which Israel 
reneged on anyway by continuing to fight on the Egyptian front), but in fact ensured that the 
war ended in Israel’s favour and on American terms.380 In Syria’s eyes, the end of the war 
might bring Israel to the negotiating table, but it had done nothing to force Israel to 
relinquish the Arab territories it had occupied since 1967 as was the original aim – the 
potential advantages that might have been accrued from the war had thus been significantly 
limited.   
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This was, at first glance, less the case for Egypt, who stood a much better chance of 
regaining the Sinai – as Kissinger affirmed the Sinai was of far less strategic value to the 
Israelis than the Golan Heights, while Sadat was also showing greater signs of cooperation 
with the US.381  Sadat had already made agreements for a cease-fire in the Suez Canal and 
accepted intervention of the UN Emergency Force, paving the way for the return of Israeli 
POWs.  Despite Asad’s increased pragmatism, conciliatory gestures towards the US, and 
concessions prior to the war, the US still felt he had not gone far enough.  Thus progress on 
an Egyptian-Israeli settlement was pushed with far greater intent and effort by the 
Americans.  
 
Little had changed, then, in America’s perceptions of Syria.  The US still viewed Syria as 
being of less importance than the other parties just as they had in 1967.  As seen in the last 
chapter, America’s approach had been to isolate Syria and largely to ignore Syrian demands 
and grievances.  To an extent this was in response to the high levels of hostility towards the 
US amongst the Syrian public, media and politicians that followed the war.  But it was also 
based on deeply set perceptions and assumptions about Syrian radicalism and intransigence 
that seemed to make dialogue redundant in the view of the US.382   
 
As had been the case previously, the US initially felt the onus of engagement should remain 
firmly with the Syrians, saving the US from having to make difficult concessions to bring 
them into negotiations.  They expected Syria would come to this decision themselves 
because of two key developments:  
 
(1) With Egypt re-establishing diplomatic relations with the US, and establishing an 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the implementation of a cease-fire (under US auspices), it was 
hoped that it would have a domino effect on Syria.  Norman Pratt expressed this view stating 
that Syria had a ‘habit of taking its foreign policy lead from Egypt’.383  Egypt’s resumption 
of relations with the US was seen as providing Syria with greater flexibility with its people 
to do the same. 384   
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(2) The US was relying on Syria’s fears of being isolated amidst these developments with an 
Arab-Israeli peace that excluded them.385  This seemed to be supported by Syria’s delayed 
acceptance of UN resolution 242, and eventual acceptance of 338 which marked the end of 
the October War.  Given that these developments occurred without any American 
engagement, they now saw the merits of allowing Syria to persist with its fears of isolation 
so that it would feel compelled to follow Egypt, rather than building on the nascent dialogue 
that was started after Asad came to power.  Thus it was stated:  
 
Strategically, I assume the US continues to desire restoration of relations with all 
Arab States, including Syria.  On the tactical level, however, I see advantage in 
letting the next move be that of the Syrians towards the US which appears probable 
as a result of these old fears.  Thus any new negotiations should begin at the 
initiation of the Syrians, and around a larger package of conditions (given the 
likelihood that Syria would try to cut them down through bargaining), rather than the 
other way round.’386 
 
This lack of American urgency in addressing Syria’s issues was reflected in the US-Soviet 
discussions for an overall settlement in the Middle East, which took place on 1 October 
1973.  There the Egyptian front (a return to the former international border), and the 
Jordanian front (i.e. the 1949 armistice line) were agreed upon and arrangements were made 
for Jerusalem to be an open, unified city.  But they took ‘no position on the Syrian border, 
since Syria was not a negotiating party in the Jarring talks, nor had it [initially] accepted SC 
Resolution 242’.387  Notably, the Soviet Union, despite its strong alliance with Syria, did not 
push for discussions on the Golan Heights.  As a result, Syria’s future was not even 
discussed at these talks.  The earlier rejection of UNSC 242 by the Jadid regime had greatly 
prejudiced the US against Syria’s intentions and capacity for peace, despite the change of 
regime, the openness to dialogue under Asad and the acceptance by 1973 of both resolutions 
242 and 338.  This was a lesson of non-reciprocation that Asad learned quite soon into his 
presidency.  Egypt had also entered into war against Israel in 1973, effectively breaching 
242, yet both they and the Jordanians had entered Peace negotiations before the end of the 
year, receiving very different treatment from the US.  In turn, a growing ambivalence 
towards US-led negotiations began to take root in Syria. 
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Thus it soon became apparent to the Americans that their predictions and policies towards 
Syria had been miscalculated.388  The view that Syria would follow Egypt had to be 
reassessed, for it showed no signs of doing so.  At this time Egypt was moving ahead with 
the US in its bilateral relations, placing greater pressure on Syria.  Egypt already signed 
agreements in late November 1973 with EXXON and Mobil for offshore oil prospecting in 
the Middle East, involving around $75 million in investments by companies over a number 
of years.  US oil industries had already invested about $200 million in their Egyptian 
operations.  The US also made available $500,000 in Egyptian pounds for use by the ICRC 
and Egyptian Red Crescent, and gave a further $1million for further US assistance-aid after 
war.389  These financial rewards can be explained by Egypt’s compliance (particularly in 
comparison to Syria’s stance) over disengagement plans.  Notably during Egypt’s bilateral 
talks with the US and disengagement arrangements with Israel, there was no mention at all 
of the Golan Heights or the plight of the Palestinians.  It focused squarely on Egyptian 
national interests.  And even then Egypt had, it appeared to many, sold itself short – the ‘6 
point agreement’ that the Egyptians and Israelis had settled on came under severe criticism 
from Egypt’s own public and its neighbours, not least because Egypt was willing to accept it 
fully while Israel set about implementing it only selectively.390  
 
There were enough financial and security incentives here for a weak state like Syria to 
follow Egypt’s example.  And yet, rather than being swayed by Egypt, Syria was one of its 
greatest critics. 391 The State Department’s optimism that Egypt’s policies would facilitate a 
cooling of Syrian hostility towards the American-Israeli relationship was also misplaced, as 
it discovered when it claimed Syria acted like ‘Cold War Communists’ and saw the US as 
the: ‘promoter of Zionist-imperialist conspiracies; armer and supporter of Israeli 
expansionism; the dedicated enemy of the Arabs’.392  The prediction that Syria would 
naturally follow in Egypt’s conciliatory footsteps was therefore not as accurate or 
straightforward as it had initially seemed.   
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In addition to this realisation, it became apparent that Syria did not fear isolation enough to 
rush into negotiations.  Indeed, while it was not the strongest or biggest actor in the region, 
the US better understood Syria’s ability to affect regional alignments and chance for peace in 
the region.  The view that Syria was dispensable in regional affairs was thus changing: 
 
[Of the] three Arab combatants, Syria has been the most intransigent and the least 
anxious to travel the path of peace.  If it remains so, Syria could- at the very least 
seriously complicate the task of bringing peace to the Middle East, for Egyptian and 
Jordanian leaders will feel inhibitions about settling with Israel in the absence of 
Syria. 393   
 
The US now feared that instead of being pressured to follow Egypt, Syria could be swayed 
back into a more radical position possibly influencing other Arab states, given the mood of 
the country and the ‘delusion and isolation’ it was feeling.394  There were two key 
forthcoming events at which Syria could exercise this influence - the Arab Summit, and the 
UN Summit in Geneva.  Both summits were significant in that they would provide a 
collective forum to discuss the situation in the Middle East.  With so many parties involved, 
these summits had the potential to either lay down a comprehensive peace settlement that 
everyone could work with, or they could result in greater deadlock and polarisation of views.  
Both America and Israel were not in favour of such summits which could also be used by 
each faction to rally more countries around their cause.  Israel felt it stood a much greater 
chance of getting what it wanted and to dilute Arab demands through bilateral 
discussions;395 the US concurred, seeing the advantages of taking the lead in shuttle 
diplomacy where it could direct the discussion, revealing or holding back information where 
necessary, rather than getting the parties to meet directly.   
 
Given that the summits could not be cancelled, and given that America’s strategy for 
‘separate peace’ in the region now seemed at stake, the US recognised that greater effort 
needed to be exerted to bring the Syrians in line with Egypt’s position prior to the two 
summits.  But if this could not be secured beforehand, the US feared Syria would act as 
spoilers during the Geneva conference.   
 
Thus the US was forced to change its strategy.  Clearly the Syrians were in no mood to 
initiate yet further concessions for the Americans, but nor could they be ignored: Syria had 
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to be engaged bilaterally and more directly through diplomacy initiated by the Americans.  
Thus began the start of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy.  
 
5.1.1 Kissinger’s visit to Damascus 
Dr. Henry Kissinger the US Secretary of State embarked on a tour of the Middle East in the 
December of 1973.  Kissinger had adopted a greater personal role in international affairs 
than his predecessors, and came to have a high degree of influence in US foreign policy, 
particularly as President Nixon became mired in the Watergate affair.  Kissinger took a 
personal interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict, not only, as he acknowledged, because of his 
Jewish roots and deeply felt connection with Israel, but also because of its impact on 
American interests.396  He was to play a significant role in the outcome of negotiations and 
the region’s politics for years to come. 
 
With his Middle East tour, the US sought to forward a disengagement process between Syria 
and Israel along similar lines of the Egyptian-Israeli process.  From Syria’s perspective, 
attention to this issue was long overdue; but from the US perspective, they merely wanted to 
eliminate those issues that could ‘imperil’ the Geneva Conference. 397  These issues were 
that: Israel was refusing to ‘sit with the Syrians’ until they provided a full list of Israeli 
POWs and agreed for them to receive Red Cross visitations; Secondly, Syria had set its 
preconditions that: 1) Israel should return to the 22 October lines; 2) that it should agree to 
abide by the Geneva Convention on the non-transfer of population to occupied territory 
(such as the Israeli Golan Height settlements); and 3) that 15,000 displaced Syrian villagers 
must be repatriated.398  On Syria’s part, these were key points of contention that it felt had 
been sidelined in the search for a more short-term peace settlement.  Despite Syria’s 
consistent demands, the US persisted with the line that the Syrian position remained 
unclear399 – this became a recurring theme which served to portray the Syrians as ambiguous 
and indecisive and indeed propped up the perception that their demands were neither rational 
nor negotiable. 
 
To persuade Syria to at least embark on a disengagement process, Kissinger paid a visit to 
Damascus in December 1973 – this represented the first visit from a Secretary of State since 
Dulles’ visit in 1953.  For Asad and his advisors, this was the first time they were to meet a 
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senior US official at all, such had been the level of estrangement between the two states.  
This marked a rare example where the US did not underestimate the importance of the trip.  
Prior to travelling, Kissinger was briefed that his visit to Damascus would ‘in many ways be 
the most challenging and one of the most important of the stops on your current Middle East 
itinerary’, and was warned that the Syrians ‘will be forming first-hand impressions which 
will be of lasting importance’.400  Moreover on the Syrian side, it was another example of the 
change undergone by the Syrian regime – the very fact that Asad was willing to receive 
Kissinger in Syria for talks showed their genuine interest in reaching a resolution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  It was the nature of that resolution that was to become the cause of 
contention between Syria and the US, not the need for a resolution itself.   
 
While the importance of Asad’s role in making Syria a credible party in negotiations was 
recognised by the US, they remained conflicted in their views of Syria and arguably found it 
difficult to move beyond time-worn perceptions about the Syrians.  In briefing Kissinger the 
State Department stated that the Syrians, due to their military background, were not suited to 
negotiation or inclined to compromise; and yet they highlighted Asad’s ‘flexibility and sense 
of realism...in contrast to the more ideological approach of some other members of the ruling 
elite’.401  This reflects a confusion over the Syrian regime’s approach and how best to deal 
with them. 
 
Prior to the visit, Kissinger set out with the following aims for his talks with the Syrians: 
 
1. To ensure that the Syrians understood how the peace conference in Geneva would 
proceed, and that the US appreciated its views. 
2. Convey America’s views on how the peace process must proceed if it was to work. 
3. Build a relationship of trust and confidence with the Syrian leaders, thus making it 
possible for the US to ‘talk to and influence them as peace negotiations proceed’. 
4. Encourage a ‘pragmatic’ Syrian approach to negotiation on territorial matters and 
Palestinian representation at the Peace conference. 
5. Move Syrians towards agreement with Israel on the exchange of POWs, if progress 
on the other fronts was not made. 402 
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In terms of what should be on the agenda during the talks, the US identified four topics.  (1) 
To gauge Syrian views on total Israeli withdrawal and the rights of Palestinians.  (2) To 
apply pressure on Syria to return the Israeli POWs since nothing could move forward 
without this, reminding them that Egypt had already done this.  (3) To discuss the 
possibilities of having a permanent Syrian diplomat in Washington rather than 
intermediaries.  And (4) to discuss the return of two US citizens, detained by Syria on 
charges of espionage for Israel in 1972.   
 
The general thrust of both the aims and the agenda for the US-Syrian meeting could be 
summed up as being focused on Israeli demands for POW return, conveying prearranged 
plans for how the Geneva conference should run and what it should achieve (the subtext 
being that there were no alternative plans), building Syrian trust of the US in order to boost 
America’s influence over them, and finally to discuss Syria’s demands - not to take them 
into consideration, but in order to persuade them otherwise.  While diplomacy necessarily 
involves the art of persuasion to win over the other party to one’s own position, it ought to 
be remembered that the US was playing the role not of an opponent in this situation, but 
supposedly a neutral mediator.  There is very little evidence here to suggest that the US was 
attempting to consider the demands and ‘red-lines’ of both Israel and Syria in equal terms, 
and to then seek a point of mutual compromise.  Rather the point of the discussions was to 
persuade and pressurise Syria to move towards a settled US position – it helped the 
Americans to present it as the ‘middle ground’ now that Egypt had seemingly been won over 
to it, but in reality the expected compromises were mostly one-sided.   
 
The chances for success during these talks appear to have been limited from the start given 
that America’s aims hardly matched up to Syrian objectives before the talks.  This would 
become a common theme behind US-Syrian negotiations, where the gulf between their 
respective goals was too great to enable significant progress.  In this instance, Syria’s aims 
were: (1) to assess how willing the US was to support Arab demands for full Israeli 
withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, as stipulated in resolutions 242, 338 and the Geneva 
Convention; (2) to emphasise their demands for the satisfaction of Palestinian rights, and the 
potential and willingness for ongoing conflict if these demands were not met. 403  
 
Syria’s demands had arguably not changed since the 1967 war, and indeed with regards to 
the Palestinians’ situation Syria’s position had not changed since 1948.  Thus what the US 
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termed as inflexible and intransigent, was a consistency of political demands that had not yet 
been addressed with any seriousness, or purpose, by the US.  For the Syrians, it was hard to 
see why they should compromise on those basic demands which tallied with international 
law when there was no evidence of compromise forthcoming from the Israelis.  From the 
military perspective that the Syrian government were rooted in, war had been demonstrated 
to be a necessary tool by which balance of power was maintained and unruly states could be 
in kept in check; peace settlements on the other hand were supposed to prolong and embed 
stability and non-belligerence when both had been achieved by all parties.  It served little 
purpose to pursue a settlement, therefore, if neither of those conditions had been achieved.  
As the Syrians saw it, the Palestinians were still suffering the consequences of 1948 – 
without territory and still living as refugees – while Israel still occupied land from three 
Arab states taken in 1967, and remained notably ambivalent about the likelihood of their 
return even after a peace settlement.404 
 
It is evident from the documentary records that the US saw bringing Syria into negotiations 
as instrumental to their own interests and the aims they had for other states405 – US-Syrian 
talks were not intended to secure any concrete settlements for Syria itself.  Thus should the 
talks fail to produce any satisfactory resolution for Syria, this was not going to trouble the 
US.  Indeed, the intervening years between the two wars had provided the US with an 
interesting insight into Syria’s role – not only the extent to which it could play a spoiler role, 
which the US now recognised should be avoided,406 but also the extent to which Syria’s arm 
was limited.  It could not, for example, ignite war on its own, or attack Israel without first 
assuring support from its neighbours.  Kissinger’s observation that ‘you could not make war 
without Egypt, but you could not make peace without Syria’ was, in this context, rather 
accurate.  The US was forming the calculation, one that would influence its policy for many 
years, that if it failed to deliver any of Syria’s demands, the consequences would be minimal 
and need not scupper US or Israeli interests, both of which could still be pursued via the 
separate peace strategy.  The key factor in this calculation was the extensive compliance of 
other Arab states, such as Egypt and Jordan, which would consolidate Syria’s 
marginalisation.  As long as the US was still unsure of Egypt and Jordan’s long-term 
compliance, Syria was still needed in the process: 
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We can be sure that the Syrians will be the least reasonable and the most demanding 
of the three Arab states which are direct parties to conflict...Still it is in our interests 
to have them involved in the negotiations, if only because Syria could play a spoiling 
role to defeat any initiatives for a peaceful settlement by exerting political pressure 
on other Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan, to take a more militant stand vis-à-vis 
Israel, and at worst, by resuming hostilities.407 
 
It is clear from the start of negotiations that the US had very little intention of securing a 
long-term Syrian-Israeli settlement but instead hoped to distract them from obstructing the 
other parties.408  For if the US did not at least give the appearance that Syria was being 
engaged as well, both Egypt and Jordan might withdraw for fear of the criticism that would 
be levelled at them by the Syrians.  In short, Syria’s involvement was vital to retain the 
public credibility of negotiations, to satisfy onlookers that the US was being balanced and 
were considering the interests of all parties, and that other negotiating parties such as Egypt 
and Jordan were not ‘selling out’. 
 
                                               
407
 Ibid. 
408
 Ibid. 
 190 
5.2 Terms of Syrian-Israeli Disengagement and US-Syrian Rapprochement 
 
None of these underlying motives were at the time known to the Syrians, and the US did 
succeed in bringing them to the negotiating table.  Communication at a high-ranking level 
was finally established by Kissinger during his visit to Damascus in December 1973.  In this 
time he began the process of shuttle diplomacy, and spent many hours in hard negotiations 
with both the Foreign Minister Abdul-Halim Khaddam and President Asad himself.  
Previously the US had privately commented on the ambiguity of Syria’s demands, despite 
the fact that these had been stipulated on a regular basis and had remained consistent since 
the 1967 war.  Lack of direct contact between the two states had always meant that it was 
easier for both parties to base assumptions and judgments on hearsay, without the urgency of 
verifying their positions.  These direct talks, therefore, finally allowed the US to gauge at 
first hand Syria’s position on the controversial cease-fire of the October War, Israel’s 
demands for the return of POWs, and their own terms of agreement in any negotiation 
process. 
 
Explaining their position, the Syrians stated that they were in a worse position vis-à-vis loss 
of territory and Israeli encroachment compared to Egypt – they had lost an additional 350 
square miles of territory to Israel in addition to the land lost in 1967.  Thus a cease-fire 
effectively meant a freeze on a situation that was highly favourable to Israel, making it even 
more difficult to explain the heavy losses incurred by the Syrian army to the Syrian people; 
409
 those losses would appear to have been in vain if there was not now a complete Israeli 
withdrawal.  While not stated by the Syrian government, US officials observed this could 
pose a threat to the regime itself as dissident factions became restless.410  Unlike Egypt, there 
had been no direct contact between Syria and Israel about the cease-fire terms or the 
exchange of POWs; indeed Syria took a tougher stance on the whole issue, stating that they 
were ‘not interested in any type of partial arrangement such as the November 11 six-point 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement.’  These, the Syrians felt, were half-baked agreements that gave 
Israel’s encroachments a degree of legitimacy, when according to UN resolutions and the 
Geneva Convention they had little justification.  Expressing this frustration at the lack of any 
compromise from Israel, the Syrian Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed Zakariya 
Ismail, stated in a meeting with Sisco and Kissinger: 
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There are 19 Israeli settlements in Golan and Dayan and others have said that Golan 
is not negotiable, Jerusalem is not negotiable, Sharm el-Sheikh and the West Bank 
are not negotiable.  How can they reconcile all these things with Resolution 242?411 
 
He lamented that ‘everybody talks about the ceasefire on the Egyptian front but nobody 
mentions the problems on the Syrian front’, and decried the imbalance in which Israel 
demanded the return of POWs but refused to return the dead bodies of Syrian soldiers, once 
again in contravention of the Geneva Convention.412   
 
A further grievance was America’s handling of the Palestinians.  The Syrians learnt that the 
Americans had already settled the format of the Geneva Conference, having consulted the 
Egyptians.  The Syrians, once again, had not been consulted.  And in these arrangements it 
was decided that the US and the Soviet Union would participate as permanent members of 
the UNSC, along with the main military parties.  There was, however, to be no Palestinian 
delegation.  The Syrians expressed their surprise and opposition to this decision in clear 
terms to the Americans, and continued to challenge them vociferously on this front 
throughout the negotiation process.413  Even more galling was the knowledge that Egypt had 
given the green light to this glaring omission.   
 
Thus based on their positions on the above issues, the Syrians set the following conditions 
for there to be any possibility of moving forward in negotiations: a) approximately 100 
Israeli POWs would only be exchanged after Israel withdrew to the 22 October lines (the 
day of the ceasefire, after which Israel still advanced into Syrian territory).  Syria would only 
comply with international conventions on POWs if Israel complied with the Geneva 
convention (article 49 of the 4th Geneva convention);414 b) Syria demanded the repatriation 
of 15,000 Syrians who had been displaced as a result of the war and Israeli seizure of 
territory;415 c) Syria demanded the return of the bodies of dead Syrian soldiers, still held by 
the Israelis;416 d) Syria demanded the inclusion of the Palestinians in the Geneva 
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conference;417 e) and finally, the end result of negotiations must be the ‘complete’ Israeli 
withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and ‘safeguarding of the legitimate national 
rights of the Palestinian people’.418 
 
Asad had outlined Syria’s overall conditions succinctly in an earlier speech after the war, in 
which he reiterated that Syria had only accepted the ceasefire and Resolution 338 after Egypt 
and the Soviet Union had given assurances that Israel would have to withdraw from all 
occupied territories and the rights of the Palestinians would be restored.419  Hence Syria 
made it clear in their negotiations with the US that they expected and sought no less than 
these outcomes, and would hold all parties to account of their earlier assurances.  With 
regards to the Geneva Conference at the end of the talks, Syria made it clear that it was 
willing to participate but did not want to attend if their conditions had not been met, simply 
in order to ratify a peace plan that represented the interests of Israel.  Hence they wanted 
some agreement with Israel on the above points before agreeing to send a delegation to the 
conference.  Ironically, from the American perspective, it would have served their plans 
better if indeed Syria were not present at the conference, where they might potentially act as 
‘spoilers’– thus there was even less incentive for the US to pursue Syria’s demands 
rigorously. 420 
 
5.2.1 Compromise and Agreements 
Having determined what both parties’ original terms were, we can now look to what 
agreements were actually made, and the extent to which each side compromised their 
respective positions.  Firstly, Syria did accept the ceasefire in the end, having held off 
throughout the winter of 1973.  This enabled the negotiation process to proceed with a 
degree of stability.  Secondly, Syria eventually did agree to provide a list of the Israeli 
POWs to Israel (65 of them altogether) and to allow them to receive Red Cross visitations 
from March 1974.421 Thirdly, Syria agreed to compromise on the initial extent of Israeli 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights – having at first demanded that Israel withdraw to the 
October 22 lines, Asad later accepted the condition of Israeli withdrawal to the October 6 
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lines.422  These dates were significant, because until October 6, Israel had occupied Mount 
Hermon on the Golan, a strategic high-point that was of great military importance to both 
sides – after this date Syria recaptured Mount Hermon during the early phase of the war 
when they had a number of military successes; it was towards the end of the war (and 
notably after the official ceasefire, which was on 22 October) that those successes were 
reversed.  Asad agreeing to drop the demand for the return of Mount Hermon as a pre-
condition for negotiations, was therefore a major concession by the Syrians.  Fourthly, Syria 
appointed Sabah Kabbani as Ambassador to the US on 16 June 1974, the first diplomatic 
channel to be established since 1967.  The fifth and significant area of compromise came 
with Syria’s acceptance of the first stage of a Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, 
signed on 31 May 1974 in Geneva.  This did not signal a truce – Syria was adamant the 
possibility of war should not be taken off the agenda, which would leave Israel unrestrained 
and unchecked to flex its muscles and dominate in the region.  However, it was an 
agreement to retain the existing ceasefire, without which more long-term negotiations for a 
lasting peace settlement could not take place. 
 
The Disengagement Agreement elicited some compromises from both the Syrian and Israeli 
sides.  It stipulated that both sides maintain the cessation of military hostilities as initiated by 
Resolution 338 on 22 October 1973.  It also implemented the separation of Israeli and Syrian 
forces on the Golan Heights, demarcating two separate boundaries, with a neutral 
demilitarized zone in between, which stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer 
Forces (UNDOF).  The Eastern boundary marked Syrian territory – this incorporated a 650 
km strip of recovered territory through the agreement.  But beyond this, no further land 
occupied since 1967 was returned to Syria, and this was to become the status quo.  Finally, 
according to the agreement, all POWs and bodies of dead soldiers were to be returned by 
both sides.   
 
While some of Syria’s demands had been met, this was still far short of the mark.  There was 
no mention of the return of displaced civilians, there had not been a full withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the Golan – Mount Hermon and the key strategic points remained under Israeli 
control.  Moreover, the agreement seemed to reduce the issue to a bilateral, territorial one, 
focusing on the technicalities of demarcation lines.  It remained separate from a 
comprehensive settlement for the whole region, it did not acknowledge the wider grievances 
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Syria held against Israel and cemented a situation that was far more favourable to Israel, 
which had always benefited from the bilateralism of the ‘separate peace’ approach. 
 
These limitations of the agreement were not lost on the Syrians.  However, they recognised 
at the time that it was meant to only be an interim deal before more serious negotiations 
began.  And in fact it did lead to a thawing of relations between Syria and the US, 
establishing a direct channel of communication that had been lacking up until this point and 
prompting Kissinger to state that Syrian-American relations had ‘greatly improved’ as a 
result. 423  And yet Syria adopted a cautious wait-and-see approach.  While Asad sought to 
explain the advantages of the Agreement to the public, 424  the Americans as peace-brokers 
were still on probation in Syria’s eyes and they did not intend to be too generous with their 
compliance.  And so it was that despite the Disengagement Agreement, grievances began to 
surface again and relations took a dive by the end of 1974, throwing the prospects for 
Syrian-Israeli peace into disarray, and in turn undermining the still cold but fledgling 
relations between Syria and the US. 
 
5.2.2 Stalemate and demise of US-Syrian rapprochement 
Syria felt that despite the compromises made on their side, no movement was being made on 
the Israeli side, while the dynamics of power in the region were shifting ever more in Israel’s 
favour. 
 
Firstly, Saudi Arabia had terminated the OPEC oil embargo which frustrated and angered the 
Syrians.  It was the Syrian view that they had no right to terminate the embargo as the oil 
was the property of all the Arabs.425  Syria’s opposition to the decision to lift the boycott was 
understood by the media from the lack of any announcement about it from the Syrian 
government.  For Syria, the lifting of the embargo reflected an abandonment of the Arab 
nationalist cause, given that the plight of the Syrians and the Palestinians in particular was 
yet to be resolved.   
 
The extent of Syria’s disapproval, and by extension ideological commitment, was reflected 
by the Algerian oil minister Bel’id Abdusalam who stated: ‘Syria will approve the decision 
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when Israel withdraws from all Arab occupied territories including Jerusalem’.426  The US 
analysed that Syria’s opposition to Saudi Arabia’s decision could be explained by three 
reasons: the need to maintain Syria’s credibility with hard-line factions at home and abroad; 
that it was ‘more directed towards Egypt than towards the United States’, since ‘many within 
the Syrian regime have since the October War resented unilateral Egyptian decisions 
affecting Syria without prior consultation’; and finally, that it reflected real opposition 
within the Damascus regime to the lifting of the boycott ‘at a time when Syria has not yet 
seen any results of the American mediation effort’.427 It is possible that all the above reasons 
were accurate; what is clear is that the weakness and collapse of the united Arab front that 
had emerged during the war caused a deep sense of frustration at the lack of Arab nationalist 
solidarity and concern at Syria’s growing isolation again.  
 
Secondly, Syria felt that the US had not gone far enough as mediators.  It was increasingly 
becoming apparent that Israeli occupation of the Golan and Palestinian territories were not 
being prioritised in the same way as the Egyptian-Israeli track.  Asad stated in an interview 
with Al-Ahram that the US position ‘has not yet reached the extent that is required and 
called for by a serious endeavour to contribute to the realization of a just peace’.428  Asad 
sought to make it clear that while impending Syrian visits to the US would be seeking to 
further economic bilateral relations between the two states, Syria’s priorities remained the 
freeing of occupied Arab lands and the situation of the Palestinians.429  Asad also wanted to 
keep the door of renewed hostilities open, despite the Disengagement Agreement later in 
May, as a threat against Israeli prevarication at the Geneva conference.  The true extent of 
Syrian dissatisfaction with the Americans was expressed by Zakaria Ismail, the most senior 
government member involved in US-Syrian communication in this period, who intimated 
that the Syrians had accepted the October ceasefire and handed over the list of Israeli 
prisoners ‘without having received anything in exchange’.430  This reflects the growing 
dissatisfaction felt by the Syrians towards the unfolding peace process and towards the lack 
of US repayment of their efforts.   
 
By September 1974, these strains were already beginning to show and were to be raised by 
Khaddam during his visit to Washington.  The principal interest in his visit was to query the 
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lack of further progress on Israeli withdrawal and the situation of the Palestinians.  His 
talking points included the following431: 1) why Israel had done so little to withdraw from 
the Golan and Palestinian territories that it occupied in 1967, and did the US raise this with 
Yitzak Rabin on his recent visit to the US?; 2) Syria was anxious about the Egyptians 
‘tak[ing] the lead alone’ and wished to see greater progress on the Syrian, Jordanian and 
Palestinian fronts – if not then Syria was prepared to withdraw from negotiations;  3) even 
with Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank (on the Jordanian front) Syria’s 
acceptance of this would depend on the extent to which Palestinian interests were taken into 
account; 4) Syria would campaign for a greater role of the PLO and representation of the 
Palestinians at the Geneva conference; 5) Syria would complain about the infringement of 
Syrian sovereignty by the presence of UNDOF, insisting they stick to their remit of 
observation only.   
 
And most significant of the complaints regarded what Syria felt were violations of the 
Disengagement Agreement committed by Israel.  These included: the arrest of three Syrian 
civilians by Israeli forces in the Syrian village of Haddas, which the Israelis were supposed 
to evacuate  on 19 June; continued Israeli military presence, contrary to the Agreement, in 
the Abu Zahab, Aakkacha and Abbas hills south of Quneitra; Israeli military operations on 
Abu Nada Hill overlooking Quneitra; Israeli construction of anti-tank bunkers and laying of 
mines and barbed wire in the evacuated area; and Israeli obstruction of engineering work to 
clear the separation zone of mines, thus preventing the return of civilians into the area. 
 
To all these queries and concerns from the Syrians, the US had the following responses: 1) 
In relation to the stalling over Golan withdrawal, the US felt that: ‘a first stage of 
negotiations on the Jordanian front, as well as a further round of disengagement on the 
Egyptian front are necessary before we can proceed with a next step on the Syrian front’, 
and that further talks on the latter were ‘politically impossible’ at that time; 2) with regards 
to Egypt, the US hoped to persuade Syria the benefit of letting Egyptian-Israeli talks to 
‘proceed at their own pace’, portraying it as a separate issue to wider negotiations; 3) further 
talks were planned on the Jordanian-Israeli track, but not intended to address the situation of 
the Palestinians – the extent to which the latter could be taken into account depended on 
what Israel was willing to live with and allow; 4) a greater role for the PLO could jeopardise 
Israeli participation, therefore Syria should not push for this; 5) UNDOF was not just an 
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observer force, contrary to the Syrians’ understanding, but had the right to inspect civilian 
and military personnel entering the area, even though the area in question had been 
evacuated by Israel and technically was Syrian territory.  This level of inspection of all 
parties was necessary for Israeli confidence in the Disengagement process.   
 
Finally, to Syria’s great annoyance, the Israeli violations they had listed were almost all 
dismissed by the US as activities which did not ‘appear to be violations of the 
Disengagement Agreement’.  The Israeli actions highlighted by the Syrians: were judged to 
have been established or taken place before the Disengagement Agreement was signed (such 
as the arrests or Israel’s military presence in the hills around Quneitra); could not be 
validated based on Israeli assurances to the contrary (such as the military operations and 
obstruction of engineer work); or were technically permitted under the terms of the 
Agreement because boundary lines were not clear and could be interpreted differently by 
different parties (which effectively covered all of Israeli’s military operations and 
activities).432  For Syria, any level of compromise or agreement carried grave risks for the 
stability of the regime, and yet they persevered with Disengagement with the assurances that 
both sides were being made to compromise – where they found Israel to be flouting the 
terms, the US refused to take any action, describing the violations as mere ‘irritants’. 433 
 
The above developments, occurring during a period when Syria was in fact attempting to 
bridge the divide between itself and the US and demonstrate conciliatory gestures, 
contributed to an increasing suspicion that none of those gestures were bearing any fruits.  
Yes, Syria had cooperated with the Disengagement Agreement and established greater ties 
with the US, but this had been conditional on the fulfilment of certain terms, or at least signs 
that both mediator and enemy parties were considering them seriously.  The continued 
postponement in addressing those terms were increasingly suspected as empty promises to 
subdue the Syrians enough to enable the Egyptian and Jordanian settlements to progress 
without hindrance – these suspicions were close to the truth, as reflected by private 
comments made by the State Department and Kissinger in his diaries. 434  Thus Syria’s 
rhetoric increasingly became less conciliatory and more threatening, as the short period of 
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rapprochement began to unravel in the year of 1974, coinciding with the new presidency of 
Gerald Ford in the US.   
 
However, this change was not merely in relation to Syria’s increasing disillusionment with 
its own prospects in the negotiation process, but was also strongly related to an exacerbation 
of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian fedayeen.  This was a trend notable from the 
previous decade, when deterioration in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had a direct and 
significant impact on Syria’s dispute with Israel, and in turn its relations with the US.   Early 
in March 1974, in response to inflammatory remarks made by Israeli Prime Minister Golda 
Meir, Asad told the Syrian press: 
 
The war is not over. It will not be over unless the occupied Arab land is liberated in 
full and unless the Pal[estinian] people’s rights are restored in full...This means that 
in this country, we must wage a political struggle while maintaining our full military 
preparedness... 
 
At a time when the Israeli PM insists that the Golan is a part of Israel, we deem it 
useful to remind... Israeli officials that Palestine is not only a part of the Arab 
homeland but a basic part of Southern Syria. 435 
 
Later, Khaddam reiterated Asad’s words by stating: 
 
Syria conditions any agreement for disengagement...on the evacuation by Israel of all 
Arab territory occupied since 1967 and the recognition of the national rights of the 
Pal[estinian] people...disengagement of forces is only a step.  Those who think it is a 
final solution are badly mistaken.436 
 
A couple of months after these exchanges, there was heavy shelling between Israel and 
Syria, with large numbers of Syrian casualties – at the same time, the US was considering a 
$2.2 billion emergency assistance to cover the costs  of Israel’s military equipment.437  
Furthermore, in May, Israeli-Palestinian tensions also flared into fighting.  Palestinian 
fedayeen were reported by the US to have attacked a teenage campsite in Ma’alot on 15 May 
1974, and against ‘other innocent civilians’ in the area.  Kissinger demanded that all 
governments condemn such actions – Syria did not.438  Following this incident, Israel carried 
out air attacks in Lebanon, killing many civilians.  The US however, responded not by 
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condemning Israel, but rather to describe the attacks as being part of a ‘cycle of violence’ 
and entreating all parties to ‘redouble their efforts for a just and lasting peace’.  America was 
accused of showing a much ‘milder’ reaction to Israel’s air attacks than the Ma’alot attacks, 
to which the US responded: ‘if [the] first action had not occurred, obviously the second 
would not have taken place.’439  These developments further served to entrench Syria’s 
existing scepticism over the US’ role as mediators, as well as reigniting its defence of the 
Palestinians and pushing it further away from a settlement with Israel. 
 
Thus after these events, Syria’s ideological rhetoric and actions increased.  At the Arab 
League summit in Rabat in October, Syria was the most vocal advocates of the PLO and 
rallied enough support to get the PLO formally recognised as the representatives of the 
Palestinians by all the other states present.440  Furthermore, true to its threats at the start of 
negotiations, Syria ultimately refused to participate in the Geneva Conference and tried to 
rally other states around them.  Syria’s disillusionment had also been compounded by the 
increasing divergence of Egypt from the collective Arab cause. 
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5.3 Egypt ‘Defects’ 
 
Thus far we have addressed the American and Syrian positions in relation to the Arab-Israeli 
negotiations in depth, and how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had a clear impact on the 
respective policies and relations between Syria and America.  Another crucial factor that 
needs to be addressed at this stage is the role of Egypt.  As outlined in the introduction of 
this thesis, Egypt offers an important comparison that can be used to explain Syria’s poor 
relations with the US.  How is it that Egypt could shift from being a champion of Arab 
nationalism, antagonist of Israel and opponent of American policy in the Middle East, to 
becoming a key ally of the US and considered as a partner by Israel in any ‘peace process’?  
Investigating this change more closely would in turn help us in understanding why Syria did 
not follow Egypt’s example, despite all the predictions by policy-makers and academics 
alike.  The roots of the divergence between Syria and Egypt can be traced further back 
during Nasser’s leadership, but the major developments occurred during the period of 
negotiations after the 1973 war.   
 
The grounds for suspicion and discord were laid after Sadat agreed to a ceasefire without 
consulting Asad.441  This was exacerbated by Egypt’s increased compliance with American 
and Israeli demands, and a tendency to pursue Egyptian interests unilaterally without 
seemingly considering the ramifications for other parties in the conflict or using its influence 
to seek solutions for others, in contrast to Syria’s policy and rhetoric as exemplified above.  I 
argue that a key explanation for this is Syria’s continued adherence to ideological principles, 
and Egypt’s abandonment of them.  This had implications for their respective, and 
eventually very different, relations with the US. 
 
Egypt was aware that it would face problems if it agreed to a full peace treaty with Israel, 
but saw that these were necessary sacrifices for the sake of stability on the Israeli-Egyptian 
front. However, such a peace would not only have ramifications for Egypt but for the other 
parties too.  For Egypt was planning to vote against allowing the PLO to represent the 
Palestinians at the Geneva conference or any subsequent negotiations.  It was not only Egypt 
that was willing to drop the Palestinian cause; Jordan it was reported were ‘exceedingly 
pleased and gratified’ about Egypt’s decision,442 fearing greater Palestinian influence and 
demands in Jordan. But unlike Egypt, Jordan was not yet ready to take the lead in any treaty 
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with Israel and cutting off of the Palestinians.443  Syria’s position can thus be seen in marked 
contrast to both Egyptian and Jordanian compliance with the US and ambivalence towards 
the Palestinians. 
 
Indeed Sadat’s willingness to comply was acknowledged by the US.  Having visited the 
three Arab leaders, Kissinger reported:  
 
Sadat [is] trying to figure out how he can manage the upcoming October 26 Arab 
summit so that he is free to undertake Egyptian-Israeli negotiations if he so wishes; a 
volatile and passionate Asad, [is] firm against piecemeal agreements and seeking to 
prevent a separate Egyptian-Israeli negotiation; and a worried Hussein [..] will insist 
he, and not the PLO, be supported at the Summit by his Arab colleagues as the 
negotiator for the return of the West Bank, but ready to remain aloof from the 
negotiating process if the Arabs support the PLO.444  
 
In stark contrast with Syria, there were no concerns about Sadat’s acquiescence with the US; 
there were few fears by this stage that Sadat would not accept Israel’s terms of withdrawal in 
the Sinai.  Rather, the greatest concern was that Sadat would do so far too willingly, thereby 
greatly weakening his own credibility in the region to such an extent that it would in fact 
hurt US interests.445  The Americans were not the only ones with such fears. Such was 
Sadat’s keenness and satisfaction with Israel’s terms, he outlined that he was already 
prepared to go forward with the second stage of disengagement even without consolidation 
of the first stage.  At this stage there was disquiet from Egypt’s own ranks.  Egypt’s Foreign 
minister Ismail Fahmy made it known that he had serious doubts ‘about the feasibility’ of 
what Sadat had agreed to; he was worried not just about trouble from Palestinians, but even 
a potential coup inside Egypt.  So extreme did he view Sadat’s acquiescence that he refused 
to participate in future discussions on greater rapprochement with Israel.446 
 
The key question to ask at this point is whether Egypt was selling itself short in future 
negotiations by being so open to compromise; what bargaining power or leverage did it 
retain with such open displays of agreement with Israel, and notably few demands of its 
own?  Particularly given the centrality of Egypt’s position with the negotiating parties, 
including the US and Israel, one might note that Egypt had far greater scope to demand 
greater concessions from Israel for itself and on behalf of its Arab counterparts – an 
observation that was not lost on Syria.  Indeed one outcome of Egypt’s flexibility was 
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arguably an increased boldness on the part of Israel –for there were signs that Egypt’s 
compliance was not being reciprocated by Israel, who set ever higher demands in its favour 
in negotiations.  Kissinger himself noted the imbalance in agreed concessions, stating: 
 
You can get an idea of the magnitude of the Israeli starting demands when I tell you 
that for withdrawal of somewhere between 30 to 50 kilometers from their present 
line on the Sinai, they want not only a commitment of Egyptian non-belligerency, 
but they want assurance there will not be a third phase negotiation for at least five 
years.447 
 
Once again, in contrast to Egypt’s willingness to cooperate and pursue a separate peace, 
Kissinger on the same trip to the region had five gruelling hours of talks with Asad, who was 
described throughout this time as being ‘firm’ in his insistence that separate talks should not 
be pursued, and that he would try to persuade the conference of this view too.  Asad made it 
clear that he did not want Syria to be isolated, but it was ‘his conviction that through a united 
Arab front there is strength and that the goal must be a total Israeli withdrawal to the ’67 
borders, and the rights of the Palestinians restored through the PLO.’448   
 
There is much literature arguing that Syria gave up on an ideological agenda to follow 
Egypt’s example, focusing on self-interest,449 so it is important to note that in fact Asad did 
not at any stage in private talks with the US abandon a) his call for peace to be pursued on 
all fronts, and b) his insistence on retaining the right to engage in diplomacy without giving 
up the right to go to war.  This for the Syrians was a crucial bargaining tool, without which 
the advantage would be handed over to Israel.  Therefore by this stage Asad had a ‘deep 
suspicion of the Egyptians’ as Asad realised that Sadat might be willing to ‘go ahead with 
the Israelis on his own’.450  Meanwhile he was also opposed to a Jordanian-Israeli agreement 
because it excluded the Palestinians.451  This indicates that Syrian divergence with Egypt’s 
closer links with Israel and the US was not merely on the basis of Syria’s interests but also 
due to ideological principles concerning the region. 
 
5.3.1 Agreements in Egyptian-Israeli disengagement 
What then were the terms that Egypt agreed to, which laid the foundations for the 
momentous truce between Egypt and Israel in 1979, and simultaneously entrenched Syria’s 
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isolation?  Firstly, it is worth noting that Sadat was the first Arab leader to start direct 
bilateral talks with Israel and to pursue a second stage of disengagement, negotiated in the 
UN zone in Sinai.  Secondly the Disengagement Agreement was not only of military but, 
crucially, also of political significance. 
 
Before negotiations could begin, Egypt set out the following terms: that any demarcation 
line should be secure from the other side’s troops; that the Disengagement Agreement 
should not give either side military advantage; that there should be a more equal balance of 
Egyptian and Israeli troops in the Sinai, which would require more Egyptian forces – 
particular given the likelihood of hostile reaction to Suez access for Israel; that the buffer 
zones be wide enough to avoid clashes and give the Egyptian people security, and there 
should be freedom of movement for Egyptians in Gaza and Sinai.452 
 
Despite the concessions, and the limited nature of Egypt’s demands, Israel still refused to 
move forward without further reassurances on the following terms. Notably Israel’s demands 
moved beyond military issues into the political arena.  Furthermore, while Egypt’s 
conditions were restricted to bilateral territorial issues, Israel’s demands had far wider 
implications for the region and other Arab parties, and were not only of a bilateral nature.  
The new Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin led the negotiating team for Israel and stated that: 
 
1. Substantial Israeli withdrawal east of the passes was ‘out of the question’, and that 
Israel was not prepared to make any concessions on territory in the Sinai and in the 
oil fields.  This would only be agreed to if Sadat made a public commitment to non-
belligerence, even while Arab territory was in effect still occupied. 
2. Rabin demanded: a public Egyptian commitment not to make war against Israel 
3. Assurances that UN forces would not be removed from the Sinai, plus the 
establishment of joint committees with supervision teams to oversee the execution of 
agreement. 
4. Despite demands for non-belligerency from Egypt, Israel still wanted an interim 
agreement, so as to delay the time of full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. 
5. Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways, plus freedom of flights 
over them, plus non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers who previously transited 
in the other party’s territory. 
6. Open bridges (for tourists, family visits, trading goods). 
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7. Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in other countries and international 
bodies.453 
 
Although the Egyptian military had wanted Egyptian forces east of the passes, with full 
Israeli withdrawal from that zone, Sadat gave way allowing Israel to remain in the East zone, 
and for Egypt to only go up to the current Israeli line, west of the passes.  Israel also insisted 
lightly armed Israeli forces should control the main north-south road in the Sinai and that its 
main forces should be stationed east of the Sinai’s Mitla and Giddi passes beyond Egypt’s 
artillery range.454 While Sadat had consistently refused this in the first Disengagement 
Agreement, he accepted this in the second stage of the agreement (also known as Sinai II).  
Moreover he agreed to allow unrestricted passage for Israeli cargo in the Suez Canal, and an 
end to hostile propaganda and boycotts against both Israel and the US.455  Unable to agree 
fully on Israel’s demands for only an interim agreement and to make some progress, Sadat 
instead gave oral assurances that if Syria attacked Israel, Egypt would not join.456  And while 
he did not officially concede to a non-belligerency pact, he accepted it in all but name by 
agreeing to the non-use of force457 even when the line of Israeli withdrawal had not been 
confirmed at all.  Furthermore, Sadat was not intending to tell his Arab partners of what he 
was planning at the Arab summit on 24 October 1974.458   He did not want it known that he 
was advancing in both political and military talks with Israel. That this was an extraordinary 
and controversial move by Sadat therefore can be ascertained from the secrecy with which 
he was operating. 
 
With the final agreement of both sides’ terms, the second stage of Disengagement was 
finally formalised on 4 September 1975 in Geneva.  As a result of this, yet a further 
agreement was signed between the US and Israel because:  
 
The United States recognizes that the Israel interim agreement with Egypt, entailing 
the withdrawal from highly important strategic and economic assets in Sinai, 
constitutes an act of great significance on Israel’s part in the pursuit of final peace.  It 
elicits full US support. 459   
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This came despite the fact that Israel’s demands on Egypt had been greater.  The great risks 
that Egypt had taken in its agreements were also not yet acknowledged publicly by the US, 
and certainly no such agreement between America and Egypt would yet materialise.  This 
would come only after Egypt would sign the full peace treaty, thus further emphasising the 
fact that Egypt was taking far-reaching action without yet securing greater financial or 
diplomatic rewards as might have been expected.  In contrast, the US was constantly 
providing Israel with further incentives to garner any compromise at all.  America agreed to 
the following, in effect to reward Israel for its cooperation: 
 
 Ongoing American commitment to Israel’s military 
 A guarantee of full quantity of oil for Israel’s economy –that extra amount being 
estimated at 450 million dollars annually 
 US would enter joint ventures with Israel to construct oil storage facilities 
 For a fixed number of years the US government would not expect Israel to withdraw 
from any new territory in the Sinai 
 Additionally Egypt would not seek further withdrawal in that time 
 The US secured assurances from Egypt that the Disengagement Agreement was not 
conditional on ‘any act or development in the relations between Israel and other 
Arab states’, that it would not initiate military action against Israel, nor support other 
states’ action 
 And the US would ensure that all Egyptian boycotts, and anti-Israel propaganda 
would cease.460 
 
Crucially, two further promises made by the US involved the Syrians.  Thus America 
guaranteed that it would not expect Israel to negotiate an interim agreement with Syria 
requiring further withdrawal from the Golan Heights; and that it would try to persuade Syria 
to agree to an extension of UNDOF’s mandate in the Golan.461  What is clear from this is 
that the US was trading guarantees against progress on a Syrian-Israeli settlement in order to 
persuade Israel to agree to a settlement with Egypt.  Syrian demands in the negotiations were 
thus sacrificed with ease, exposing America’s ambivalence towards them. 
 
Although Egypt had already accepted a wide range of terms under the Agreement, they were 
expected to undertake yet another set of guarantees to placate Israel, and which were all 
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based on US-Israeli demands and had major implications.  Egypt did not question the terms 
but again proved to be acquiescent. These promises included: 
 
1. Not to permit training, planning and organising of Palestinian terrorist activities 
against Israel 
2. To oppose terror activities of all kinds, including kidnappings, hijackings, threats 
from groups on third country territories – Egypt must give public and official 
opposition to such acts.  It could not grant asylum to perpetrators either. 
3. To prohibit the advocating of terrorism, guerrilla action or a ‘popular war’ as a 
means of conducting warfare against Israel or as an instrument to advance political 
goals against Israel in official pronouncements or government media. 
4. To support Jordan in peace negotiations and would not obstruct talks between Jordan 
and Israel.462 
 
5.3.2 Implications of Egypt’s agreements for Syria and Arab relations 
Before such agreements were made, Syria’s prospects of a favourable settlement were 
already looking bleak.  President Ford, having assumed leadership during a stalemate in the 
Syrian negotiations found himself to be ‘in a complicated way’ because the trajectory of 
talks had been so disproportionately in favour of Israel that the US now had to maintain the 
semblance of equal bargaining – thus Ford could not give outright assurances to Israelis that 
he would not raise and press the Syrian matter, but there was a tacit acceptance that he 
would not.463  This reflected the existing deadlock on the Syrian front, as it had become clear 
that Israel was not willing to concede any further land on the Golan Heights while Syria was 
demanding full withdrawal.  This raised Syria’s scepticism over the utility of talks; the US 
admitted that Rabin ‘[had] been inconsistent’ during talks.  At one stage he had stated that he 
was ready to look at an interim agreement based only on cosmetic changes; but in the 
autumn he agreed to consider the possibility of a unilateral Israeli steps towards withdrawal, 
with follow-up discussions with Syria at the Geneva conference.464   
 
However, while Syria’s prospects already were bleak, Egypt’s decisions further relegated the 
importance of Syria in negotiations and put the Golan Heights and the Palestinians’ plight on 
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the backburner.465  Firstly, any efforts by the latter two parties were undermined since the 
second stage of Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement.  Egypt’s willingness to accept Israel’s 
demands put greater pressure on Syria to move along at the same pace, but also to 
undermine their own demands as unrealistic and intransigent.  The demands were no longer 
seen as representing a unified Arab position that had to be negotiated but rather one that was 
now marginal and appeared to be obstructionist to the cause for ‘peace’.   The Agreement 
stipulated both parties could not resort to ‘the threat or use of force against Israel/ Egypt and 
to settle all disputes through negotiations and other peaceful means’466 - a military solution 
was thus ruled out.  With the threat of war with Egypt taken off the agenda, it became less 
important for Israel to negotiate with the other parties, and gave Israel greater flexibility to 
exercise and enhance its power in the region. 
 
Secondly, having agreed separately with Egypt to withdraw from the Sinai, Israel claimed 
that any further withdrawal from other Arab territories would jeopardise Israeli security, and 
were therefore not prepared to move negotiations forward on other fronts.  Israel’s 
leadership argued that now the Knesset did not want Israel to talk to Syria and therefore the 
leaders had no mandate to do so.467  Had Egypt not acted unilaterally and had set conditions 
for Israeli withdrawal from other fronts, it may well have been more difficult for Israel to 
use its agreement with Egypt to justify its non-cooperation with other parties. 
 
Thirdly, the Disengagement Agreement with Egypt also gave Israel a further pretext to place 
further demands and conditions on the US.  Thus in return for its acceptance of the 
agreement, Israel extracted guarantees from the US: to supply oil and aid, and that ‘should 
Israel take military action as a result of an Egyptian violation of the Agreement or any of its 
attachments, the US [Government], if it agrees that such action is reasonable, will lend Israel 
material and diplomatic support’.468  Furthermore, if any world power threatened Israel, its 
security or sovereignty, the US promised to lend support, and it agreed to ensure that the 
Israel-Egypt agreement was not contingent on any other agreement with other Arab states. 
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Significantly for Syria, Israel set the condition that the US would not press Rabin to change 
his position on an Israeli-Syrian agreement. 
 
5.3.3 Egyptian-Syrian relations deteriorate and pressure on Syria 
By September 1975, relations deteriorated significantly between Syria and Egypt as a result 
of the widespread view that Egypt had betrayed its Arab partners and had conceded too 
much to Israel and the US: In September the Egyptian Embassy in Damascus was attacked.  
The Egyptian foreign minister Fahmy responded that if such an attack happened again, he 
would order the destruction of the Syrian Embassy in Cairo.469  The attack was perpetrated 
by 100-150 members of Rifaat Asad’s special forces dressed in civilian clothes – Syrian 
authorities did warn the Egyptians that a demonstration was planned, and later claimed the 
rogue rioters had got into embassy through the back.  So Egyptians issued an ultimatum to 
Syria that the Egyptian Ambassador would be withdrawn if the anti-Egypt tactics were not 
stopped.470 
 
Egypt’s precarious position was made worse because Israel continued to praise Sadat and 
compare him with other Arabs’ belligerency.  This in fact weakened Sadat and led to him 
being described by many as a traitor.  Sadat was put in an unwinnable situation – the US 
reported that he did not want to admit to his agreements with Israel in public, but at the same 
time in ‘protesting his innocence’ against the accusations of collusion with Israel, he would 
be accused by Israel of reneging against his agreement not to engage in anti-Israel 
propaganda. 471  It was said that Egypt expected sharp criticism from the Palestinians, but 
that the ‘unexpected virulence of Syrian reaction is upsetting.  As is [...the] concomitant 
deafening silence of even friendly Arab states’.472  According to reports, Sadat was calling 
his foreign minister Fahmy everyday to ask him ‘what can be done to reassure and calm the 
Syrians down’.473   
 
Despite his dismay at these attacks, the charges that Sadat seemingly had few answers to 
were the ones coming from both Syria and Israel (described by the US as ‘strange 
bedfellows’ on this occasion) that the Egyptian front was now frozen thus ending the state of 
war ‘practically and contractually’.  Syria was also furious that Sadat failed to mention other 
Arab territories or mention Palestinian people in his agreement; that he had introduced 
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‘armed US intelligence agents’ into Arab territory, and had rewarded ‘Israeli extortion with 
colossal amounts of US aid’.  Sadat admitted to the US that he and his advisors had 
anticipated these criticisms, but had hoped ‘Damascus at least would not, repeat not air them 
publicly’.474   
 
Despite praising Sadat’s courage publicly, the US recognised in private that Sadat did not 
get what he had initially wanted from negotiations, and had conceded more than he and his 
advisors thought was politically safe.  Such was the level of antipathy towards Sadat, and the 
unpopularity directed towards Egypt, that the following was noted: ‘That the GOE 
[Government of Egypt] would shed no tears at Sadat’s disappearance is assumed here...’ 475 
 
5.3.4 Egypt’s motivations 
Why then did Egypt act so readily? While Egypt’s decisions and actions have been outlined, 
the reasons behind them now need greater analysis.  This in turn will help to explain why 
Syria did not pursue the same path.  Egypt’s decision was viewed even by its supporters as 
extraordinary – in trying to assess the reasons, the US provided a number of explanations. 
 
 (i) Firstly, Sadat had taken a gamble in shifting his reliance from the Soviet Union to the 
US, and his cooperation with Israel was intensely unpopular.  He was very conscious of his 
critics – he was stung by the criticisms levelled at his decisions and saw this as his last real 
chance to prove his strategy was working, and had not ‘hopelessly stalled’ as his critics were 
charging.476  For 18 months Sadat was unable to get movement on the Israeli front and was 
beginning to lose support even among those who initially supported an agreement.  Thus any 
opportunity at a settlement was deemed better than none – it was a case of ‘now or never’ for 
Sadat.477  It should be noted that Asad too was under pressure to prove that cooperation with 
the US would lead to results; but unlike Sadat who got deeper into concessions in order to 
save face, Asad walked away from negotiations.   
 
(ii)  Sadat, however, felt he could not follow Asad’s example.  The US argued that he knew 
Egypt could not ‘win’ a war, undermining the value of keeping the option of war open as 
Syria preferred.  Egypt could still have gained from a limited war, which might have enabled 
it to take back the Mitla and Giddi passes.  But Sadat also knew that with such an act Egypt 
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would lose US support.  He could not risk this, especially having alienated the Soviet Union 
who refused to participate in the Geneva ceremony to sign the agreements; loss of Soviet 
support was already placing economic pressures on Egypt and the US needed to be kept on 
side to compensate for this.478  Having failed to secure the passes or oilfields from Israel, 
American support was one of the few gains Sadat could use to justify his controversial 
policy and argue it was working – if this too was jeopardised it would be a ‘crushing 
admission that his policy was bankrupt’.479  
 
(iii)  The US also argued that Sadat was duped by the mystique of the Free Officers in 1952, 
believing that the Arab world’s ‘respect for his person and that of his old comrades is 
immutable’.480  Sadat’s sceptical foreign minister Fahmy went as far as to claim that ‘this is 
[the] sole important reason that Sadat nerved himself to sign [a] ‘bad’ agreement...now these 
premises have proven dramatically untrue, [the] president is in some state of agitation’.481 
 
(iv)  Furthermore, the US argued that Sadat was impressed with the notion that a 
disengagement involving the first case of Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory would be 
brought about by negotiations and not war – Sadat wanted to construct this as a symbolic 
victory for his and Egypt’s legacy, in which Egypt helped to initiate the beginning of a peace 
process after decades of conflict.482 
 
(v)  Despite widespread unpopularity, there were some who did support Sadat’s decisions – 
this provided him with enough encouragement to pursue an agreement with Israel and to 
agree to so many concessions.  Among these were the Saudi regime, whom the US argued 
were pivotal in persuading Sadat; the US argued many Egyptians were also ‘in [the] mood to 
accept even [a] ‘bad’ Disengagement Agreement’, despite the apparent abandonment of 
ideology that it represented – they argued businessmen wanted stability, while the army were 
aware of the ‘severe disadvantages’ it faced if it continued on a war-footing.  War fatigue 
and a yearning for economic improvement were cited as key motivations for Egypt’s 
rapprochement.483  There were of course many other sections of Egypt’s population that 
were excluded from America’s analysis here, as was borne out so dramatically on 6 October 
1981 when Sadat was assassinated. 
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(vi)  Finally, more pressing realities also impacted Sadat’s decision – he was aware that 
Egypt was militarily weak and vulnerable at this time.  He had hoped that through this 
agreement he had sealed his borders against Israeli attacks.  He also saw it as opening up the 
chance of obtaining supplies from western sources, which had previously been withheld.484 
 
Thus the following reasons – Egypt’s economic and military stagnation; support from 
business elites and conservative Arab neighbours; the prestige of initiating peace; the need to 
stave off criticism and produce something after two years of talks and a costly war; and fear 
of losing newfound US support, explain why Sadat agreed to sign the agreement, with 
incomplete Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and a range of far-reaching concessions in the 
military and political realm.  For all their plaudits, even the US described his actions as a 
‘faute de mieux’.485   
 
While much of the literature highlights, even lauds Sadat for his pragmatism in turning his 
back on ideological principles, indicating that it was a mark of a mature state,486 the 
documents reveal the high level of concern held not only by insiders in the Egyptian 
government but also the US who feared that Sadat had gone too far and acted too hastily in 
discarding popular opinion and altering Egypt’s foreign policy so dramatically.  Of course 
Sadat knew the risks were high, but he seemed unprepared for the level of opposition he was 
to face.   
 
To understand this opposition it should be noted that he had left himself open to attack on 
almost every traditional principle of Arab nationalist philosophy:  having expelled the 
Soviets, he had invited the Americans to play an even greater role in the region, thus 
seeming to facilitate the reintroduction to the area of superpower ‘imperialists’; he had 
agreed to the de facto suspension of the state of belligerency against Israel, which had been 
the main ideological driving force after decolonisation – in doing so Sadat was seen to be 
violating the basic tenet of Arab solidarity, in effect accepting the status quo in the region 
when he had been unable to get a public and firm determination from the US to seek Israel’s 
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immediate pullback from the Golan, and had ‘nothing to offer the Palestinians’ except a 
statement that he had urged dialogue with them.487  The following assessment from the US 
State Department sums up Egypt’s predicament accurately: ‘In short, Sadat will be hard-
pressed to refute charges that his is a self-seeking ‘Egypt first’ policy which flies in the face 
of Arab nationalist principles of 1952 revolution’.488 
 
The shift, or as some called it ‘defection’ by Egypt was completed over the following years, 
culminating in a formal peace treaty with Israel on 26 March 1979.  The symbolic impact of 
the turnaround had been made all the greater with Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, 
followed by a series of foreign aid agreements with the US, producing a solid alliance which 
would last for decades.  As a result, Egypt benefited from $2billion of US aid every year and 
was given a central role in the ‘peace process’ and other regional affairs.  While it is cited as 
an example of Egypt giving up ideology for pragmatic self-interest, there are important ways 
in which this assessment comes into question.   
 
Firstly, it strongly went against popular opinion to such an extent that it placed the regime at 
risk.  Sadat himself paid the ultimate price when he was assassinated by gunmen on 6 
October 1981.  Both the controversial pro-American policy and the regime remained intact 
after Hosni Mubarak came to power, but at the expense of its reputation and popular 
leadership that Egypt had enjoyed prior to the truce with Israel.489  Nor did the country as a 
whole benefit as much as was hoped in terms of development and economic advancement: 
US aid barely trickled down to lower levels of society, as poverty levels increased over the 
decades.  And finally, the region’s problems were not resolved by Egypt’s actions – they did 
not produce the domino-effect as was expected, Israel still faced hostility and insecurity and 
indeed it could be argued that the marginalisation of Israel’s opponents and Egypt’s apparent 
kow-towing to US policy increased radicalism in the region.  Egypt’s ‘self-interest’ 
contributed to the region’s problems rather than resolve them.   
 
If pragmatism is associated with efficiency and strategic prowess, then the outcomes of 
Sadat’s policy fell short.  Moreover, Sadat’s policy was seen even by contemporaries as 
idealistic, rather than pragmatic.  His expectations in America’s ability to deliver 
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concessions from Israel if the Arabs complied, and his granting of concessions before these 
were reciprocated by Israel,490 exposed naivety in negotiation skills or even recklessness. 
And finally, as analysed above, Sadat’s policy was not entirely the result of rational 
decision-making, but rather there was a degree of hubris and desperation in his motives.  
From the anger shown by his ministers and Sadat’s failure to consider the extent of public 
opposition that might be stoked by his policies, it is evident that there was little collective 
decision-making and poor intelligence of popular opinion at the heart of the regime. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
In two decades time, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir claimed that a private letter 
given by President Ford to Rabin during the Disengagement talks stipulated that the US 
would not challenge Israel about its continued occupation of the Golan Heights.491  Shamir 
argued that this letter laid the parameters for future talks and justified Israel’s non-
cooperation over the Golan Heights.  Such a letter would indeed be highly controversial, 
given that it directly contradicted America’s public rhetoric, not least to the Syrians, that it 
was acting as a neutral mediator and was working on the basis of UN resolutions stipulating 
withdrawal.  However, the following archival evidence shows that Shamir’s claims were 
accurate, as Kissinger had recorded the content of a letter from Ford to Rabin which matches 
the wording of the note given by Shamir to Secretary Baker in 1991:  
 
The US will support the position that an overall settlement with Syria in the 
framework of a peace agreement must include effective arrangements to assure 
Israeli security from attack from the Golan Heights.  The US appreciates fully and 
gives great weight to Israel’s view that any peace agreement with Syria must be 
predicated on Israeli remaining on the Golan Heights.  The US is prepared to support 
this position if other arrangements which might prove feasible are not, in the US 
judgement, of comparable effectiveness in protecting Israel’s survival and security, 
to which the US is fully committed.492 
 
Syria, of course, was ignorant of any such promises made by the US to Israel.  As long as 
this secret arrangement between Israel and the US continued, the premise of any current or 
future negotiations between Syria and Israel was flawed; meanwhile this demonstrates that 
the US was not acting in an even-handed way with the Syrians and in fact helped to 
predetermine a negative outcome in Syrian-Israel negotiations and thereby US-Syrian 
relations. 
 
And Indeed the US had already laid the foundations for this one-sided policy prior to this 
communication.  The State Department had been more receptive of Syria’s concessions and 
more genuine in wanting to reach a comprehensive settlement including Syria.  But whatever 
they had expected from the talks, they were somewhat irrelevant to the negotiation process.  
It largely came to be dictated on the American side through the President’s office and 
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especially by Kissinger – the sidelining of the State Department allowed Kissinger to wield a 
great deal of influence.   
 
Independent of the fact that the American public were in favour of Israel with a danger of an 
anti-Arab backlash if the administration were seen to do too much for Arabs,493 Kissinger’s 
own memoirs show that he had no intention to push for the fulfilment of resolution 242, 
which stipulated Israel withdraw from all Arab land occupied in 1967.494  Kissinger always 
consulted with Israel before talking to the Arabs, thereby ensuring that Israel demands were 
the starting point of any negotiations; moreover, there were times when Kissinger actively 
discouraged Israel from moving too quickly in negotiations in case it made Israel ‘look 
weak’ – the US played a role therefore in supporting Israel’s inflexibility.495 Kissinger also 
acknowledged that he wanted to make Arabs learn the lesson of the ‘impossibility’ of 
achieving anything through military means.496 The Arabs’ hand had been weakened 
therefore well before negotiations even started.   
 
To answer the questions this chapter began with, the Americans had already prepared the 
ground for their preferred outcome, which was a piecemeal settlement that excluded the 
Syrians and the Palestinians –the US proved not to be a neutral mediator but rather it 
actively avoided pursuing Syrian and Palestinian demands for fear of upsetting Israel and 
jeopardising the Egyptian and Jordanian negotiations.  Thus its relationship with Israel – not 
just at the diplomatic level but also faced with pro-Israeli public opinion domestically – did 
hinder a more just and comprehensive settlement that reflected the goals of all the parties.  
Moreover, there was evidence to show that the US held deep-seated perceptions and 
assumptions about the Syrians that meant that their track in negotiations was given low 
priority to begin with.  Such was their conviction that Syria’s radicalism and intransigence 
would not result in a settlement, that they merely saw the Syrians in an instrumental light to 
make the path smoother for the other parties – hardly conducive to a successful outcome on 
the Syrian-Israel front. 
 
To what extent, then, were American perceptions of Syria accurate? Syria’s position was 
supported by UN resolutions 242 and 338; in legal terms their demands were neither 
unrealistic nor unjustified.  In this light it would be difficult to argue that Syria was being 
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obstructionist because it maintained its basic demand for Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
territory – the logic of which would mean Syria would have to concede territory to Israel, 
occupied in contravention of the Geneva Convention, in order to be rid of the obstructionist 
label.  Thus to describe Syria’s actions as obstructionist are not warranted.   
 
In terms of the view that Syria was intransigent and inflexible  there is some accuracy to 
suggest that Syria was the most consistent in its demands and the least willing to sacrifice its 
starting terms in negotiations.  But again it would be difficult to see what principles could 
have been sacrificed when their demands for withdrawal, though crucial, were also very 
basic.  Moreover, it was not the case that Syria was entirely inflexible and unwilling to 
negotiate any terms or agree to interim arrangement that favoured Israel more – their 
acceptance of the Disengagement Agreement and willingness to allow temporary territorial 
concessions demonstrated that they were a party that one could bargain with.  In fact Israel 
were just as unwilling to concede its war-time advantages than the Arab parties, if not more, 
while the inducements needed to persuade them to even engage in talks were always far 
greater than any offered to the Arabs.  There were a number of principles that Israel was not 
willing to concede – some of these were for deep-seated ideological reasons and some were 
due to public pressure.  In that sense Israel shares more similarities with Syria than Egypt, 
with whom Syria is usually compared, because Syria similarly would not sacrifice key 
ideological principles – demands for a comprehensive settlement, opposition to Israel and a 
united Arab front – even in the face of financial, military and political incentives.  The 
regime’s adherence to Arab nationalism was both personal and historical; but it was all the 
more pressing and indispensable because of popular opinion.  
 
Sadat’s role was important, but he did not shape the nascent peace process as boldly as he 
hoped.  He ended up facilitating the outcome desired by the Americans (so willingly at times 
that even they were surprised) but his actions also weakened the Arabs’ strength to negotiate 
and to retain leverage.  Crucially his actions gave the separate peace initiative the legitimacy 
needed of having Arab support.  The status quo of Israeli occupation of other Arab lands was 
therefore solidified with the removal of a key challenger.  Sadat could pursue this path by 
abandoning ideology, which he saw as intangible and unrealistic, and opting for the self-help 
route.  And yet his decisions were not only motivated by self-interest for Egypt but they 
were also influenced by a combination of idealism, desperation, need for recognition and 
hubris (particularly in underestimating the level of opposition his policies would evoke).  
Given the non-rational motives at play, the pragmatism that is often associated with Sadat’s 
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policy is therefore questionable.  Syria, on the other hand, though retaining its ideological 
principles, also demonstrated caution and realism with regards to the outcomes of the 
negotiations, and a greater awareness of a) the public mood, b) its own limitations both 
domestically and internationally and c) the strategies and goals of its opponents.  Thus 
conversely, Syria’s policy was ideological in substance, and pragmatic in its calculations and 
implementation.  It was thus both these approaches which prevented Syria from following 
Egypt in signing a truce with Israel and forming an alliance with the US. 
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Chapter 6 
US-Syrian Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
At the close of the 1970s after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Syria found itself isolated in 
the region.  But the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the emergence of the Islamic Republic in 
Tehran provided Syria with an unexpected and unlikely ally.   Syria was the first state in the 
Middle East to recognise the new Islamist regime, and was the only state to support Iran 
during the Iranian hostage crisis.  Thus a long-term strategic alliance was forged between the 
two anti-imperialist states.  This served to further entrench US-Syrian hostility throughout 
the 1980s, with the US placing Syria on its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and applying 
greater sanctions on the regime.  In this context, the Gulf crisis in 1990 when the US sought 
Syria’s help, marked a dramatic turnaround in the fortunes of US-Syrian relations.   
 
The ensuing decade has at times been described as the decade of hope because of the 
unlikely improvements in relations between previously hostile states.497  The disruption of 
the structural consistencies of previous decades places increased scrutiny on the role of 
ideology in Syria’s foreign policy, and how it adapted to the altered international setting of 
the 1990s.  This chapter seeks to examine Syria’s adherence to ideology in the face of 
changing regional and global circumstances, and how this in turn affected its relations with 
the US.   
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6.1 Syria’s Participation in the Gulf War and Implications for Ideology 
 
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied neighbouring Kuwait.  The UN Security 
Council passed resolution 660 which condemned the invasion and demanded complete and 
unconditional withdrawal, secured by the use of force if necessary.  This was followed soon 
by cutting off arms supplies and the deployment of US troops in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The usual pro-western Arab states were expected to support America’s charge against 
Saddam Hussein.  But what made the Gulf War unique in comparison to previous conflicts 
in the region was Syria’s participation on the side of the US against Iraq.  Lesch even states 
that Syria ‘was most important of all the Arab states in the coalition’.498  The US hoped that 
this unusual partnering gave the intervention more credibility, supporting American claims 
that most of the Arab world was opposed to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and deflecting some 
of the criticism that this was a colonial venture.499  By all accounts Syria stuck to the terms 
of the embargo and economic sanctions on Iraq.500  And indeed when the war began, Syrian 
troops took part in backing Egyptian forces in Kuwait, although they would not go in to fight 
Iraqi forces.501 
 
While it helped to reduce Syria’s isolation in the region, it had for a while negative 
consequences for Syria’s reputation of standing up to the Americans and external meddling 
in the region’s affairs.  It raised doubts at the time about Syria’s commitment to Arab 
nationalist ideology, and academics and policy-makers alike for years afterwards cited this 
event as marking the death-knell for Arab nationalism in the region.  Such perceptions and 
accusations of hypocrisy did trouble Asad.  For years he had prided himself on not caving in 
to pressure from the US or its neighbours to give up the ideological ‘struggle’.  Thus, in 
contrast to the eagerness of other Arab states,502 he was reported to have been reluctant about 
participating in combat operations, eventually claiming that he was committing troops in 
defence of Saudi Arabia, ‘not for an assault on brother Arabs’.503  To the US Secretary of 
State James Baker, who questioned why he was in a dilemma, Asad explained:  
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What do we say to the Syrian people?...There are Syrians who questions why we 
have sent forces to the Gulf…you talked about American public opinion.  We have 
similar problems.504 
 
Evidently Asad understood the risk he was taking in supporting the American venture.  
Syria’s image in the eyes of other Arabs, public opinion, and not being seen to betray the 
ideological consistency which Syria had always publicly given great importance to, were all 
essential to Syria’s self-identity and political credibility.  Other states built their status and 
influence on resources or military power, Syria had built its status on the power of ideas.   
 
Did Syria’s decision to participate in the American-led coalition therefore represent a crisis 
in identity for state and people, and a dilution in its Arab nationalist, anti-hegemonic 
ideology?  Had Syria relented to the changing dynamics of a now unipolar world, in which 
bandwagoning with the US was seen as the only viable option?  These are the questions that 
are regularly posed in relation to Syria’s participation in the Gulf War, with implications for 
the role of ideology in both Syria’s foreign policy and its relations with the US. 
 
There are two main charges of hypocrisy levelled at Syria and its ideological claims as a 
result of the Gulf War.  The first is that Syria sacrificed the principle of Arab unity in 
supporting the coalition against its Arab neighbour Iraq.505  The long-term political and 
personal rivalry between Saddam Hussein and Asad is well documented,506 all the more 
ironic given that the two states were both Ba’thist.  It is often argued that Asad was eager to 
see action taken against Iraq because his grudge against Saddam Hussein superseded 
ideology. 
 
The second charge is that Syria sacrificed the principle of protecting Arab autonomy and 
resistance to external intervention in the region’s affairs by supporting America’s lead 
against Saddam Hussein.  As elucidated in the previous chapters Syria had for years held to 
the principle of challenging American dominance due to the protection that it gave to Israel.  
Syria contrasted itself with neighbours Egypt to demonstrate that it was principled and 
would not be pressured to ‘sell-out’ to the US.  Thus it is also argued that Asad was now 
willing to bandwagon with the US given the decline of the Soviet Union, exposing its 
ideological claims as mere rhetoric. 
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6.1.1 Why did Syria join the military action against Iraq? 
Let us address both these arguments - it is true that Syria did have its own grievances against 
Iraq and there is no doubt that there was a personal component to their running dispute.  
However, this is too simplistic an account and reflects an un-nuanced realist interpretation of 
the region’s politics; for there were other factors overriding this personal element that were 
important drivers behind Syria’s decision in 1990.  Syria’s main motivation was summed up 
by Baker: 
 
‘…he left no doubt that he had no brief for his bitter enemy.  He indicated that 
Saddam’s invasion was wrong, and therefore Syria was adopting the principled 
position of supporting the coalition’s efforts.’507…Asad said: ‘We will do the right 
thing…but it is not easy to do because of our public opinion’.508 
 
Indeed this case has been put forward by Syrian officials since the event.  Ghayth Armanazi, 
the Syrian head of the Arab league at the time of the Gulf War explained: 
 
Before viewing this period as one of cooperation with the US against a fellow Arab 
country, it is important to understand that Syria saw Saddam’s attack against Kuwait 
as damaging the crucial notion of a united Arab front.  Saddam’s actions were giving 
the rest of the world the idea that the Arab world had deep divisions and were willing 
to threaten and attack each other.  This was deemed by Syria as a greater threat to 
pan-Arab ideology, than seeking the help of an external power.509 
 
While such a position lacks the greater complexity that was likely to be involved in Asad's 
motives, it does in many ways support the analysis put forward in this thesis regarding the 
praxis of Syrian ideology.  It reflects, in part, the primarily political nature of Arab 
nationalism, and the notion that Arab sovereignty, which rested on the need for order within 
the regional system, was paramount.510  One of the greatest threats to these principles came 
after the First World War when the region was in disorder, and Arabs collaborated with 
European powers to annex territory and create their own monarchies.  During the Gulf War 
however (and according to the official Syrian line) the Arab states were not cooperating with 
the US to take Iraq’s territory for themselves, but to protect another Arab state, Kuwait, from 
being overpowered.  If Iraq’s actions were left unchallenged, this would create disorder in 
the region and would be used an excuse for external powers to enter the region again under 
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the pretext of restoring order.  A contained intervention, one which united the Arabs in a 
common cause, was deemed as a legitimate reason for acting against another Arab state.511   
 
After the war, Asad was challenged by the Jordanians at the Arab summit, who queried how 
Syria could justify working with the Americans, and who called for a solely Arab solution to 
the crisis.  Asad responded by asking how many of the Arab states present would have been 
willing or ready to commit forces to liberate Kuwait, and how many would have taken 
serious steps to help?512  Thus his position was that in that instance, accepting American help 
was the only option to prevent even worse developments that would disunite and weaken the 
whole region, making it more susceptible to external intervention in the future.513  Asad's 
explanation attempted to justify Syria's decision as being wholly consistent with its 
ideological principles.   
 
But if we analyse the decision in a more critical light, then it cannot be separated from the 
post Cold War context.  While Syria did not want to admit to yielding to the US, the 
uncertain and unprecedented situation presented by US unipolarity placed a great deal of 
pressure on the Syrians to bandwagon in this instance, in a way that marked a great 
discontinuity from past policies.  Furthermore, Asad's wish to rein back Iraq was less out of 
solidarity for Kuwait and more out of fear of Iraqi aggrandisement against its other 
neighbours, including Syria.  Thus very defensive, realist concerns against the US and Iraq 
were also at play here. 
 
A second more principled factor behind Asad’s decision was concern for the credibility of 
the UN.  American intervention on this occasion was seen to be different from previous 
instances of US involvement in the region because it had the approval of the United Nations.  
There had been in total 12 UN Security Council resolutions and not responding to them 
would have affected the credibility of the UN.514 The UN had authorised the use of force if 
Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait through a final resolution 678 on November 29 1990.  
After the conflict, just prior to the Madrid talks, Asad reinforced his support for the UN by 
stating that the UN gave collective action ‘international legitimacy’ and ‘moral authority’.515  
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This has been a consistent factor in Syria’s foreign policy since the 1967 war.516  The 
importance Syria gives to the role of the UN is tied to the concept of multilateralism 
deflecting the hegemony of the great powers; but also, Syria saw the UN as an important 
tool of moral and political recourse against Israel, and was aware that in turn Israel perceived 
the UN as a ‘mortal enemy’.517  Syria had always supported the implementation of UN 
resolutions in the Arabs’ plight, thus supporting UN resolutions now would also increase the 
legitimacy of the resolutions pertaining to Israel.  Similarly, to undermine the UN in the Gulf 
crisis would have served to undermine those UN resolutions against Israel.  Thus the moral 
and legal legitimacy of Syria’s grievance against Israel and demands for the Arabs has 
become symbiotic with defending the UN.518 
 
Finally, to challenge the notion that Syria was strongly motivated by its longstanding rivalry 
with Iraq, we should compare Syria’s reaction to US policy towards Iraq over the subsequent 
years.  Having supported the US in the Gulf crisis, Syria strongly opposed US air strikes on 
Iraq in 1998, with numerous public demonstrations against the US; this followed efforts by 
both regimes to renew diplomatic contacts late in 1997 when Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister 
Tariq Aziz was received in Syria.  Syria also took part in the oil for food programme 
exporting medicine and food to Iraq during American sanctions on the Iraqi regime; and 
Syria also reopened the oil pipelines that had been closed since 1982, and three border posts.  
It was reported that Syria lobbied Saudi Arabia in this time to reintegrate Iraq back into the 
Arab ‘fold’.519   
 
And more recently, in 2003, despite the traditional rivalry between the two states, Syria was 
the most vocal in its opposition to the US invasion, and in doing so it placed the Syrian 
regime at risk from a military attack520 and put it at odds with its long-term ally Iran. So 
while the personal and political animosity between Syria and Iraq was deep, its impact on 
Syria’s policy, and the notion that it forced Syria to align with the US just to spite an old 
rival to the detriment of its ideological principles, has been exaggerated.   
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6.1.2 Why did Syria collude with the US? 
While it has been argued above that Syria bandwagoned with the US during its ‘unipolar’ 
moment, despite being ideologically opposed to much of American policy in the region, this 
too needs a more nuanced explanation.  Firstly, in 1990, the coalition against Iraq was built 
on factors that were very different from those that formed the ‘coalition of the willing’ in 
2003.  Notably the US acted more gradually and did not act unilaterally.  It built up 
diplomatic and particularly economic pressure via the UN, before moving on to military 
pressure.521   
 
Moreover the US did not want the coalition to be attached to connotations of the west 
lecturing an Arab state, and was keen to emphasise that this time the Soviet Union (in its last 
days), and other Arab states, were fully on board and endorsed the plan.522  Syria perceived 
that the US was trying to build a genuine consensus with other parties in the region, the UN 
and even America’s normal enemies (including Cuba), rather than seeking the bare 
minimum needed to facilitate an American hegemonic exercise.523  Indeed as outlined above, 
America’s policy served to strengthen the UN on this occasion, not the opposite as had been 
the case in the past.  Going through the UN was crucial in getting the Arab states to join, in 
contrast to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s suggestion for unilateral action to 
protect US interests.524  What this demonstrates is that Syria was not averse to cooperating 
with the US at all costs.  Its opposition to the US over the years had been built on US 
policies which were at odds with Syrian ideology and interests.  Where the US was seen to 
be attempting a change in its approach, there was room for change in Syria's policies as well. 
 
Finally, and crucially, Syria saw a rare opportunity in which the US needed its support and 
participation, and wanted to use that as leverage to make its own demands.  It questioned the 
US why it had come to Kuwait’s aid when it had been occupied, but failed to do the same for 
the Palestinians against Israel.  Gradually, there was growing momentum behind the notion 
that this occasion of Arab unity under a common cause, and Arab cooperation with the US, 
should be grasped as an opportunity to break the stale-mate in the Arab-Israeli conflict after 
the Gulf War had ended.  Despite its suspicions of the US, Syria recognised that America 
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was ‘a useful power broker’ and wanted to channel that influence to help the Arab cause.525  
At a joint press conference, Syria’s Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa stated: 
 
We hope that these relations will improve to preserve the interest of the two 
countries and peace and stability in the region...we believe that an Iraqi 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait in implementation of UN security council 
resolution, would certainly pave the way after that for an Israeli withdrawal from the 
occupied Arab territories ...If we take into consideration the post cold war [situation] 
then it is important and imperative that this region should witness genuine peace and 
stability.  The immediate issue now is to get the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the 
restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait and then certainly if you want 
genuine stability in the region, then we should work for a comprehensive and just 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.526 
 
From Baker’s perspective, despite disapproval from Dennis Ross, he felt that Syria’s 
participation was of very important symbolic value: ‘With Syria represented, the credibility 
of our Arab coalition partners was immeasurably strengthened’.  But as he also stated, he 
had a more long-term plan, and he felt that, ‘There was no way to move a comprehensive 
Mideast peace process forward without the active involvement of Syria.’527  Bush reinforced 
this position when he told Baker: ‘I think you should consider going to Syria.  I don’t want 
to miss the boat again’.   
 
This demonstrates the difference with which this administration considered the role of Syria 
compared to previous and subsequent administrations.528  In public, the US did not want to 
make the linkage between intervention in the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict, for fear that 
Saddam Hussein would use it to sow disunity among the Arabs.529  But in private, 
particularly when trying to secure Syria’s support, the US was very clear that it intended to 
build on the coalition that had been formed to work for a comprehensive peace plan after the 
Gulf crisis, stating:  
 
We’re optimistic that the circumstances that bring Syria, Egypt, and the Gulf states 
together in a major Arab coalition can augur well for the future of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process.530 
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If we assess the outcomes of Syria’s participation in the coalition against Iraq, we can see 
that a key winner was the Middle East peace process, and not necessarily Syria on its own.  
Syria did gain from its participation – the Gulf War had left Syria ‘in a stronger position 
with regard to virtually all of its major regional concerns’531  It was more involved in matters 
of regional security, and saw more consultation with Egypt and the Gulf states reflected by 
the fact the GCC met in Damascus to discuss regional security.  But these gains in 
international recognition were needed to counter the damage of years of international 
isolation; moreover it was not just recognition for the sake of prestige, but rather it gave 
Syria greater leverage in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  It was Syria’s involvement which led the 
US to realise that ‘it could no longer seek to exclude [Syria] from any role in the resolution 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict’.532  And Syria felt its inclusion was needed to provide an 
alternative voice to that of Israel and the pro-American Arab states in that arena. 
 
In terms of economic and material advantage, we can see that this certainly did act as a 
motivating factor for other regional states who joined the coalition.  In the run-up to the Gulf 
War as the US sought to secure its coalition partners, it ended up forgiving Egypt its $7.1 
billion of debt.533 Similarly when Turkey agreed to provide its bases for the US military, it 
required an increase in World Bank loans which were raised to $1-1.5 billion.  Thus clearly 
much of the bandwagoning with the US, even among long-term allies, was partially 
motivated by financial aid.  It is worth noting that Syria did not benefit from any such loans 
or debt repayments in return for its participation in the coalition.  Moreover, the US secured 
Syrian support even before promising that the Saudis would pay for Syria’s ‘expeditionary 
costs’.  
 
This demonstrates that Syria’s cooperation with the US on this occasion was limited as a 
strategic move; it reflected a mix of a perceived principled necessity with the intention of 
furthering the Arabs’ cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need to be cautious about 
alienating the US too much in a new unipolar system.534  But it did not appear to be seeking 
a wholesale change in its policy, such as Egypt under Sadat, and thus it would be inaccurate 
to view this episode as a realignment of ideology.  If it had sought a deeper alliance with the 
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US, it might have asked more freely for financial aid knowing that the US would in turn 
have expectations of greater political compliance from Syria in future; this was not the case. 
 
Overall, it was the Gulf War and the coalition that was formed with the Arabs, and 
America’s consensus with the Soviet Union, that launched a renewed Middle East peace 
process.535  America’s handling of the crisis, the evident concern it had shown to build up a 
coalition of all Arab parties,536 and its standing by its promises to seek a comprehensive 
resolution to the Arab-Israel conflict afterwards, helped to remove some of the intense 
mistrust that had developed between both Syria and the US over the years.  And unlike on 
previous occasions, it seemed this trust was valued by the US administration and which it 
did not want to lose.  Baker stated after Desert Storm was over, that he wanted to return to 
the idea of the Middle East peace process, reflecting that ‘having given my word in this 
regard, I felt a moral obligation to follow through.’537 
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6.2 The Launch of the Madrid Talks – Breakthrough in the Middle East 
 
In October 1991, the Arab parties, Israel, the US and the Soviet Union met at a peace 
conference in Madrid in order to reach a final peace agreement.  Given the failures of the 
previous attempts, this might have seemed idealistic.    But there were a number of important 
differences between the post-Gulf War and post-October War contexts.  Firstly, the end of 
the Cold War signalled a new era in which the US was able to engage with the Middle East 
without constantly framing its policies in anticipation of the USSR’s actions.  This allowed 
them a greater level of flexibility in facilitating the interests of the Middle East states.  
Secondly, the US had managed to forge much closer links with all the Arab states, including 
Syria, after the successful coalition across ideological lines against Saddam Hussein in the 
Gulf War; it was a time in which, as James Baker put it, the US ‘stood at the zenith of [its] 
influence in the Middle East’.538  The mood towards the US was certainly more conciliatory 
compared to the antagonistic atmosphere immediately following Arab-Israeli hostilities in 
1973.  Thirdly, the American president George Bush appeared to be less overtly ideological 
or pro-Israel than Reagan,539 and was more forceful in condemning the spread of 
settlements.540  This greater even-handedness aided greater trust from the Arab side of 
negotiations.  This relationship of trust was strengthened by the fact that major figures in the 
State Department were accepted by all parties as having no particular personal connections 
with either the Israeli or Arab sides.541   
 
This atmosphere of optimism and sense of opportunity was followed up with concrete 
achievements in deciding the format and procedure of the talks.  Given the dissatisfaction 
over even basic arrangements on previous occasions, these marked a breakthrough in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict at that time:  
 
(1) It was the first time that all the parties were involved in peace talks collectively, and 
speaking to each other directly.  Since 1967 Syria had been consistent in demanding 
Palestinian inclusion in any talks, and its demand in return for cooperation in the Gulf War 
had been for a comprehensive peace settlement.542  Both premises were accepted as a 
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fundamental condition for the first time in any negotiations.543  Thus the incentive for Syrian 
cooperation was greater, or from a sceptical US perspective the incentive for obstructionism 
was therefore minimised.  
 
(2) All parties eventually agreed to the format and content of the negotiations, which had 
remained contested during the Disengagement talks.  At first there were deep conflicting 
goals that appeared to be irresolvable: Israel did not want to focus on territorial issues at all.  
Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister and leader of the right-wing Likud party, was 
clear in his unwillingness to relinquish any territory.   Shamir reminded the US that 
President Ford had virtually promised Israel that it could remain on the Golan;544 this stunted 
talks before they even started, for there was no basis for discussion without the notorious but 
now accepted land for peace formula initiated by Kissinger.  Facing an impasse, Baker put 
forward the proposition that if Israel did agree to withdraw from the Golan, US troops might 
be stationed there instead of directly handing it over to Syrian military control.545  To this 
Shamir is recorded to have retracted his refusal to withdraw.546  Thus the all important 
agreement to withdraw seemed to have been extracted from Israel at this stage. 
 
In direct contrast to Israel, Syria was adamant that the only basis on which it would 
participate was if the talks pursued the existing UN resolutions, particularly 242, stipulating 
the return of Arab territory.547  Syria’s demands were not only restricted to Syrian land but 
were applied to all Arab territories occupied by Israel.  Also in opposition to Israel, Syria 
still argued for joint discussions and contested bilateral deals, and also preferred to have the 
UN as mediators rather than the US.  If Syria was only concerned in regaining the Golan as 
some analysts have suggested, it would not have shown such consistent opposition to 
bilateral deals, which as Egypt had demonstrated were in fact more conducive to a state’s 
self interests.  But instead, Foreign Minister Sharaa and Syria’s delegate to Madrid, stated 
that the implementation of UN resolutions: 
 
Should not be the subject of new bargaining during bilateral organisation.  Rather 
they should be implemented in all provisions and on all fronts...This means that 
every inch of Arab land occupied by the Israelis by war and force, the Golan, the 
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West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza strip, must be returned in their entirety to their 
legitimate owners.548   
 
To overcome this impasse, the US firstly agreed to work on the basis of UN resolution 242, 
which had been largely sidelined during the Disengagement agreements.549   Secondly, it 
maintained that talks should be conducted on a mixed basis of both bilateral talks (to 
produce reciprocal compromises for all parties), and multilateral talks (for region-wide 
issues).  While Sharaa noted his and other Arabs’ opposition to any bilateral talks, which 
they saw as a divide and rule tactic,550 their acceptance of the compromised format for the 
pre-negotiation phase marked the first concession by the Syrians to facilitate the progress of 
the talks.  They still hoped for a common Arab approach and Arab coordination among the 
negotiators; but the promise of multilateral talks on region-wide issues partially placated the 
Syrians for now.  Thus both Syria and Israel made important concessions before talks could 
even begin. 
 
(3) There was further promise at the start of the Madrid talks due to an important change in 
the approach of the US administration itself, particularly towards Syria.  Though not relating 
to the actual content or format, this had a significant bearing on the direction of talks under 
the Bush administration.  In all previous talks, Syria’s role was merely seen as being 
instrumental in persuading other Arab parties to participate – a resolution that would also 
satisfy Syria’s demands was not one of America’s goals, and indeed when the main priority 
of Israeli-Egyptian peace had been secured at Camp David the Syrian-Israeli front became 
neglected.  In contrast, Baker stated with regards to the Madrid talks that:  
 
With Syria represented, the credibility of our Arab coalition partners was 
immeasurably strengthened.  But I had a more long-term purpose in mind.  There 
was no way to move a comprehensive Mideast peace process forward without the 
active involvement of Syria...551 
 
Both Baker and Bush saw Syria as having more than just a symbolic part to play in the 
peace-talks; rather they felt that peace on the Syrian-Israeli front could unlock the impasse 
on other fronts and thereby lead to the comprehensive peace that was so needed in the 
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region.  Thus Syria was viewed with greater importance than it was under Nixon and 
Kissinger and their successors. 
 
6.2.1 Stalemate 
However, despite such positive foundations, a stalemate ensued in the early phase of 
negotiations.  There could be no progress if all sides were not willing to make compromises 
– Syria, for its part signalled willingness to do so if their conditions were met.  By March 
1992, they had signalled a commitment to: end the conflict with Israel and to sign a peace 
treaty with Israel based on a comprehensive peace plan between Arabs and Israelis, although 
in reality Syria’s vision of any treaty was closer to a non-belligerency pact than full 
normalisation that the Israelis were seeking.552  These were significant offers, but notably 
based on clear conditions, these being: Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied from 
4 June 1967 and the fulfilment of Palestinian rights.553  For a while Asad still maintained his 
demand that the Madrid conference be held under UN auspices.   But ultimately after much 
shuttle diplomacy, Asad was willing to have just a UN spokesperson at the conference and 
accepted the invitation.  According to Baker, this was the single most important factor to 
ensure the conference went ahead.554 
 
On the Israeli side, however, American diplomacy seemed to have less effect.  Cobban 
states: 
 
To be sure, as long as Shamir’s government remained in power, it is fair to say that 
no substantive progress was made on this track – or, indeed, on any of the other 
tracks – of the Madrid-launched peace process.555   
 
Having agreed to enter talks after Baker’s offer of US troops on the Golan, Israel showed 
unwillingness to give any commitment to withdrawal, and mooted instead the idea of 
reciprocal territorial exchanges between Israel and Syria556 – something which was 
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unthinkable for the Syrians.  This was labelled as intransigence by Israel, but Syria argued 
that its terms for full withdrawal merely echoed UNSCR 242, and was therefore entirely 
justified.  Moreover on the Palestinian front, despite releasing 1200 prisoners captured 
during the Intifada in April 1991, Israel continued to build settlements in the occupied 
territories (with an announcement that 13,000 new units of housing would be built over three 
years).557  Baker stated that he saw these moves as ‘a deliberate effort to sabotage peace’.558 
 
This stalemate ate up valuable time and much of the optimism that the talks had started out 
with.  By October 1991, the 120 day period in which Bush and Baker had set to push for as 
much progress as possible, was coming to an end.  In this time, Israel’s relations with the US 
were also tense.559  Baker announced that the US administration would grant the entire $10 
billion loan that Israel requested, on condition that Israel froze all settlement activity in the 
occupied territory – any money Israel spent on finishing construction that it had already 
started before, would result in a deduction from the loan – thus ensuring that no loan money 
would go towards settlement construction.560  Pro-Israeli senators proposed more favourable 
terms, but Bush threatened to veto such proposals for fear that it would destroy the fragile 
peace talks.  In the end, the foreign aid bill was passed in the US without the usual loan 
guarantees for Israel. 561  According to Baker this had a significant impact on the Israeli 
elections – while one might expect it to have led to increased nationalism in Israel thus 
keeping the Likud government in power, the reverse happened with Labour winning Israel’s 
elections in June 1992, and Yitzhak Rabin coming to power.562   
 
While it is difficult to ascertain, it is very likely that this episode had some impact on the 
American presidential elections as well.  This assertive move by the Bush administration 
made it particularly unpopular among the Israeli lobby in the US.  While it is inaccurate and 
simplistic to attribute too much influence to the American-Israeli lobby, it should not be 
dismissed either. Then, as now, it held important ties in the economy and politics, and was 
one of the oldest and best-established lobby groups in the US.  Thus Bush’s challenge to 
Shamir also strengthened Jewish-American support for the Democrat opposition.563 
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Bush was ultimately defeated in the US elections, bringing in a new Democrat 
administration and Bill Clinton as President.  It was this administration that would be in 
charge of mediating the talks until 1996 when they eventually broke down. 
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6.3 Transition from Bush to Clinton 
 
The changes in the Israeli Knesset and US administration had an important impact on the 
peace process.  On the Israeli side, Rabin showed himself to be more open to negotiations 
than Shamir; this opened up a second phase of negotiations that provided more opportunities 
for progress.  Rabin began negotiations with the Syrians in August 1992 with a mutually 
acceptable foundation for both sides – the acceptance of the territorial condition in 
Resolution 242, stipulating the withdrawal from all occupied territories, reciprocated by 
security guarantees.564   
 
During this round of talks the Syrians submitted via their chief negotiator, Walid 
Muallem565, a document laying out an agenda and declaration of principles for the talks. 
These came under four sections: withdrawal; security arrangements; normal peaceful 
relations; and 'timetable for fulfilment’.566  The analogy of ‘four legs of a table’ was used 
frequently to refer to this plan, particularly by Rabin, and was recognised by all sides, 
including Israel, as a significant step by the Syrians who had never put forward such a clear 
intent for a resolution up until now – indeed it formed the basis of all future discussions.567  
 
Despite this positive signal, a second break to proceedings ensued, firstly due to the 
changeover between the Bush and Clinton administrations.  This effectively meant the 
American mediators were seen as members of a ‘lame-duck’ government, and meant the 
negotiations were ‘rudderless’ during the transition period.568  This was coupled with a flare-
up between Israeli soldiers and Hamas on the Gaza border.  When three Israeli soldiers were 
killed, Rabin responded by ordering the deportation of four hundred suspected Palestinian 
activists into North Lebanon. This heightened Arab anger and evoked fears from previous 
expulsions of Palestinians by the IDF, prompting all the Arab parties including Syria to 
suspend participation in the talks. 
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Thus when the Clinton administration came into office in January 1993, there were no 
negotiations in process.  To an extent this hiatus suited the Clinton administration – firstly it 
allowed them to focus on the crisis in Bosnia, which was of more pressing concern to them 
at the time.  Secondly, according to Samuel Lewis the new head of Policy Planning at the 
State Department, the Democrat administration had ‘close links to many parts of the 
American Jewish community’ and so ‘was not about to do anything to cause an open crisis 
with Israel’.569  They had learnt the lessons of their predecessors, and were not wishing to 
make themselves unpopular so early on in government.  
 
6.3.1 From Oslo to COS I 
Dramatic and unexpected events in September 1993 brought the world’s attention back to 
the peace process.  Rabin and the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the first ever 
agreement between Israel and a Palestinian representative.  This was unexpected not least 
because it came after a deadlock in the talks and was particularly surprising given Israel’s 
recent actions against the Palestinian activists.  Moreover the US had been slow in following 
up the peace process, which in the summer appeared to be in jeopardy.  It was clear therefore 
that this sudden deal was a result of secret negotiations solely between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, which the Syrians had been kept in the dark about.    
 
After initial procrastination, Clinton now pushed for a resumption of talks on the Syrian-
Israeli front.  However, it was not just Syria who had reservations about the impact of the 
Oslo accords. Rabin feared that any deal with Syria so soon afterwards would turn Israeli 
public opinion against him.  He persuaded Clinton to postpone any talks with Syria until the 
end of the year.  Such was the perceived breakthrough of the Oslo accords that it convinced 
Clinton that he ‘was on the right track in letting Rabin take the lead on peace process 
issues’,570 and thus he delegated Rabin with even more leadership as a result.  Despite their 
frustration at yet another delay, the Syrians nevertheless agreed to wait and even mustered 
some positive enthusiasm in time for the US-organised Geneva summit in January 1994 in 
anticipation of concrete developments, stating ‘we are ready to sign peace now’.571  
Evidently the Palestinian-Israeli deal had motivated Syria in its search for a settlement as 
well. 
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However, such readiness by the Syrians was dampened by Israel’s declaration that any 
agreement over the Golan Heights would be put to the Israeli people in a referendum.572  
This was coupled by a new obstacle concerning the very foundations of the peace talks.  
Rabin was now having doubts about the term ‘full withdrawal’ from the Golan.  Having 
earlier given an apparent commitment to the US and the Syrians when he took over as Prime 
Minister,573 he now clarified his position to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that 
he was only offering full withdrawal (to the 4 June 1967 lines) as a hypothetical situation 
merely to gauge Syria’s response, rather than as a conditional commitment.574  It was a 
crucial difference, but presented with sufficient ambiguity as to not yet obstruct the talks; for 
example, Syria interpreted Rabin’s clarification as confirmation of his initial commitment.  
This is demonstrated by Sharaa’s comments that the apparently shared understanding of the 
final objectives of talks ‘made a lot of changes and enhanced the confidence of both 
sides’.575 
 
Once again, as had occurred in the summer of 1993, developments on another track diverted 
Israel and America’s attention away from the Syrian negotiations for the third time at a 
critical stage.  This time it was a breakthrough on the Jordanian front – on 25 July, both 
Israel and Jordan had agreed to the principles for a formal peace treaty, pledging to achieve 
this within two months.576  This again exacerbated the pressure on Syria and undermined the 
comprehensive premise of the talks that Syria had fought so long for. 
   
Talks resumed for a third time after this pause.  With the agenda seemingly agreed upon, 
Clinton urged both parties to move on to the second leg of negotiations concerning security.  
He proposed that these discussions be conducted with Syria and Israel’s military chiefs of 
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staff rather than the political leaders. C.O.S (I),577 as the first round of security discussions 
became known, was led by Hikmat Shihabi on the Syrian side and Ehud Barak on the Israeli 
side on 21 December 1994.  Ultimately it did not produce any fruits, with both sides 
conceding it to have been a failure.578 
 
When talks restarted for a fourth time in May 1995, security arrangements were to be 
discussed once again, but this time with the input of the political leadership first, to avoid the 
farce of COS-I.  These talks were far more substantive than those that had preceded it, with 
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher shuttling between Israel and Syria and Sharaa 
visiting Washington to make significant contributions to the drafting of terms known as the 
‘Aims and Principles’ document. 
 
6.3.2 From COS II to the Breakdown of Talks 
Despite the ambiguity built into the Aims and Principles document (more of which will be 
discussed later on), all parties were prepared to move on to the implementation phase of the 
terms through a second round of COS talks.  The main problem the Israelis were facing at 
this stage was breaking the news of their intention to withdraw from the Golan to their 
public; having implied this commitment to Syria and the mediators, the leaders were now 
reluctant to announce this openly.579  Each time Rabin was queried about the agreed 
demarcation line, he used the ambiguity created in negotiations to shield the extent of his 
agreements with Syria and the US from the public.580  In contrast, Shimon Peres was far 
more vocal about the commitments Israel was expected to make in these negotiations.  
Hoping it might placate public opinion, he compared giving up the Golan to the precedent 
set by a Likud government which gave up the Sinai; and noted that like Gaza, the Golan did 
not constitute sacred land for the Israelis.581 
 
I am convinced we must not hesitate and must not allow the chances of a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East slip between our fingers…There are no 
tricks here, we have two truths and we must choose one: remaining on the Golan 
Heights means giving up peace.582 
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These hints from the government were seized upon by Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu 
who used these statements to whip up more frenzy and opposition against the peace process 
among the Israeli public.583  The mention of possible evacuation of settlements galvanised 
the Israeli settlers, the most hostile to the peace process, into greater opposition towards it.584  
Anti-withdrawal activists began campaigning at the Knesset to protect the ‘Golan law’ of 
1981 through which Israel had formally (but illegally) annexed the Golan – a majority vote 
would have to be passed to allow any amendments to the law. Furthermore hundreds of 
demonstrators protested against Rabin and clashed with the police.585  Amidst an already 
volatile situation, the extent of withdrawal demanded and expected by the negotiating parties 
was leaked to the press, most likely by a participant present at the meetings. 
 
Against this backdrop the COS II talks continued dealing with sensitive discussions about 
the Aims and Principles document and its implementation.  And yet further issues arose that 
complicated matters and soured the atmosphere in the negotiations.  The Israeli delegate 
General Tzvi Shtauber’s papers were leaked to the Israeli press.  His document emphasised 
the military advantages of the positions currently occupied by Israel on the Golan, and 
highlighted Syria’s demands for them to be demilitarized altogether after withdrawal – this 
stirred up greater fervour among Israelis about the need to retain the Golan.586  On 28 June, 
another blow to negotiations occurred.  Yet another leak, this time from Netanyahu, 
disclosed to the Knesset a so-called ‘document of concessions’ discussed in the talks, which 
was then duly published in an Israeli newspaper the next day.587  This information 
aggravated public opposition to any level of withdrawal. 
 
Using this hostility as an opportunity to push for a change in the initial terms of agreement, 
Israel proposed that in addition to having US troops located on the Golan instead of Syrian 
troops, Israel should also maintain its own troops on the strategically vital Mount Herman.  
Furthermore, Israel insisted on stationing an early warning system on the Golan.588  
 
Syria was dismayed at these developments on two accounts:  1) it was angered about the 
leaks of the meetings to the Knesset and to the Israeli press, sensing that this demonstrated a 
                                               
583
 Cobban, Peace Talks, 80 
584
 Madeleine Albright, Madame Secretary, Macmillan (2003), 475 
585
 Ibid. 81-82 
586
 Lesch, Arab-Israeli Conflict, 331; Cobban, Peace Talks,  89 
587
 Ibid., 90-91 
588
 Muallem, Fresh Light, 86 
 239 
lack of seriousness on the part of the Israelis.589  In the end, according to Muallem, COS II 
never got round to discussing the third item on the agenda (the international forces) directly 
as a result of these leaks.590  2) The Syrians completely disputed Israel’s demand to retain 
Mount Herman and to station troops or an early warning system on the Golan as a disregard 
for Syria’s sovereignty. 591  Thus Israel’s latest demand was seen as being highly 
provocative.   
 
Thereafter, both sides appeared to clamp down on previously agreed concessions.  Due to 
the new demands being introduced in COS II, and the number of leaks, Asad no longer 
wished to engage in the military talks but to return to the diplomatic channels.  This in turn 
was seen as ‘bad faith’ by Rabin who called it ‘inflexibility’.592  Thus the fourth attempt at 
negotiations had ended without success. 
 
The extent of public hostility to the peace process in Israel provides the crucial context to the 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 by a Jewish fundamentalist.  The shock 
of Rabin’s assassination brought the two sides back to the starting points of negotiations.  
Shimon Peres, both Rabin’s long-term rival within the Labour party but also his partner in 
the peace process, took over as Prime Minister and immediately brought a very different 
approach to the negotiations.  Whereas Rabin was slow and cautious, dealing with each track 
separately at a time, Peres wanted to move quickly and to negotiate each track 
simultaneously (although still bilaterally).  By January 1996, the US considered the peace 
process to be back on track and despite the setbacks and numerous delays, reinitiated talks to 
finalise the agreements that had been made thus far.593  According to Muallem, the 
expectation was that a final document from all sides would be ready by September 1996.594   
 
Three significant events occurred to halt proceedings.  The first, and arguably the most 
important, was Peres’ decision on 25 January during the talks at the Wye Plantations to call 
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early elections in Israel.595  The impact that elections and changes in government can have 
on such negotiations was already exemplified with the changeover from the Bush to the 
Clinton administration in the US.  This change altered the direction and eventual outcome of 
the talks.  Rabin’s assassination undoubtedly already had an impact on negotiations, not only 
because his leadership had been such a marked change from the open intransigence of 
Yitzhak Shamir, but also because his negotiating style was distinctly cautious and slow-
moving.  However, while the style now changed under Peres, this was the same Labour 
government and the substance of Israel’s negotiating terms had not.  The call of elections, 
however, and the prospect of a Likud government coming to power, generated a sense of 
futility in any further proceedings. 
 
Despite this, the US intimated they still wanted the talks to continue, and thus they were 
resumed in Maryland in February 1996.  But shortly afterwards, the second event to affect 
negotiations took place.  Two suicide bombs went off in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv between 25 
February and 3 March 1996; Israel immediately informed the US and Syria that it had 
suspended the talks.  Muallem states,  
 
From that time of course, everything began to collapse.  The international and Israeli 
focus shifted to combating terrorism.596   
 
Two conferences were organised, one in Sharm El-Shaykh and another in Washington to 
discuss ‘anti-terrorism’; but from then until the Israeli elections there was no further 
discussion of the peace process. 
 
The third and final event to halt the talks occurred when on 31 May 1996 Peres and the 
Labour government lost the elections, and Benyamin Netanyahu, the hard-line Likud leader 
and perennial opponent of the peace talks, was voted into power.  With that ended all further 
negotiations between Syria and Israel until 1998-2000 under a new Israeli government and 
Prime Minister. 
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6.4 Implications for US-Syrian relations 
 
During Bush’s tenure as US president, with James Baker as his secretary of state, it is 
arguable that US-Syrian relations were at their most cooperative.  On the American side, 
there was a higher degree of empathy for Syria’s position, both in terms of its regional role 
and Syria’s concern about public opinion.  Moreover the administration recognised Syria’s 
importance to the viability of peace in the Middle East more than any preceding US 
government; as a result it was anxious to involve the Syrians rather than marginalise them, 
and gave more consideration to Syrian demands as issues that needed to be resolved if there 
was any chance of achieving peace.   
 
On the Syrian side, both American rhetoric and actions instilled in them a greater level of 
trust.  The greater attempt on the part of the US to be and also appear more even-handed in 
its approach to both Arabs and Israelis had an impact.  Notably the withholding of the US 
loan to Israel due to continued settlement building, despite the negative political fall-out in 
the US, demonstrated to the Syrians the seriousness of US intentions for a comprehensive 
peace in the region.  In a rare vote of confidence in the US, Asad stated to Baker:  
 
We have come to the conclusion that you are strong and decisive, you say what you 
mean, and this makes us believe that you are a straightforward man.  It’s important 
that a person be frank and direct, whether or not we agree.  When these qualities are 
there, even if there is no agreement, there is trust.597 
 
And although the ‘special relationship’ was never in danger, it was notable that improved 
US-Syrian cooperation coincided with a nadir in America’s relations with Israel under 
Shamir.  It was one of the rare occasions during negotiations since1973 when the US 
acknowledged that Israel was displaying the greatest intransigence of all the parties, rather 
than laying the blame with the Arabs, and was prepared to make this public if Israel 
continued to obfuscate.598  The lack of overt bias despite America’s historical and 
unavoidable connections with Israel, demonstrated that firstly, relative impartiality could be 
achieved by a US administration - Israel’s opposition to US demands for an end to 
settlement construction did not demonstrate that the Bush-Baker camp was favouring the 
Arabs, as some in Israel interpreted (the settlements were, after all, in contravention of the 
Geneva Convention and thus the US were merely upholding international law), but rather the 
extent of American leniency towards Israel in the past.  This shift in America’s approach as 
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mediators also could be seen as a significant change from Kissinger’s diplomacy.  And 
secondly, greater even-handedness had a significant impact on Syria’s responsiveness to US 
efforts and willingness to seriously invest in the peace process.599 
 
Under the Clinton administration, however, relations between Syria and the US took a 
downturn.  Syria maintained in the aftermath of the failed negotiations that they were 
satisfied with the US’ role as mediators.  Muallem described them as ‘moderators, brokers, 
even partners...’ in the talks.600  He highlighted the instrumental role of the US in bringing 
both sides back to the table after the COS I talks had failed, by drafting and pushing forward 
the Aims and Principles document outlining security arrangements.601  Without this talks 
would not have resumed by June 1995.  Thus there clearly were times when the US as 
mediators sought to push the peace process forward and without their input it would not 
have progressed.602  However, several aspects to America’s approach to mediating, which 
then affected Syrian perceptions of the US role, can be identified. 
 
Firstly, there was an important change between the Bush and Clinton administrations.  With 
the Bush administration, the relationship with Israel was based on the traditional ties 
between both states over the decades and was largely a political connection.  Under the 
Clinton administration, the relationship with Israel was deeper.  There were greater personal 
connections among the staff, many of whom on the American side were of a Jewish 
background.603  This was particularly the case in the State Department, which had the 
greatest involvement in the peace process and greatest interaction with the Arab parties.  The 
administration also depended a lot more on political support from the Jewish American 
community.604  And finally, there was simply greater affinity and personal bonds between 
the leaders.  Clinton developed a close personal friendship with Rabin – indeed over the 
years Clinton came to see Rabin as a mentor, even a ‘father figure’, and communicated with 
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him over even the smallest details of the peace process.605  Apart from regular meetings – 
Rabin would meet with Clinton face-to-face twice yearly – the two leaders were in telephone 
contact regularly.  This was nothing like his relations with the Arab counterparts, whom he 
rarely met and usually conveyed information to via the intermediaries in negotiations, his 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Dennis Ross from the State Department.606   
 
However, America’s close alliance with another state, and the racial or religious background 
of its staff alone cannot be cited as reason enough for the continued grudge between the US 
and Syria.  It was the perceived impact on US conduct as mediators that caused friction.  The 
pace of the talks seemed to be determined by Israel’s wishes, with little intervention by the 
US when talks were postponed or stalled.  Israel was not adequately challenged by the US 
when introducing new elements to the negotiations that were not a part of the originally 
agreed terms, such as early warning systems on Mount Hermon and the suggestion to put 
full withdrawal to a popular referendum.  And when Israel engaged in acts of belligerence in 
the region, they were not condemned by the US nor was pressure placed on Israel to desist.  
Indeed, the Syrians were acutely aware that much of Israel’s firepower was sponsored by the 
US.  In answer to the question posed – ‘have the Americans been true to their role as honest 
broker?’, Muallem replied: 
 
This is difficult to answer. Of course you cannot compare the Americans’ relations 
with Syria with their relations with Israel, but at least we are satisfied with their 
role.607 
 
The last words are those of a diplomat, bearing in mind that Walid Muallem had been the 
Syrian Ambassador to the US; it is the first reply that, in its ambivalence, is more indicative 
of the Syrian view of the US as mediators.   
 
Secondly, there is no evidence that the new administration did recognise the value of Syria’s 
role in the peace process in the same way that Baker expressed in his memoirs.  
Unsurprisingly, given the regular extent of Israeli-American communication, the US were 
‘mindful’ and highly sympathetic to the constraints faced by Rabin at home in moving 
forward on the peace process, feeling that he had done much to change his views, whereas in 
                                               
605
 Cobban, Peace Talks, 56 – citing David Remnick, quoting Eitan Haber; also see Rabinovich, Waging 
Peace, 49, who describes it as a ‘warm personal relationship’. 
606
 Ibid. 
607
 Muallem, Fresh Light, 91 
 244 
contrast it felt Syria ‘was not doing as much reframing’ of their views towards Israel608 –this, 
despite the fact that the ideas for a constructive plan to work with and calls for greater 
urgency had come from the Syrian side, as opposed to the frequent stalling from Israel.  
Furthermore, Asad’s response to Rabin’s hypothetical offer, in which he insisted on 
demanding first withdrawal and then discussions on normalisation as was agreed from the 
outset, was described as ‘an unimaginative and unyielding response’ by Christopher.609  He 
went on to note that Asad had made a ‘new, highly controversial demand’ for a return to the 
pre-1967 Syrian-Israeli border – a demand that in fact Syria had always maintained during 
any negotiations.610  Exemplifying the contrasting perceptions that the US held of Israel and 
Syria, Christopher expressed his view that: 
 
Rabin had shown himself to be a visionary by allowing me to present Assad with the 
possibility of a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.  Assad, however, appeared 
paralyzed in the face of this historic opportunity.611 
 
This assessment fails to acknowledge the additional requests by Israel to station troops on 
the Golan even after withdrawal, and the fact that Israel’s 'breakthrough' offer of withdrawal 
was nothing new.  It had in fact been the only reason why Syria had agreed to participate in 
talks in the first place.   
 
Thus with the Clinton administration there was a return to the perceptions of Syrian 
intransigence and obstructionism that were held by Kissinger and held sway with the US 
administrations of old.  The Bush administration had been interested in recognising Syria’s 
efforts by agreeing to reassess the sanctions that had been placed on Syria since 1967 and 
1979, and to potentially reconsider Syria’s position on the US list of state sponsors of 
terrorism.612  In contrast, no such moves were contemplated by the Clinton administration.  
The lack of reciprocal movement by the US towards Syria under Clinton was noted by 
Muallem: 
 
There was...pressure in that our relations with the United States never progressed 
during the four or five years of this process; to the contrary, we were kept on the 
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American “blacklist,” and Congress tried to adopt additional measures this Summer 
[of 1997].613 
 
The overall impact of the negotiation process on US-Syrian relations then was negative.  
From a positive start under the Bush administration, Syria’s confidence in the US as neutral 
mediators deteriorated under Clinton.614  This continued throughout the stagnant years of the 
Likud government.  While there was a window of opportunity remaining for peace during 
Ehud Barak’s Labour government in 1998, continued Israeli leaks and the perception that the 
US was not taking the Syrian-Israeli track seriously enough exacerbated Syria’s lack of trust 
in the US.  Syria’s disdain for the American approach rose to a peak during the 
Shephardstown talks, which ended dismally without resolution despite a last-gasp attempt by 
the Americans to respond to what had been significant overtures for peace from Syria.615 
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6.5 Explaining the Failure of the Madrid Process 
 
Why is there a need to understand the reasons or explanations behind the failure of the peace 
process in the mid 1990s, and how does this build into the argument of the thesis?  Firstly, 
the failure of the talks had a significant impact on US-Syrian relations.  It generated lasting 
impressions on both sides, which meant that the rare opportunity for reconciliation after the 
Gulf crisis was not capitalised on, and instead further seeds of mistrust were sown for the 
rest of the decade.   
 
Given the above, it is therefore important to understand what caused the talks to fail in the 
first place, as an underlying cause behind continuing ambivalence in US-relations.  One of 
the outcomes of the talks was a perception on the American side that Syria had not done 
enough to cooperate during negotiations, and had demonstrated inflexibility; while on the 
Syrian side the old view that the US had not done enough to assist the Arabs in resolving 
their grievances, and had been too gentle with Israel, was reaffirmed.  Both sides felt that 
these factors to some extent contributed to the lack of progress; which of their policies were 
most significant in obstructing the peace process?  And what role did Israel and other 
external factors play in the breakdown of talks? 
 
Furthermore, to return to a key hypothesis in the introduction of the thesis, an analysis of the 
failures is necessary to gauge the extent to which ideology was an influential factor in 
Syria’s negotiations.  And if Syria was motivated, or restrained, by ideological principles, 
how far did such a position adversely affect the talks?  History had shown that to mend 
relations with Israel automatically improved a state’s relations with the US, and by default 
afforded it greater acceptance into the international ‘community’.  Egypt, and latterly Jordan 
and the Palestinian authority, had learnt this lesson.  This, no small incentive for an isolated 
and economically struggling state, was at last a tangible reality for Syria after the Gulf crisis 
– was it something Syria was willing to jeopardise for the sake of ideology? 
 
Many analysts have argued that finally, after years of inflexibility, Syria followed a realist 
model and was ready to forego its ideological principles in order to regain its territory, 
establish peace on its border and gain international prestige through greater ties with the US.  
Syria, it is argued from this position, was more willing than ever to sign peace with Israel 
and thus was at its most cooperative. 
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However, this of course serves to deflect responsibility for failed talks away from Syria, and 
points the torchlight on the US and Israel.  Hence much of the analysis coming from the US 
and Israel retains the argument that Syria was indeed still motivated by ideology, and thus 
was intransigent and unrealistic in its demands.616  Syria is portrayed by some American and 
Israeli accounts as not ready to move on, fearful of progress if a deal became unavoidable. 
Syria’s historical attachment to ideology and domestic concerns about regime legitimacy are 
thus cited as having obstructed the talks.   
 
Which of these accounts hold more accuracy?  Indeed should the two positions of realism 
and ideology be separated in this way?  The outcome of this analysis will have significant 
implications for the key arguments laid out at the start of this thesis, and will be crucial in an 
assessment of how ideology affects the foreign policy of a state, and Syria in particular.  Six 
reasons for the failure of talks are analysed below. 
 
6.5.1 Syria As Spoilers and the Arabs’ Separate Paths to Peace 
Syrian intransigence is one of the oft-cited reasons for the failure of any talks Syria is 
involved in.  Syria’s singularity was especially striking given that by 1996, all the other 
Arabs parties who had been at war with Israel had opted for peace.  Given that Syria was the 
only state refusing to sign, it seemed obvious to outsiders, and was indeed intimated by 
several key figures involved in the negotiation process, that Syria was the culprit behind the 
failed talks.617   
 
And indeed the Oslo Accords, rather than being welcomed by the Syrians, came as a heavy 
blow to them.  The Syrians expressed their disappointment by stating that they were ‘neither 
opposed to nor supportive’618 of the Oslo accords – diplomatic speak for dissatisfaction at an 
outcome.  In reality, the Syrians were said to be ‘furious’.619  They were aware that the 
accord between the Palestinians and Israel effectively legitimised the normalisation of 
relations between Israel and the rest of the Arab world and as a result, as Shlaim noted, there 
appeared to be ‘no longer a compelling reason for the Arab states to continue to reject 
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[Israel]’.620  Worse still, for Syria, it appeared to vindicate Egypt’s much maligned policy in 
the 1970s of being the first among the Arab nationalists to recognise Israel.  With the 
Palestinians, the one group in the region with most right to be aggrieved by Israel, seemingly 
following Egypt’s path, Syria was even further isolated than it had been after the talks in the 
1970s.  As Shlaim stated at the time, the result of this wider mood of acceptance of Israel 
was that ‘the rules of the game in the entire Middle East have radically changed’.621 
 
From the US perspective, the Oslo Accords in fact increased the possibility of progress as it 
placed pressure on other parties to follow suit.  Thus inability to cooperate or compromise 
put the Syrians in an especially unfavourable light when compared with their Palestinian 
counterparts for whom Syria had always claimed to speak up for.  Syria’s unease about the 
breakthrough in the other tracks has been interpreted as resentment that others had achieved 
peace first, and an interest in continued conflict for ideological and domestic political 
reasons.622 
 
However, Syria’s opposition to the Oslo Accords was not purely because it had scuppered 
Syria's policy of obstruction as was suspected by the US, but because it undermined the hard 
won premise of the Madrid talks that the goal should be a comprehensive settlement.623  It 
was this, not conflict with Israel at all costs, that motivated Syria. The Israeli-Palestinian 
deal immediately put Syria in a position similar to the one it had faced in the mid-70s when 
Egypt moved at a much faster pace, and its compromises undercut Syria’s bargaining power.   
 
Moreover the notion that the Arabs would coordinate their strategies, to demonstrate to the 
US and Israel that divisive tactics to sell the Arabs short would not work, had been proven to 
be an empty promise.  The eagerness of other Arab parties to strike deals for less than they 
had initially demanded conveyed the impression that those demands were merely rhetorical 
– this in turn gave Israel less reason to cooperate fully and deliver concessions.  This had 
implications for all the Arab parties, not just the Palestinians.   
 
While it was not publicly expressed at the time, Syria’s suspicions about Israel’s bilateral 
deal with the Palestinians, and the fear that the latter had been too eager to sign what was not 
an equitable deal for the Arabs, was justified over time when the details of the deal 
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emerged.624  It emerged that Israel still retained full control over at least 75 per cent of 
Palestinian territory; only 3 per cent of land was being returned to Palestinian control, and 
these were areas that Israel were not interested in keeping anyway.625  The growing fear 
among many Palestinians was that they had not so much compromised as accepted defeat to 
the Israelis and Zionism.  As Rhynold explains: 
 
On the Palestinian side, the dominant narrative continued to view Zionism as a 
colonial movement.  This meant that peace, rather than being associated with justice, 
was associated with capitulation or at best pragmatism.626 
 
It was a fear shared by the Syrians, and thus their opposition to Oslo was also grounded in 
objective strategic concerns, not merely blind obstructionism.  These factors helped to 
undermine the foundations that had initially persuaded Syria to join the Madrid talks in the 
first place; Rabinovich agrees that after Oslo, the ‘prospects for an Israeli-Syrian agreement 
diminished’.627 
 
The notion that Syria was the more obstructionist party in negotiations is further countered 
by the number of Syrian concessions compared to Israel’s, and the fact that none of the 
numerous pauses in the peace process were attributable to Syria.  Baker acknowledged that it 
was Asad's acceptance of the Bush-Baker initiative that induced Shamir to relent and agree 
to attend the Madrid Conference628  whereas Shamir was acknowledged as ‘obstinate and 
unyielding’.629  Brent Scowcroft was reported to have thought that any initiative would fail 
because ‘Israel was the main stumbling block to peace’.630  Certainly in the early stages, the 
US relied on Asad – being the only one who mirrored the Israelis as a difficult negotiator – 
to make Israel rethink its strategy and avoid being blamed for scuppering the peace 
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process.631  Much of the perception of Syrian intransigence relates to its insistence on Israeli 
withdrawal to the pre-war boundaries of the Golan.  It is true that on this point Syria was not 
willing to compromise, but withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied during the 1967 War 
was the one key condition Syria had maintained since that war.  While Syria could not 
control the fate of the Palestinians, it could still hold firm on principles relating to its own 
territory.  According to Aaron Miller, the former Deputy Special Middle East coordinator of 
the US State Department, it was not necessarily Syrian ‘intransigence’ on this demand that 
was the obstacle in negotiations; he stated that one of the problems with the Madrid 
negotiations was:  
 
Our inability to understand what would be required to reach an agreement.  When 
Asad said 100 per cent [withdrawal from the Golan] he didn’t mean 99 per cent.  If 
he wanted 100 per cent, instead of talking him out of it, which is what we tried to 
do…we should accept [it] and change his view of the process.632 
 
6.5.2 Delays 
Peace talks do need time, but they also need momentum.  Too many delays allowed other 
events to have an impact on proceedings, and allowed old suspicions to be aroused.  
Rabinovich notes that the delays came from the Syrian side.  He states that during the three 
and a half years of negotiations, Asad acted as if ‘time was no constraint’ whereas ‘Rabin 
was insisting on a deal that would be completed in several years’.  Rabinovich also writes 
that Muallem complained that Peres after Rabin was ‘too bold and swift’.633   
 
The first comparison between Asad and Rabin is at odds with the account provided by 
numerous sources,634 including his own (later) admission that Asad ‘too cared about swift 
negotiations’;635 in contrast Rabin is reported to have been cautious and slow-moving.  
Overall there were three periods of delays and procrastination attributable to the Israelis 
between 1992 and 1995: In December of 1992 after Rabin expelled the Palestinians; 
September 1993 when Rabin wanted to be able to digest the deal with the Palestinians, and 
again in January 1994 after signing peace with Jordan.  These factors prompted Sharaa to 
note: ‘it seems that the Israelis have not made up their mind firmly, and haven’t committed 
themselves to a comprehensive peace’.636  
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Although the Syrians too were capable of drawing out negotiations, in large part because of 
Asad’s meticulous approach, on this occasion there was less need for delay on their part.  
Importantly there was little ambiguity about their stated goals (full Israeli withdrawal from 
the Golan), and as such they were far more eager to see the implementation of the first stage 
of talks sooner.  Indeed in a meeting with Warren Christopher, Asad stated that he wanted 
the withdrawal to be completed within six months of the talks.637 
 
With regards to Syria’s response to Peres, the accounts from all sides corroborate the view 
that Peres preferred to move at a fast pace.  Muallem explains: 
 
[Peres] was in a hurry – he wanted to enter the elections with the Syrian-Israeli 
agreement in his hand.  He wanted to “fly high and fast,” as he used to say.  I used to 
tell the Israeli counterpart that it is important to fly but it is also important to know 
when and where to land... 
 
Thus the apparent discrepancy between accounts of Asad’s urgency on the one hand, and 
hesitancy on the other, can be explained by the chronology of events.  It is unsurprising that 
he reacted differently to Israel’s contrasting approaches under Rabin and Peres.  According 
to Martha Kessler, CIA officer and the US liaison at the peace talks, one of the problems in 
the negotiations was that at this stage there was ‘a huge rush, because the Clinton and Israeli 
governments were coming to the end of their terms’.638  Ultimately, Peres’ urgency when he 
took over amounted to little since he did not wait for the peace process to take its course and 
called elections within three months.  This did a great deal to halt the peace process that he 
had sought to speed up. 
 
Apart from the deliberate suspension of talks, there were also unproductive phases of the 
talks that did much to delay proceedings and diminish the appetite for cooperation.  In 
particular, the military level discussions (COS I and II) added to the delays, particularly COS 
I which was widely seen as a failure.  The failure can be put down to four main reasons: 
firstly, the military leaders had no authority to make final decisions that had such weighty 
political implications - the exclusion of the political leaders was therefore ineffective and 
rendered the C.O.S talks futile. Secondly, according to both Muallem and Rabinovich, the 
heads of their respective negotiating teams, the Israeli side went into these talks ill prepared, 
with Barak having only four days to prepare for what was being described as the break-
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through meeting.639  Rabinovich stated that this was because the meeting was ‘held almost 
spontaneously’,640 (although why it should have been arranged in such a way when the 
request for the meeting had been initiated by the Americans on behalf of the Israelis remains 
unclear).  Thirdly, it appeared that Barak had his sights set on a political career.  Not only 
was he due to retire at the end of the month anyway, but his future aims were influencing his 
demands during negotiations as he tried to calculate how the talks would impact on his 
election campaign.641  And fourthly, according to Dennis Ross, the premise of the talks were 
flawed because they had differing goals of what they sought to achieve – Israel only wanted 
to lay out agreed aims, while the Syrian side also wanted to establish agreed upon 
principles.642  This divergence prevented movement forward with C.O.S I, which was 
postponed in order to re-engage the political delegations.  COS II talks were then pushed to 
May 1995.  The Syrian side perceived this as having been a deliberate delaying tactic from 
the Israelis since it was known all along that ‘officers on their own cannot reach a 
decision’.643  It meant that almost a whole year had lapsed since the Israeli-Jordanian 
agreement before Syria and Israel’s leaders met again to resume talks.   
 
As for the US, they also played a part in these delays.  According to Cobban, in 1994 
Clinton was determined not to stop at the Jordanian-Israel treaty but was impatient to move 
forward on the Syrian front, implying a sense of urgency for Syria’s side of the talks.644  
Rabinovich also implies the US gave greater importance to the Syrian-Israeli track.645  But 
while Clinton did pay a visit to Damascus immediately after the Jordanian-Israeli peace 
treaty, these assessments do not seem to tally with two points: firstly, Clinton willingly 
surrendered a lot of the initiative in setting the agenda and timetable for negotiations to the 
Israelis.  He was new to the complexities of the peace process and in large part leant on the 
experience of Rabin.  Secondly, the US facilitated numerous delays on the Syrian-Israeli 
track at Israel’s behest – when they did seek to hasten the process on Israel’s part they 
always acquiesced with Israel’s calls for postponement or suggested format of talks.  Thus 
even if the US sensed the Syrian track should be given more attention, particularly under 
Rabin, and notably after the deal with Jordan in 1994, it did not put much pressure on Israel 
to comply. 
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6.5.3 Ambiguity and Dispute over Terms of Agreement 
The ‘Aims and Principles’ document drawn up in most part by the Americans during the 
shuttle diplomacy of May 1995, was riddled with ambiguities.  Given that this document was 
essential in salvaging the talks after the deadlock of the COS I discussions, and was to be the 
main foundation for discussions on security arrangements, this embedded ambiguity would 
prove to be a major problem for the peace process and was bound to resurface as a stumbling 
block further along in the process.  The ‘aims’ part of the document was designed to reduce 
the possibility of surprise attacks, border friction and the danger of large-scale invasion or 
war – this chiefly addressed the concerns of the Israelis.  Meanwhile the ‘principles’ part of 
the document stipulated that security had to be guaranteed equally for all parties (not at the 
expense of another), that the security arrangements had to be mutual and reciprocal, and in 
respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity.  This acknowledged some of Syria’s main 
concerns.646   
 
The first problem with the document arose with the ‘principles’ section – all of this was 
uncontroversial, except a caveat in principle two, which suggested that if equality in terms of 
security arrangements could not be achieved, then these would be addressed via 
modifications – in other words Syria could be expected to take on a greater share of the 
security requirements to satisfy Israel’s concerns.  This partly depended on where the final 
line of withdrawal would come to – something which was not yet agreed upon.  Thus 
important parts of the document were predicated on ambiguities, creating further confusion. 
 
Such ambiguity aided Israel’s strategy – indeed this was characteristic of all Rabin’s public 
communications with regards to the extent of Israeli withdrawal.647  The Syrians had been 
consistently clear that they would accept nothing less than full withdrawal and were not 
interested in any further interim agreements; Israel’s demands on the other hand were less 
clear-cut from the beginning, and sprawled into more long-term aims concerning security, 
economic openness and normalisation, all of which were harder to define and achieve in the 
short-term.   Moreover Israel wavered on what it was prepared to sacrifice – initially full 
withdrawal seemed a possibility to Rabin, but as he was pressed to commit to this he became 
increasingly swayed by the opposition this would incur among the Israeli public and all 
parties – left and right – in Israel.  Domestic politics was ever a constraint in Israel’s 
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decisions, and it produced volatility and unpredictability in the Israeli leadership.648  Thus 
the real extent of progress in negotiations was always in question. 
 
Why then did Syria display comparative eagerness to move forward when there was this 
level of uncertainty in Israel’s commitment? This can partly be explained by the success of 
Israel’s strategy, which was designed to allay both public fears and the suspicions of its 
Syrian counterparts.  Rabin avoided being so equivocal as to halt proceedings, and to then be 
blamed for the failure.  Moreover, Syria saw the initial acceptance by Israel to proceed on 
the basis of resolution 242 as a key success, and opted for a strategy in which they would 
hold Israel to this starting point.  Syria was therefore ready to call Israel’s bluff, knowing the 
ambiguity would have to be exposed at some point and that Israel would be responsible.   
 
A second problem with the document was related to the accuracy of assumptions that 
influenced the ‘Aims’ section of the document.  This section alluded to Israel’s concerns of 
possible attack, and it based its demands for normalisation on this.  However, Syria felt these 
concerns were an exaggeration of the reality.649  On two occasions while the talks were 
underway, Israel had engaged in major military operations, launching air and ground 
offensives on Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, without any state response by its Arab 
neighbours.  Based on precedent, the greatest threat of surprise attacks, of war or invasion in 
the region, came not from Syria but in fact Israel.  Muallem further highlighted Israel’s 
superiority ‘over any combination of Arab states’, arguing: 
 
They have nuclear bombs, the most advanced arms and technology.  American arms 
and supplies and technology are completely open to them.  Israel manufactures 60 
per cent of its needs in military equipment and is the fifth [biggest] arms exporter in 
the world.  Yet despite all this, they used to tell us they were afraid of Syria.  We did 
not believe this, and we kept asking ourselves the motive behind this exaggeration.650 
 
Syria also questioned Israel’s attempts to change the basic parameters of an agreement, 
which seemed to be written into the Aims and Principles document via the caveat permitting 
modifications to security agreements.  One such modification, the early-warning station on 
the Golan, was considered to be a clear infringement of sovereignty, ‘as if they wanted to 
spy on us from our own territory – and this in a situation of peace, not a situation of war’; 
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moreover Israel demanded that all the area reaching just south of Damascus should be 
demilitarised, which would have meant ‘you open the capital to them’.651 
Rabinovich offered an alternative account, that the reason why talks stalled was not because 
of Israel’s alterations in the terms of agreement, but Syria’s failure to deliver on Israel’s 
security conditions.  In his diaries Rabinovich quoted the following statement from Asad: 
 
“Many issues that constituted the elements of peace were still pending.  These issues 
include the elements of security and other elements, and all of them are basic.  The 
security issues might make the regained land something that is not worthwhile, and 
also might discount dignity and rights”.652  
 
Rabinovich interpreted this as an acknowledgment by Asad that Israel had fulfilled its side 
of the bargain (pertaining to land return) but Syria had not fulfilled its side pertaining to 
security issues.  It is true that Israel’s demands had not been met, more of which will be 
discussed shortly.  However, the notion that Israel had fulfilled its side of the bargain needs 
to be scrutinised here.   Firstly, the one key demand from Syria was full withdrawal from the 
Golan.  But the Israeli negotiating team spent much of its time trying to reframe its initial 
acceptance of this term, and trying to convince its public that no firm commitment had been 
made.  Secondly, even if Israel had given a firm (conditional) commitment to withdraw, then 
this was negated by two key points: a) Israel still sought an early-warning system and sought 
to situate Israeli troops on the Golan; b) whatever commitment Rabin had given became 
irrelevant when Israel proposed that it would have to be put to a national referendum in 
Israel – the negative outcome of which was predictable. 
 
What, then, of the security arrangements and issues surrounding normalisation referred to by 
Rabinovich, that were encapsulated in Israel’s ‘aims’ in the document, and which were 
indeed included in Syria’s own proposed terms at the start of the talks?  Though the talks 
never reached this stage of the ‘four-legged’ agenda, its inclusion on it has been cited as 
evidence that Syria was willing to forego its ideological enmity with Israel in return for 
peace and land.  But this is questionable since here too there was a dispute in the 
interpretation of this aim and the timing of its implementation.   
 
Firstly, Israel expected an end to the economic boycott of Israeli goods and businesses, and 
an opening up of borders to Israeli investment and tourism.  Israel sought comprehensive 
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recognition in political, diplomatic, economic and cultural terms.  Moreover Israel expected 
the change to be swift.  Syria refused to accommodate these expectations on two counts: 1) 
the Syrian public would not abide such a change: 
 
You can’t oblige [the public] to buy Israeli goods or visit Israel if they are not 
convinced that Israel has changed from being an enemy to a neighbour...we cannot 
be obliged to make the peace warm.653 
 
2) The timeframe was unrealistically fast, while complete openness would not be equitable 
for Syria’s economy:  
 
They wanted open borders, open markets for their goods and so on.  This would have 
had an obvious effect on our economy.  Our economic regulations are not against 
them; we do not open our markets to any country. 654   
 
For Israel’s part, the demands seemed realistic based on historical precedence, perhaps 
justifiably so, for these were the same terms that Sadat had almost unquestioningly accepted 
almost twenty years earlier.  For Syria, the same route was not an option – Sadat had 
sacrificed public opinion and Egypt’s autonomy in doing so, two core principles of Arab 
nationalist ideology.  It was not a sacrifice Syria was prepared to make, even in return for the 
Golan.655  Any deal had to fulfil Syria’s ideological criteria.  Thus on all four aspects of the 
agenda for peace talks, there was discrepancy between Syria and Israel’s expectations.  
Israel was not prepared to offer full withdrawal, and Syria was not prepared to offer full 
normalisation, and both states were driven by ideology – within both the regime and public 
opinion – in their policies. 
 
6.5.4 Leaks and Public Opinion 
As was outlined earlier, the leaks during negotiations on the Israeli side, and the subsequent 
inflaming of public opinion against the peace process had a significant impact on the 
outcome of the talks:  Firstly the leaks undermined Syrian confidence in the Israeli 
negotiators, due to the probability that the leaks came from someone present at the talks, and 
also the inability of the leaders to crackdown on those leaks seemed to indicate a lack of 
seriousness on their part – to what extent did the public outcry in fact play into Israel’s 
strategy?  It was notable that in other high level negotiations, for example for the Oslo 
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agreement, there had been no such leaks in the run-up to its announcement.656  There was 
thus a suspicion that whenever Israel was not enthusiastic about the terms of a deal 
undergoing negotiation, leaks of information would help to sabotage the deal.  Secondly, 
concern over public opinion was the main reason for Rabin’s regular requests for 
postponement in order to allow the Israeli public to ‘digest’ the developments in other tracks 
of the negotiations.  Thirdly, Peres’ early elections call, which ultimately broke off the talks, 
came on the back of Labour’s narrowing lead in the polls and increased support for the right-
wing Likud, as well as a calculation of how the public would react to a potential Syrian-
Israeli deal if it advanced before the elections.   
 
Given the apparent ease with which Egypt and later Jordan and the Palestinians were able to 
agree deals with Israel regardless of the popular view, why was the Syrian-Israeli track so 
susceptible to public opinion?  Firstly, while the Golan was a huge prize, particularly on a 
personal level for Asad under whose watch it was lost in the first place, Syria was not 
willing to cross public opinion in order to regain it.  This was in part connected to the 
precariousness of a minority regime, and thus domestic politics played some part in this.  
But also, the public were opposed to regaining land if the deal was not equitable and at the 
expense of the country’s dignity.  Particularly because previous peace treaties between other 
Arab states and Israel had fallen so far short of Arab demands, peace had now become 
synonymous with accepting defeat to Israel in the eyes of the Arab public.  Thus even if 
ideology had become an irrelevant factor in the eyes of the region’s leaders, this was not the 
case among the public.  When Baker was trying (and failed) to secure Syria’s agreement to 
an early proposal for the format of talks, he asked in frustration what Syria ‘had to lose’ in 
agreeing.  To this Asad gave the very telling reply: 
 
We will lose Arab domestic public opinion…they will know what is going on.  This 
would not only be adventurism, it would be a form of suicide.  It is one thing to 
adopt a suicidal policy if it brings benefits to the people, but it is truly foolhardy if 
there is no positive result.657 
 
This in many ways sums up the close connection between Syria’s adherence to ideological 
principles, and the role of its public opinion.  Asad was willing to be pragmatic, but 
pragmatic in his view was to stay close to public opinion in the Arab-Israeli conflict, because 
their ideology was also in Syria’s best interests.  And it was Syria’s adherence to ideology 
and unwillingness to compromise both Syria’s ideational and strategic interests, which then 
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tested Israeli public opinion and ideology, in a way in which no other Arab parties’ positions 
did during the Madrid talks. 
 
Israel’s intransigence was a winning formula against other Arab states who had discarded 
their own ideological policies.  But with Syria holding firm to its demands for full 
withdrawal before any conditions could be delivered, Israel’s leaders were forced to consider 
a level of compromise that had not been required of them previously.  Israeli public opinion 
became so exercised on the Syrian-Israeli track precisely because there was less Arab 
compliance as there had been on the other tracks.  Almost mirroring Syria’s adherence to 
ideology, there was a strong current of ideological fervour running deep not just in Israeli 
politics but also society; and there were red lines which neither the left or right of the Israeli 
public divide were willing to sacrifice.658  In the period of the COS II talks, a poll was 
conducted by Tel Aviv University’s Tami Steinmetz centre – 46.5% of Israelis objected to 
any withdrawal from the Golan, another 34.8% wanted only a partial withdrawal.659 
 
To deal with this opposition, Rabin had three elements to his approach to talks – ambiguity 
as mentioned above, secrecy and slow drawn-out talks.660  The first two were designed to put 
the public off the track of what agreements were being made, while the latter was supposed 
to help the public get used to small aspects of the agreement gradually.  Thus it was this fear 
of public opinion that contributed to the delays that did so much to undermine the process.  
While in Syria, the fear of alienating public opinion was tied to a dual fear of revolution and 
loss of ideological credibility, Israel’s fear of losing public opinion was tied to a fear of 
losing power at the ballot box.  As Muallem states: 
 
Peres’ decision to call early elections must have depended on pressures from within 
his own party, because the margin between Labor and Likud had started to narrow in 
the polls.661 
 
Later Muallem stated: 
 
Israel believed that you can push a button to make peace warm, to direct Syrian 
popular attitudes from a state of war to a state of peace.  This is not logical, 
especially when it is rare to find a household in Syria that has not lost someone on 
the battlefield.  It is always necessary to educate and inform the people.662 
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However, the approach used in Israel was not gradual.  Rather everything was done in 
secrecy, and finally when negotiations were at a more advanced stage, there were leaks 
being made to the public without giving the government a chance to prepare the ground; and 
when they did via Peres’ statements, it was very sudden and too much for the public to 
digest.  This evoked even more public emotion and hostility to talks.  
 
6.5.5 Individuals versus Political System 
It would be easy to attribute certain periods of progress or deadlock to the personalities of 
the different leaders.  While Shamir comes in for a lot of criticism in US reports, Rabin is 
portrayed as being very compliant; thus the peace process is widely seen to have progressed 
in large part because of Rabin.  It is true that the leaders did have an impact on the direction 
of negotiations, but whether the impact was substantive or merely procedural is debatable.  
Firstly, the different leaders often had different priorities or views on how to proceed with 
negotiations – Shamir was unconducive to any peace settlement that would require 
compromise of any territory by Israel.  In contrast Rabin indicated that he agreed with a land 
for peace approach (thus a substantive change) but favoured dealing with each track 
separately and one at a time.  And even having decided this, he changed his view, switching 
from the Syria first policy which he started out with, to prioritising the Palestinian track.663  
Peres conversely favoured dealing with all the tracks simultaneously (but still bilaterally).664  
Arguably this was closer to the notion of a comprehensive peace settlement envisioned by 
the Syrians; but this was merely a procedural impact, not a substantive one.  Moreover by 
this stage a number of the parties on the Arab side had already concluded deals with Israel 
and the incentive for joint bargaining and consultation was running thin on the ground.   
 
But regardless of the leader, what ultimately made it almost impossible for Israel to be 
flexible was a) the government deemed itself to be so constrained by the weight of public 
opinion, and b) given this was the case, the high number of leaks from the Israeli 
government to the press meant that a number of opportunities for progress failed because of 
Israeli public opposition.665  The leaks almost certainly were designed to have that effect.  
 
Looking beyond the Madrid talks, many have agreed, including the Syrian leadership at the 
time, that the reason for the lack of peace talks between 1996 and 2000 was largely due to 
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the right-wing nature of the Likud party and its leader Netanyahu,666 Muallem memorably 
stated that under Likud, ‘it was a dialogue of the deaf’.667  Certainly Likud’s obstruction to 
negotiations is particularly apparent when compared with its predecessors, and its successor 
Ehud Barak’s resumption of talks when he came to power in May 1999.668   
 
Thus of course, individuals play an important role, particularly in a process that becomes, by 
its secretive nature, very personalised.  But their overall impact needs to be weighed against 
the norms and the systemic factors that create consistent conditions and obstacles, limiting 
all the leaders’ decision-making options in the first place.  For example Cobban, writing in 
the early days of Barak’s leadership, attributes too much causation to the agency of 
individual leaders.  Netanyahu, she argues, derailed what she presents as an otherwise 
smooth and fairly successful process.  She makes the argument that the peace process merely 
needed to be picked up from where it was left off under Peres and it had every chance of 
being successful.  But it would be worth remembering that it was Peres who suspended talks 
after the two bus bombings in Israel (carried out by Palestinians); while it was Rabin before 
him who refused to move forward with Syrian talks after the Palestinian and Jordanian deals 
for fear of aggravating public criticism.  The embedded ambiguity in the aims and principles 
of the talks was already creating problems under Rabin.  And indeed even after Netanyahu, 
Barak continued some of the most controversial policies of his predecessor such as 
settlement construction, and often turned to populist policies, despite his initial rhetoric that 
had suggested otherwise.669   
 
From this we can see that there are evidently some constant restraints on Israeli political 
decision-making especially in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which transcend the 
different leaders.  The instability and uncertainty of Israel’s political system, and the regular 
turnaround of leaders, makes it difficult for them to pursue the issue of peace consistently 
without resorting to populist tactics to curry favour with the Israeli electorate.670  The 
assassination of Rabin was a potent warning to future Israeli leaders not to give anything 
away in a compromise with the Arabs.   
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Israel’s political system ultimately influenced both substantive and procedural aspects of the 
negotiations.  The temporaneous nature of the terms and strategies on the Israeli side 
generated uncertainty for the future of any settlement being negotiated, and also placed 
Israel’s interlocutors in doubt as to how to proceed.  And this then contributed to a lack of 
trust between the parties, an important component in any such negotiations.  This lack of 
trust due to the internal uncertainty over Israel’s government could be seen even during the 
peak period of negotiations.671   
 
Of course Israel’s democratic system cannot plausibly be seen as a reason behind the failure 
of the talks.  Public debate, regular elections and political accountability, which were all 
demonstrated during the negotiations process in Israel in marked contrast to Syria, affect the 
politics of all open societies.  However, it is worth pointing out that Israel is unique in the 
polarised nature of its politics in the realm of foreign policy.  In almost all other examples of 
democratic systems, there exists a broad consensus across party lines when it comes to the 
major foreign policy decisions, precisely because policies in this area are more long-term, 
and more may be at stake, particularly if it involves issues of international war or peace.   
Time is needed to see through a policy and not render the efforts of each outgoing 
government futile.  Where there are changes to a foreign policy, the changes are phased in 
over a long period of time.  In most cases where negotiations seeking resolution to conflict 
are underway, they are continued by the incoming government.  The outcome may still be 
greatly affected by changes in personnel (the Bush to Clinton transition is a good example of 
this), but the overriding policy goal tends to remain the same.672  
 
Secondly, the potential swing in Israeli policy is greater due to the volatility of Knesset 
membership.  Proportional representation, and the regular need for a coalition of many 
parties in order to form a government  means the Israeli government is inherently weak in 
comparison with single-party governments in other democracies.  As a result of the 
fluctuating personnel, and the possibility for what might be described as hard-line, even 
radical politicians, to ascend to power is higher than in most places.  This, in addition to the 
ideological inflexibility of individual leaders and lack of political will, often renders the 
pursuit of a long-term and complex foreign policy change as futile; and when it is pursued, it 
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lacks the momentum and continuity needed to make it viable.  Such systemic factors on the 
Israeli side had a great impact on the talks.673 
 
6.5.6 Conflict 
In early 1996, Palestinian radicals opposed to the Oslo Accords carried out bomb attacks on 
Israeli military and civilian targets.  Peres abruptly suspended his team’s participation in 
talks, and unable to further act against the Palestinians he followed this up by a series of 
attacks against Lebanon known as ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’; shortly afterwards Peres 
was defeated in the general election.674  The fall-out from the conflict led to a sharp 
deterioration in relations between not just Syria and Israel, but also Syria and the US.  The 
first question to ask is: how did this combustion between Israel and the Palestinians, 
contribute to a breakdown in talks between Israel and Syria?  
 
Cobban’s explanation can be contested on two counts.  Firstly, she argues that Peres 
suspended talks on the Syrian track because of pressure from his party to refocus on the 
Palestinian track.675  The reasoning is highly improbable given that Israel suspended all 
talks, and its response was not to resume talks with the Palestinians but to take military 
action against the Palestinians and Lebanon.  In reality Peres had just called an early 
election, and any deal with the Arabs would have faced major opposition from the Israeli 
public.676  Secondly Cobban argues that Syria also terminated talks as it thought the attacks 
against Lebanon and the international conference against terrorism were aimed at the 
Syrians, and because there was ‘no reassurance to the contrary’ conveyed by Washington to 
Damascus.677   
 
This is a typical self interest-based explanation.  But there is no evidence to suggest that 
such assurances would have placated Syria’s anger at Israel’s use of force against its 
neighbours, nor is it evident that it was only concerns for Syria’s own security that angered 
the Syrians.  Israel’s assault on Lebanon was not only construed as an indirect threat to Syria 
(although that is also true), but also demonstrated Israel’s continued belligerence in the 
region in Syria’s eyes.  When assessing the history of Syria’s reactions to such events, it is 
apparent that Israel’s use of military action – even if not directly targeting and affecting 
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Syria – has always been enough to thwart Syrian engagement in any regional diplomacy.678  
Most accounts continue to seek motives of self-interest in Syria’s refusal to condemn the 
attacks, or expel Hamas from its headquarters in Damascus.  However, Lesch’s explanation 
is more credible: 
 
This is where Syria’s traditional role at the vanguard of Arab nationalism and the 
rejectionist anti-Israel front and its oft-stated commitment to the Palestinian cause 
possibly hampered its ability to break out from this self-professed paradigm...679 
 
Thus Syria’s anger was not only an expression of its own state interests, as Cobban implies, 
but a reflection of Syria’s continued adherence to ideological principles applied to the entire 
region.  In turn it had a significant impact on its relations with the US, not least because the 
US was always seen to be too tepid in its condemnation of Israel’s actions. 
 
The second question to be asked is: given that the Palestinian attacks certainly contributed to 
the ending of talks, to what extent were they the most important factor in the breakdown of 
the Madrid talks after five years of trying? 
 
Numerous accounts in academia, policy and the media world have cited the attacks of 1996 
as the most significant factor that killed off the talks.680  Thus the Arabs in general, the 
Palestinians in particular, and the Syrians by default, were to blame for the eventual failure 
of talks.  If it had not been for this event, Peres would not have suspended the talks, 
Netanyahu would not have been voted into power, the US would have applied more pressure 
on Israel to compromise for a final settlement with Syria. 
 
While the attacks undoubtedly had an immediate short-term and dramatic impact on the 
talks, it would be simplistic to cite them as the only cause.  The usual balancing between 
short-term and long-term factors needs to be adopted, as in any historical assessment.  In this 
case, it would be just as possible to point to what a number of scholars have argued were the 
inherent or structural flaws of the Oslo accords;681 or indeed it would be possible to point to 
Israel’s continued illegal construction of settlements; both of which could be seen as driving 
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factors behind the Palestinian attacks.  Moreover, as I have sought to do in the above 
analysis, it is important to consider the ways in which the peace process on the Syrian-Israeli 
track had already been undermined and suffered a number of set-backs which exposed the 
fragility of the process and the wavering political will.  Prior to the summoning of the 
Madrid conference Israel had been under no pressure since 1973 to enter negotiations with 
Syria and to withdraw from the Golan – certainly not militarily, nor domestically from its 
own public, and not diplomatically from the US either.  It was not Israel who had called for a 
return to negotiations after the Gulf War; indeed on the Syrian-Israeli track it could be 
argued that Israel had the most to lose by cooperating.  Given this was the case, the 1996 
attacks which suspended the talks had in fact provided Israel with a reprieve, saving it from 
having to withdraw from the Golan and from defying its public opinion.  Thus to see the 
flare-up of conflict between Israel and the Arabs as initiating the breakdown of the talks is a 
flawed analysis.  Indeed Rabinovich concedes that the peace process was already receding 
by the time Rabin was assassinated.682 
 
What the renewed conflict did do, however, was to produce an altered set of conditions that 
had a significant impact on future events and developments.  Other actors, particularly 
Hamas, previously marginal to the theatre of the Madrid talks, now came to the fore. This 
pushed Syria closer to Hamas in its objectives, despite the difference between their 
respective secular and Islamist characters.   
 
                                               
682
 Rabinovich, Waging Peace,  70-1. 
 265 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The above analysis allows us to assess the role of ideology in Syria’s foreign policy more 
closely and how this affects its relations with the US.  There are two arguments on opposite 
ends that need to be addressed.  The first is that Syria remained driven by ideology and as a 
result was unchanging, intransigent, unwilling to make compromises and was therefore at 
fault for the lack of progress when the talks broke down.  I have sought to demonstrate in the 
above analysis that this was not the case and that while there were red lines that Syria was 
not willing to cross even for the sake of a momentous peace agreement, it was not wholly 
inflexible where Israel showed it too was willing to compromise.  It would certainly be 
inaccurate to describe Syria as being obstructionist simply because it held on to its core 
principles (of which there were relatively few).  In many cases Syria attempted to facilitate 
further progress and speed in the negotiations.   
 
A second argument contends that since Syria was open to striking a deal with Israel, it was 
in fact willing to abandon ideology for the sake of regaining its territory and establishing 
closer links with the US.  Thus Syria’s decisions are explained by materialist factors.  
Cobban states that Israel’s conflict with Syria is ‘a classic political-military conflict between 
two established states’, unlike the Israeli-Palestinian case, which involves issues of national 
identity, national values and non-military solutions.683  However, while the negotiations may 
have served to portray the dispute between the two states to be merely territorial, the 
hostility was in reality deeper than that.  The enmity was and is visceral, rooted in history, 
memory, perceptions as well as material factors.  Both sides wanted ‘peace’ of a sort, but 
there was no great interest on either side to seriously resolve the ideological clash.   
 
Some have highlighted the fact that Syria was at least willing to contemplate normalisation 
of relations with Israel, something that had been unthinkable at any other stage of the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  But notably the ‘peace’ Syria was prepared to offer the Israelis in return was 
not spelt out.  On this matter Sharaa stated: ‘how can such a desirable objective logically be 
realized without eliminating occupation and restoring legitimate rights?684  It was for this 
reason that Syria was adamant to deal first and only with territorial issues, and showed little 
enthusiasm for the normalisation that Israel sought.   
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For Israel’s part, it sought all the other trappings of peace to benefit its own security and 
economy, but could not countenance returning the Golan, not just because of strategic 
reasons but also an ideological belief that it rightly belonged to Israel.  Indeed, if Syria’s 
policy was not in large degree shaped by its ideology, it is likely there would have been 
greater cooperation, and sooner, on other issues such as security, distribution of resources, 
arms control, and economic integration, if it was aware that Israel would be more willing to 
withdraw from the Golan as a result.  Egypt’s example of a state discarding the constraints 
of ideology provides a comparable case of state behaviour when strategic self-interests 
trump ideological principles.  However, for Syria, as long as the conditions upon which its 
ideology was founded were still in place, ideology continued to be relevant.  Even before the 
talks broke down, Asad (referring to Israel, and possibly implicating the US as well) stated: 
 
I believe that they want a dark future for us…I believe that the long-term goal of the 
others is to cancel what is called the Arabs, what is called Arabism…I mean 
cancelling our feelings as a nation, cancelling Arab feelings, cancelling pan-Arab 
identity.  We, as Arabs, certainly reject this because…Arabism is not a commodity to 
trade in even though this is what others seek.685 
 
The way in which external factors help to foster or alter the relevance of ideology can be 
seen from Syria’s reactions to two separate trends in the 1990s.  It could be argued that when 
its neighbours, and especially the Palestinians, reached a rapprochement with Israel, which 
coincided with a global systemic change and the onset of US unipolarity, Syria's ideological 
zeal was briefly dampened.  It is evident that there was a degree of bandwagoning, with 
pressure felt by the Syrians to comply with US demands.   
 
However, external factors also helped reinvigorate Syrian ideology, namely the renewed 
hostilities between Israel and those Palestinian radical groups that emerged stronger as a 
result of the peace process and the loss of the PLO’s legitimacy.  Instead of condemning the 
attacks or expelling the various Palestinian organisations from their bases in Damascus – 
among them Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinians – 
Syria appeared to gain renewed purpose in its own ideological campaign against Israel.  The 
alliance and support that had been lost with the Oslo accord and the formation of the 
Palestinian Authority, was replaced with a strong alliance with those groups that were now 
seen to be closer to the Arab nationalist, anti-Zionist spirit.  Given the option between 
pursuing the realist-statist route that had been carved out by its Arab neighbours and upon 
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which Syria had unwittingly embarked itself, and the path of ideological ‘resistance’ that 
seemed to have been reignited with the breakdown of the Madrid process, Syria chose the 
latter.   
 
This in turn had a concomitant impact on Syria’s relations with the US.  Syria had attempted 
to improve its relations with the US in response to the Bush administration’s efforts to end 
its isolation.  But under Clinton it became evident that, as Miller stated: 'the Road to 
Washington is through Israel - full stop.’686  This was corroborated by Rabinovich who 
argued that the US felt ‘Israeli-Syrian peace could be a prelude to an American-Syrian 
rapprochement’.687  Thus with relations strained already as a result of America’s continued 
support for Israel, and Syrian frustration at America’s role as mediators, the forging of closer 
links between Syria and ‘terrorist’ organisations merely pushed Syria and the US further 
apart.  Syria made a deliberate decision to regroup with other ‘resistance’ forces at a time 
when it had slowly built up stronger links with the US and could have easily opted for a 
more US-friendly strategy.  Strategic and power-political considerations were at play, but the 
role of ideology in driving Syria’s decisions at this time, in consistency with its long-term 
policy, cannot be discarded. 
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Conclusion 
Explaining US-Syrian Relations and the potential for change 
 
This study has examined in detail the relations between Syria and the US, both the 
continuities and changes in their bilateral policies.  It has brought together different periods 
in the history of US-Syrian relations to identify recurring patterns across time.  The first two 
historical periods exemplified the confrontational nature of US-Syrian relations, which has 
been resilient even in the face of many changes within the region and realignment of Arab 
states with the US.  The second two phases focused on the episodes of greater engagement 
between the two states, although those instances were ultimately short-lived.   The thesis has 
sought to explain these trends. 
 
Guiding Questions and overall arguments:  
The overarching questions that I posed at the start of the thesis were the following:  why has 
Syria persistently opposed the US, and to what extent has the US contributed to hostility 
between the two states?  The first point to note is that the questions, to a degree, characterise 
US-Syrian relations as being linear and fixed, whereas in reality they have been far more 
complex than that.  Nevertheless, the episodes of cooperation can be described as being less 
frequent than the periods of mistrust or outright hostility, which have been the more 
continuous features of US-Syrian relations.  To help approach this question, a series of 
secondary questions were also posed.688 These can now be answered based on the historical 
analysis carried out. 
 
Much of the blame for US-Syrian tensions has been attributed to Syria acting as a ‘spoiler’ 
against American policy in the region.  It is the case that during the Cold War Syria refused 
to accept US aid after independence, or to participate in US-led regional alliances such as the 
MEC, and instead struck an alliance with the Soviet Union.  It was the most vocal in its 
criticism of the US, led the boycott of the US after 1967, and gave its backing to Iran after 
1979.  Therefore it might appear that Syria was opposed to the US at all costs. However, 
Syria had not always set out to disrupt US strategy in the region - Syria initially had a highly 
positive view of the US in the inter-war period because it was seen to be opposed to the 
European powers’ exploitation of the Middle East. Syria also demonstrated its willingness to 
engage in negotiations with the potential of compromise.  This was demonstrated after Hafez 
Asad came to power in 1970 with the acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338, during the 
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Disengagement Talks after 1973, and particularly in the run-up to and during the Madrid 
peace process that followed.   
 
In that Syria was one of the Arab parties that remained most consistent in its demands, it 
could indeed be seen as a spoiler for American strategy in the region.  But whereas this has 
often been presented as wilful and irrational disruption, an alternative look at the situation 
provides a more rational explanation of Syria’s position.  Thus rather than view Syria as an 
obstructionist party with no constructive goals of its own, it is more accurate to see Syria as 
pursuing its own positive principles and goals for the region, which contradicted those of 
Israel’s and thus set it on a collision course with the US as well.   
 
What then were the American policies that contributed to US-Syrian hostility? Syria’s 
animosity stemmed from three key American approaches: 1) a tendency to marginalise Syria 
in regional issues based on lasting Cold War perceptions of Syrian intransigence and 
expectations of blind opposition to the US; 2) clear preferential treatment of Israel, and 
protection of Israeli interests which directly undermined Syrian and Arab aspirations; and 3) 
an expectation that Arab parties would and should carry the burden of concessions in the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, and would eventually forget their grievances against American policy if 
enough financial, military and political incentives were provided.   
 
In the early stages of the Cold War, US interventionism (exemplified in the Syrian-American 
crisis in 1957) was the biggest contributor to Syrian hostility, but after the 1967 war 
America’s support for Israel became the overriding factor behind US-Syrian tensions.  
Massive increases in arms sales and financial aid to Israel under Kennedy and Johnson, and 
a shift in strategy under Nixon which twinned Israel to US security interests, demonstrated 
to the Arab parties that their goals were seen as secondary to those of Israel.  Israeli 
intransigence during negotiations, though at times frustrating for the Americans, did not 
result in American diplomatic pressure or isolation as it did for the Arab parties.  As for US 
expectations of the Arabs carrying the greater share of concessions, it meant that when Syria 
did not relent to American incentives (unlike Egypt), it was seen in a particularly negative 
light.  
 
In relation to this last approach of the US, it is arguable that it overestimated the potential for 
Egypt to influence other states in the region.  This led to heightened, and indeed unrealistic 
expectations that the Arab parties would comply in search of similar financial and political 
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incentives as those received by Egypt on the back of its truce with Israel in 1978.  The US 
failed to take account of the histories of different Arab states, the strength of public opinion 
against any rapprochement with Israel, and also maintained an uncritical look at Sadat’s 
decisions.   
 
Herein lies some of the answers as to why Syria did not pursue the same path as Egypt, 
despite both sharing many similar traits in the past.  The case of Egypt, its ‘pragmatism’ and 
apparent interests in peace, were often used by the US to castigate what in comparison 
appeared to be Syrian obstinacy.  However, Egypt’s pursuit of peace with Israel was by no 
means a success for peace in the region: the tactic of isolating non-compliant actors, such as 
Syria and the Palestinians only served to exacerbate the estrangement between them and the 
US, and their conflict with Israel; meanwhile Israel’s boldness in taking unilateral measures 
and its military position in the region were strengthened, fostering deeper resentment against 
it; and conversely, though Egypt now had the ear of the US, its stature in the region was 
greatly undermined due to a loss of Arab nationalist credibility.  In that sense, Syria’s refusal 
to side with Egypt over its alliance with the US, and a refusal to accept the same financial 
and military incentives that had been offered to Egypt, was ideological but also reflected 
pragmatism in terms of public opinion and consequences for the region.   
 
America’s approach reflects its misdiagnosis of the region in general and of Syria in 
particular.  The notion that military and economic capabilities, or geopolitical factors such as 
territorial size and resources, are the main motivating factors or the only determinants of 
influence and power in the region grossly underestimated the importance and power of ideas.  
This underestimation meant that Syria’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its ability to 
affect the politics of the region was often dismissed on the ground that it lacked many of the 
above capabilities and assets; and yet its ideological weight had not been taken into 
consideration sufficiently.   
 
Syria’s ability to act independently, despite lacking in economic, military or geopolitical 
power has been regularly overlooked.  While it would be far-fetched to suggest that Syria 
does not need the backing of more powerful allies in the region, its willingness to act alone 
even when facing diplomatic isolation has been notable throughout the periods under study 
in this thesis.  Thus reducing Syrian opposition towards the US and Israel to a product of a 
balance of power system, in which Syria was merely bandwagoning with Egypt and the 
Soviet Union in the past, or latterly with Iran, erroneously overlooks the ideational 
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component in Syria’s foreign policy, which it has often pursued even when it resulted in a 
disagreement with its more powerful allies.  
 
Overall, this thesis argues that a significant factor behind Syria’s regular opposition towards 
the US lay in its attachment to ideological principles.  Its opposition to US interventionism 
and support for Israel was not only borne out of a power-political strategy, but a political 
thought that prioritised Arab independence and freedom from external domination – it 
should be emphasised that this does not rule out ‘realist’ goals, many of which in Syria’s 
case are coterminous with its ideational goals.  The US contributed directly to Syria’s 
mistrust by its interventionist policies, its overt bias towards Israel, and its marginalisation of 
Syria (and the Palestinians) in regional politics.  The US often exacerbated the situation by 
failing to understand the roots of Syrian opposition and dismissing it as pro-Soviet bias, 
irrationality or xenophobia.  The overall outcome of this was the increased salience of 
ideology for Syria as a framework for countering US hegemony and its support for Israel. 
 
Methodological and theoretical frameworks 
While a historical approach has been at the heart of this study, the role of theory in 
organising the analysis and framing the vital questions should not be overlooked.  One of the 
outcomes of the thesis is to highlight the constructive role theory can play in a historical 
analysis and in opening up the study of the Middle East to non-regionalists in the academic 
discipline.  However, rather than provide all-encompassing explanations, theories in any 
study should merely act as a tool to: organise and structure one’s arguments and findings in a 
more systematic way; to enable one to move beyond very specific, sui generis explanations 
in order to provide broader conclusions about a case-study; and to facilitate comparative 
studies with other cases from different historical and geographical contexts.  Thus while the 
first goal of the thesis was to provide a thorough and comprehensive historical account of 
US-Syrian relations, a secondary but important goal in this thesis was to evaluate the 
accuracy of theoretical assumptions that have commonly underpinned other accounts.   
                                                                                                                                                      
The first two chapters highlighted the methodological difficulties associated with an 
ideational approach to FPA.  One of the key problems was the assumption that ideological 
explanations of Middle East politics imply irrationality on the part of the leaders on the one 
hand, or assume instrumentalisation of ideology for the sake of manipulating the masses.   
Both positions lack nuance and fail to recognise the possibility that ideology and pragmatism 
could be compatible in a given foreign policy.  Moreover the notion that ideological policies 
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can also serve and support both ‘realist’ interests such as state security, and a so-called 
‘liberal’ motive of reflecting popular opinion, is also overlooked as though this is untenable.  
Therefore the thesis has argued for greater nuance in the study of ideas in Middle East 
politics, and the first important step towards this was to demonstrate how this could be 
operationalised in the US-Syrian case. 
 
Four components to this were outlined.  The first was the need for a typology of ideology 
which would allow one to identify whether something constituted an ideology or not, beyond 
the realm of ‘identity’ or ‘interests’. The seven point typology outlined normative and 
prescriptive values; agency; outward solidarism; internal pluralism; adaptability according to 
context; political goals; and societal cooption, as tenets that define ideologies, and which all 
apply to Syria’s Arab nationalist ideology. 
 
The second step in the methodology was to define the political goals of Syria’s ideology.  
This was particularly important in order to filter out the generalisations that are prevalent in 
much of the literature.  To aid this, Freeden’s conceptualisation of core and peripheral goals 
was applied, which enabled us to separate the ideology’s priorities from its unessential 
characteristics.  Firstly, recognising the potential for peripheral goals to become core goals 
and vice versa, and for ideologies to affiliate or separate from others, was important in 
making the case for flexibility and evolution in ideologies over time.  Secondly, it helped to 
demonstrate how ideological actors can be pragmatic by sacrificing peripheral goals while 
still adhering to their core goals.  Thirdly the importance of understanding and defining an 
ideology according to its practical manifestation, beyond just its theoretical or intellectual 
face, was highlighted. 
 
Given Syria’s Ba’thist history, the intellectual writings of Michel Aflaq and Salah ul-din 
Bitar were a key source for identifying Syria’s core ideological goals.  These goals were: 
Arab independence and autonomy, freedom from external domination and opposition to 
colonialism; crucially, they gained relevance within a foreign policy, rather than domestic 
policy, context.  These theoretical goals were also corroborated by a more popular socio-
political movement in Syria, which manifested the core Arab nationalist sentiments in their 
political activism.  Chapter 2 laid out a framework that illustrated the factors that produce an 
ideological foreign policy; chapter 3 then analysed the historical and practical emergence of 
ideological politics in Syria during the inter-war and post-independence phases. Thus both 
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the intellectual and practical expressions of Arab nationalism were analysed to distil the 
most important goals of the ideology. 
 
Measuring Ideology in Syrian policy towards the US 
The third component of the methodology was to integrate key questions in the thesis which 
could then be used to measure when ideology was functioning in foreign policy.  These 
questions689 were designed to help demonstrate that Syria was willing to forego and sacrifice 
financial, military, or power-political advantages in order to adhere to its ideological 
principles.  The findings from these questions are summarised below: 
 
1. How did Syria respond to high levels of US pressure?  
 
In the periods covered in chapter 3, 4 and 5, we saw that the US applied significant 
levels of diplomatic pressure on Syria to comply with its policies.  For example, it 
withdrew its ambassador and imposed an arms embargo since 1967, terminated all trade 
and placed greater sanctions on Syria in 1979 and generally encouraged its allies in the 
region to isolate Syria; and yet Syria did not abandon its ideological principles. 
 
2. How did Syria respond when it was faced with isolation by its neighbours?  
 
When compared with other states, for example Jordan which at varying times faced 
similar threats and capitulated to US pressure, Syria persisted in its policies which 
opposed the US.  Similarly, with regards to the loss of previous ideological allies, Syria 
was not put off from its position; in fact isolation pushed Syria closer towards other 
allies who would support it in its goals – this was evident in chapter 3 when Egypt under 
Nasser was increasingly distancing itself from the Palestinian cause, and particularly in 
chapter 4 and 5 when Egypt and Jordan pursued a pro-American course.   
 
3. How did Syria respond when faced with financial incentives to comply with the US?  
 
While Syria resisted the pressure from sanctions and use of the ‘stick’ by the US, it also 
demonstrated that it would not be swayed by America’s use of the ‘carrot’ either.  
Financial incentives were either put on the table in return for greater ties with the US (for 
example through the Point IV programme under Truman) or were known to be 
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forthcoming based on the experiences of other states.  Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf 
states all received US aid after showing willingness to facilitate US policy in the region 
– Egypt in particular received the greatest amount of aid and economic support after 
Israel as a reward for its change from an Arab nationalist stance to a pro-American one 
(see chapter 5).  Almost all the participants in the coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War 
in 1991 also received aid in return for their support. Syria in contrast did not receive aid 
from the US on any occasion and was not persuaded to abandon its ideological goals, 
despite being in need of such investments.  
 
4. How did Syria react to apparent failures in its ideological goals?   
 
When Syria faced the apparent failure in the outcome of some of its ideological goals, it 
did not necessarily lead to a decline in the continued salience of ideology.  The following 
might be seen to indicate a lack of success in Syria’s foreign policies: the growing 
military and political strength of Israel; Israel’s victories in 1948 and 1967; Israel’s non-
compliance with UN resolutions; Israel’s refusal to withdraw from Arab land and lack of 
concessions in negotiations; the worsening plight of the Palestinians; the break-up of the 
UAR; Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights; and the consolidation of US hegemony 
in the region.  And yet this did not deter Syria from its Arab nationalist position. If 
ideology had been adopted as a route to regional power and geopolitical gains, these 
examples indicate that it should have been abandoned in light of its failure to deliver.  
However, this was not the case, and indeed Syria’s ideological commitment often 
increased in response to defeat. 
 
There certainly were examples when Syria was willing to cooperate with the US and offer 
concessions in the ‘peace process’, but most of these instances did not contradict Syria’s 
ideological principles.  However, the above method also enabled us to falsify the importance 
of ideology – chapter 6 provided an important case study of Syrian cooperation which 
arguably did compromise its ideological principles.  It cooperated with the US against a 
fellow Arab state, Iraq – and even though Syria argued that this was to protect the 
sovereignty of Kuwait, it did not absolve the fact that it had aided an external power to 
intervene in the region.  Secondly, for all its calls for a comprehensive peace, Syria appeared 
to give in to the separate peace strategy towards the end of the peace talks in the mid 1990s, 
in return for its own territory.  It appeared to envisage the possibility of peace with Israel, 
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albeit uncomfortably.  Hence Syria’s ideological commitment highlighted above appeared to 
diminish at some stages in the 1990s. 
 
There were two possible ways of viewing this shift – one was to see it as a unilateral 
decision by Hafez Asad to discard ideology for a dramatic change of course, similar to the 
decision taken by Anwar Sadat.  Such an assumption would be inaccurate given Asad’s 
caution and pragmatism, and his own personal identification with Syria’s ideology.  Thus a 
better way to explain the above changes was to look to the wider context in which Asad’s 
decisions were made.  
 
Explaining ideological salience in Syrian foreign policy 
In order to explain all the above trends, we needed to understand the contexts in which 
ideology was deemed to be important, but also the conditions which diminished the salience 
of ideology for Syria’s foreign policy. This was important to avoid a deterministic account 
of US-Syrian relations – one which characterises Syria’s policy as somehow always being 
destined to reflect ideological principles.  This certainly is not the case.  If, therefore, Syria’s 
adherence to ideology is contingent and changeable, what factors is it contingent on?   
 
Two frameworks that guided this thesis on this question were FPA and constructivism.  For 
a more complex understanding, we needed to unpack the state to identify the internal sources 
of state policy.  However, this approach did not negate the traditional realist factors – these 
too were crucial for a comprehensive understanding.  Thus external, geopolitical and global 
systemic factors were also taken into account when attempting to understand the salience of 
ideology from an FPA perspective.  While FPA delineated which factors to analyse, 
constructivism enabled us to explain how those factors in turn contributed to the 
construction of ideas and norms over time.  Each historical period covered in the thesis 
should not be viewed as separate blocs, but rather as progressive stages in a process of 
increasing mistrust between Syria and the US.  If circumstances change to disturb that 
process, the role of ideology in Syria’s policy towards the US need not be fixed and may 
dissipate.  But if events continue to incrementally build on historical experiences that 
embedded the importance of ideology in the first place, ideological norms will remain.  This 
framework allowed for the possibility that these norms, and thereby US-Syrian relations, 
might change – but first those conditions would need to change.  This framework was 
mapped out in chapter 2 with the following diagram: 
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Fig. 1: The Contingency of Ideological Salience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using this model as the fourth component of the methodology, we can summarise how each 
of these factors either perpetuated or reduced the importance of ideology for Syria’s foreign 
policy towards the US, therefore demonstrating the contingency of Syria’s policy towards 
the US. 
 
(i) In terms of historical context, this was perpetuated, for Syria at least, throughout the 
periods under study in this thesis.  As outlined in chapter 3, the importance of ideology in 
Syrian foreign policy emerged with the European mandate system, and was continued with 
the establishment of Israel and American interventionism.  In chapter 4, this major source for 
Syrian ideology did not recede but in fact was exacerbated after the 1967 War, when the 
Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza strip were all occupied.  This salience 
of ideology for Syria was continued in the period studied in chapter 5: while Egypt was able 
to regain the Sinai after the Disengagement talks, the occupation of Syria’s Golan Heights, 
and Palestinian territories, meant the ‘struggle’ against its enemies was still very much alive.  
Ideology was supposed to act as a guide and framework for making decisions in the face of 
such struggles, and as a result it remained highly relevant as long as Israel still held Arab 
territory.   
 
(ii) Opposition:  Syria did not operate its ideological policies in a vacuum, but it was 
mirrored by those that it opposed.  Firstly, we saw in chapter 3 that the US was strongly 
influenced by its own ideological perspective in its policy towards the Middle East, and 
wrongly viewed Arab nationalists in the Cold War as being controlled by the Soviet Union, 
which therefore put them in the ‘enemy camp’.  Furthermore, Israel’s own strong adherence 
to Zionist ideology, inherently incompatible with Arab nationalist ideology, directly put it at 
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odds with Syria.  Like Syria, Israel’s commitment to ideology was also shaped by its own 
historical narrative.  Israel’s ideological motivation was evident when it capitalised from the 
1967 War to expand its borders, not just for security reasons, but also to encompass more of 
what it considered was ‘Greater Israel’.  This had implications for the negotiations in chapter 
5, for while Israel was prepared to sacrifice the Sinai, which it had occupied as a strategic 
bargaining tool, it was not willing to sacrifice the Golan Heights which Israel’s right-wing 
argued also held religious significance.  Thus it was clear that Israel was often as inflexible, 
if not more, than Syria in sticking to what it believed were non-negotiable, ideological 
principles.  For Syria, knowing that its staunch enemy was pursuing (and succeeding in) its 
ideological goals strengthened the relevance and perceived necessity of its own ideological 
principles.   
 
However, while there appeared to be no potential for change among Israel’s political 
establishment, there were signs that the US could have pursued alternative strategies that 
would have diluted some of Syria’s ideological opposition against it.  There was a regular 
tug of war over ideas and strategy between the State Department and the President’s office.  
Under the Truman administration, the State Department stressed the importance of providing 
aid to Syria in order to build its infrastructure post-independence, under Eisenhower it 
discussed the need to understand Arab concerns beyond the Cold War context, and after the 
1967 War it questioned the US’ close relationship with Israel and argued for the resumption 
of economic and cultural ties with Syria.  In all these cases the President’s office overruled 
the State Department’s recommendations.  However, this divergence was reduced under 
Bush on when both sides were interested in rapprochement with Syria.  Although it did not 
remove the salience of ideology altogether, it did a great deal to reduce the confrontational 
element in Syria’s ideological policy towards the US. 
 
(iii) The role of personalities and individual agency, and how it played off systemic factors 
was a crucial factor in sustaining the importance of ideology in Syria’s foreign policy.  It is 
unsurprising that most of the leaders after independence adopted an Arab nationalist position 
since all of them had lived under French colonial rule.  The most significant leader to have 
had an impact on the continued salience of ideology in Syria’s policy towards the US was 
Hafez Asad.  Growing up under colonial rule instilled in him a strong Arab nationalist 
outlook; he also felt a personal enmity with Israel, having participated in every Arab-Israeli 
war and particularly after the loss of the Golan Heights when he was the minister of defence.  
As outlined in chapter 4, his experiences and ideological motives influenced the Ba’th, the 
 278 
military, and Syria’s policies as he rose in power.  His interpretation of ideology had an 
impact by instigating changes (between the theorists and militarists in the party; or between 
the radical Jadid regime to Asad’s pragmatism) as well continuities.   
 
Of course those at the very top were not the only ones with the capacity to direct foreign 
policy, and Syria’s military had an interesting and complex role to play despite it being an 
authoritarian system.  Staunchly ideological and opposed to Israel, the military elements in 
the Syrian regime acted as a constant reminder to the leadership of Syria’s Arab nationalist 
commitments.  Chapter 3 outlined two occasions when Syria had leaders who took clear pro-
American positions: General Husni Za’im in 1949 and Ma’mun Khuzbari in 1963.  Both 
regimes were short-lived – Za’im, who also signed a truce with Israel, was assassinated a 
few months into power, while the Khuzbari regime was overthrown by the Ba’thist coup.  
The unpopularity of both regimes was shown to be directly related to their support for the 
US at the expense of Syria’s ideological principles, and it was the army that took direct 
action against them.   
 
And finally public opinion also needs to be considered as a factor in Syria’s ideological 
policy.  While the constraints placed on US policy by domestic opinion and lobby groups 
have received more attention in academic literature, the influence of Syrian public opinion 
on the regime’s ideological position and policy towards the US has at times been dismissed 
as irrelevant.  However, this thesis has sought to demonstrate the crucial connection between 
the Syrian state’s position vis-à-vis the US and Israel, and the public mood.  A powerful 
convergence of public and state animosity towards Israel and mistrust of the US has meant 
that whereas in other aspects of politics the regime has been able to bypass domestic 
opinion, there remains a rare normative adherence by Syria to popular demands on Arab 
nationalist concerns.  Even when Syria had leaders who abandoned the ideological agenda, 
there was a continuity of Arab nationalist opinion among the general public and the military 
before, during, and after these brief periods of rule.  It is in fact remarkable that there was so 
much continuity in Syrian foreign policy towards the US despite such a lack of domestic 
political cohesion prior to the presidency of Hafez Asad.   
 
It is true that Syria’s decisions were not dictated by public opinion – Asad’s actions during 
the Gulf War in chapter 6 demonstrated he was willing to take risks; but only as far as it 
would also produce tangible benefits, not just materially but also in terms of Syria’s 
ideational goals as well.  When a deal with Israel appeared possible in 2000, the public in 
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support of the military’s position reacted with hostility to the notion that any compromise 
would be offered to the principle of full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan – thus 
unsurprisingly, certain compromises that were reported to have been offered by the Syrians 
were categorically taken off the agenda when Asad met with Clinton in Geneva.690  While 
Asad calculated his public’s mood and continued adherence to ideological principles 
accurately, Anwar Sadat or later Yasser Arafat can be seen to have miscalculated in this area 
– their publics had not been prepared to abandon their ideological goals, and the leaders 
suffered the loss of legitimacy as a result.  Thus all three components of societal factors 
played into Syria’s continued adherence to ideology in foreign policy. 
 
For the most part, the above conditions remained constant.  However, in the following areas 
there were indeed significant changes to the original circumstances, which led Syria’s 
foreign policy to become further removed from its ideological principles. 
 
(iv) Global Events: Chapter 3 addressed how the onset of the Cold War affected events in 
the Middle East.  However, while it was a new phenomenon on the international scene, it did 
not overturn the basic dynamics of Middle East politics but exacerbated them.  Cold War 
rivalry saw superpower intervention and did drag the region into a global conflict, but it also 
enabled those states that chose not to align with the US to ally with the USSR to balance 
against American hegemony.  This is what enabled the Arab states during the Cold War to 
retain so much agency: as long as the Soviet Union was willing to sell them arms and give 
their political backing, the Arab nationalists were not compelled to turn to the US for 
military support.   
 
As a result, the greatest level of change in US-Syrian relations occurred after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Many at the time predicted that the demise of the USSR, the rise of the US 
as the sole superpower, and the apparent mood of reconciliation in the Middle East, would 
reduce the salience of ideology.  With US power greatly enhanced, the propensity of weaker 
states seeking to align with the US and its allies seemingly increased.  As outlined in chapter 
6, the new context of unipolarity placed an implicit pressure on Syria to comply and take 
actions against a fellow Arab state.  It did not do so on the basis of financial incentives, but 
Syria did seek political advantages and an end to isolation as a result.  It is notable that the 
US left Jordan completely in the cold after the Gulf War as payback for its support of Iraq; 
in turn, Jordan had to go to even greater lengths to prove its loyalty to the US to restore its 
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relations.  In giving its support to the US when American power was at its zenith, Syria 
avoided such isolation or the embarrassment of having to show contrition afterwards.  
Similarly during the Madrid process, Syria did feel the extra pressure to cooperate with the 
US, more than it otherwise would have.  These events on their own however would not have 
been enough to sway Syria away from its ideological position – for this we need to look to 
the last contingent factor.   
 
(v) The role of regional actors:  This condition had a varying impact on the salience of 
ideology for Syria. When it adopted Arab nationalist policies after independence, it shared 
ideological goals with a number of Arab actors.  The Palestinians were at the forefront of 
Arab grievances against colonialism and the west, whereas Egypt joined with the Arab 
nationalist camp after the Free Officers’ revolution in 1952.  Iraq followed suit in 1963 
though its relationship with Syria was fraught with power-political rivalry.  Jordan showed 
willingness to join in the Arab nationalist cause when it suited it, but without offering much 
further commitment.  Given that Arab nationalism claimed to defend the rights of all Arabs 
and the Middle East against external interference, some level of convergence of ideological 
goals across the region was important.  The first blow that was dealt to Syria’s Arab 
nationalist policies was Egypt’s alignment with the US and its peace with Israel.  However, 
as discussed in chapter 5, while it was a significant setback it did not diminish Syria’s 
adherence to ideology.   
 
What did eventually undermine the relevance of ideology in Syria’s strategy was yet another 
defection from the Arab nationalist cause and the fight against Zionism.  But this time the 
defectors were the Palestinians.  This struck at the core principles of Arab nationalist 
ideology, which was deeply attached to the Palestinian cause.  It is true that at the regional 
level, Syria was as capable as other Arab states in working against the Palestinians (as was 
seen by its actions in Lebanon).  However, in relation to the US and Israel, Syria had for 
decades spoken out not only against its own occupation but also that of the Palestinians; for 
years Syria had argued for Palestinian representation in the peace process.  Thus when 
Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo agreement, it not only was seen as a grave betrayal by Syria, it 
also appeared to remove the need for a comprehensive settlement. 
 
This demonstrates that the conditions that make ideology relevant can change, and this 
indeed forced Syria to reassess its goals.  Hence we see that after Oslo in 1993, Syria was far 
more ready to consider a separate deal with Israel, and went much further in negotiations 
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than it had on previous occasions.  Some commentators have highlighted this development 
as an example of Syria’s abandonment of ideology and pursuit of realist self-interest at the 
expense of its Arab neighbours.  Certainly 'realist' politics were at play here, but it should 
also be noted that throughout the process until the Oslo Accord in 1993, Syria consistently 
called for a comprehensive settlement, coordination of Arab efforts, and Israel’s withdrawal 
not just from Syrian territory, but all Arab territory.  But by the end, it was the Syrians who 
were left behind by their Arab partners before they too then searched for a separate deal with 
Israel.691  Thus the strength of ideology waned, not because the principles were no longer 
pertinent, but because the feasibility of realising those goals had diminished so dramatically 
after the loss of key allies, particularly the Palestinians, and the changing global situation in 
which the US were the only power through which any mediation could occur. 
 
And yet, just as the salience of ideology could be undermined with the loss of fellow Arab 
nationalist actors, it could also be revived with the emergence of new allies.  Hence, as 
outlined in chapter 6, Syria returned to a more ideologically inclined policy towards the US 
after the increased activism of Hamas in the mid-1990s.  By giving sanctuary to Hamas 
leaders and by giving its strong support to Hizbullah in Lebanon, Syria knew well that it 
would incur the anger of the US and rekindle much of the hostility that had existed in the 
past.  And yet the appeal of a renewed ideological momentum in the region, with the 
emergence of new allies, had a significant influence on Syria’s foreign policy. 
 
What the above summary suggests is that the tensions between Syria and the US and Syria’s 
adherence to Arab nationalism are contingent on a number of factors.  The conditions that 
have facilitated the continuities in US-Syrian relations have become embedded over time, 
but there is also evidence from the historical analysis that there is the potential for change.  
What, therefore, are the conditions needed for such a change? Firstly, for an underlying, 
structural change to take place in US-Syrian relations, two significant factors would need to 
be altered. The first is the historical context and the role of opposing ideologies.  Should 
external interference and perceived exploitation of the region end, and Israel’s occupation of 
Arab land be overturned, the primary conditions for Syrian hostility towards Israel and in 
turn the US might dissipate.  This would not necessarily mean there would be an 
abandonment of Syria’s ideology, but that the conditions within which it gains the most 
relevance would have changed dramatically.   
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The second type of change that might occur is if all the above conditions remained the same 
with the exception of the position of the US.  Thus if the US no longer gave its support to 
Israel, and challenged Israeli policy, there would very likely be an improvement in US-
Syrian relations. 
 
And finally, the third type of change to US-Syrian relations would see the historical context 
and opposing ideologies remaining the same, but the Syrian sentiment that this needs to be 
challenged would diminish.  Thus if there were to be a major shift in public opinion, in the 
values held by the Syrian leadership, and in the ideologies of Syria’s allies (such as Iran or 
Hamas), all of which no longer sought to resist Israel and to challenge US hegemony, there 
would most likely be an improvement in US-Syrian relations.  The short-term likelihood of 
all three scenarios is highly contestable, but they remain the possible avenues for change in 
US-Syrian relations. 
 
Future research and final conclusions 
This thesis did not look so far ahead; the historical analysis stops at the death of Hafez Asad 
in 2000.  However, there is ample potential for this study to be continued and extended to 
analyse US-Syrian relations under Bashar Asad’s regime.  Some of the corner-stones of US-
Syrian relations remained the same since 2000, such as America’s strong support for Israel; 
however there were also new components to US-Syrian hostility, such as America’s ‘War on 
Terror’ after 9/11, its invasion of Iraq in 2003, and Syria’s withdrawal from, but continued 
involvement in, Lebanon.  While 9/11 was a global event that briefly produced an 
opportunity for improved US-Syrian relations, similar to the post-Cold War period, it soon 
faded with the emergence of the Bush doctrine and the Iraq War.  These events, along with 
the second Intifada in 2000, served to strengthen the role of Arab nationalism in Syria’s 
foreign policy, and sparked a new phase of US-Syrian hostility that was arguably worse than 
some of the periods studied in this thesis.   
 
Conversely, some of the factors that ensured ideology remained salient under Hafez Asad 
may have receded, thereby potentially reducing the strength of the Arab nationalist 
component in Syrian foreign policy – for example, Hafez Asad's personal enmity towards 
Israel and adherance to Arab nationalism to a great extent stemmed from his own personal 
experiences having fought in the Arab-Israeli wars.  Such historical experiences cannot 
weigh on Bashar Asad exactly as they did on his father.  How does this impact on the 
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salience of ideology in his foreign policy?  A comparative study to identify the similarities 
and continuities, and differences and departures, between father and son, would be the 
logical next step after this thesis.  Thus it is hoped that this study has provided solid 
foundations for future research on US-Syrian relations, which is increasingly recognised as a 
pivotal dynamic in Middle East politics, and has also provided a thematic anchor (this being 
ideology) which would facilitate a more focused comparison between the two regimes.   
 
Furthermore, this thesis has highlighted the way in which the dominance of realism in the IR 
of the Middle East has distorted the analyses of foreign policies by preventing a more 
serious engagement with genuine ideological factors in the region. In order to redress this, 
ideologies do need to be taken more seriously, in tandem with constructivism which 
highlights the contingency of those ideologies.  And in order to do so the false dichotomy 
between ideology on one hand, and pragmatism or rationalism on the other, needs to be 
dismantled, for it rests on numerous theoretical assumptions that are not borne out 
empirically.  Thus the aim of the thesis has been to provide a practical framework for 
analysing the role of ideologies in the foreign policies of Middle East actors more 
effectively, giving recognition to the importance of ideas in politics and understanding it in a 
more nuanced and complex way.  It is hoped that this challenge can also be taken up on the 
back of this study.  The framework outlined need not only be applied to Syria and its future 
governments, but could be used to analyse other ideological actors in the region – not just 
Arab nationalists, but also those aspiring to Zionist or Islamist political principles for 
example.  Indeed a key outcome of this thesis has been an emphasis on identifying 
ideological agency and not immediately seeking to shoehorn it with other political 
explanations when it might not fit, simply because ideologies seem to lack a natural 
theoretical home in IR. 
 
Finally, with regards to adopting a more nuanced approach to studying ideology, this thesis 
has argued that Syrian Arab nationalism needs to be understood and measured within a 
foreign policy context, for this was the context in which it was formulated in the first place.  
The problem with trying to assess Arab nationalism's relevance by analysing Syria's 
domestic policies, is that the ideology is not particularly concerned with the domestic sphere 
beyond the issue of foreign intervention.  With regards to Syria's foreign policy and global 
conflicts, the ideology still has much credence; but in relation to the domestic situation it is 
rendered less relevant. However, it is not only scholars who need to pay heed to this 
distinction – political leaders are also guilty of conflating the differences.  The uprisings in 
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the Middle East reflect the regimes' disconnect with the people on serious domestic issues; 
thus the (ab)use of Arab nationalist ideology, largely irrelevant for the domestic context, to 
quell dissent at home is an ineffective and largely futile strategy.  While Marxist arguments 
depict the masses as being easily duped by the elites, this thesis has argued that even in 
Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, public opinion carries agency and influence, and is far 
more astute than scholars have given it credit for – therefore governments who dismiss it or 
seek to crush it do so at their peril.  The current situation in the Middle East corroborates this 
argument.  In the context of Syria, it is plausible for the people to support a regime's foreign 
policy that pursues ideological principles, but to oppose the same regime that suppresses the 
people at home, as numerous opponents have argued.  If governments can make a distinction 
between foreign and domestic policy, so too can the public.  Thus context is a crucial 
consideration when seeking to understand the role of ideology.   
 
Thus several lines of academic enquiry have been delineated above, demonstrating the wide 
scope for a critical and original research agenda that can be forged via this study.  It is hoped 
that the findings will have constructive implications for research in other areas of Middle 
East politics, but also more generally for theoretical debates in the discipline. 
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